Category: 9-11

9-11: May 2003 Hearing; additional insight

The purpose of this article is to provide additional insight for historians into the work of the 9-11 Commission, specifically, the first air defense hearing on May 23, 2003.

Previously, I discussed Colonel Scott’s presentation at that hearing in which he presented a slide that blurred the paths of the air defense fighters from both Otis and Langley.  NORAD had been tasked to explain the indirect scrambles from both Air Force bases.  That did not happen.

Here is the slide Scott presented as established in Commission work files on Oct 24, 2003.


When I asked Scott during interview why he blurred the paths he cited the limitations of power point.  That was, and is, a disingenuous answer.  Most military officers in their careers, especially while serving on staffs, become “power point rangers,” masters of the art of depicting information visually.  Scott was no exception.  Moreover, he had access to the work of Cheri Gott who had accurately depicted the Otis and Langley scrambles for NORAD in preparation for its testimony, including Scott’s.  I linked to Gott’s work in an earlier article.

Scott revisited

At some later time, most likely after our visit to Tyndall Air Force Base and our interviews with Scott, General Arnold, and General McKinley,  the Team 8 Leader, John Farmer, asked me to see how difficult it was to accurately portray the Otis and Langley scrambles using power point.

I found the task to be tedious, but straight-forward, well within the skill set of any staff officer.  Here is my revised version of Scott’s original slide, as established in Commission work files on February 13, 2004.


My assessment, retrospectively

NORAD, writ large and at all echelons, never figured out what happened until we told them, one echelon at a time, beginning with NEADS (Marr), then CONR (Arnold and McKinley), and finally NORAD (Eberhart).  Arnold’s immediate reaction said it all, “that is a better story than the one we told.”

As a result of that inability NORAD never came to grips with the details of the Otis and Langley scrambles.  Therefore, Scott, a late addition to the hearing team, had little choice but to notionally depict the two scrambles.

I stand by the assessment I made in an unpublished 2006 letter to the editors of the Washington Post.  NORAD did not lie, they told the story as they understood it.  It was not a failure to tell the truth, it was a failure to figure out what the truth was.  It remains my assessment that the NORAD leadership (and FAA, by extension) fell victim to shoddy staff work, inexcusable then and inexcusable now.

The failure was a two levels, staff and command.  The staff didn’t get it right and command didn’t put the staff “through the hoops” to explain their findings.

So, what happened?  The story begins with the NEADS tapes.

The NEADS tapes, a fragile collection

NEADS attempted to transcribe its tapes soon after 9-11.  That effort, undertaken by a technician brought in for the sole purpose of transcription, ended abruptly when one of the tapes was apparently overwritten or erased.  Thereafter Colonel Marr, the NEADS Commander sequestered the tapes to avoid further damage.

A partial transcript was completed by the NEADS secretarial staff, based on the work of the transcriber, with a lead note explaining what happened.  Multiple copies of the partial transcript were archived by the Commission Staff.  Here is a link to my copy.

That partial transcript would have been available to the testifiers and the staff that assisted them.  However, without the clarity of the primary source information, the tapes, the transcript alone was insufficient to the task at hand.  The NORAD staffs at all levels failed to get the story straight.

Shoddy staff work

First, Colonel Marr did not release the tapes from sequester.  Nor did anyone at any level direct him to do so.  The tapes remained sequestered until DoD, at the specific request of the Commission, tasked NEADS to furnish them.  That task turned out to be non-trivial and NEADS could not deliver them before the Commission Staff’s first visit.  Piecemeal delivery during the Staff visit revealed the deficiencies in the partial transcript as the Staff attempted to reconcile the transcript with the tapes during interviews with NEADS personnel.  The net result was a subpoena.

Second, no one at any NORAD staff level asked for the FAA tapes pertaining to the Otis and Langley scrambles.  Therefore, no audio primary source evidence was available to prepare for NORAD testimony before the Commission.

Third, the NEADS staff and Scott did not do a zero-based review of the most critical document the MCC/T (Mission Crew Commander/Technician) log.  They used the log, as Scott made explicit at the May 23 hearing.  But they did not uncover the basic errors that were made in September 2001 when NORAD completed and published its timeline.

Fourth, it is not clear that the NEADS staff and Scott reviewed the radar files or even paid attention to the work done by Cheri Gott.  A simple review of that primary source evidence should have raised an alarm about the nature of the air defense response.

In sum, NORAD failed to adequately prepare for the May 2003 air defense hearing.  Rather than clarify they further confused the story, the first step on the road to a subpoena.

9-11: UA93; FDR and CVR links

The purpose of this short article is to provide links to the CVR and FDR files for flight UA 93.

Flight Data Recorder (FDR)

Here is a link to the FDR readout as provided to the Commission, archived by NARA, and posted by History Commons on Scribd.  The readout shows that UA93 started erratic maneuvers shortly after 9:58 and started climbing at 9:59, ultimately to 10,000 feet altitude by 10:02.  The speed readout showed up and down variations beginning about 10:01.

At 10:02 the aircraft began its plunge to ground, accelerating from 300 knots to 500 knots at impact.  NTSB determined the impact time to be 10:03:11.  The Commission used NSTB-computed impact times for all four hijacked aircraft.

Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)

Here is a link to a time-stamped transcript in English and Arabic as provided to the Commission Staff by the FBI, archived by NARA, and posted by History Commons on Scribd.

The CVR correlates to the FDR in every respect.  The words “Yes, put it in and pull it down” were spoken shortly after 10:01, followed by the words “down, down” at 10:02:18, and “pull it down” at 10:02:23.  The recording ended at 10:03:10.9.

Transponder back on

During the plunge to ground the transponder became activated.  That fact was noticed by Cleveland ATC and reported in near real time to Herndon Center.  At 14:02:45 a reinforced (radar and beacon) return (84th RADES data point, corrected) showed the plane to be at 7800 feet.  At 14:02:57 a beacon (transponder) only return (84th RADES data point, corrected) showed the plane to be at 6100 feet, an instantaneous descent rate of 8500 feet per minute, a rate that was increasing as the plane accelerated.

Convergence of evidence

The primary source evidence is conclusive as to the fate of UA 93.  The hijackers flew it into the ground while under attack by the passengers and remaining crew.  It impacted at 10:03:11.

Any other explanation is speculative and without merit.


9-11: Herndon Center-FAA HQ open line; a story continued

Introduction

In a previous article, “9-11: FAA Tactical Net; a window into the FBI SIOC,” I discussed the open line at the FAA’s Herndon Center that provided a window into both FAA Headquarters and the FBI’s SIOC and ended the article, “to be continued.”

I now have the continuation audio file, “5 DCC 1923 Ops Phone #5128, pos 28, 1415-1515 UTC.”  We pick up the story with the following from my first article.

“There is one brief background conversation at about 10:15 at Operations Position 28 which suggests that erroneous information concerning UA 93 was being passed along from the FAA’s Washington Operations Center (WOC).

The background voice said, “OK, number one is 93, it’s 20 minutes outside of DC, go pass that.”  That brief transmission can be heard here. 101430 UA 93 20 minutes out.

Setting the stage

The FAA’s tactical and primary nets merged soon after the primary net was activated at 9:20.  None of the positions at the FAA’s Washington Operation Center (WOC) were recorded.  However, thanks to personnel at the Air Traffic Control System Command Center (Herndon Center) the line at position 28 was left open thus providing the only known primary source information concerning actions taken at FAA Headquarters on September 11, 2001.

The person on position at the WOC received information from the Herndon Center and other sources and passed that information along to others to pass up the chain of command, most likely using the Secure Video Teleconference System (SVTS).

In another previous article I described the SVTS (pronounced “civ its”) as a closed system, a cold war relic that did not allow the input of information in real time.  Participants in a SVTS conference were limited to the information they brought with them to the table.  Additional information had to be passed using runners.

It is probable that the information received at the WOC was being passed to either Monty Belger or Jane Garvery who, in turn, passed that information to Norman Mineta.  No alternate explanation is plausible, given the chain of command in place that morning.

Picking up the story

There were three pieces of information that the WOC wanted passed as we pick up the tape continuation: United 93, 20 minutes out; all inbound international flights diverted to Canada; and the launch of Air Force One and a Secret Service request for fighter support from Andrews.  Here are the audio clips, in order, and we begin with the time stamp.

1415-1515 Pos 28 Time Stamp

101500 UA 93 20 minutes out pos 28

101545 Internationals diverted to Canada Pos 28

101654 AF One launched request fighter escort

The last clip contains an example of how confused and chaotic the situational awareness was at FAA Headquarters.  The person on position erroneously stated that Air Force One was going to take off from Andrews.  It was the fighter escort that was to launch from Andrews.

A brief explanation about the times

The audio recordings at all Herndon positions were forwarded to the Commission on reel-reel cassette tapes, one hour per side.  There is a few second overlap as the quality assurance specialist copying the tapes turned the cassette tape over.  This tape is typical of all FAA-provided cassette tapes; there is an introductory certification by the quality assurance specialist.  On the first tape in a series that certification lasts nearly a minute.  On the continuation tapes, such as this one, the certification is on the order of 30 seconds or less.  I have taken the certification into account as I adjusted tape time to actual time.  I have included the actual time in the title of each clip.

Source of information to the chain of command

As would be expected, the recipient of the information being passed from the WOC wanted a source he/she could pass along.  The WOC established the source to be the FAA TAC NET, T A C NET.”  101800 Source is TACNET

In the background a person is heard saying the people down there in the “big room” want to know the source of the information.

Another situational awareness bifurcation.

Immediately after the three items are detailed for passing and the identification of the source is established, New York TRACON came up on the net to report, erroneously, that they had determined that a Sikorsky helicopter from Poughkeepsie flew into the trade center at 1227 (0827 EDT).  The following audio clip documents an excellent example of disruptive feedback entering the system.  101826 Sikorsky helicopter

The Attorney General, a disruptive flight home

Another example of disruptive feedback into the system was the saga of the Attorney General who was attempting to return to the capital from the midwest. His attempt to return to Washington was elevated to the WOC at about 10:27.  This saga can be heard on multiple FAA audio files and the NEADS tapes.  The Attorney General was insistent that he be allowed to return and he wanted a fighter escort.  The episode was continuously disruptive to other ongoing actions.

More disruptive feedback and FAA inability to keep its phone bridges straight

About 10:30 a voice on the TACNET, possibly Rich Ducharme, Eastern Region, announced an unconfirmed report that a hijacked aircraft out of the Washington area was headed to New York, another example of the lack of situational awareness at the national level.

During this time and beginning with the Sikorsky helicopter report there is continuing evidence that the FAA bridges were interfering with each other.  Nevertheless, information concerning planes of interest, by this time just UA 93 and D 1989, was received and passed along.

Delta 1989 status

At about 10:33 the TACNET received a report, most likely from Herndon Center, that Delta 1989 was on the ground in Cleveland and that it landed with the flaps up.  Police were responding.

NORAD and NMCC not on the bridge

At about 1035 the Air Traffic Services Cell (ATSC) at Herndon Center asked if NORAD was up on the bridge.  The answer was negative, neither NORAD or the NMCC was on.  The ATSC was given the task of bringing them up on the net.

This time is consistent with the findings of the Commission Staff concerning the efforts at Herndon Center to get FAA and the NMCC connected.  This effort most likely began shortly after 0930 at NEADS when the FAA representative asked to use the SOCC Director’s STU-III (secure phone).  Here is the audio file, as recorded at Herndon Center, confirming that the military was not on the FAA net as of 10:35.  103434 NORAD and NMCC not on bridge

Diversity of information under discussion, examples

Even though the military was not on or did not have access to the FAA TACNET and to FAA Heaquarters other entities did. In this next audio clip the New York Port Authority passed along information concerning the attack on the AA 11 cockpit.  103800 Port Authority AA11

In a clip shortly thereafter we hear in the background that UA 93 was down, the report concerning AA 11 was passed along, landing of all aircraft was discussed, and a question about ATC Zero was asked.  The context for the latter was a Boston Center decision to evacuate.  Herndon also reported that in Indianapolis Center a voice at Elkins flight service was warning planes that they would be shot down if they didn’t land.  103900 Herndon FAA Discussion

A third clip is notable because there is an indication that the line was still open all the way through to the FBI SIOC.  It is possible that some of the background chatter heard on this tape may have originated from that location.

In this clip we learn that the Attorney General has been cleared to land in Richmond (he will later reject that option) and that D 1989 was on the ground and authorities were responding.  The information about Indianapolis Center was passed along.  104700 More Discussion

Delta 1989 Status

Given that D 1989 was on the ground it became a matter of further interest as to how it was to be handled.  FAA HQ reached out to Great Lakes Region security for an update.  (Readers who have been following my articles on NEADS Vigilant Guardian will note the similarity to the exercise vignette of the defecting Aeroflot plane.) The issue was who notifies the FBI and other authorities.  In this real world example the answer was FAA.  104824 D 1989 Status

It’s Chaos out there

In this clip we learn that in California, Long Beach, Ontario, and LAX facilities were evacuated.  A background voice said “it’s chaos out there,” referring to the possibility that terrorists were on the ground as well.  105132 chaos out there

UA 93 Update

FAA HQ asked for and received an update on UA 93 from Herndon Center.  It was equated to the plane that crashed in Pennsylvania.  Note at the end of the clip a background voice says they are on the national net.  105405 UA 93 status

Delta 1989 updates and Attorney General updates intermixed

Concerning D 1989, Great Lakes security advised that no one had yet approached the aircraft.  105542 Further D1989 update

Concerning the Attorney General, the FBI SIOC confirmed that November 4 was the Attorney General’s plane and that he was allowed to land at DCA (Reagan National).  In other ATC tapes the Attorney General had rejected all other landing destinations, to include Richmond.  He was insistent that he be allowed to return to the capital.  This audio clip confirms the Attorney General’s persistence.  However, the Attorney General was not finished with his demands as we shall soon see.  111100 Attorney General confirmed for DCA

In the interim, FAA received an additional update on D 1989.  There was still no breach of the aircraft by law enforcement. Note the garbled exchange that led to D 1989 being tagged a hijack.  We know from Cleveland ATC tapes that D 1989 was under positive air traffic control and was not considered a hijack.  So how did that change?

Great Lakes security stated that according to the Cleveland Airport Commissioner, Cleveland Tower reported D 1989 “was under hijack conditions.”  The HQ FAA recipient of that information immediately made the leap in logic to state that “we have a report of hijacked 1989 on the ground, nothing further.” 111217 Additional D1989 update

Finally, in the last substantive conversation on this tape, we learn that the Attorney General now wanted a fighter escort.  111250 AG wants fighter escort

Summation

We learned that during the hour from 10:15 to 11:15 that FAA headquarters initially passed three issues up the chain of command–UA93, international flights, and fighter escort for Air Force One.

During the course of the hour just two commercial aircraft of continuing interest were discussed–UA 93 and D 1989.  AA 11 was briefly mentioned with information about how the cockpit was breached.  There were two erroneous reports, one from New York TRACON concerning a helicopter and another concerning a report of a potential hijack headed from Washington to New York.

We learned that the military–NMCC and NORAD–were not on the FAA’s “national net,” and that the tactical net was also the primary net.

A Final Comment

At some point, if I have time, I will tell the primary source story of the Attorney General.  It is a fascinating battle of wills between a senior official who was insistent he needed to get to DC and FAA air traffic control officials who were just as insistent that he land somewhere else.


Chaos Theory: 9-11; CRITICS, a snapshot of the national awareness

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to put into perspective the National Security Agency’s (NSA) release of CRITICS concerning events of 9-11.  The article is intended primarily for historians, but modern day researchers will also be interested in what the release is and what it is not.

The released documents provide a key glimpse into the state of knowledge at the national level after the Pentagon attack and while UA 93 was an issue.

I read the NSA CRITICS during my work on the Congressional Joint Inquiry Staff and I knew that the original CRITIC was not accurate, the case with many CRITICS.  The CRITICS were not something I carried over to my work on the Commission Staff as a major issue.

What I had not remembered was the NSA summary of its NOIWON call.  That places into perspective information that has been in the public domain since the Commission’s records were released by NARA.

NOIWON correlation

I wrote about NOIWONs in a previous article which should be read first.  In that article I mentioned that we would get around to discussing a thing called “CRITIC.”

According to the FAA log that establishes CIA activation of the NOIWON line, NSA initiated a second NOIWON conference, which FAA logged at 10:20. The substance of the log entry is redacted. However, my recall from work on the Joint Inquiry Staff is that NSA was seeking additional information from other agencies concerning the CRITIC.

What is a CRITIC?

A CRITIC is a FLASH precedent message that forwards Critical intelligence (DoD definition).  Such information is by nature raw and unevaluated.  Time is of the essence and the initial CRITIC message is followed by amplifying messages as necessary and a close out or cancellation message to complete the action.

What knowledge is in the public domain that CRITICS were issued on 9-11?

An FAA log entry (see link above) shows that the FAA watch “faxed critics to the 10th floor.”  Despite the fact that the log entry indicates “faxed critics…,” there was only one critic with follow-on messages. The “critics,” plural, entry refers to one event only.  That information has been available to the public since NARA released the work files of the Commission.

The NSA CRITIC sequence

NSA did not issue the original critic.  NSA issued a LATERAL CRITIC; it simply retransmitted a CRITIC it received.  The original CRITIC was issued by NORAD.  NSA tells us that in their cover letter releasing its redacted documents.

NSA wrote, “records responsive to your request include documents containing North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) information.  NORAD is a bi-national command; therefore, it is not subject to the FOIA.”  NSA then stated, “…the NORAD information has been redacted with the notation “OGA” which stands for Other Government Agency.”

Based on the “OGA” redaction, the original CRITIC was no more than two or three lines.  It was issued by NORAD at 111349ZSEP01 (9;49).  NSA retransmitted the message three minutes later as a LATERAL CRITIC at 111352ZSEP01 (9:52).

NSA next issued FOLLOW-UP-1 at 111414ZSEP01 (10:14).  Again, the issuance was referenced to the original NORAD CRITIC in the header information and the content was no more than 4 or 5 lines, again “OGA” information.

NSA issued FOLLOW-UP-2 AND FINAL TO DIRNSA [Director, National Security Agency] CRITIC at 111448ZSEP01 (10:48).  Again, the content was all attributed to NORAD.

What the CRITICS are not

Although transmitted by NSA, this set of three CRITICS, one lateral and two follow-ups, is not intelligence community information.  NSA did not collect any information to prompt the issuance of these electronic messages.  The fact that NSA used an intelligence community classification, “SECRET SPOKE,” was likely either a matter of formatting or a matter of convenience, nothing more.

The NSA NOIWON summary, my assessment

NSA’s released document, “NOIWON RECORD SHEET,” is a summation.  The “LOCAL TIME: 0913L” entry is most likely the time that NSA logged when CIA initiated the original NOIWON conference.

NSA initiated its NOIWON conference just before its first FOLLOW-UP CRITIC.  Although FAA logged that NSA convened at 10:20, the NSA summary is dated “ZULU TIME: 1413Z [10:13].”

The NSA summary documents the fact that the White House Situation Room was a participant in the NOIWON conference, as well as the National Military Command Center (NMCC), National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC), State Department (STATE/INR and STATE OPS), CIA (CIA OPS), and Department of Justice (DOJ/OPS).

Those may be formatted boxes to be checked for the ‘major players.’  Even though not listed we know that FAA’s ACI Watch on the 3d floor at FAA Headquarters was also on the NOIWON call.

The NSA summary also documents the confusion and misinformation at the time.  That includes the state of the nation-wide ground stop [inaccurate] , the unconfirmed crash of UA 93 south of Johnstown, PA, [probable] and, especially, a report that a Boeing 767 aircraft originating from JFK was hijacked and heading for DC as of 1339Z (9:39).  The summary also reported that two USAF F-16s intercepted the aircraft.

The hijack reference, time-wise, followed the false report that AA 11 was still airborne and may be related to that report.  It is possible that the reference to two F-16s intercepting that aircraft may be a reference to the content of the NORAD CRITIC, itself.

The summary e-mail

NSA also included in its release a “TRAN DESK” [most likely the Transportation Desk in the NSOC  (National SIGINT Operations  Center] e-mail that provided, as of 16:21:20 GMT (12:21), a summary from the FAA OPS center.  Of note is the continuing confusion and false information about AA 77.  As of 12:21 EDT, FAA [not Herndon Center] was, according to the NSA TRANS DESK, carrying AA 77 as “possibly crashed area Kentuckey/Ohio [sic] border.”  NSA added a note: “the a/c that crashed at the Pentagon was “NOT” regular scheduled flight, and did “NOT” file a flight plan.”

The CRITIC Summary

Two days after 9-11 at 131303ZSEP 01 (5:03 a.m. EDT, Sep 13, 2001) NSA issued a “CRITIC SUMMARY FOR DIRNSA CRITIC 1-2001.”  NSA reported: “According to Press, a hijacked 757 airliner originating from JFK crashed during the late 1300Z or early 1400Z hour…in rural Pennsylvania, apparently the fourth aircraft involved in the 11 September terrorist plot.”

NSA’s awareness of events of the day remained the same, with one exception.  The language about “interception” was dropped.

What next?

The time of the original CRITIC from NORAD, 9:49 EDT, may document the beginning of the national level’s descent into chaos, a subject I am currently researching.

9-11: NEADS; Exercise Vigilant Guardian in perspective, Sep 8

Background

I am going through the primary source audio files from NEADS for the days prior to 9-11 specifically to assess Exercise Vigilant Guardian.  In previous articles we found that there was, for now, one major event each day.  We also established that the exercise hours were 1000-2200 each day until 24-hour operations were required.

On Sep 6, NEADS dealt with a wayward C-130 that required a scramble and escort to a base.  On Sep 7, the main event was a defecting Russian aircraft that required NEADS to determine a diversion landing field, not JFK, and to scramble and escort the Aeroflot plane to the diversion field.  Moreover, NEADS had to coordinate with the FBI for someone to meet the plane on arrival.

In this article we will discuss the events of Sep 8.

Real World

The audio files for Sep 8 reinforce that the NEADS/NORAD focus, as testified, was outward.  All Cubana (Cuban) and Aeroflot (Russian) aircraft were special tracked; the flight plans were provided by either FAA or its Canadian counterpart.  In this audio clip NEADS is heard designating an Aeroflot flight as a “Special 20.”  0908163030 Aeroflot Special 20

In this next clip a couple hours later we hear NEADS and Oak Grove (SEADS) discussing and monitoring a Cubana flight.  0908190544 Cubana and Oak Grove

NEADS then passed the information, with specificity to the Surveillance section and the track is identified as a Special 23, “anything going to and from Cuba.  0908190717 NEADS Cubana discussion

Unknown tracks of potential interest were all over water.  Most faded away or turned out to be bad data.  In this nearly five minute clip the NEADS staff is heard going through their procedures, to include a live world scramble order.  Towards the end of the clip a caller asked about an exercise issue.  The caller was told, “we’ll call you back.”  This is an example of how NEADS balanced real world and exercise issues, in perspective.  0908193213 Real World Takes Precedence

NEADS Identification Technicians checked with concerned FAA centers and with Giant Killer since the unknown track was in offshore training area Whiskey 105.  Ultimately, NEADS determined the track to be a possible ship and did not scramble.  This next audio clip is part of the mandatory unknown report to CONR.  0908193825 Unknown report to CONR

And in this interesting exchange between NEADS and the Otis Command Post we learn that in the process of scrambling and then standing down only one of the two Otis alert fighters was actually started.  We also gain more insight into how degraded the air defense mission was as of 2001.  Otis had no Supervisor of Flying (SOF) on duty on weekends and if refueling was required on the ground additional people had to be recalled.  0908194349 Exchange with Otis Command Post

We also learn that the NEADS floor provided morning as well as evening briefings to key personnel at headquarters.  (The headquarters building was separate from the NEADS sector operations center.)  The following two clips contain the morning briefings for the Commander, Colonel Marr, and the Director of Operations.

0908104934 Col Marr Morning Brief

0908112617 DO Morning Brief

Exercise

NEADS exercised tracking certain U.S. aircraft.  One such scenario had NEADS assisting an EP3 land at Brunswick,  Maine.  For the exercise, a special track was created for “Air Force Two” returning to Andrews AFB from Helsinki.  Here is the audio file.  0908165109 Air Force Two Special Track

Recall that there was a major Russian exercise ongoing and NEADS was watching that as well.  Specifically, Russian strategic bombers, codenamed “Bear” were flying.  A flight of Bears was near Canadian airspace and there was some discussion on what to do with American fighters.  The decision was made to keep the fighters in American airspace.  In this next clip we hear one side of a conversation between the Mission Crew Commander and probably the Battle Cab as he explained the rationale for his action.  Historically, the bread and butter of the Continental United States air defense mission was intercepting and escorting Soviet strategic bombers, especially when they were forward deployed to Cuba.  NEADS knew “Bears;’ they knew what to do.  0908185648 Russian Bears Flying

At a shift change the US reaction to the Russian exercise was discussed.  In this clip we hear that Alaska and CANR (Canada) were reacting, that fighters were forward deployed to King Salmon and Galena, and that CINCNORAD and JCS were involved and concerned.  0908190702 Shift brief on reaction to Russian exercise

The Main Event

The NEADS task on Sep 8 was to deal with a probable drug trafficker out of Bermuda with a scheduled flight plan.  The problem was that the track split into two tracks, meaning that a second plane took off in trail of the first aircraft in an attempted deception.  NEADS had to figure that out and then obtain guidance on what to do.  The guidance was to “radar flight follow” both tracks; there was no scramble.

In the aftermath, in background on many of the audio files, the NEADS staff can be heard discussing the what-ifs of a split track and how to deal with that.

The scenario began with the NEADS ID section announcing and seeking information from the simulation cell about unknown track B673, a possible Customs squawker.  0908204005 Track B673.  The time was 2102Z.

That announcement was immediately followed by the decision to make an “unknown riders” call, a broadcast message asking the unknown to respond.  Note that the decision to make this a five-minute track was also discussed.  That meant the ID section had that amount of time to identify the track.  0908204059 Unknown Riders Call

NEADS issued a scramble order for Atlantic City on track B672 [sic] and then pushed the simulation cell for additional information.  The cell was initially uncertain as to whether the track was friendly or not but quickly asked for all the help they could get on a drug carrying aircraft out of Bermuda.  0908204242 Scramble on Bermuda Drug Smuggler

NEADS then received an additional sim call from FAA’s New York Center advising that they were talking to the aircraft, tail number N527MB, and that it would be assigned a new code, 3714.  0908204336 Tail Number N527MB ZNY

That caused an discussion on the floor about “going friendly.”  The ID technician pushed for the designation and she was successful.  The track was designated friendly at 2108Z.  In the midst of that discussion a new track, B010, real world, popped up.  This next clip is a good example of how NEADS treated the two, concurrently.  Track B010 was later dropped as bad data.  0908204510 Designated Friendly

Anytime NEADS established a track and forward told (linked electronically) it to CONR a report was required.  In this next clip we hear the beginning of that report concerning B673.  The rest of the report was pro forma, simply a pass of information that was known by block number on a form.  Of interest is that CONR briefly conflated the exercise event with a real world event, track R335 from WADS.  0908204551 Report to CONR

As the R335 track discussion continued NORAD, who was also on the call, explicitly told CONR to work that issue because “real world is a little more important than exercise.”  0908205214 Real World More Important

In this next clip we hear the pro forma second part of the initial report to CONR and NORAD on track B673.  I include it to show the specificity of information and the sharing of that information at all NORAD echelons.  The NORAD participant is the Air Warning Center (AWC).  0908205652 B673 Complete Report to CONR and NORAD (AWC)

On the NEADS floor the discussion about designating N527MB a friendly continued.  The Atlantic City fighters were kept on the ground and the decision was made to “radar flight follow.”  0908204724 Radar Flight Follow

However, the floor discussion continued and the final NEADS decision, for the moment, was to reclassify the track a Special 17 (unknown), because of the decision to “radar flight follow.” That decision was announced to the floor at 2111Z.  0908205017 Reclassified Special 17

At this point in the scenario we have covered about 10 minutes of real time, with floor conversations available on multiple channels on the NEADS floor.  NEADS has dealt with a probable drug-related unknown but does not yet have a clear operational picture.  Fighters were scrambled but not launched.  Working with simulated FAA, NEADS decided to leave the fighters on the ground.

The Track Splits

The first apparent indication of a track split comes from the ID technicians who are discussing the pace of the evening’s activity.  During that discussion they pick up a new unknown, B045.  That track would have been established by the surveillance technicians.  Here is that first indication.  0908205639 Track B045

The ID technician soon realized it was a split track and informed the MCC.  They discussed what to do and the ID technician announced the track as a Special 17 (Unknown) at 2119Z.  0908205730 B045 Special 17

The split was also reported to CONR.  This exchange clearly shows that CONR could only see tracks that had been forward told by NEADS or one of the other sectors.  0908210028 Split Reported to CONR

The MCC talked to, most likely, the Coast Guard in the Sim Cell and it was determined that NEADS would provide 10-minute updates on both tracks and landing information on the one that FAA was talking to.  0908210030 MCC Discussion with Sim Cell

The ID technician called FAA’s simulated Washington Center about the split.  That surfaced an interesting exchange involving the controllers.  The issue was why did NEADS make the track a Special 17.  0908210405 Sim Cell Floor Discussions

As with the earlier track the split, B045, was reported to CONR and NORAD.  In this clip it is specified that the CONR position is in the RAOC (Region Air Operations Center).  The RAOC link is to the 1996 NORAD Instruction 10-31 concerning the ADNET (Anti-drug Net).  0908210456 Track B045 Report to CONR

In the Aftermath

Several minutes later the NEADS floor was trying to figure out what happened. They discussed the possibility of three tracks, B673, B045 and code 3714.  In this next clip we hear that they decided there were two tracks.  We also have an explicit example of how the MCC could “camp on” (listen in) to any position on the floor, in this instance the ID position.  0908210900 NEADS Floor Discussion

In this next clip the MCC defends his decision to make the second track a Special 17 and learns it should have been a “pending” track.  0908211151 Should Have Been Pending

Nevertheless, the MCC continues to defend his position and we learn at the end of this next clip that he is actually defending his position not to scramble fighters.  The ID Technician attempts to take the blame for the miscue, but ultimately it is the MCC’s decision.  0908211223 Decision Not to Launch

The discussion continued on into the evening.  In this clip the MCC explains that they, NEADS, aren’t going to do anything except provide a landing base.  Having a fighter behind the smuggler won’t do anything.  0908211612 F16 won’t do anything

He continues to explain that maybe “up there” (Battle Cab) might have scrambled if the second track had been a pending unknown as opposed to a Special 17.  0908211721 Might Have Scrambled

My Assessment

NEADS should have scrambled as was determined in the after action review.  Although the ID Technician took responsibility for the failure to scramble the responsibility was ultimately that of the MCC.

It is not surprising that Exercise Vigilant Guardian would have at least one counter-drug scenario.  After the end of the cold war Congress made money available for a major national counter-drug program.  NORAD was quick to carve out a mission for itself especially since its primary mission, guarding against the Soviet threat had dissipated.  The new NORAD mission is reflected in the NORAD Instruction concerning the ADNET, as linked above.

Importance Concerning 9-11

What we have heard is that NEADS had specific procedures in place to handle unknown tracks as they occurred.  However, NEADS actions, including the forward tell of tracks of interest to CONR and to NORAD depended on a track being established.  A designated track was the key to everything that followed.

Understanding that NEADS (and WADS and SEADS) worked from a designated track paradigm is key to understanding what happened in the air defense response during the terrorist attack on the morning of 9-11.  There was never a designated track on any of the hijacked aircraft, except briefly on AA 77 (B032), a track that immediately faded.  Therefore, no operational information was ever forward told to CONR or NORAD.

The only track that was established and followed procedurally was B089 (Delta 1989).  It is only that track that NORAD reported to the NMCC-convened Air Threat Conference.  It is only that track that General Arnold and Colonel Marr saw “meander” that morning.  It was not UA 93.

Exercise Hours

We learn that NEADS sector personnel anticipated the shift to 24-hour operations to occur on Wednesday [Sep 12], that is when their duty shifts would change to 12 hours.  Here is the floor discussion; there is some uncertainty.  0908210646 12-hour Shift Discussion

If accurate, this is an important point.  It means that on the morning of Sep 11, the exercise was not scheduled to start until 1000 hours.  Thus, the exercise was not a factor during the time that AA 11, UA 175, and AA 77 were an issue.

Updated Nov 30, 2010.  I have added a preamble to the article for Sep 6 which indicates that 24-hour operations were scheduled to begin on Sep 10, 2010

We will learn more as I listen to the audio tapes for September 9 and 10, 2011.

9-11: NEADS; Exercise Vigilant Guardian, in perspective, Sep 7

This is a continuation of my review of NEADS tapes covering the days prior to 9-11.  In this article I provide details concerning exercise activity on Sep 7, 2001. Sep 6 was devoted to a military cargo plane, Cargo 45, in distress and squawking the hijack code 7700.  The main event for Sep 7 was something different; a defection

There are several things of interest in the tapes, including examples of NEADS distinction between real world and exercise.  However, the most important event of the day was the defection and how it was handled by both the control staff and the exercise staff.

Defection discussed

Soon after the exercise started that morning a short conversation revealed that a defection was on the schedule.  Here is that conversation intermingled with another, separate conversation.  0907134746 Defection planned for later.  And in this next clip additional descriptive material was added.  0907134913 Added information

Routine exercise activity

Beginning in the afternoon the audio files reveal routine activity as NEADS dealt with tracks of interest.  By midafternoon NEADS was dealing with an unknown track B337.  Here is the clip which shows a call to the sim cell for clarification and the acknowledgement that someone did not reach out to FAA.  0907191845 Exercise Insight The decision was made to hold a scramble.

And here is the official announcement by the ID section to the floor that the unknown was friendly.  This is an example of how exercise announcements are correctly handled, the ID technician began and ended his announcement stating it was for the exercise.  0907191935 Keeping Exercise Separate

Tracking the Russians (and Cubans)

Here is a specific example of an “intel” input to the exercise, this one concerns an IL 96 to Cuba.  0907193918 IL 96 to Cuba Intel Input

At this point in the exercise it becomes apparent that NEADS was concerned about potentially hostile foreign aircraft.  A brief conversation about a Cubana flight was followed by this more extensive exchange concerning a Russian flight.  0907195250 Tracking the Russians In this case the flight of interest was a Moscow to Havana flight that was being special tracked.

The concern for Russian and Cuban aircraft was mirrored in the real world as an exchange a few minutes later shows.  0907195950 Russian Real World

Despite the rigorous split between exercise and real world a Russian plane became confused.  According to information in this clip the NEADS scopes could be changed from exercise to real world at the flip of a switch.  0907200630 Live Side Sim Side discussion

Things got a bit more confusing.  NEADS was dealing with a northern track and a southern track as is clear from the previous clip.  In this next clip NEADS discussed a northern track with their Canadian counterparts who reported the aircraft, a Beechcraft, probably crashed and that search and rescue had been notified.  0907200830 Canada discussion crashed aircraft

The NEADS floor continued to confuse Russian flights.  In this clip the issue is whether an Aeroflot flight is civilian or military.  The clip includes a simulation conversation with New York Center.  0907203209 More Russian confusion.  Huntress ID confirmed it to be civilian, real world, JFK to Moscow. 0907203455 Real World JFK to Moscow

The position we are listening to also had real world duties.  In this clip we hear calls the command group and the DO (Director of Operations) with the evening brief, an apparent daily requirement.  The real world was quiet and the exercise was mentioned as something with which they were busy.  0907204328 Briefing Key Personnel

Deviating Aeroflot flight, what to do

A few minutes later the NEADS floor had to deal with a deviating Russian aircraft that wanted to land at JFK.  FAA’s New York Center (ZNY) military desk is simulated and NEADS learned that FAA did not want the airplane to land at JFK.  Here is how NEADS initially reacted; battle stations only.  0907205030 Aeroflot defection to JFK

In this next clip we learn that the purpose of the event was to exercise how NEADS handles a defection not a deviation.  0907205328 Defection not Deviation NEADS immediately sought clarification as to whether FAA authorized the deviation or not.  0907205458 Clarification sought However, ZNY became insistent that the plane not land at JFK and pushed the NEADS floor which, in turn, passed the decision along to, most likely, the battle cab.  We hear only one end of the conversation with the battle cab.  0907205543 ZNY becomes insistent

The NEADS floor decision was to divert the aircraft to Suffolk County Airport and turned the problem over to FAA; there would not be a scramble.  0907205703 Suffolk County no scramble A floor discussion ensued about alternate fields, that Suffolk was too small.  Moreover, according to FAA (simulated) the pilot did not want to land at Suffolk.

The controllers were insistent that a scramble be generated.  0907205933 Controllers force a scramble NEADS did scramble Atlantic City, the order can be heard in the background  0907210138 Scrambled generated

Thereafter, the NEADS floor decided the event would be treated as a deviation and they went down their checklist.  One voice raised the question about what they were going to do with the plane.  The answer was to not to intercept pending approval from higher headquarters.  This an example of how NEADS would have handled an intercept on 9-11 had they been notified of a deviation.  0907210428 Scramble discussed

Once NEADS had gone through the checklist procedures the control cell representing ZNY informed NEADS that the situation had been resolved by “higher headquarters,” mililtary and civilian, the aircraft was to be allowed to land at JFK.  0907210858 Resolution land JFK However, the problem remained about what to do with the flight once it landed.

Event end game

NEADS continued to discuss intercept authority and decided that the defector should land at Westover; FAA said the pilot agreed.  While NEADS was working the issue they received a call from CONR for an update.  0907211426 CONR call

Here is a clip with additional insight as to how NEADS operated.  0907211753 How NEADS operated

Apparently the FBI was supposed to field eercise calls concerning defectors.  However, when NEADS attempted to reach them the desk was not manned.  Therefore, the controllers handled the NEADS request.  This clip provides insight into the phone list that NEADS used for the exercise.  0907211952 FBI and Exercise Phone List

There was little to do thereafter except keep the fighters in the area and at altitude until the defector actually “landed” at Westover, which he did.  Thereafter the fighters were ordered to return to base, “RTB.”  0907214444 Aircraft secured RTB

There was one other later call that further defined the simulation aspects of the exercise.  In this clip we hear the simulated air operations cell at Atlantic City report the status of an aircraft previously not available.  0907215250 Atlantic City simulated air operations

A real world call of interest

That evening the NEADS floor received a routine call from Boston Center asking for the next days air activity.  That exchange of information can be heard on this clip.  0907224845 Real World Coord with Boston Center

I asked Colin Scoggins (at ZBW on 9-11) to listen to the clip and verify that it was a known voice to him; it was.  He further said that ZBW did not participate in Vigilant Guardian.

Here is Colin’s email response:

“Yes that is ZBW, that is ***** (not sure of the spelling)…That is the daily scheduling for the next day, they coordinate it the night before.   The call was normally initiated by ZBW, once we received the FAX for their request.  Then we would normally call around 7 PM, this is followed in the morning at around 6 AM local when we reconfirm the schedule.  I beleive that call is initated by us as well.  We had no play in Vigilant Guardian at ZBW, didn’t even know a thing about it.  That would be normal by the way.”

A Personal Comment

I consider this article to be a final draft.  When I have time I want to go back and review the floor conversations concerning the several Russian aircraft and tracks.  I will revise this post if/when necessary.

It will be a few weeks before I post concerning Sep 8.  This is a tedious, iterative process and I won’t have further access to my audio files until after Dec 1, 2010.

9-11: NEADS; Exercise Vigilant Guardian, in perspective, Sep 3-6

Preamble (added Nov 30, 2010)

Here is a link to Vigilant Guardian information from NEADS as contained in the records of the 9-11 Commission.  This clarifies the hours of the exercise.  According to an included email from Col Marr, NEADS Commnder, “Exercise VIGILANT GUARDIAN N0 1-2 is a NORAD-sponsored Transition to Wartime Operation Command Post exercise that will be conducted in two phases: Crisis Action Team (CAT) Planning and 24/7 Operations.  CAT Planning will be conducted from 20-31 Aug 01, weekdays only and 1/2 day play TBD by NORAD. The Operational Phase will be conducted from 1400Z 6 Sept 01 to 0200Z 9 Sept 01 and the 24/7 Operational Phase will be conducted from 10 Sept to 13 Sept.

Introduction

I am working with NARA to obtain copies of the NEADS audio files as they were originally provided to the Commission.  In a first delivery, NARA provided DVD copies of the following three Commission documents, by accession number:  RDoD0312646, 1 of 2, NEADS GSA Box 110; RDoD03012647, 2 of 2, NEADS GSA Box 110; and RDoD04020857, NEADS Dictaphone remake DRM1, GSA Box 141.  The files are too massive for me to upload to RapidShare. I am looking for a work around to put the files in the public domain.

These three DVDs are not the files originally forwarded piecemeal to the Commission in the immediate aftermath of our first visit to NEADS and the resultant subpoena,  NARA is still looking for those files.  These files are .wav versions submitted to the Commission for the record.  Of interest to researchers and historians is the fact that these files go back to September 3, 2001 and help document Exercise Vigilant Guardian.

Each subfile on the DVDs is for a specific day.  For example, DVD 1 of 2 contains five subfolders for Sep 3 through Sep 7.  The subfolder for Sep 4, the first day of the exercise, is D20010904DRM3-20010903-234840_DRM003_1.ARC.  The first nine characters establish the date of the included files.

For each date there are two sub-folders.  One is an Access .mdb file which provides the start and end times for each .wav file.  The .wav files are conversation dependent and range in duration from a few seconds to more than 20 minutes.  Many of the short duration files are dial tones.

The second sub -folder for each day contains folders for 24 channels.  The Access file, printed out, will tell you which channels were recorded and which are empty.  Knowing that will save time; one need only open the folders containing data.  Once opened there is an additional single sub-folder which lists the .wav files by a sequence number (Zulu time) which can be correlated to the Access .mdb file.  The size of each .wav file is included; it doesn’t take long to figure out which files are substantive and which are not.

One last point.  It is near imperative to exploit the files using a program such as Adobe Audtion. Use of a media player will quickly lead to frustration.  I use Adobe Audition in order to quickly find conversations, identify dial tones, and, when necessary, amplify background conversations.

Here is Exercise Vigilant Guardian based on the audio files provided by NARA.  In this first article we start with the period Sep 3-6, 2001.

Exercise Vigilant Guardian

Vigilant Guardian was primarily a command post exercise controlled by a “sim cell” (simulation cell).  Non-NORAD entities such as FAA were portrayed by the exercise controllers.  The exercise was separate and distinct from the real world.  Here are the highlights of the first days, Sep 4-6, 2001.  As with every exercise in my experience, both field and command post, the pace starts slowly.

Monday, Sep 3, 2001.

Although an audio file was provided it appears to be a placeholder only.

Tuesday, Sep 4, 2001.

It is uncertain that the exercise itself started on this day.  The day’s activity consisted of “evals,” evaluations for three controller teams.  The scenario was defensive counter-air featuring blue on red forces operating over established training ranges, in this case Falcon Axe.  The fighters were Burlington-based, Jaws call sign vs Grunge call sign.  Each evaluation lasted 30-45 minutes the first beginning around 1pm (probably Zulu time, in context).  The next two were at about 4:45 and 7:20.

Of interest, the first team was lead by Major Fox who would be the Senior Director on duty the morning of Sep 11, 2001.  Demonstrably, Fox was the best of the three, his competence and confidence come through loud and clear.  Here are some audio segments which highlight the days activity.

Fox’s voice identified. In the following clip we clearly hear the voice of Major Fox; those familiar with the NEADS tapes will recognize him immediately.  In an earlier floor conversation he did identify himself by name.  Here he gives a succinct description of the mission in which he places the opposing fighters (Grunge) as the DCA [defensive counter-air] force.  0904122350 Fox describes DCA

Fox puts Vigilant Guardian in contest. In the following clip Major Fox distinguishes “VG” (Vigilant Guardian) from the evaluations and establishes that the time is before 10:00 local.  0904122918 Fox Vigilant Guardian Perspective

Fox’s fighters, Jaws, declare “Miller Time.” In this clip Major Fox is heard directing a successful attack.  0904131130 Miller Time and Success

The entire engagement directed by Fox is in the audio files, primarily sequence number 130713.  Later files describe the second two evolutions of the day, similar to the engagement directed by Fox.  A better description of the defensive counter-air mission is included in sequence number 161531.  0904162726 Mission Described The language is cryptic and mission-specific.  Readers familiar with the language of air defense training will appreciate the insight into NEADS operations.

There was no other activity recorded on Sep 4, 2001; the day was devoted to controller evaluations at NEADS.

September 5, 2001

There was little, if any, discernible exercise activity.  There was one additional combat air engagement, similar to the three events on September 4.  That additional event does provide specific examples of how air-air combat exercises were started and terminated.  In this case HUNTRESS was controlling a flight with call sign Mad Dog.

The battle begins  0905191547 Fights On, and ends  0905193437 Knock it off.  HUNTRESS ended its control by handing the Mad Dog flight off to GiantKiller.  09055193822 Contact GiantKiller.  I have discussed GiantKiller in other articles.  It is the military (Navy) control center for designated military training areas.  It is located in Virginia Beach, VA., and operates using FAA procedures.  GiantKiller would have handed the flight off to the appropriate FAA Center for the return flight to base.

The only other notable activity in the audio files is the HUNTRESS ID section validating and verifying the “modes and codes” with several military planes, a procedural test possibly part of the exercise.  Here is one example.  0905155326 Swordfish Mode Check

September 6, 2001

The day started slowly but picked up pace in the evening. Here are selected  audio clips of interest.

First is a clip of a late afternoon simulated scramble of two fighters, HOPS 71 and 72 from Langley.  The scramble call is made to the simulation cell.  0906174716 Simulated Scramble Langley

Second is an evening call to the simulation cell which clearly shows that the exercise equipment was separate from real world and that the controllers did not want all the exercise equipment to be functional.  0906182747 Exercise Equipment Separate

Third is a background announcement shortly after 8pm announcing that exercise hours would be 1000-2200 hours each day, including weekends, until 24-hour manning was required.  I amplified the conversation and suppressed some of the clicks for clarity.  0906200336 Exercise Hours

Fourth is a conversation concerning a special track on a Aeroflot flight, JFK to Moscow.  0906201638 Aeroflot flight special track

Fifth is an extended discussion with the simulation cell about the hours of the exercise and a planned expansion.  (The expansion will be one of coverage, NEADS will assume control for WADS (Western Air Defense Sector) while they do a planned evacuation.  More on that later.)  0906201733 Expansion

Sixth is clear evidence that the simulation cell was simulating all outside agencies, in this case Giantkiller and FAA’s Washington Center.  The issue is a C-130 that is squawking 7700.  Listen as the exercise team discusses the situation.  Note that Huntress ID goes down a check list and asks the key question, “requesting any assistance?”  0906202145 C130 squawking 7700

That is an important point. The hijack procedures in place on Sep 11, 2001, required an FAA request for assistance.  The only hijacked plane on 9-11 for which NEADS assistance was requested was AA 11; the request came from Boston Center.

Seventh is an admission by the simulation cell that they started an exercise inject one hour early.  NEADS, therefore, initiated a “Jersey Scramble” early.  The Commission records obtained from Atlantic City define the Jersey Scramble as the standard lanuch of Atlantic City fighters, 090 for 90 (head East for 90 nautical miles).  Note the similarity to the standard launch from Langley, 090 for 60, which is the heading, direction and distance the Langley fighters went on the first leg of their flight to the nation’s capital on 9-11.  This Jersey Scramble, if properly in sequence, most likely pertained to the C-130.  0906203024 Sim Cell started inject early

Eighth is a “May Day” call from the simulated C-130 in distress, Cargo 45.  0906203853 Cargo 45 May Day

To be continued, Sep 7, 2001 is next.

9-11: NSA; setting the record straight

Introduction

Today, Sep 10, 2010, my Google alerts surfaced a post by Phil Shenon in “The Daily Beast” titled, “The Secret Files 9/11 Investigators Missed.”  Here Shenon extends an argument he first made in his book The Commission, the uncensored history of the 9/11 investigation. His reference is to the National Security Agency (NSA).

I was interviewed by Shenon, I don’t recall us discussing  the subject of his “secret files,” the NSA.  Retrospectively, I wish we had shared more fully his NSA agenda; I could have put this issue in perspective for him and for his reading public.

The Congressional Joint Inquiry

Shenon doesn’t mention the fact that the Joint Inquiry staff had a team dedicated to NSA; it lived and worked at NSA headquarters during the course of the Inquiry.  That team thoroughly explored the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) holdings concerning the reporting leading up to the events of 9-11.

The Staff Director, Eleanor Hill, discussed the SIGINT issue fully in her final report.  As reported by Hill and by the 9-11 Commission, the only three individuals linked to the events of 9-11 in the SIGINT reporting were Khalid al-Midhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi, and Salem al-Hazmi.

The NSA provided a “SIGINT Retrospective” and an “Addendum” to the Inquiry Staff.  Those document resides in the paper files of the Congressional Joint Inquiry.  The Retrospective and Addendum included every relevant SIGINT report published and unpublished, unilateral and third-party, concerning the intelligence leading up to the attacks.

I, personally, spent hours sifting through the Retrospective.  I was not directly involved in the writing of the final report and had time to do a thorough analysis of the SIGINT reporting.

I created a work paper that included the text from every one of the SIGINT messages, some three dozen or so, in total.  I then integrated in time sequence all information concerning what the government knew, what government actions had been taken, and what was known about the activities of the 19 hijackers, apart from the SIGINT information.  That work paper resides in the Inquiry files in three variations.  I printed out iterative paper copies.  There are companion electronic files to the paper copies.  I copied all my substantive work files, including my work on the Retrospective, to compact discs.

The Commission

One task of the Commission was to build on the work of the Congressional Joint Inquiry.  In addition to NSA the Joint Inquiry had teams dedicated to and working at CIA and the FBI.  My team, the Other Agency Team, had offices at DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) and at NIMA (National Imagery and Mapping Agency).

The Commission knew about and did build upon the prior work of the Joint Inquiry.

Updating Shenon

In his blog Shenon wrote: the Commission “failed to conduct a thorough inspection of the government’s most important library of raw intelligence on al Qaeda and the 9/11 plot.  And nobody appears to have inspected that intelligence since.”  And, “There is no sign that anyone from Capitol Hill or elsewhere in the government has attempted to get back into the NSA to review its pre-9/11 terrorism archives…”

Capitol Hill did thoroughly investigate and review the pre-9/11 terrorism archives of the NSA.  That information was shared with the Commission.  I personally examined the SIGINT holdings in detail and archived that work.

The 9-11 Compendium

All researchers and historians know–and Shenon knows this–that the public body of investigative knowledge about 9-11 includes the Commission Report, the Joint Inquiry Report, the records of hearings by both entities, the multiple staff statements by both Staff Directors, and, in the case of the Commission, the separately published monographs.  It also includes the Commission’s referral to the Inspectors General of the Department of Transportation and the Department of Defense and the formal reports by both.

To focus on a single component of that body of knowledge and extrapolate a narrow conclusion is misleading, incomplete, and counter-productive to the public’s understanding of the events of the day.

Chatted with Phil Shenon

This morning, I sent a quick email to the “Daily Beast” for forwarding to Shenon.  He called me as I was finishing up this article.  He is aware I am posting this article and he raised the issue of Iran.

I reviewed the Commission Report (the search engine link is invaluable) and Shenon’s treatment of the issue.  My recall of the SIGINT files and the additional work of the Inquiry NSA team is that this issue has been substantively addressed; there is no smoking gun.

9-11: The National Level; descent into chaos, disposition of friendly forces

Introduction

This article is the first in a series.  It sets the stage for a discussion of the national level’s descent into chaos as it pursued a plane which no longer existed, UA 93.  I will show that, threat aircraft aside, real or imagined, the national level had little situation awareness of friendly forces.

National Level

I define the national level as the National Command Authority; the Vice President; relevant Departments of government, specifically Defense and Transportation (including the FAA); and certain supporting organizations, specifically the National Military Command Center and the White House Situation Room.

The national level did not start getting organized until 9:20–I will speak to that in a later article-and never gained situational awareness of the threat during the terrorist attack.  What is little understood is that decision makers and their supporting staff apparently had little awareness of the friendly situation.

The Decision

The decision at hand was whether or not to allow Air Force One to continue north and return the President to the nation’s capital.  The collective wisdom dictated that the President not return, that he seek safe haven to the west, ultimately Omaha, Nebraska, with a short stop in Louisiana.

The danger was knowledge of another hijacked aircraft (UA 93) and a vague, false threat to Air Force One.  Yet, there were adequate friendly forces available to support the President’s return.

Friendly Force Disposition

At 10:10 EDT, the moment Air Force One turned west just south of Ocala, Florida, there were at least six fighters in the air that could have provided protection or escort, and there was an E4B, Venus 77, that had been positioned south of Washington D.C. specifically to support Air Force One.

Friendly Forces 10:10 EDT, September 11, 2001

Three Langley air defense fighters, two fully armed, had established a combat air patrol over the nation’s capital at 10:00.  Three Andrews fighters had just been recalled from scheduled training over Dare range in North Carolina.  One, Bully 2, was already en route home base, the other two were just beginning the flight north.

Other military aircraft, Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine, were active in Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia.  Here is a powerpoint screen print of the Mode 2 (military) tracks during the period 10:00-10:30, as contained in the 84th RADES radar files from the Southeast Air Defense Sector.

Military Air Activity (view as slide show for better clarity)

Although the Andrews fighters had training ammunition only, they did have tanker support and could have escorted Air Force One until the Langley fighters, also supported by tankers, could take over.

Retrospectively, it is clear that the National Military Command Center and, by extension, the White House Situation Room, was not able to accurately advise the National Command Authority concerning either the enemy or the friendly situation.  That was more than a failure of imagination it was a failure of execution.

9-11: Rules of Engagement; expanding on the Commission’s Report

Author’s note.  The audio clips in this article, with one exception, have been copied from the NEADS file, DRM 2 1 DAT 1 Channel 20 SD2.  I have run the clips through a noise suppression filter using Adobe Audition.

Introduction

This article is one of the primary reasons I established my web site.  I wanted to continue the work begun by the Commission, relying on the primary sources and secondary material of the day.  One such primary source is the NEADS audio files.

The NEADS files are difficult to listen to and even more difficult to transcribe.  The Commission-contracted effort with Alderson to transcribe the NEADs tapes is indicative of how difficult the transcription process was, and is.  Alderson attempted to provide continuity by concentrating on specific voices.  Captain Brian Nagel, the Senior Director 2, is male speaker 13, for example.  Their transcription effort for the Senior Director 2 position is available.

Background

The Commission [pp 42-43] reported that “The NEADS commander [Colonel Marr] told us he did not pass along the [shoot-down] order because he was unaware of its ramifications.  Both the mission commander [Major Nasypany] and the senior weapons director [Major Fox] indicated they did not pass the order to the fighters circling Washington and New York because they were unsure how the pilots would, or should proceed with this guidance.  In short, while leaders in Washington believed that the fighters above them had been instructed to “take out” hostile aircraft, the only orders actually conveyed to the pilots were to “ID type and tail.”

That set of circumstances pertained to the initial order that NEADS received over a chat network passed from the Region Commander [General Arnold] with explicit reference to the Vice President.  According to the Commission Report: “Okay? Okay, you read that the Vice President, right?  Vice President has cleared.  Vice President has cleared us to intercept traffic and shoot the down if they do not respond per [General Arnold].”

At the time, circa 10:31, the “DO [Director of Operations] [said] no.”  That would later change, as we shall hear as we examine the continued NEADS effort to generate fighters from bases in the Mid-West.  The position of interest on the NEADS floor is the SD2 [Senior Director 2] position manned by Captain Brian Nagel.

Nagel’s chain of command was Nasypany to Marr.  His situational awareness was that Cleveland Center (ZOB) would evacuate and that there may still be unknown hostile aircraft in the sky.  His guidance became to protect major cities.

New Directions Coming Down

Captain Nagel time-stamped this primary source information for us.  He exchanged information with Cobra 1, the lead of a flight of two fighters out of Syracuse.  Cobra 1 told him his “play time” (time available in the air).  The Cobra flight was awaiting directions while in a holding pattern in Misty Thunder, a training area over Lake Ontario.

Nagel glanced at a clock or watch and verbalized the time as 1453 [10:53, actual tape stamp time is circa 10:55].  Cobra 1 informed Nagel that he and a second Syracuse pair of fighters (Apex) had hot guns only.  Nagel acknowledged that and informed Cobra 1 that there was new direction coming down and that he would brief him once he got the word.  That exchange can be heard here.  1453 New Directions Coming Down

Nagel briefs Cobra 1

Ten minutes later (circa 11:03 EDT) Nagel briefed Cobra 1. The new guidance coming down from above, “as in Presidential,” was to protect the major centers.  Nagel told Cobra 1 he would direct them to Pittsburgh once he arranged for tanker support.  He told Cobra 1, “there is clearance to kill, if required,” and that he would provide a further brief but had to “confirm the details on that.”  All subsequent clips in this article are a continuation and the first clip, the brief, can be heard here.  1503 Protect Major Cities

Cobra 1 responds

Cobra 1 advised that the previous transmission from Nagel was interfered with by Guard (emergency frequency) and he needed a repeat.  Nagel again told him the mission and advised that Cleveland Center was evacuated and that Cobra [and Apex] would be on “auto ops.”  He also made reference to the earlier report that one aircraft [UA 93] reported a bomb threat.  1504 ROE shortly

Nagel asks the MCC for clarification

Nagel asked for the “kill direction,” what to tell “these guys.”  He was just going to give them a brief, wasn’t going to tell them to do anything.  The MCC’s response was blocked by a concurrent transmission by Cobra 1.  150430 MCC When Able

Nagel again asks for clarification

Nagel briefed the MCC on what he was doing with the Syracuse fighters.  The MCC’s response can poorly be made out; he was speaking to lack of response [by a potential target] and divert procedures.  Nagel responded, “Wilco.”  1505 Wilco

Nagel briefs Cobra 1

Nagel told Cobra 1: “direction is…protect the major centers, when you are overhead the major center, it will be Pittsburgh in this case, you have intercept authority on any traffic in the area, if the traffic does not respond to hand signals, divert procedures, anything like that and they continue to press in a threatening manner towards the major center you are cleared to engage.”  Cobra 1, “copies.”  1506 Cobra Copies

Perspective

In the 10:50-11:00 time frame, after the battle of 9-11 was over, the nation began the transition to Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), protect the major centers, a labor-intensive, around-the-clock, resource-draining effort.  The exchange between Captain Nagel and Cobra 1 provides specific primary-source information that new guidance, Presidential guidance, had been issued and had reached the cockpit level.

At the same time, the NEADS sector floor, at the MCC position, became aware of the nation’s transition to DEFCON 3. That acknowledgment can be heard at this clip from DRM 1 DAT2 Channel 5 ID TK.  1505 DEFCON 3

It is an open question as to when ONE began.  In an earlier article I suggested that it began the moment the third Andrews fighter, Quit 27, lifted off; the first expansion of the established air defense mission.  It is also reasonable to establish that ONE began concurrent with the nation’s transition to DEFCON 3 and the new mission to protect the major centers, as we heard in the audio clips from the NEADS floor.

I leave it to the Air Force historians to set the time line for ONE; I am comfortable with either of the two times I have suggested.