Category: 9-11

9-11: Air Force One; the return to DC, an uneventful flight

Introduction

A correspondent asked me what I knew about the return flight of Air Force One to the nation’s capital.  I had not previously looked at the event so turned to the primary source information to analyze the situation.  Here is that analysis based on 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron radar files, air traffic control communications from the Federal Aviation Administration’s Washington Center (ZDC), and the audio files of the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS).  The story is interesting but uneventful.  We begin with the radar files.

USAF Radar

Multiple aircraft are mentioned in the ZDC file, which we will discuss shortly.  That discussion, however, requires a picture of where the relevant aircraft were spatially during the time that Air Force One was controlled by ZDC.  I have selected a single time hack, 1809 EDT, to orient the reader.

At that time Air Force One was just completing a 360-degree turn, a holding pattern to allow its fighter escort, Cowry 45, 46 and 47, to catch up.  Even so, ZDC informed Air Force One that the escort was 90 minutes in trail, the red Xes off the chart to the west.

Caps 1 and 2, the Andrews fighters tasked to escort Air Force One on the final leg, were well to the east and had just passed The Plains, Virginia.  A Lifeguard flight, headed southwesterly, was accounted for, but did not impact the return flight.

A low level flight, Mode 3 code 0270 was discussed jointly by ZDC and NEADS; both agreed it had dropped off.  The plane was broadcasting a Mode 2 code indicating it was military-related.  The related target observed by NEADS and ZDC was at low level, 1200 feet and below and some of the returns were beacon only, not radar, hence the difficulty in tracking.

An additional pair of fighters, briefly mention by Mode 3 code, was to the south and circled back to the North and ultimately joined the escort of Air Force One.

Here is a screen shot of the 84th RADES radar file, annotated in powerpoint.

Washington Center (ZDC)

Air Force One was in ZDC airspace from 1800-1816 EDT as it returned the President to the nation’s capital.  The check-in after handoff from Cleveland Center was routine.  1800 Air Force One Checks In (ZDC audio clips come from file 148-911-3007885A-s1.mp3, as archived by NARA in 2004)

At 1802 Air Force One requested a right 360 degree turn after which it would continue on course.  That gradual turn, which covered considerable real estate when projected to the ground, served two purposes.  First, as we shall shortly hear, it allowed fighter aircraft in trail to catch up.  Second, it aligned Air Force One for a direct return just south of The Plains, Virginia, essentially parallel to Interstate I66. 1802 Right 360 Request Approved  At 1803, ZDC notified an unidentified air traffic control entity (Linden?) about the 360-degree turn.  1803 Air Force One Doing a 360  

At 1805 an Identification Technician at NEADS, Sergeant Lisa Raymond (digraph Lima Romeo), called to resolve Mode 3 code 0270.  ZDC and NEADS agreed that the track had dropped out.  It was sometimes a beacon-only (transponder return but not radar return) track at low altitude which may be why it “dropped out.”   The conversation is an example of how NEADS routinely worked with FAA en route centers to resolve tracks of potential interest.  Given the location and altitude the military-related aircraft, squawking a Mode 2 code, would have been under Dulles TRACON control and not ZDC.  1805 0270 Code NEADS ID Tech

Shortly thereafter, at 1806, two things happened simultaneously.  First, Sergeant Richmond called asking why Air Force One was turning and heading the opposite direction.  A background voice answered that “he is doing a 360 at his request.”  Concurrently, Air Force One was calling the same controller with a request.  That exchange tells us why Air Force One was turning.  It was waiting for Cowry, a flight of three F-16s likely still under Cleveland Center control.  The Air Force One cockpit voice asked that they be vectored to him.  1806 NEADS Concern and AF1 Request  

Soon after 1807, ZDC provided an answer to Air Force One.  Cowry 45 [flight lead] was 90 miles behind.  1807 Cowry 45 90 Miles Behind

A minute later, shortly after 1808 a Lifeguard flight made a routine check-in with ZDC.  1808 Lifeguard Flight Checks In  

At 1810 two things came to the attention of the ZDC controller.  First, Cowry 45 reported in and that he was “in the block” [tactical expression?] with Air Force One.  Second, another controller informed that a pair of fighters out of the national area were coming that way to “intercept the group.”  Here the term “intercept” simply means to join up.  They did just that as clearly shown on the depiction of the radar files.  They flew out, spotted and identified the aircraft, and then joined to escort Air Force One.  1810 Cowry 45 Check In Other Fighters Mentioned 

At 1812 the controller was informed by another sector of the presence of a different fighter and that “they know about it.”  That report referred to the second pair of fighters that joined the escort of Air Force One from the south, as depicted in the lower right of the graphic, above.  1812 Other Fighter Reported 

In the 1812-1814 time frame several things happened.  First, Cowry 47 reported in asking for a squawk [Mode 3] and that he was information with Cowry 45.  Second, Cowry 47 confirmed the approach of the fighters [085 direction] from the DC area.  Third, the Life Guard flight was informed and acknowledged the presence of military aircraft.  (The discussion about “Uniform” had to do with a division of labor among the Cowry flight as to who was going to monitor what frequency in which band.  A similar discussion had taken place eight hours earlier when another flight of three fighters, the Quit flight from Langley, also approached the nation’s capital.) 1813 Cowry 47 Other Fighters Life Guard 

At 1816 Air Force One was handed off routinely to Dulles TRACON.  1816 Air Force One Contact Dulles  Other than a  sweeping 360-degree turn to allow escorting fighters to catch up, it was an uneventful flight according to the available air traffic control communications, a primary source.  But we also have available additional primary source audio files, those of NEADS.

Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS)

NEADS began tracking Air Force One well before the flight entered ZDC airspace.  At 1730 EDT the track (B001) and altitude (33000) were reported to Master Sergeant Maureen Dooley (“Mo”)  The technician making the report did not observe any fighters.  He was told the track was being forward told, now, a probable reference to passing the track to Cheyenne Mountain. 1730 Track B001 Air Force One (Channel 4, DRM1, cut 210926)  Immediately, NEADS personnel decided that, according to NORAD, Air Force One was going to Andrews.  1730 Going to Andrews (Channel 4, DRM 1, cut 211022)

The NEADS tapes reveal that the first team was on duty as inferred by the reference to Sergeant Dooley.  In this next clip in the 1740 time frame we hear the voices of both the Mission Crew Commander, Major Nasypany, and the Senior Director, Major Fox.  There was an issue about a Mode 3 unknown 40 miles south of Air Force One which was resolved to be the “Omaha” flight. 1747 Some Familiar Voices (Channel 2, DRM 1 cut 212211)

Shortly after Air Force One checked in with ZDC NEADS controllers were aware of the position and were asking themselves where the fighter escort was.  They did not know. 1801 Wheres Fighter Escort  We know from the ZDC tape that the fighters were well to the west, but NEADS did not yet know they were in trail. (Channel 2, DRM 1, cut 212211)

By 1805, the observation on radar that Air Force One got NEADS attention.  This next clip, over two minutes long, captures how Major Nasypany handled that situation.  He is listening to multiple positions on the NEADS floor, but Sergeant Raymond’s voice comes through loud and clear when she reports that Air Force One is orbiting at the President’s request.  1805 Orbiting at the Presidents Request  (Channel 2, DRM 1 cut 212211)

For the record, here is the continuous conversation between Sergeant Raymond and ZDC concerning both the 0270 zero code and Air Force One.  The NEADS tapes provided to the Commission end on all channels shortly after 2208Z.  1805 Raymond and ZDC AF One 

Observation

Although it appears from the radar picture that Air Force One was unescorted while in ZDC airspace the tactical picture suggests otherwise.  The Cowry flight of three was  present to the west (trailing) and north.  The escorting fighters from the long-established DC Combat Air Patrol were present to the east and south.  In addition, there were two E3’s airborne, one in the Chicago area and one in the DC area.

I will eventually get around to telling the E3 story, one that spreads across most postions and recorded channels at NEADS.  The E3, in effect, mirrored and supported NEADS.  Each had a Mission Crew Commander working under the overall direction of Major Nasypany, the Mission Crew Commander at NEADS

9-11: AA11; impact time, setting the record straight

Occasional researchers have speculated that the radar data and seismic data concerning the impact of AA11 into the World Trade Center, North Tower, do not agree. That erroneous interpretation, in their view, somehow supports the notion that the towers were brought down by deliberate, nefarious means.

None of that speculation is true; it is based on an apples and oranges comparision. The radar data and seismic data are in agreement. In this brief article I will establish the facts of the matter for serious researchers, historians and academicians so that they can put the issue in persepective.

The Seismic Data

Seismic data, as depicted by Popular Mechanics, established an impact time for AA11 of 8:46:26. That data, fully considered, does not support any conspiracy theory, as clarified by seismologists at Columbia University’s Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in Palisades, N.Y.

The Commission Report

The 9-11 Commission reported an impact time of 9:46:40, taken from the National Traffic Safety Board (NTSB) report on AA11. The Commission, by convention and for convenience, used NTSB-established times for the ipact of all four hijacked aircraft on 9/11.

Commission analysis was based on the Air Force radar data provided by the 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron (RADES). My analysis then, and now, was that the impact, according to radar, was between one to two radar sweeps earlier than the NTSB-established time, closer to one rather than two. A radar sweep is twelve seconds. Therefore, the assessment was that the actual impact time, according to radar, was between 8:46:16 and 8:46:28, and closer to the latter.

I had no issue with the convention of using NTSB-established times since the time difference was a matter of seconds. I did point out that the difference might come into play when/if the narrative used times rounded to the minute. Even that concern turned out to be inconsequential. The popular narrative, today, is that AA11 impacted at 8:46.

History Commons timeline headings, for example, all round down to 8:46. The timeline cites several sources, including an FAA timeline in which FAA listed that it lost AA 11 at 8:46:31 on radar and that the impact time was 8:46:35.

Of note, Wikipedia currently (Feb 25, 2012) reports a time of 8:46:30, as established by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), a time consistent with both the radar data and the seismic data.

There is data still to come from the Commission files, including any of my workfiles which I did not print off and archive. Additional primary source information will someday be realeased–the infra-red times for all four impacts as observed by satellite and as recorded as log entries in the CMOC (Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center) log.

So, how did the 8:46:40 time come about?

NTSB

Radar data for AA11 was depicted graphically by the NTSB in Figure 2 of its February 19, 2002, “Flight Path Study, American Airlines Flight 11,”  viewable at this link. It is clear from the graphic and from the NTSB study that a time of 9:46:40 was extrapolated from Figure 2. However, that extrapolated time is for elevation zero and does not account for the height of the impact above that datum. It is also clear from the graphic that an extrapolated radar time for the height of the impact is consistent with seismic data, my analysis of Air Force radar data, the FAA assessment of its radar data, and the NIST established time of 9:36:30.

Comparing Apples and Oranges

It is not valid to compare an extrapolated, published radar time of 8:46:40 with a seismic data time of 8:46:26. It is valid to compare radar data to seismic data. Responsible researchers will do so and will find the times to be consistent.

 

9-11: Dulles TRACON called by FAA Eastern Region; asked about UA175; was told about fast mover

This article documents a call from Ron Ruggieri, Eastern Region, to John Hendershot, Dulles TRACON manager.  It is clear and explicit primary source evidence that the alert about the fast mover later identified as AA77 passed to NEADS by Boston Center was a result of Colin Scoggins listening to the results of this conversation.

In this call Ruggieri is turned over to the Supervisor, John Hendershott,  and asked about UA 175, but then confirmed it was out of Boston.  Here is the the start of that call.  0934 Ruggieri to Hendershott about UA 175

Hendershott then told Ruggieri that they were tracking a primary target headed toward  the White House [P56].   Hendershott advised that National Approach and the White House had been notified.  It is clear from this next cut that Ruggieri was briefing someone else who was then passing along the information.  0935 IAD Tracking a fast moving unknown toward White House

Ruggieri asked for a position and was told the target was six miles southwest of the White House, identical to the information that Colin Scoggins was concurrently passing to NEADS.

0936 six miles SW of White House

Note the confusion, however.  Hendershott opined that the target could be military.  In the background a voice is heard saying that the military had been notified.  That is either a garble of Hendershott’s opinion or an acknowledgement of the Boston Center notification to NEADS.  There is no evidence that anyone in the military other than NEADS was notified.  The FAA primary net did not include the NMCC and the NMCC had closed down its Significant Event Conference and was in the process of bringing up an Air Threat Conference, one that did not include FAA.

Hendershott, clearly looking at a TRACON radar scope, then provided near-real time updates to Eastern Region.   It’s “maneuvering,” now turning back “towards the White House.” A background voice asked if it was military.  Hendershott responded, “we have no knowledge.”  The background voice immediately passed along that information, “they have no knowledge, Dave.”  0937 Turning Back Toward the White House

That is likely a reference to Dave Canoles.  If so, then Eastern Region was passing the information immediately to FAA Headquarters.  Given that Colin Scoggins was listening to the Eastern Region phone bridge, then it is likely that the false earlier report that AA11 was still airborne originated on that bridge.  Scoggins has long contended that the false report came from Canoles’ office, if not from Canoles, himself.

Headquarters, via Eastern Region, became concerned that National was not on the bridge and that the hot line to the White House had not been activated.  National had done that immediately when Daniel O’Brien and her supervisor sounded the alarm, but no one at FAA Headquarters or Eastern Region apparently knew that.  Hendershott took an action to call National and confirm that the hot line had been activated.  0937 Concern About Hot Line to White House

Hendershott reported that  the primary dissappeared shortly after 9:38.  Then reporting got confused as apparent false returns from the aftermath of the Pentagon impact caused Hendershott to also report that the target was a mile from the White House.  It was a chaotic moment and in that moment Hendershott confirmed that the White House hot line had been activated.  0938 Target Disappeared False Returns Confuse White House Hot Line Confirmed

A  little more than a minute later Ruggieri told  Hendershott, with resignation, that  “he went into the Pentagon, West side.”  Ruggieri heard that first in background just as he was explaining that the only reason he called had to do with UA 175.  0939 He Just Went into the Pentagon West Side

The Ruggieri call provides a unique and perhaps the only real time window into the FAA’s Eastern Region.  Once John Hendershott was asked to keep the line open the window opened.  Eastern Region was and is an administrative headquarters.  It served FAA poorly by interjecting itself into a battle being fought by Herndon Center.

Eastern Region had no business being in the middle of the situation once the focus changed from UA175 to a fast moving unknown being tracked by Dulles TRACON.  Yet, ironically, had Eastern Region not made the call looking for UA175 then FAA Headquarters would not have had near real-time information from a radar scope displaying the track of what would later be determined to be AA77.

9-11: Market Menopause; enough already

The American stock market since 9/11 has been a series of seemingly endless mood swings, from euphoria to near-clinical depression.  Enough already.  Granted we are supposedly a mature nation; that does not mean we cannot rejuvenate and move on.

Tempting as it is to dwell on the issue, I have just three suggestions for both government and business, but pointedly directed  to the Congress, both houses, both parties.

First, Congress, get back to the business of responsible oversight and get your own house in order to do so.  The staffs of both the Congressional Joint Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission quickly determined that one of the root causes of the nation’s vulnerability to a surprise attack was the inability of Congress to establish and maintain efficient and effective oversight.  Multiple committees and subcommittees in both Houses, all with disparate agendas, were and continue to be in the oversight business.  Enough already. Each inquiry softened the blow in its reports; perhaps we should have been more direct.

Second, Congress, let me announce my criteria for voting for representation, Senate and House, national and local, in 2012. Incumbents need not apply.  Party lines go by the wayside here.  The nation appears much better served to cast out the lot of you and keep doing so until some group of our citizens elected to do the public’s business actually charts, and then follows, a course to do so.

Third, business and government, I offer a universal solution to the unemployment problem, the market malaise, and the effectiveness of government.  Hire some human beings to answer the danged telephone.  This remedy applies to both the public and private sector and to government agencies at all levels.

If you want my business and my attention, hire people to interface with the consumers and the public.  Enough already with your fancy voice tree menus.  Provide no more than three options, please, in the following specific order:

  • For any language other than English, press one
  • To speak to a real person, press two (regardless of language)
  • For other options, press three

The latter option is reluctantly granted recognizing that properly constructed menus can be useful.  Few are so constructed. Try harder.  Let me give you a hint: fewer words, shorter pauses, no redundancy, confident voices speaking in clear English, just to name a few items on a much longer list.

Begone with you now. Go figure out how you are going to gain my attention, my business, and my vote. Enough already with mood swings.

9-11: The Andrews Fighters; the Reagan National Story

D R A F T (This article needs some fine tuning)

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to document for the record the air traffic control communications at the Reagan National TRACON (DCA) concerning the Andrews fighters.  The positions are F2, Final Radar, archived tape as provided to the Commission by FAA is “1 DCA 101-102 Tape 1-2 F2 1327 – 1450 UTC,” and Krant, Departure Control, archived tape as provided to the Commission by FAAis “1 DCA 99 Krant 1430-1600 UTC.” This article stands alone, narrowly focused on the FAA air traffic control positions most involved with the Andrews fighters.  I will designate Krant communications as “Krant.”  All other DCA communications are from the F2 position.

I am creating this article as backup for my presentation. “9/11: It Was ‘Chaos Out There,” to be presented on November 17, 2011, at the Air Force Historical Foundation and Air Force Historical Studies Office 2011 Biennial Symposium, “Air Power and Global Operations, 9/11 and Beyond.”

I am on the first panel, “9/11 and Operation Noble Eagle,” along with Maj. Gen Larry K. Arnold, USAF (Ret) and John J. Farmer, Jr., Dean, Rutgers School of Law, Newark.”  Here is a link to the Symposium agenda.

We begin the Reagan National story with the first hint that change is in the air.

0950 – 1000

0952.  DCA informed Patuxent (a military training area between Washington and Langley/Norfolk), “Do not let anybody in the Washington area.  Tell ’em to go someplace and land.”  0952 Don’t let anybody in Washington area

0957. The arrival of the Langley fighters came to the immediate attention of DCA TRACON.  Even though the arriving planes were under the control of FAA’s Washington Center, DCA TRACON and other air traffic control facilities immediately recognized and acknowledged the presence of fighters in the area.  In this next clip the DCA controller told a caller from Andrews Tower, “I don’t know who they are, but they’re somebody.  Don’t worry about it, OK.  They’re up high, they’re fighters.”  The caller had asked if DCA knew who “those three emergencies” were, squawking about twenty thousand.  The reference “emergencies,” refers to the fact that the Langley fighters were under AFIO, Authority For Intercept Operations, and were squawking 7777, the code for such operations. 0957 They’re up high they’re fighters

0959.  DCA again told a caller do not land in his area.  “They don’t want anybody in Washington airspace.  0959 No one in Washington air space

So what do me make of the activity at DCA?

My Assessment.

 Earlier, at about 0934 when the alarm about the fast moving unknown (AA 77) was sounded, DCA TRACON established an open line with the Secret Service.  It can, therefore, be assumed that when the DCA uses the pronoun”they” in this context the reference is to the Secret Service.  These three communications, taken together, have to do with Presidential movement, the flight of Air Force One to the nation’s capital.  Air Force One took off in Florida at 0955 EDT and headed directed toward Washington D. C. until 1010, at which time it turned west and headed for Louisiana.

This primary source information provides a glimpse into the advanced preparations for the arrival of Air Force One.  Those preparations translated into a general shootdown order as a protective measure, not one issued in response to a specific aircraft.  The Secret Service reports and actions will get more interesting as we examine the next time frame.

1000-1010

The first of the Andrews fighters returning from the range at Dare, North Carolina showed up in air traffic control channels.  Concurrently, several things happened involving the Secret Service.  At 1003 it provided an erroneous report that a Northwest airline was inbound to Washington D.C. from Pittsburg and was unaccounted for.  That was probably a garble, more likely a reference to UA 93 approaching from the Northwest.  Here is that report as recorded at Herndon Center on phone line 4530.  1003 SService reports NW airliner headed to DC

Shortly thereafter, at 1004,  the Service directed a periodic broadcast from Andrews Tower announcing that Class B airspace was currently closed.  All aircraft were advised to avoid Class B airspace.  Any intrusion would result in a shootdown.  1004 Class B airspace closed

Class B airspace can extend as high as 18,000 feet, but the ceiling is generally lower.  Class B airspace is the domain of the TRACON, in this case Reagan National.  Because of the direct link between DCA and the Secret Service the order pertained strictly to the nation’s capital and only to that airspace under local control.  Andrews Tower was an additional tower in the Reagan National controlled area.

Concurrently, DCA passed the alert to Herndon Center.  Herndon, in turn, passed the warning to Washington Center (ZDC).  100442 DCA passes Secret Service warning

And, in the same time frame, Herndon Center learned that major Washington D.C. buildings were being evacuated, including the Capitol and the White House. 100224 White House Capital being evacuated  

Bully Two showed up in the middle of all that activity.  DCA had just passed the Secret Service alert to BWI TRACON and was told by Swan position, Washington Center, about a hand off.  DCA told Swan to turn the plane around, but quickly changed that order when the DCA controller learned that it was Bully Two.  10004 Bully Two returns

Here is the series of clips concerning Bully Two from a DCA perspective.  The critical information needed was whether or not he was armed and, if not, could he be armed at Andrews.  To expedite Bully Two’s approach DCA cleared him direct to Andrews.

 1006 Are you armed       1007 Can you be armed       1008 Bully Two unable for fuel  

It is clear from this sequence that the DCA controller was communicating with the Secret Service and was relaying questions.  We can surmise that the plan was to use Bully Two, in some fashion, as an asset in the air.  This, despite the fact that the Langley fighters had already established a CAP over the nation’s capital and were available, as was known to FAA controllers and was surely known to the Secret Service.

The first plan for Bully Two was to keep him in the air.  When he reported he was not armed the plan changed to land him, get him armed, and then back in the air.  That plan included a check on his fuel status.

Despite that flurry of activity, Bully Two was not relaunched.  Commission Staff was told that he was a new pilot and that the Wing waited for Bully One and Bully Three to return.

At 1010. the situation was that Bully One had returned and was available.  The Langley fighters had established a West-East CAP at 23,000 feet.  The E4B, Venus 77, was establishing a North-South, 60-mile leg orbit centered on Richmond, Virginia.  Bully One and Bully Three were en route North from Dare Range, North Carolina.  At 1010, Air Force One turned away from  its approach to the nation’s capital and turned West.

1010-1020

We learned in the Nasypany articles [link is to Part V] that the situation quieted down at NEADS during this time.  UA 93 and D 1989 had been accounted for and there was nothing on the horizon, air defense-wise.  The battle was over.

That quiet interlude was mirrored at DCA.  The only thing of note during a nearly ten minute period was DCA learning that tanker support for the Langley fighters had arrived.  Washington Center, Swan Center, reported “tankers at nineteen seven [19,700 feet].”  1016 Tankers at nineteen seven 

The quiet was interrupted by the return of Bully One.  DCA told the caller to “bring him home.”  The flight plan said the flight of two was landing at Patuxent.  That was changed and DCA was told “he will be coming to you.”  1019 Bully One flight of two F-16s

In summation, as of 1020 the air defense battle was over.  Bully Two had recovered to Andrews and Bully One, flight of two, was approaching the nation’s capital.  Activity would again pick up at DCA as it dealt with the emerging Andrews situation.

1020-1030

At 1022 a called asked if DCA was aware of a hijacked aircraft in the area.  DCA responded that it was.  The called asked where it was.  DCA responded, “we don’t know exactly.”  The caller responded, “is he coming from the West?”  Answer: “Yes.”  1022 You aware of a hijacked aircraft

At this time it was still not known what aircraft hit the Pentagon and this could be a reference to either AA 77 or UA 93.

At 1023 Dulles reported a helicopter, a medivac out of Hagerstown, that wanted to return to Davison [Fort Belvoir].  DCA strongly advised against the return, “he will be shot down.”  1023 Medivac Hagerstown to Davison  Hagerstown was the point of origin of the revised flight plan for United 93 as filed by Cleveland Center.

At 1027, Bully One was cleared direct to Andrews.  1027 Bully One cleared direct Andrews

At 1028, DCA learned that United 93 was no longer being shown in the system.  This is a reference to the flight plan system and to the associated traffic situation display.   The flight plan entered earlier by Cleveland Center terminated the flight at Reagan National at 1028.  That termination was recognized immediately by someone in the FAA system and reported in near-real time to DCA.  United 93, which crashed at 1003, ceased to exist, even notionally, before Bully One landed.  1028 United 93 no longer in the system 

At 1029, DCA asked Swan if he was talking to Quit 25.  He was.  DCA said he would get back to him, he thought Secret Service might have a question for him.  It is clear from this exchange, as heard in real time, that DCA was talking to the Secret Service.  1029 Are you talking to Quit 25 

As of 1030, there was no known threat, real or notionally.  United 93 was not an issue. A helicopter was attempting to return to Davison Air Field from Hagerstown, as reported by Dulles TRACON.  Bully One, flight of two, was cleared to land.  The Secret Service knew that the Langley fighters were in the area.  DCA was standing by to relay questions to the Langley flight lead, Quit 25, via Swan.

There was no apparent need to launch Andrews fighters, yet they were sortied, as we shall learn.

1030-1040

First, at 1030, DCA relayed a message to Krant to have the Langley lead, Quit 25, change frequency so he could talk to Reagan National directly.  1030 Have Quit 25 change frequency

Within a minute, Quit 25 was talking directly to DCA.  He was told, “Secret Service wanted you on this frequency.”  Quit 25 said, “go ahead” and was then told to “stand by a second.”  1031 Secret Service wanted you on this frequency  

For the next minute, DCA was off microphone most likely talking to the Secret Service.  The DCA controller then came back to Quit 25 at 1032 and in a nearly two minute conversation verified four things.  First, he confirmed that the fast movers at altitude 240 and 250 were with Quit 25.  Quit 25 confirmed that they were his number two and number three wingmen.  Second,  he confirmed that there was no traffic in the Washington area.  In other words, no targets.  Third, he confirmed that fast movers to the east were part of the operation.  Quit 25 confirmed that they were his refueling aircraft.  Finally, he confirmed that the military had control of the airspace and that DCA would simply act as a relay.  1032 The air picture established by DCA and Quit 25

At this point we lose the Bully One story as he switched to Andrews Tower frequency.  I will come back to that later, but let me summarize here.  At first, Bully One was told to proceed to E ramp to get armed.  At about 1036 those directions were coutermanded and Bully One reported that he had orders from his commanding general to get back in the air.  We will pick him up again when he switches back to a DCA frequency.

At 1033 Krant advised Swan of some primary targets northwest of Washington and asked that the information be passed to the Langley fighters.  Krant confirmed that he was talking to Quit 25.  Krant also learned that military aircraft could return to base.  Specifically, the medevac helicopter from Hagerstown had permission to return to Fort Belvoir.  1033 Krant military aircraft can return to base

Meanwhile, Quit 25 addressed an unresolved issue with DCA.  NEADS had been under the impression for some time that a “First, flight of four” from Langley were in the air as part of the support package for the return of Air Force One.  That information had been passed to Quit 25 and he asked DCA about it at 1036, the same time as Bully One was receiving orders to get back in the air.  DCA confirmed with Washington Center that there was no “First, flight of four” from Langley.  1036 No First flight from Langley 

At 1038, Krant position, Bully One’s departure for radar intercept was announced.  1038 Krant Bully One departure for radar intercept

During the next two minutes, DCA talked primarily to Quit 27, the first time we hear his voice.  DCA confirmed the CAP configuration (East-West) and the identity in the air of each of the three Langley fighters.  He also learned that Quit 26 was in direct contact with Huntress (NEADS).  At 1040, Quit 25 was advised that an F16  ([Bully One] had just departed Andrews.  1038 CAP discussed    1040 F16 just departed Andrews  

At 1039, Bully One checked in with Krant and asked for instructions to check out an aircraft flying down the river.  He was given instructions to check out what aircraft it was.  He was told to head toward Georgetown.  1039 Krant Bully One checks in for instructions

As of 1040, DCA was communicating with Secret Service and was acting as a relay from the Service to the Langley lead, Quit 25.  DCA knew the Langley CAP configuration and had identified each of the three aircraft in it.  The DCA controller knew that the Langley flight was talking to Huntress [Quit 26].  He also confirmed that the Langley flight knew about its tanker support, to include location.  Bully One had launched and was told to head toward Georgetown. Despite that air defense protection of the nation’s capital the first Andrews response, the relaunch of Bully One, heralded another chaotic event, the merger of the Langley and Andrews fighters into a coherent operation.

1040-1050

At 1040, the refinement of the Langley CAP and its control continued.  Quit 25 advised DCA that the Langley flight would need to cycle through the tankers one at a time.  That would require some coordination by DCA. The DCA controller was also advised that Huntress (NEADS) wanted to talk to him.  A number was provided by Quit 27.  Presumably, that number was then available to the Secret Service.  1040 Tanker support and give Huntress a call  

At the same time, Bully One was told that the airspace belonged to the military for the operation [Huntress/Langley], that there were several helicopters in the area, and nothing else, right now.  Bully One reaffirmed that he was sent aloft for a target.  Krant responded, “that information probably came through your source, not ours.”  Concurrently, in a comms over ride, the launch of the first pair of Andrews fighters, Caps flight, was announced.  1040 Info from your source not ours 

Krant continued to work with Bully One at the same time that Caps one was checking in.  1041 Krant Bully One and Caps One

Concurrently, for several minutes, DCA continued to work with the Langley flight to coordinate squawks and tanker support.  Quit 25 needed to split off and refuel.  DCA informed Quit 27 that at the Huntress (NEADS) number provided,  “whoever answered has no idea what we’re talking about.”  DCA and Washington Center also discussed an unknown target, 3666,  northwest of Manassas airport.  1041 Team 23 tanker support and target NW of Manassas   1042 Working out squawks with Quit flight   1043 Huntress number no idea  

Also concurrently, a significant discussion took place between Caps One and Krant position.  Caps One asked for a vector to an unknown, unidentified aircraft, inbound.  Krant responded that there was no target, “as far as we know.”  Caps One then asked if Krant was in contact with the National Command Authority.  The  response was explicit, “affii rmitive.”  Thereafter, Caps One said they would orbit at whatever location Krant desired.  The Caps flight was directed to establish an orbit about 10 miles to the Northwest of Washington at 11,000 feet.  Caps One acknowledged, “eleven thousand would be fine.”  1042 Krant You in contact with NCA Affirmative

By 1043, Bully One confirmed that he had no targets and was headed back to Andrews.  He was advised of the Caps flight presence and its location.  Bully One’s status report to Krant was, “I have no other aircraft on my radar, and we only have helicopters out here, so I’m going to proceed back to Andrews.”  1043 Krant Bully One no other aircraft on radar 

At 1044,  Krant and Caps One discussed a possible target.  Caps One was told about a possible unknown,  helicopters over the Pentagon, Bully One returning to base, and F-16s at 250 “on top of you.”  The conversation was predicated on Caps One asking for confirmation that he had no unknown civilian target as he was advised prior to takeoff.  This is primary source confirmation that the Andrews fighters knew about the Langley fighters at altitude.  1044 Krant F16s above you 

At 1047, Caps One persisted in his hunt for a target.  He asked Krant,  “are there any blind spots in your radar coverage.”  He was told, “just, right over DCA.”  1047 Krant any radar blind spots  

At 1048, Caps One was told that the Wild flight was five minutes away from launch.  As Krant and Caps One sorted out the CAP configuration, Caps One made a significant statement concerning the Wild position.  The Wild flight would be centered south of Andrews and that “would be at peace, as well.”  That is the only statement of ROE (Rules of Engagement) status for the Andrews fighters of which I am currently aware in primary source information.  1048 Krant Wild at peace as well 

Compare that status statement with a similar statement two minutes later by Major Fox, Senior Director, NEADS.  Fox was asked about authority concerning a target in the Boston area.  His answer was, “at peace.”  0911145222 Request Clearance to Shoot 

Therefore, as of 1050 both NEADS and Andrews, separately, were operating under “at peace” ROE, despite Vice Presidential guidance to the contrary as recorded in the NEADS chat log shortly after 1030  1032 You need to read this 

I am stopping this narrative for now.  Remaining is the contentious arrival of Wild One on the scene and the struggle to establish a joint CAP between the Langley and Andrews fighters.   Part of that story is the DEFCON status change promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at 1052.

To be continued

 

 

9-11: NEADS Mission Crew Commander; a valiant effort, ultimately futile, Part V

Introduction

This is the fifth and concluding article in a series describing the battle on the morning of September 11, 2001, from the perspective of the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), Mission Crew Commander (MCC) Major Kevin Nasypany.  The account is based on primary source information, the NEADS audio tapes.

In the first four articles (part I, part II, part III, part IV) we covered Major Nasypany’s actions up to 1010 EDT.  NEADS had just heard about a fourth hijacked aircraft, UA 93, and, concurrently an aircraft over the White House.  It had also heard of a potential threat of an unknown aircraft from Canada headed toward the nation’s capital.

We will pick up the story at that point, but first we need to tend to some unfinished business.  In Part IV we left hanging the story of how the Langley fighters finally arrived on station and we did not identify the source of the unknown aircraft over the White House.

Unfinished Business

Langley fighters. In part IV the status of the Langley fighters was described as follows: “ At 0946 the CAP point provided, 3825N 07702W was transposed in its northern component, which should have been 3852N, a separate story for another time.” Now is that other time.

While comparing notes on other activity the Weapons Controller and Weapons Controller/Technician realized that Quit (corrected Jul 12, 2012.  Original text was “Caps”)  25, Langley lead, was astray.  Quit 25 informed the controllers that “the CAP point you gave us [was wrong]” and asked for a “lat long.”  The correct lat long was 3852N 07702W.  Quite 25 acknowledged, “eight FIVE TWO.”

Readers will recall that in Part IV, at that same time, Major Nasypany gave this explicit instruction: “Talk to me about my Langley guys.  I want them over the NCA, NOW!! Immediately, the Weapons Controller said, “where are the fighters.”  And that’s when the Langley fighters were turned back North, vectored, correctly, toward the CAP point, the last location of track B32, AA 77. 0952 Langley CAP point corrected (DRM 2, Channel 13)

There are two things that historians and researchers need to know about this event.  First, Quit 25, when interviewed, took full blame, stating that he had an equipment malfunction in his cockpit display.  That was admirable of him, but it was not his fault.  It was a controller transposition of two digits in a latitude designation, according to the primary source information of the day.  On a separate note, it is also to Quit 25’s credit that he took full responsibility for missing the Norfolk TRACON controller question asking him which direction he wanted to go.  His comment when he heard the air traffic control tape was straight forward and professional, “there was an opportunity missed.”

Second, this event is yet another example of how responsive NEADS SOCC personnel were to every order or suggestion given by Major Nasypany.  Subordinate personnel consistently took immediate action to his leadership, without hesitation.

Unknown over the White House

Once the Langley fighters got squared away they began a combat air patrol over the nation’s capital at 1000.  Had someone in the Pentagon courtyard looked straight up with binoculars he would have seen one of the Quit flight at 23,000 feet, vertically overhead at exactly 1000 EDT.  The approach of the Langley fighters, however, itself became chaotic.

Two of the three fighters, Quit 25 and 26, were squawking identical Mode 2 and Mode 3 codes.  Quit 27 was supposed to also be squawking the same Mode 3 code, 7777, but was not.  In the resulting confusion, at NEADS and both the FAA’s Washington Center and Baltimore TRACON, military and civilian controllers became confused.  The net result was that one of the Langley fighters became the unknown over the White House.  The air defense intercepted itself, as we shall find out.

The initial report came from an FAA air traffic controller in the Baltimore area and was reported by Quit 25. “Baltimore is saying something about an aircraft over the White House, any words (mission)?”  The Weapons Controller/Technician reported that the information came from “Center,” meaning Washington Center. Moreover, the fighter the controller was talking to was actually Quit 26, as we shall hear. Here is how all that played out at the Weapons Controller/Technician position from 1007 to 1011 resulting in a mission to Quit 26 to “identify by type and tail.”  1007 unknown near the White House

That situation was concurrent with Major Nasypany learning about United 93.  We return to his operations position to pick up the story.

Back to the MCC Position

We ended Part IV with this clip.  1007 UA 93 bomb on board unknown over White House.

A relisten, after hearing from the controllers, provides yet more insight into Major Nasypany as floor commander.  Note that he speculated that the unknown over the White House might be that fifth airplane, a reference to the false report of an unknown headed toward Washington from Canadian airspace.  Nasypany also mused, quickly, to someone that “he had had better days.”

Nasypany continued to juggle two competing issues, United 93 and the unknown over the White House.  He also fielded a quick question from someone asking if he needed MCC help.  His quick response was, “we are fine for MCCs, right now.”

Nasypany’s evenhanded demeanor comes through clearly when he asks about, probably, the Toledo fighters, “any weapons?”  He answers his own question, “we don’t know, we’ll press with that.”

His explicit and profane exchange with Major Fox concerning the unknown over the White House is also revealing.  “Negative clearance to shoot,” was his guidance from the Battle Cab to Jamie (also “Foxy”).  Major Fox responded that “he wasn’t really worried about the code words (possible reference to authentication).  Nasypany’s immediate response was “Fuck the code words, that’s perishable information.”  Nevertheless, the explicit guidance was “negative clearance to fire, ID type, tail.”  1010 Negative clearance to fire

Major Nasypany then turned his attention to the United 93 situation and spoke with the commander at Syracuse about United 93 and “the special,” (Delta 1989).  The commander advised that he had “hot guns, that’s all I’ve got.”  Nasypany’s matter-of-fact response was, “that’s good enough for me, for now.”  Further, he dealt directly with the commander to arrange for the preparation for launch of two additional fighters. Nasypany did this on his own recognizance.  This  vignette is an example of Nasypany’s ability to deal with a senior officer while balancing the requirement of managing his crew on the SOCC floor. 1012 Conversation with Syracuse

United 93 Down

Immediately thereafter, at 1014, Major Nasypany learned that United 93 was down.  The confusion on the SOCC floor is captured in this next audio clip.  NEADS personnel equated the report of a bomb on board with an explosion and speculated that the plane exploded near Camp David.  The voices of the Identification Technicians are clearly heard in the background as they help sift through information. At one point MSGT Dooley stated emphatically that “this is making no sense, whatsoever.”

Separately, but intertwined, the E-3 support issue was briefly discussed. MCC position personnel learned that an E-3 was headed Northeast, one they wanted headed toward Chicago, and that two more were on immediate status.  1014 NEADS learns UA93 is down

At 1016 Nasypany took a call front CONR which provides insight as to how he dealt with the next higher headquarters.  The issue was that CONR did not know the disposition of fighters over the NCA (National Command Authority) area because NEADS was falling behind in forward telling (electronically forwarding) the track information.  CONR did not have radar scopes and relied on NEADS (and the other sectors) to forward tell tracks of interest, friendly and enemy.  Nasypany, again, gave explicit direction to his crew to get the tracks forwarded and told CONR, “I’m protecting the NCA, as best I can.”

This next clip establishes two things.  First, CONR, and by extension (Granite Sentry, the Cheyenne Mountain display system) NORAD, and by further extension (Air Threat Conference) the NMCC, knew as of 1017, that there were three air defense fighters protecting the NCA.  Second, in a background conversation, Nasypany informed Major Deskins that a track, “this guy,” (Delta 1989) faded over Cleveland.  1016 CONR call protecting NCA best I can

Time for a Summation

At this point in the Major Nasypany story it is time to stop for a moment and speak to the larger narrative, the NORAD story concerning the events of 9-11.  As documented in primary source information at the MCC position on the NEADS SOCC floor we can conclude two things.

First, as of 1017 EDT, the status of friendly forces protecting the nation’s capital could have and should have been known at every echelon, including the NCA–the Secretary of Defense and the President, and by extension the Vice President and the Secretary of Transportation, to include the Secret Service.  Major Nasypany told CONR, explicitly, that he was protecting the NCA as best he could.

Second, the status of both United 93 and Delta 1989 was established by that same time.  United 93 was known down, possibly exploded, and Delta 1989 had faded over Cleveland.  Those facts were known to the NEADS Battle Cab and, by extension, CONR and NORAD.  The clarity of the dual situation of those two airplanes, whose stories were intertwined, was firmly established at the MCC position, but never established in the aftermath by the staffs at NEADS, CONR, and NORAD.

Unfinished Business, Finished

At this point, readers may ask what happened to the unknown over the White House?  That story is instructive as to how the NEADS SOCC floor operated, particularly under Major Nasypany’s command.  It was the nature of operations that important information flew immediately to everyone who needed to know it.  If it become unimportant the flow stopped immediately and the issue was resolved at the scope or position level.

It is worth restating at this point that the Mission Crew Commander had the capabililty to “plug in,” to listen to any position on the SOCC floor.  That capability makes it confusing for researchers to sort out what is going on and to track issues of particular interest since conversations were recorded concurrently on one channel even though they took place disparately on the SOCC floor.

The unknown aircraft over the White House issue was resolved by the controllers, as we hear on this next clip from DRM 2, Channel 13. Quit 26 reported that Washington now knew about the Quit flight squawks: “They do now, they didn’t earlier.”  The controller immediately said to those nearby, “It was our guys, It was our guys.  Washington was reporting our guys flying around.”  And, later, “we intercepted one of our own guys.” 1014 We intercepted one of our own guys

Back to the MCC Position

With that issue resolved by subordinates and the Delta 1989 and United 93 issues clarified things quieted down at the MCC position and by 1018 Major Nasypany had unplugged from all other positions. For an extended period of time we hear primarily his voice as he dealt with the occasional issue of interest to him.

One such issue was the report to him at 1026 that Air Force One was airborne out of Florida headed for Washington.  He was also briefed that the First Fighter Wing at Langley would provide escort at the appropriate time.  Southeast Air Defense Sector was to have fighters on Air Force One, according to the report.  Nasypany tasked Major Fox to take over fighter escort once “they hit our AOR (area of responsibility).  1026 AF One Airborne headed for Washington

None of that happened the way it was recorded at NEADS.  Air Force One took off at 0955 and was vectored west to Barksdale Air Force Base at 1010, well before NEADS was informed the plane was airborne.  There was no fighter escort until just before landing at Barksdale when fighters from the Texas Air National Guard joined the flight.  Even though a requirement did not materialize, Nasypany anticipated that NEADS would be tasked.  However, he had no assets.  The flight of four fighters from Langley did not materialize, a story for another day.

You Need to Read This

At 1032 activity at NEADS took an interesting turn as Major Nasypany verbalized what he was reading off the chat log. “Hey, you need to read this.  The Region Commander has declared that we can shoot down tracks if they do not respond to our direction.”   He then repeated what he had read, “OK, the Region Commander has declared that we can shoot down aircraft that do not respond to our direction. OK?”  “Copy that?”  So if you try and divert somebody and he won’t divert.”

Nasypany broke the thought process to announce that Atlantic City was scrambled at 1430 [Zulu time].  He then picked up the thread by asking “Foxy, you got a conflict with that?”  Fox responded, “right now, no.” Then, “you read that from the Vice President has cleared,” and another voice picked up the recitation, “the Vice President has cleared us to intercept tracks of interest and shoot them down if they do not respond per CONR CC [General Arnold].”  1032 You need to read this

The preceding account is how that event was recorded at the MCC position.  In the June 2004 Commission hearing the Staff presented the same information but recorded at a different position on the SOCC floor.  At that position a voice commented that the DO (Director of Operations) said no.  That voice was not picked up on the MCC channel.

Conclusion

We leave the story of 9-11 as told in the voice of Major Nasypany at this point.  The battle was over, his job thereafter was maintenance and continuity.  Life on the NEADS floor would thereafter follow two main threads.  The first was the one we just heard, shootdown authority and what to do about that.  The second was the emergence on the scene of fighter augmentation from an unexpected source, Andrews Air Force Base.

We hear the voice of Major Nasypany one last time in this story as he asks the logical question when told at 1041 that fighters were scrambling from Andrews.  “Are the coming under our control?”  1041 Andrews scrambled under our control

The key point here is that NEADS, and by extension CONR and NORAD, knew that the Andrews fighters were joining the fray.  They knew because Colonel Brooks from the Air National Guard Crisis Action Team  told them at 1039 before Andrews launched the Caps flight (Sasseville and Penney). 1039 Andrews CAT checks in with NEADS

Colonel Brooks was referred to the Senior Director position and when the phone was answered the story of the battle of 9/11 came full circle back to the original call from Boston Center just two hours earlier.  Sergeant Jeremy Powell, still on duty as the Senior Director/Technician, greeted the Andrews caller by saying “Huntress Weapons, Sergeant Powell.”  Powell was precise and effecient as always but did say, “The 113th, I hate to ask, where’s that?” 1039 Huntress Weapons Sergeant Powell

The initial assumption by Major Nasypany was that NEADS would control.  However, Sergeant Powell told Colonel Brooks that control would remain with FAA and that NEADS would be backup.  We will pick up that point when I retell the Andrews story in the voice of the Reagan National (DCA) controller.


9-11: NEADS Mission Crew Commander; a valiant effort, ultimately futile, Part IV

Introduction

This is the fourth in a series of articles describing the battle on the morning of September 11, 2001, from the perspective of the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), Mission Crew Commander (MCC) Major Kevin Nasypany.  The account is based on primary source information, the NEADS audio tapes.

In the first three articles (part I, part II, part III) we covered Major Nasypany’s actions up to 0941 EDT.  NEADS had heard about three hijacked aircraft, AA 11, UA 175, and AA 77.  NEADS established track B032 on a fast moving unknown near the White House which, retrospectively, was AA 77.  As we pick up the story, track B032 has faded, AA 77 is reported down well to the West, and the Mission Crew Commander, Major Nasypany has learned that the Langley fighters are not where he thought they were.

We concluded part III with this clip (0941 Delta what) that announced yet a fourth hijacked plane, Delta 1989.  Here is how things proceeded at NEADS from Major Nasypany’s perspective.

The Langley fighters, continued

Major Nasypany was listening to the weapons controllers working with the Langley fighters.  This next clip establishes three things.  First, NEADS was now in radio communication with the Langley flight lead, Quit 25.  Second, with Quit 25 squawking the AFIO code 7777, the controllers were responsible for clearing the route through traffic, as we hear.  Third, the last known location of track B032 (AA 77) was to become the Z point to establish a CAP (combat air patrol) over Washington.  0941 Establish CAP over Washington

Quit 25 asked for that specific point and was told to stand by and continue current heading.  According to the radar track, as depicted in the Part III graphic, that heading was toward Baltimore (BWI), and that explains why, as of 0942, the fighters were still not vectored toward the nation’s capital.

Expanded Operations

At this point NEADS was activating additional scope positions on the sector floor to expand operations to the Midwest.  Major Nasypany was now engaged on two fronts as we hear in this next clip.  His train of thought is difficult to establish since he was listening to the Weapons Controllers for the Langley fighters and his conversations, specifically with the Battle Cab, were continually overridden. This next audio fragment captures a portion of his 0943 brief to the Battle Cab concerning the possibility of additional assistance from Langley, the 1st Fighter Wing, for the eastern situation, and his concurrent order to contact Selfridge to seek help for the situation in the Midwest.  0943 Brief Battle Cab Langley Selfridge

In the continuation of the brief, at 0944, Nasypany briefed another aircraft spotted near the Pentagon, a probable reference to track B32 (AA 77) and “Delta eight niner” south south east of Toledo on which a “special track” had been established.  0944 Battle Cab brief continuation

Langley fighters approaching DC

As Nasypany concentrated on the Midwest, Selfridge and Duluth, the Langley fighters were about to go astray for a second time.  At 0946 the CAP point provided, 3825N 07702W was transposed in its northern component, which should have been 3852N, a separate story for another time.  Moreover, Quit 25 confirmed that “all birds” were squawking quad seven (7777), the AFIO code.  Quit 27 was not, according to the 84th RADES radar files. 0946 Quit 25 wrong coordinates

While that was happening Nasypany’s authority was questioned by a commanding officer in Toledo.  This next audio clip provides insight into Nasypany’s thought processes and performance.  He was prepared to “schmooze” his way to get units to respond but also prepared to summon Colonel Marr for support, if needed.  He also received a call from an off duty person who volunteered to come in.  Nasypany’s response is clear evidence that he had all the support he needed: “I have beau coup folks here!” 0948 Toledo questions authority

Over the next few minutes we gain even more insight into Nasypany, who tended to verbalize everything, either to himself or to those near him or listening to him.  First, he matter of factly stated that “Pentagon just got hit, CNN,” and then immediately turned to another person and told them to just do “the best they can.”  Then he returned to the Toledo situation musing that “God dammit, I can’t even protect my NCA (National Capital Authority),”  and then for, likely, the Toledo fighters demanded that they be “hot turned,” “I’ll pay for it, I got a credit card.”  Then someone asked about the Langley fighters and Naspany stated explicitly and profanely, “I’ll tell you what the history on that is, fuckin’ Giant Killer sent them out to 386 (Whiskey 386 training area).”  0950 Can’t even protect my NCA

By 0952 Nasypany’s attention had returned to the Langley fighters and protecting Washington.  In this next clip he gave explicit directions: “Talk to me about my Langley guys.  I want them over the NCA, NOW!!  0952 Langley over NCA NOW His immediate side comment showed that his attention was focused on Washington and not the Midwest:  “Bravo zero eight nine [Delta 1989] is making a hard right turn, whoever that was.”

Nasypany did, however, continue to follow the Delta 1989 scenario but was thinking well beyond the immediate situation.  At 0958 he placed a call to his counterpart at the Western Air Defense Sector (WADS).  He told the WADS MCC that NEADS wasn’t “doing so good right now” and that the situation could be a “world-wide, CONUS type of thing.”  His specific interest was in generating fighter assets from Fargo, ND.  The WADS MCC agreed to the request.  Of note is the degree of authority delegated to the Mission Crew Commanders at each of the air defense sectors.  The WADS MCC made the decision to support on her own recognizance with no hesitation.  0958 Request to WADS The time was 1000 EDT.

The Chain-of-Command at Work

Nasypany, for his part, immediately back briefed the Battle Cab.  In the course of the conversation he vocalized two very specific thoughts that demonstrate that he knew he was in command and needed to take very specific action.  First, he pressed the Battle Cab for specific guidance on what he was supposed to do during an intercept.  “What are you going to do if this is it?  What are you going to do?  I gotta give my guys directions.”

Second, he realized that the SOCC (Sector Operations Control Center) Director, an officer that out ranked him but was not part of the operational chain-of-command, was interfering with his work.  “I gotta get Ian off the floor, he has been circumventing my system here.  He is not an MCC, he needs to stay up there [Battle Cab.]”

That comment about the SOCC director is a specific example of NEADS ability to maintain the integrity of the chain of the command and to delegate authority and then stay out of the road.  At no time did Colonel Marr ever come to the SOCC floor.  He would only have done so–the Toledo situation–at the direct request of Major Nasypany.  Otherwise, Nasypany and subordinates were to be left to do the job for which they were trained.  The SOCC director violated the chain-of-command and Nasypany took action.  1000 What are we going to do

By 1003, another problem confronted Major Nasypany, a 5th airplane, one out of Canada headed for Washington.  Nasypany’s guidance was colloquial and apt, let’s “do the Northern border thing.”  By that time he had been looking to generate fighter assets from the Alpina range in Michigan and though they could assist.  He also asked if he could get E-3 support, specifically for the Chicago area, and tasked that requirement to the Surveillance Section.  At the end of the clip we learn that the Canadian information came from the Battle Cab.  That threat never existed.  It was speculation by Canadian intelligence officers that something like that might occur, a fact that NEADS will later learn.  For the moment, to Nasypany, it was a very real threat, “a 5th airplane.”  1003 Unknown from Canada

Nasypany continued to work the generation of additional fighter assets from multiple locations.  As a result he was concerned that he did not have radar and radio coverage over Chicago and at 1005 issued explicit orders for some one to “call them,” (Tinker AFB) yet another example of Nasypany’s command presence, decisiveness, and leadership that morning. 1005 Need E3 over Chicago

Example of Staff Coordination

There was one additional person from the Battle Cab on the SOCC floor and she was there with Major Nasypany’s concurrence and for the explicit purpose of briefing him on the status of additional fighters.  Major Dawne Deskins told Commission Staff that she spent the majority of her time in the Battle Cab working on obtaining additional air assets.  Listen in as Deskins and Nasypany compare notes shortly after 1005.  This clip portrays dedicated staff officers at work performing their duties under intense conditions.  1006 Deskins Nasypany coordinate

Shortly thereafter, Nasypany’s day took two concurrent turns for the worse. He heard for the first time about United 93, with a bomb on board.  As that came to his attention he also learned, but not recorded on his channel, of an unknown over the White House.  He issued explicit instructions, which on first listen sound like he was responding to United 93.  He was not.  His guidance pertained specifically to the unknown.  Here is how those two events were recorded at the MCC position.  Note, that, again, Nasypany pushed the Battle Cab for explicit instructions for the unknown, “intercept and what else.  Aircraft   over   the   White   House.”  1007 UA 93 bomb on board unknown over White House

Summary

As of 1010, Nasypany, who had been working the generation of additional assets, the inaccurate threat posed by Delta 1989, and the false threat of an unknown from Canada, was suddenly faced with two very real threats, United 93–crashed but unknown to NEADS–and an immediate threat to the White House.  We will pick up that story in Part V.

To Be Continued

Chaos Theory: UA 93; disruptive feedback, an interesting analysis

Introduction

The purpose of this short article is to document for the record an analysis of the final chapter in the UA 93 story.  In the language of chaos theory, UA 93 became disruptive feedback once Cleveland Center entered a new flight plan for the hijacked plane in the air traffic control system, with destination Reagan National Airport.  The disruptive feedback that United 93 was still in the air confounded the national level at the time and in the accounting in the aftermath.

UA 93 lost on TSD at 1028 EDT

Here is a clip from the F2 Position, National TRACON (1 DCA 101-102 Tape 1-2 F2 1327-1450 UTC, as archived by NARA as part of the Commission files)  The F2 Position controlled the Andrews fighters once airborne.  As of 1028 the F2 Position knew that there was no target associated with UA 93. 1028 UA 93 not in system

In previous articles I have dealt with disruptive feedback, primarily in terms of the false report of AA 11 still airborne and the erroneous report that Delta 1989 had been hijacked.  In the language of chaos theory feedback is disruptive if it results in “a gain” to a system.  Concerning events of 9-11 that “gain” was the addition of planes the either had ceased to exist or were not in distress.  By that measure, the introduction of a new flight plan for UA 93 by Cleveland Center became disruptive.  That action by Cleveland Center was beneficial to air traffic control, specifically Cleveland and Washington Centers.  It was not beneficial to the system at large as we shall see.

Here is a link to analysis done by Brian Stark (Boone870 on the web) some months ago.  That analysis included the audio clip from National TRACON.  Stark’s analysis remains the definitive work on the UA 93 Traffic Situation Display (TSD) story, as told in the primary source and secondary information material of the day, supplemented by later recall by Transportation Secretary, Norman Mineta. 

(Note: the link in the last slide is no longer active)

Even though UA 93 was reported down with an impact time of 1003 EDT the flight plan was displayed and updated in the Traffic Situation Display (TSD) system until the flight “landed” at 1028 EDT at Reagan National.  It was that “landing” that was concurrently reported to National TRACON by an FAA caller who was watching a TSD display. (In context, the FAA caller was likely either Baltimore or Dulles TRACON)

It was the “approach” to that landing that became the threat to the National Capital Region, as updated to Secretary Mineta by Monte Belger, according to Mineta’s interview the next year with MSNBC.

It would be nearly ten more minutes before the first Andrews fighter took off in pursuit of an airplane that no longer existed, in fact or in projected flight plan.

9-11: The day of; a report card

Update: January 16, 2013

At 9:10, at least one controller at Boston Center notified all aircraft on his frequency to increase cockpit security.  That guidance was recorded on a traffic management phone line and a conversation concerning UA 175 overrides part of the controllers warning.  This following brief clip is an example of the multiple tasks being handled concurrently by Boston Center–warning to pilots in the air, determining data about UA175, and initiating a ground stop.

0910 Attention All Aircraft Increase Cockpit Security

Update: January 13, 2013

The FAA’s Air Traffic Control System Command Center (ATCSCC, Herndon Center) is downgraded from high marks to low marks because of its reluctance to react immediately and positively to a Boston Center request to increase cockpit security.  Boston Center made that request at 9:15 EDT.  Here is that request.

 0915 ZBW Recommends Increased Cockpit Security

The request was to make such notifications for aircraft that had departed Boston; however, Herndon Center should have picked up and expanded the initiative. Even though Tony, Command Center East, told Boston he would get the message out that did not happen. The Herndon Center position was that such notification should come from the airlines, not air traffic control.  Nevertheless, Boston Center made such notifications on its own recognizance, which reinforces the original high marks given to that Center.

Ultimately, the notification to United Airlines flight 93, the one flight that might have benefited by such a warning, was sent belatedly by United Airlines via ACARS (Aircraft Communications Reporting and Addressing System).

Introduction

(Note: The grades given are subject to revision as more is learned about events of the day.)

Today is the 10th anniversary of the battle of 9-11. Even with this small increment of history behind us it is possible to look back and grade the work done by the defenders against the attack–the government bureaucracy, with the Federal Aviation Administration and the North American Aerospace Defense Command at the fore, and the Air Traffic Control System Command Center (Herndon Center) and the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) in command.

The front line of troops comprised the enroute air traffic control centers and the traffic control (TRACON) facilities and the designated air defense units at Otis and Langley Air Force Bases.  It did not include the fighters at Andrews, but they became a factor anyway.

The report card for the offense, the attackers, was long ago established; a 75% rate of accomplishment.  The report card for the emergency response I leave to others with more knowledge.

This is a report card for the government not the administration.  The standard operating procedures (SOP) and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) in effect on September 11 transcended administrations, some procedures dating back for years.

Some argue that 9-11 was a failure of the Bush administration, others that it was a failure of the Clinton administration.  My position is that is was a failure of a bureaucracy of long standing, independent of who happened to be in charge, politically.

The work done that day will be graded on a curve; on the whole the defense was a failure.  Yet, within that failure, the work of some agencies stood out and deserves higher marks.  We start with the highest performing entities.

Highest Marks

  • FAA Reagan National (DCA)
  • FAA Otis Tower/TRACON
  • USAF National Guard Otis AFB, 102d Fighter Wing

High Marks

  • NORAD Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS)
  • FAA Boston Center (ZBW)
  • FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center (Herndon Center)
  • FAA Cleveland Center (ZOB)

Passing Marks

  • NORAD CONUS Region (CONR)
  • FAA New York Center (ZNY)
  • FAA New York TRACON
  • USAF NG 119th Fighter Wing Detachment, Langley AFB
  • FAA Newark Tower
  • USAF Langley AFB Tower
  • FAA Norfolk TRACON

Low Marks

  • FAA Indianapolis Center (ZID)
  • Air Force Rescue and Coordination Center
  • Giant Killer (Fleet Area Control & Surveillance Facility, Virginia Capes)
  • United States Navy
  • United States Air Force

Failing Marks

  • FAA Headquarters
  • FAA Washington Center (ZDC)
  • FAA Dulles TRACON
  • FAA Regions (New England, Eastern, Great Lakes)
  • White House Situation Room
  • Secret Service
  • JCS National Military Command Center (NMCC)
  • NORAD
  • USAF Langley AFB Base Operations

Incomplete

  • United States Air Force Air National Guard
  • Andrews AFB, 121st Fighter Squadron

Grades given on 9/11

FAA graded the performance of both itself and the Secret Service shortly after 1052 EDT.  On line 4530 at Herndon Center this bit of fatalistic conversation transpired between Herndon Center and FAA Headquarters.  “So, Secret Service is more screwed up than we are, John?” This was in reference to one of the erroneous Secret Service reports of the morning.  105231 SS More Screwed Up than we are 4530 Line

That comment was followed a few seconds later by this exchange:  105314 SS Reverse Call Not Camp David 4530 Line

Voice One:  Ah, Secret Service now is reversing their call, they think the United did go in south of Johnstown and not at Camp David.

Voice Two: We can’t reverse our calls on these things.

Voice One: [Snort]

Vocie Two: Ah, OK

Voice One  So, they’re worse, they’re worse  than we are, right?

Highest Marks Discussion

DCA. The highest mark goes to Reagan National Tower/TRACON (DCA), the only entity, military or civilian, that vectored a military aircraft to follow one of the hijacked airplanes.  Once alerted by Dulles TRACON the DCA response was immediate.

Otis. Two other entities share a mark nearly as high, Otis Tower/TRACON and the fighter detachment at Otis.  Between the two they reduced the delay time by, in effect, putting the alert pilots on battle stations before such an order was received.  Further, Otis Tower/TRACON followed up with NEADS on the request from Boston Center for military support.

A comment is needed at this point.  Marks awarded are for actual performance that morning, not for performance in the aftermath.  Afterwards, the Otis pilots internalized their experience into a myth, one of supersonic flight and direct response to the situation in New York.  Even though that myth persists to this day that is not what happened.

High Marks Discussion

NEADS. NEADS, by every measure, performed as well as it could that morning, given the information made available to it.  Specifically, NEADS immediately eliminated an exercise which had not yet restarted as an intervening variable.  Further, NEADS personnel continuously responded with speed to fragmentary orders issued on the fly.  NEADS is downgraded from highest marks for two reasons.  First, there was no followup to make sure the Langley scramble proceeded as ordered.  Second, NEADS had no awareness of the importance or even the existence of the Herndon Center.

ZBW. Boston Center receives equal marks for not waiting for higher FAA authority to engage the military.  Boston fell short for the same reason as did NEADS, a failure to recognize that NEADS should have been communicating with Herndon Center.

ATCSCC. Herndon Center also receives equal marks. As Center personnel told Commission staff on our first orientation visit, the ATCSCC was, in effect,  the National Military Command Center (NMCC) that morning.  Herndon receives the highest possible mark for recognizing that the only way to manage chaos was to bound the situation. That they did by ordering every commercial airplane aloft to land.  Herndon Center is downgraded for two reasons. First, they turned the requirement to request military support back to Boston Center. Second, when Boston Center recommend that a cockpit alert be sent to all planes in the air Herndon demurred.  Such communication was the provenance of the airlines, not FAA, according to SOP.

ZOB. Cleveland Center also receives high marks for its prompt and continuous reporting on the flight path of UA 93 and its initiative to establish a new flight plan to assist Washington Center.  Cleveland Center’s reporting was passed in near real time to FAA Headquarters, another high mark for Herndon Center for keeping a line open to Headquarters so that the information could be passed along as it was received at Herndon.  Had Cleveland Center notified NEADS directly and immediately they would have received highest marks.

Passing marks Discussion

CONR. NORAD’s CONUS Region, CONR, receives passing marks for facilitating the command decisions made at NEADS.

ZNY, TRACON, Newark. The FAA’s New York Center also receives passing marks as do its subordinate facilities, New York TRACON and Newark Tower.

Langley Detachment. Langley air defense detachment.  The Hooligans, a detachment from the North Dakota Air National Guard, receive passing marks, downgraded because of a lack of understanding of how Langley Tower actually launched air defense fighters.

Langley Tower. I am convinced, after three trips to Langley Tower, that their insistent story that they used and would continue to use a flight plan of “090 for 60” made sense from their perspective.  They are downgraded, here, for a failure of imagination, not action.

Norfolk TRACON. The TRACON did its job by asking the Langley lead pilot which way he wanted to go.  The Langley scramble, as a whole, was a series of understandable discrete actions that did not cohere in the aggregate.  Hence the passing marks for Langley Tower, TRACON and the air defense detachment.

Low Marks Discussion

ZID. FAA’s Indianapolis Center.  “Indy” Center was a victim of the timing, planned or otherwise, of the terrorist attack.  AA 77 was hijacked before UA 175 struck the World Trade Center and it was understandable why AA 77 was considered to be lost as opposed to hijacked.  Indy did not have the advantage that Boston Center had and Cleveland Center had, hijacker pilot broadcasts on frequency.  Nevertheless, at the time they informed Air Force Rescue and Great Lakes Region they should have also notified Herndon Center, given what had already transpired in New York.

USAF RCC. The Air Force Rescue and Coordination Center, at Langley, also receives low marks for failure to recognize the larger picture, given they were notified of the loss of AA 77 several minutes after UA 175 struck the World Trade Center.

Giant Killer. Giant Killer, the Navy air traffic control facility for military warning areas also receives low marks, for two reasons.  First, they had already handled the Otis scramble and knew the urgency of the situation.  They heard the scramble order for the Langley fighters yet did nothing to correct the situation when Langley Tower entered a flight plan of 090 for 60.  Further, Giant Killer decided on its own that its tapes could be recycled, normal procedure, and not retained for after action analysis.

United States Navy. That myopia was shared by Giant Killer’s United States Navy chain-of-command.  No one, at any level, thought it necessary to preserve the Giant Killer air traffic control tapes as evidence.  Thus the low mark for the United States Navy.

United States Air Force. The myopia was not limited to the Navy chain-of-command.  The Air Force failed to direct units at Langley Air Force Base, specifically Base Operations, to retain records beyond the normal retention period.

Failures Discussion

FAA. First and foremost on this list is FAA Headquarters.  FAA policies and procedures failed to stop any of the 19 hijackers from entering the National Airspace and then boarding the four hijacked aircraft. That is the single most egregious point of failure the morning of September 11, 2001.  Further, FAA failed to get itself organized at the highest level in reasonable fashion.  Of note, at Headquarters, there were three different crisis activity centers.  In addition to operations at the WOC (Washington Operations Center), air traffic control officials set up their own response cell at the other end of the 10th floor at FAA Headquarters.  Moreover, the only entity actually talking to the national level across all agencies, the ACI Watch, was operating in its SCIF on the 3d floor.  Since at least 0916 that morning, the ACI watch was in communication with all other watch centers in the Washington area, including the NMCC, DIA, State, NSA, State, and CIA, among others.

ZDC and Dulles TRACON. Washington Center and Dulles TRACON failed to react and look for AA 77 even though they were aware of an unknown track as early as 9:25 according to their after action documents and air traffic control communications.

FAA Regions. The FAA’s regional structure failed because, as administrative headquarters, they attempted to play an operational role that just confused things.  Herdon Center should have been the focus of activity, it was not.  Specifically, Great Lakes Region failed to promptly notify Herndon Center of the loss of AA 77 as soon as they were notified by Indianapolis Center.

WHSR. The White House Situation Room failed by facilitating the use of the Secure Video Teleconference System (SVTS) to isolate key agency personnel just as the Pentagon was struck.

USSS. The Secret Service receives the highest possible marks for protecting the President and the Vice President.  However, the Service failed to realize that its mission to protect the President and the Vice President and the mission of the President and the Vice President to protect the nation had become mutually exclusive.  Thus, the Service consigned the Vice President to PEOC purgatory and facilitated the decision to have the President flee,  to hightail it to the hinterlands.  Moreover, some of the false reporting that day was later attributed to the Secret Service.

JCS/NMCC. The National Military Command Center (NMCC) dithered in its selection of a suitable conference call.  First, they delayed because a NOIWON conference had been convened by CIA at about 9:16. (See FAA discussion) Ironically, that conference had already connected all the major entities, to include FAA.  Second, the NMCC convened a significant event conference which failed.  Then, instead of convening a significant air conference they chose a conference with serious doomsday overtones, the air threat conference.  But the most serious NMCC failure was of a different nature.  The NMCC and, by extension, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had no grasp of the disposition of friendly forces, an egregious failure.  At the time critical decisions were made concerning the President’s route, the Langley fighters were directly overhead the Pentagon, the E4B, Venus 77 was establishing a racetrack orbit centered on Richmond, Virginia, and the Andrews fighters were preparing to return from Dare Range on the North Carolina coast.

NORAD. NORAD wisely let CONR and NEADS deal with the tactical situation but failed at the national level by facilitating the choice of an air threat conference by the NMCC.

Langley Air Force Base. Base Operations at Langley had no grasp of emergency response operations by tenant units.  There was no mechanism in place for the Rescue Coordination Center to report that AA 77 was missing, a fact known at Langley by 0910 that morning.  There was no mechanism in place to provide oversight of the Langley scramble, even though Base Operations heard the original order.  Base Operations was silent as the Langley scramble went astray.  To compound things further Base Operations decided they did not need to keep records of the day longer than the prescribed time.

Incompletes Discussion

USAF ANG. The grade for the United Stated Air Force National Guard will be adjusted to “high” once the Guard gets its story straightened out with what actually happened that morning.  Specifically, the Guard expeditiously generated fighters sorties at non-air defense bases and armed them as quickly as they could.  In addition, tanker support that morning was excellent.

Andrews. The grade for the 121st Squadron at Andrews and its higher headquarters will be adjusted to “passing” once it, too, gets its story straight.

Personal Comment

The grades given are by me, not by the Commission, Commission Staff, or Team 8.  I have thought about these grades for several years now and I share them with my readers on this 10th anniversary of the battle of 9-11.


 

Chaos Theory: The Langley Scramble; the ultimate linear response

Introduction

I recently published the third in a series of articles about 9-11 from the perspective of the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), Mission Crew Commander, Major Kevin Nasypany.  Concurrently, I have been rereading Does God Play Dice?, The New Mathematics of Chaos, by Ian Stewart.  While reading, it struck me that the Langley scramble on 9-11, wayward by anyone’s definition, can be described using the language of chaos, in this case linearity and nonlinearity.

Linear processes or procedures

In multiple articles over the past two years I have cataloged and discussed the procedures used by government and military officials at all levels in response to the attack on the morning of September 11, 2001.  Among those were the Federal Aviation Administration’s primary net, the National Military Command Center’s air threat conference call, and the national level’s Secure Video Television System (SVTS).  All were unsuited to the task, each operated in isolation, one from the other.

Notably, one linear procedure not used was the hijack protocol, for two reasons. First, it was cumbersome, out of date, and no one was quite sure at the Federal Aviation Administration who the hijack coordinator was.  Second, Boston Center could not wait for higher headquarters to act and short circuited the process.

At Langley Tower, personnel struggled that morning with what to do after the order to scramble the air defense fighters came down.  The controllers defaulted to an existing linear procedure; it seemed the logical thing to do, one that sent the Langley fighters out to sea, despite the scramble order.

To find out why that happened we turn to Ian Stewart for an explanation.

Linearity, in context

We live in a nonlinear world, yet the mathematical simplifications that allow us to understand that world are largely linear.  Further, the institutions we establish to manage life in a nonlinear world operate by establishing set procedures, SOPs in the vernacular, so that people know what to do without constant attention from leadership and management.  Such procedures become routinized into tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) and generally work well to manage the day-to-day activities needed to get through one work day and on to the next.  Except when they don’t.

Stewart had this to say about linearity.  “In classical times, lacking techniques to face up to nonlinearities, the process of linearization was carried to such extremes that it often occurred while the equations were being set up (all emphases here and after are as in the original). In the management world that equates to writing SOPs or TTPs based on the observed activities of people doing their jobs.  If something works, make it routine.

Stewart continued, “Few asked themselves what the long-term future might be for a method which–to be brutal–solved the wrong equations.” Stewart could well be speaking for any number of managers, leaders, and supervisors when he wrote, “‘Give me an answer,’ is the demand.  So the linear theory obliges, hoping that nobody will notice when its the wrong answer.”

A digression

Here I digress for a moment as an example from 9-11 pops into mind. Richard Clarke, ordered, “I want the head of every agency” to participate in his SVTS conference that was activated at 0925 and convened at 0940, the exact time frame that Langley Tower, Norfolk TRACON and the Langley fighters were struggling with the mandate of the scramble order. Clarke got his answer and it was the wrong one. The leadership at each agency was isolated from its work force. Nowhere was that more evident than at FAA headquarters, as documented in primary source audio files.  “Jeff is being pulled away….you know, everyone just left the room.” They left because they  were on their way to Clarke’s SVTS conference.  0949 Pulling Jeff away

Back to Stewart

Stewart then became explicit in his tutorial.  “Today’s science shows that nature is relentlessly nonlinear.” He elaborated, “Classical mathematics concentrated on linear equations for a sound pragmatic reason; it couldn’t solve anything else.”  Substitute the word “management” for “mathematics” and the word “procedures” for “equations” and you end up with a statement of how management, be it civilian or military, government or private, operates.  By and large, management is not capable of managing nonlinearity and certainly not the chaos that often ensues.

Stewart then became even more explicit.  “Linearity is a trap…if you decide that only linear equations are worth thinking about, self-censorship sets in. Your textbooks fill with triumphs of linear analysis, its failures buried so deep that the graves go unmarked…”  Now, again substitute “procedures” for “equations” and reread Stewart’s words from a manager or leader perspective.

With that background, borrowing the language of chaos theory from Stewart, we can now turn to a detailed look at the Langley scramble.

Langley Scramble

Here is an audio clip of the scramble order as heard at Norfolk TRACON.  0924 Langley Scramble Norfolk Tower Such an order, by SOP at the time, required four specific pieces of information; a direction, a distance, an altitude, and a target.  NEADS had only two of the four and, to its considerable credit, broke the habit of linearity and broadcast the order specifying only a direction and an altitude, heading 010 (northerly), flight level 290.

All concerned parties in the Langley area–Langley Tower, base operations, air defense detachment, Norfolk TRACON, and Giant Killer–heard that order.  The first entity to take action was Langley Tower. The Tower struggled briefly with what to do and defaulted to existing TTP, linearity.

Three times Commission Staff visited Langley Tower. Three times we climbed the Tower and discussed the Langley scramble with personnel on duty that day. Three times we were told that they did what they did with due deliberation and that, moreover, they would do it again.  The established procedure was to enter a flight plan of “090 for 60” (easterly for 60 nautical miles) into the FAA system, and that is what they did.

Taped to the console, as of the staff’s last visit in 2004, was that same flight plan, “090 for 60.”  The Langley Tower story was consistent, the controller on duty looked at the supervisor for confirmation when the scramble order came in.  Both looked at the standard flight plan and without hesitation the controller entered a plan into the system that was nearly 90 degrees askew from what the scramble order intended.  How can that happen?

Following the language and logic of Stewart, an established procedure prevailed.  The nonlinear NEADS initiative to issue a partial scramble order did not translate to similar action at Langley Tower.

There was rationalle behind the Tower’s decision to go with the existing process.  First, the scramble order did not specify a distance.  It took a direction and a distance to enter a flight plan into the FAAs air traffic control system. Second, they knew from experience that it often took several tries to find a flight plan that would be accepted by the system.  The standing procedure of 090 for 60 was a known quantity, one already in the system and fool proof.  Third, they knew from long experience that it didn’t matter, someone else would tell the fighters where to go, once airborne.

And that’s exactly what happened.  Norfolk TRACON gained radar contact while the fighters were lifting off and when they reached the SOP climb out point, runway heading to 4000 feet, the TRACON controller asked the lead pilot which way he wanted to go.  Absent any other information, the pilot and the controller agreed that the flight plan was later information than the scramble order.  093100 Langley What Heading would like hand off Giant Killer

And that’s how the Langley fighters ended up heading for the military training area Whiskey 386 and the NEADS controllers “had no idea why.’  0933 No idea why

Lesson Learned

“Linearity is a trap,” Stewart advised.  That advice is applicable to leaders and managers at all levels as they establish SOPs and develop TTPs to manage daily activity.  Typically, exercises and training emphasize procedures, to develop habit.  A better solution may be to make exercises nonlinear, to develop the skills necessary to recognize that nonlinear, even chaotic, situations require nonlinear responses.

Epilogue

At the same time Norfolk TRACON and the Langley fighters agreed on a flight plan of “090 for 60” Danielle O’Brien at Dulles TRACON sounded the alarm about a fast-moving, primary-only target fast approaching.  O’Brien, in one of the definitive nonlinear actions of the morning, picked up the phone and alerted anyone that was listening.  Here is her warning as immediately acknowledged and then acted on by Reagan National Tower and TRACON.  093222 AA77 Danielle Heard at Reagan We See Him Krant Tape

When O’Brien made the warning call AA 77 was just passing over Fairfax, Virginia.  It was already east of Dulles and was soon to cross inside the beltway.  Here is a Google Earth plot showing the relationship.

Here is a screen print from the radar files depicting all primary radar returns in the area from 0928-0938 EDT.  The primary-only track of AA 77 is annotated to show the approximate time of the O’Brien alert and the tracks relationship to Dulles and the Pentagon.

O’Brien’s alert was one of two definitive nonlinear actions by FAA personnel that day.  The other was the action of Boston Center to call NEADS directly about AA 11 not quite an hour earlier.  NEADS would hear about the fast-moving target announced by O’Brien almost three minutes after the warning; not from Dulles, not from Reagan National, not from Washington Center, not from Herndon Center, not from the National Military Command Center, but from, once again, Boston Center.  093536 AA77 Scoggins VFR 6 Miles

In the language of chaos theory, strange attractors, indeed.