Category: 9-11

9-11: Hijacker seating arrangement; interesting tactical move, prior planned

Introduction

During the period November 17-21, 2003, I traveled with Team 7 during their site visits to American Airlines and United Airlines headquarters. I wrote an MFR to “list certain details from Mr. Kara’s perspective.” Those details included transponders, cockpit vision, flyability, ACARS, and ASD (Aircraft Situation Display). Here I focus primarily on the hijacker seating, with brief comment on other items of interest.

Hijacker Seating

Here is what I wrote:

The hijacker seating arrangement of 1-2-2, with pilot to the front on the B757s was clearly pre-meditated and different from the 2-1-2 seating arrangement aboard the B767s with the pilot in the middle. On the B757 there is only one cabin crew (one of four or five), the purser, sitting forward immediately aft the cockpit. On the B767, as many as three (of nine) sit forward immediately aft the cockpit.

This is an example of the detailed planning for the attack and is based on information that would have been obtained from the several cross-country orientation flights taken by the hijacker pilots and associates.

My Assessment

I estimate that the plan was to have each pilot seated as close to the cockpit as tactically convenient, based on availability of seating when reservations were made. The B767 crew arrangement, however, dictated that accomplices be seated forward of the hijacker pilot.

Other Brief Comments

According to my MFR, the senior pilots for both United and American assessed that the UA 175 hijacker pilot likely did not see AA 11 fly into the World Trade Center north tower, but  “it was near certain that he would have immediately seen the fire/plume.”

According to the senior pilots, “The cockpits of the B757 and B767 are virtually interchangeable in their essential elements. Both are “easy to fly.”

The United Airlines alert to UA 93 about cockpit intrusions was sent at 1324:24Z. UA 93 crew asked for confirmation at 1326:10Z. That was the last crew communication from the cockpit. In a recent update to the 9/11 Report Card, I downgraded Herndon Center for not following up on a Boston Center request to notify pilots in the air to increase cockpit security. That Boston request was made at 9:15, nearly 10 minutes before the warning was sent to UA 93.

The Aircraft Situation Display was not time sensitive and refreshed each minute or more. Its sensitivity allowed United to maintain continuity on UA93, but did not allow American to gain situational awareness of AA 77.

9-11: UA175; Boston Center; Reaction in Real Time, Ground Stop

Purpose

This short article documents for researchers and historians how Boston Center (ZBW) learned of the impact of a second airplane [UA175] into the World Trade Center and its immediate reaction to a request from New York Center (ZNY) to ground stop everything.

The Impact

ZBW learned of the second impact as it occurred, as recorded at the Severe Weather position Traffic Management Unit (NARA Batch 5, tape 3007988-s2, certification length 42 seconds). ZBW was on the phone with ZNY discussing the fact that ZNY was not taking any hand offs, any overflights. Wanda at the Air Traffic Control System Command Center (Herndon Center) facilitated the conversation. Thus, Herndon Center also learned of the second impact in real time. Here is that three-way conversation.

0902 ZBW ZNY second WTC struck

The Reaction

Within seconds, ZBW Traffic Management Unit complete a series of brief calls to airports in its area ordering a ground stop. There is an important aspect to the notifications. The traffic manager at ZBW started by declaring that all commercial traffic was ground stopped.  By the third call he had shortened his message to a requirement to “ground stop everything.” This is an example of how FAA facilities became confused as to whether or not the ground stop and the later order to land all commercial air traffic pertained to the military, law enforcement, and first responders. Here is that series of calls.

090340 ZBW Ground Stop Calls to Towers

I will add to this article as I find examples of FAA facilities asking for clarification.

9-11: AA11; Initial Notifications, the Boston Center perspective

Introduction

This article is an extension of my recent conversation with Paul Schreyer and is the second of two articles that deal directly with inaccuracies in Schreyer’s “Anomalies” article published in the Journal of 9/11 Studies. The first article dealt with the non-correlation between the Langley fighters and the B747, Venus 77, the so-called “mystery” plane. In this article we turn to Schreyer’s speculation that NEADS was notified as early as 8:31 EDT.

Schreyer’s Position

Schreyer believes that Colin Scoggins, Military Specialist, Boston Center, called the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) as early as 8:31 EDT and that conversation directly calls into question the timeline of events as established by the 9/11 Commission. Schreyer’s argument is based on anecdotal information, in this case the recall of events by Scoggins.  Schreyer judges that the established timeline of events is off by several minutes.

At this point it is useful to discuss, briefly, a 9/11 truth community tendency to bias times as early as possible, to round down vigorously when convenient to do so. For example, I have seen mention in the blogosphere that NEADS was notified at 8:37, based on the original alert call to NEADS. That call rang through shortly before 8:38 and was answered at 8:37:55. A Mission Crew Commander was summoned to the phone and she was on the call by 8:39.  She received actionable information, a set of coordinates, at 8:40.  The Mission Crew Commander/Technician logged the notification in the official log as 8:40. The point is it takes time, measurable time, for events to unfold.

In Schreyer’s case he takes Scoggins recall of a position for AA11 as “20 miles south of Albany,” and extrapolates his argument based on the time that AA11 was 20 miles south of Albany.  The more likely case, even if Scoggins’ recall is accurate, is that by the time he made his call AA11 was south of the position Schreyer extrapolates.

Commission Staff findings

The staff interviewed Scoggins and considered his recall information in light of available primary source information, specifically the audio files from NEADS, Boston Center, Cape TRACON, and the Air Traffic Control System Command Center (Herndon Center). The staff understood that eye witness and participant recall information was useful if used in conjunction with primary source information and any logs and other secondary material that might be available. The staff determined that Scoggins first talked to NEADS soon after 8:38 EDT when he was called by NEADS.

The Evidence

There is no disagreement with Schreyer about the radar tracks. He has them right. What is at issue is the other primary source information, the audio files, which do not support either Scoggins’ recall or Schreyer’s extrapolation.

The Commission Staff received two deliveries of audio tapes from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The first delivery consisted of copies of the tapes that FAA provided to the National Traffic Safety Board as part of its accident investigation submissions. Those tapes contained only audio files that directly pertained to information about the air traffic control of the four hijacked airplanes. FAA was duly diligent in compiling those files and did provide all information required by the NTSB. The tape from each relevant air traffic control information contained several minutes of information before and after each relevant transmission or sequence of transmissions. The Commission received those files on cassette tapes in .mp3 format.

However, the body of evidence contained in those mandatory submissions fell well short of what the staff needed. We requested and received four hours of continuous recordings (0800-1200 EDT) from every phone line in the Traffic Management Units (TMU) of the responsive FAA en route centers, as well as tapes from the towers and TRACONS involved. We also asked for and received tapes for the air traffic control of the Otis, Langley, and Andrews fighters, which were not part of the FAA submission to the NTSB. That second delivery of tapes was also on cassette tapes but in .wav format.

Concerning Boston Center specifically, that second delivery of tapes provided a record of all calls into and out of the TMU, to include the desk of the Military Specialist, Colin Scoggins.

What The Record Reveals

Note to historians and academicians.  The audio files, below, come from the NARA collection, Batch 5, tape 148-911-03007988H1.s1.wav.  The tape contains a 45-second certification at the beginning that identifies the position recorded as “Severe Weather.”  There are no earlier responsive conversations on any of the other Traffic Management Unit (TMU) tapes from Boston Center. Altogether, eight phone lines in the Boston Center TMU were recorded.

The first call out was shortly after  8:27 to Herndon Center by Dan Bueno alerting first Herndon and then Cleveland and New York Centers. Bueno told Herndon Center that AA11 was West of Albany, southbound. Tony at Herndon Center immediately responded “I see him.”  Herndon Center did not have a radar feed.  What Tony was seeing was the path of AA11 on a traffic situation display (TSD).

082715 AA11 ZBW to Command Center

That call continued at 8:29 when Herndon Center linked Boston, New York and Cleveland centers on a teleconference. During that conference Boston Center reported the location as “one five” miles south of Albany. Tony advised the conferees that “you can tag him up on the TSD.” Further, Boston established the altitude as flight level 290. Altogether, the communication from Boston to Herndon and on to New York and Cleveland took three minutes. This is a good example of the measurable time it took, and takes, to process events in real time.  Here is the continuation.

0829 ZBW Continuation to ZNY and ZOB

The second call was at 8:34 to Cape TRACON asking if Otis fighters could respond. Dan Bueno also made that call and was handed off to the “sup” [supervisor]. Approximately 8:35:15 he told the Cape supervisor  that AA11 was 40 miles south of Albany. That call is consistent with Scoggins’ recall, except that the call was made by Bueno, not Scoggins, and it was to Cape TRACON not NEADS. Here is that call.

 0834 ZBW call to Cape TRACON

Scoggins recall, therefore, is not the 8:31 time that Schreyer extrapolates, but a time at least four minutes later. Scoggins, Bueno, and Cooper worked in close proximity and all were aware of what the other was doing. It is natural that Scoggins might recall that he made the call. If Scoggins had called NEADS that call would have been recorded on one of the TMU lines.

Thereafter, Cooper made the 8:38 call to NEADS and alerted the Senior Director/Technician who called a Mission Crew Commander to the phone. By the time she took the call an Identification Technician had already dialed Boston Center and was talking to Colin Scoggins.

At NEADS, the two calls overlap on the tapes and the tapes from both facilities prove a clear and conclusive record of the notification to the military by FAA, just as the Commission staff wrote in Chapter One of the Commission Report.

Comment

Schreyer’s urge to extrapolate a single piece of information, out of context,  in favor of an explanation that calls into question the established facts of the day is understandable given that he is pursuing a false flag thesis concerning 9/11. Scoggin’s compression of time and conflation of events is typical of most eye witness and participant recall of events such as 9/11. My consistent position is that the story of the day of 9/11 is best told in the recorded voices of the day. Further, the air defense story is best told using radar data and voice communications in conjunction.

9-11: The Langley Scramble; a different perspective

Background

I have been in an extended email discussion with Paul Schreyer concerning the Langley Scramble. My position was established in the “gang aft agley” paper (and Addendum) several years ago. Succinctly, the Langley scramble was a serious of understandable, logical individual events that did not cohere in the aggregate.

Schreyer’s position is based on a false flag theory which let to his “anomalies” paper published elsewhere on the web. To try and help Schreyer clarify his understanding I came up with a different perspective, one I shared with him.

A Different Perspective

Schreyer believes that the scramble order, itself, was changed. That is not accurate, it remained the baseline for the scramble as it developed. Langley Tower could not translate the scramble order to a flight plan that they were confident the air traffic control system would accept without trial and error. Therefore, they used a proven flight plan, one of long standing, zero nine zero for 60 (090 for 60) nautical miles.

Comparing a scramble order to a flight plan is problematic. It is an apples and oranges comparision; two distinct and separate processes. A scramble order is simply a device to get the air defense fighters into the air so that weapons controllers can then tell them what to do. The flight plan is the air traffic control means of getting the fighters safely into the national airspace system. It requires a direction and a distance. The scramble order issued did not included a distance. However, Langley Tower air traffic controllers were confident using a standard flight plan, knowing from experience that weapons controllers would take over. Except they didn’t, and therein lie the details.

What happened

The procedures in place, to include 090 for 60 (a flight plan) were cold war era practices that survived into the anti-drug era. Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) weapons controller radios could not reach the Langley fighters at low altitude once airborne, but that didn’t matter because the flight plan 090 for 60 delivered the fighters to military airspace controlled by Navy air traffic controllers at a facility known as Giant Killer. Those controllers were responsible for air traffic control in off shore training areas.

Giant Killer could then act as a relay to NEADS, just as they did on 9/11. It was Norfolk TRACON/Tower’s intermediate responsibility to take control of the fighters once in the national air space system and then hand them off to Giant Killer prior to entry into the training area, as they did on 9/11, unless the lead pilot requested otherwise.

On 9/11 the flight lead, Quit 25, did not tell Norfolk to send him North to get back on the scramble azimuth. In the heat of battle, in the chaos of the morning, he elected to continue east and was handed off to Giant Killer. Giant Killer was in contact with NEADS and did turn the fighters at NEADS request, direct Baltimore.  Nothing was known about AA 77 and the threat it posed. The perceived threat was AA 11 bearing down on the nation’s capital from the North.

There is no fault that accrues to Langley, the tower controllers did their job and, in their words, would do the same thing again if they had it to do over. I did mark NEADS  down in a report card issued on 9/11/11 for not knowing how scrambles actually proceeded at Langley, by the way.

Why it happened

Here, we turn to chaos theory for an understanding.  The Langley scramble, writ large and in detail, is an excellent example of sensitive dependence on initial conditions. Those initial conditions include a cold war era structure and policy; an emphasis on counter drug operations; and a requirement to identify all planes entering the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).  NEADS (and NORAD) was, as General McKinley testifed to the Commission in May, 2003, “focused outward.”

Scramble missions had to do with either drug runners (counterdrug operations), special cold war-related tracks (Aeroflot, China Air, Cubana), or DVFR (Defense visual flight rules) flights–fish spotters, cable checkers, doctors and dentists, “Moms and Pops,” who filed to exit the ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone) and then forgot to turn their transponders back on when re-entering the ADIZ. The standard flight plan at Langley Tower was a proven method of getting the fighters to altitude, over water, and headed East to prosecute any of those missions.

NEADS controllers on 9/11 did not understand the standard techniques in place at Langley.  As the NEADS tapes reveal, the weapons controller technician did “not know why” the fighters were headed toward an off shore training area.

For perspective, interested readers should review my series of Vigilant Guardian  articles covering the period Sep 3-11, 2001. (scroll down to third article in the category) The “Moms and Pops” reference comes from my interviews of nearly two dozen Southeast Air Defense Sector (SEADS) Mission Crew Commanders during my work on the Brothers To The Rescue project while at the Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General.

Who participated

Altogether, eight individuals, who I will identify by position, caused the Langley scramble to happen as it did, up to the point that NEADS realized the flight had gone astray.  All eight—four at NEADS, two at Langley Tower, one at Norfolk TRACON/Tower, and the lead pilot—were duly diligent and did their jobs as best they could given the information available to them.  None were negligent and there was no outside voice, no unseen false flag opportunist that intervened.  Their combined story is complete, coherent, and logical, understanding that NEADS did not appreciate the impact of what were standard operating procedures at Langley.

At NEADS, the weapons controller and weapons controller technician were responsible for the metrics that produced the scramble order, azimuth 010, flight level 290.  The flight level was based on the last known altitude for AA 11.  The senior director approved the order (with the knowledge of the Mission Crew Commander and the NEADS Commander) and it was broadcast by the senior director technician.

The broadcast was heard by Langley command post, Langley tower, the fighter detachment, Giant Killer, and Norfolk Tower/TRACON.  At Langley Tower, the duty air traffic controller and his supervisor entered the flight plan, 090 for 60, into the national airspace system.  Control, “radar contact,” was passed to Norfolk Tower while the fighters were taking off.

The Norfolk Tower controller knew by SOP that the fighters were to proceed on runway heading (runway 8, 80 degrees) to an altitude of 4000 feet before turning.  At that point he asked the flight lead which way he wanted to go.

Quit 25, the flight lead concluded that the flight plan was later information than the scramble order and turned slightly right to a heading of 090 and continued.  When I played the controller conversation back to him after our interview he said he did not recall that and that it “was an opportunity missed.”

Perspective

The Langley scramble is not nearly as askew as the graphic picture portrays.  The fighters were airborne at 9:30 EDT and were not going to turn for at least two minutes.  Had they turned as soon as possible, the turn would have occurred over the Delmarva Peninsula and the remaining flight time to the nation’s capital was on the order of 10-12 minutes, too late to be in position for AA 77 but well in time to guard against the approach of UA 93.

Altogether, including the false turn south on approach to Washington, DC, the Quit flight lost on the order of 15 minutes.  The combat air patrol to protect the National Command Authority began at 10:00 EDT, twenty-two minutes after AA 77 slammed into the Pentagon at 9:38 EDT.

In a perfect world it is conceivable that the Langley fighters would have reached the nation’s capital concurrent with the arrival of AA 77, but with no authority to do anything, as General Larry Arnold testified to the Commission.  The national level was just getting organized.  When the Pentagon was hit the National Military Command Center had just convened an Air Threat Conference; FAA had not yet joined.  At the White House, the Richard Clarke-chaired secure video teleconference convened at 9:40 EDT when FAA Administrator Jane Garvey joined the conference.

 

9-11: Quit 25 (Langley) and Venus 77 (NEACP); Different Missions, no correlation

Introduction

Periodically, the false notion surfaces that there was some relationship between the Langley fighters (Quit 25, 26, 27) and the B747, Venus 77, a NEACP flight (National Emergency Airborne Command Post). Despite a cursory screen print that suggests a relationship there is no correlation. The two flights were independent events whose paths crossed as they flew to complete their assigned tasks. There is no primary source evidence that links the two paths.  The crossing was incidental.

Also, there is an occasional comment in the blogosphere questioning why military aircraft didn’t immediately land when Ben Sliney ordered all planes to the ground and why aircraft such as Venus 77 were allowed to take off. First, it was not clear to FAA facilities if Sliney’s order pertained to law enforcement, first responder, and military aircraft. Readers familiar with the FAA tapes of the day know that multiple FAA facilities raised that very question to the Air Traffic Control System Command Center. That question was also raised by “Navy Ops” to Andrews Tower at 9:37. The answer given was “that we will know in about 20 minutes.”  Ultimately, all such aircraft were allowed to fly. Here is the conversation that took place at Andrews Tower which should lay to rest any notion that military aircraft should not be flying.

We will know in about 20 minutes

Quit 25 and Venus 77 flight paths and missions

Here is a complete radar-derived graphic that shows the spatial relationship between the two planes  and their separate missions. The graphic is a screen import into first powerpoint and then paint from the files of the 84th RADES as run on the RS3 software.  (Click on the graphic for a non-distorted view.)

Venus 77 (Mode 3 0321) took off abruptly from Andrews Air Force Base at 9:43 EDT, soon after the National Military Command Center (NMCC) initiated an Air Threat Conference Call.  It declared for Offutt Air Force Base and turned West. Over Rock Creek Park/Silver Spring, it changed course and returned East and then immediately South to establish a 60-mile, North-South, race track orbit centered on Richmond, Virginia. By 10:00 EDT, it was in position to support the return of Air Force One to the nation’s capital. Later, after Air Force One headed toward Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, the orbit was adjusted so that its long axis pointed to Barksdale.

This next near-two minute audio clip recorded at Andrews documents the takeoff and original intention of Venus 77. This establishes that its original destination was Offutt Air Force Base. In other articles I believe I have stated the destination to be Wright Patterson Air Force Base; not the case.  Venus 77 is further identified as a “Knee Cap” (NEACP), Boeing 747. This is further evidence that the abrupt departure of Venus 77 was part of the continuity of operations plan triggered when the NMCC changed its Significant Event Conference to an Air Threat Conference.

0941 Venus 77 NEACP departure

While over Northeast Northwest [corrected Dec 18, 2012] Washington, DC, the B747 was filmed by the media and it later became the so-called “mystery plane.”  I wrote about that several years ago in the linked article. I have also previously covered, in detail, the Langley flight, in several articles, including this most recent one.  There is no mystery here, either.

In the graphic, above, I have isolated the Quit and Venus tracks based solely on the Oceana radar. Even so, it is clear that beginning over the Maryland portion of the Delmarva Peninsula there are two radar returns for the Quit flight. That is the point at which the wingman, Quit 26, also switched to Mode 3, 7777, “Quad Sevens” in the vernacular.  Both fighters were squawking the same code and are only distinguishable in the RADES text files where the lead and wing can be separately identified.

The Crossing Point

The paths of the two planes crossed over Charles County, Maryland, due east and across the Potomac River from Stafford, Virginia. Venus 77 crossed first at 9:53:50 EDT at 19,000 feet. Quit 25 crossed next at 9:5502 EDT, at 23,000 feet. Their closest point of convergence was about 5 nautical miles with a 4,000 foot separation in altitude. Neither knew the other was there. Venus 77 proceeded directly to its orbit and at the point of crossing Quit 25 began its turn back on course after being given a correct set of Combat Air Patrol (CAP) coordinates.

The time separation is precise, six radar returns, one minute and twelve seconds. I’ve made the 25 second correction necessary for the NEADS radar clock for the individual crossing times. The radar clock adjustment is irrelevant, however. The two flights were also tracked by the Southeast Air Defense Sector, whose radar clock needed no correction.

The Quit flight was on a heading for Baltimore (Baltimore Washington International Airport, actually.) The tactical decision after takeoff and back under NEADS control was to put the fighters between Washington DC and the reported approach of American Airlines flight 11. Once NEADS learned of the fast mover (American Airlines flight 77) threat to Washington DC the Quit flight was placed under AFIO (Authority for Intercept Operations, squawk Quad 7s) on its Baltimore axis of approach. Once abeam the Capital and Andrews Air Force Base the flight leader was given the CAP coordinates, transposed at first, and then corrected.

The following NEADS audio clip describes what happened at 0953 EDT just as the Quit flight was approaching the crossing point. It is conclusive that Quit 25 had been given the wrong coordinates and heading and that was corrected with the correction emphasized by Quit 25. Immediately, the Quit flight began its turn back to the North just as it crossed well behind the path of Venus 77.

 0953 Quit approaches crossing point

Two points of clarification concerning the conversations heard. First, the Giant Killer reference was part of a radio transmission from the air, most likely from Team 21, a tanker being staged to support air defense activity. Second, the reference to “zero three two” is the specific point of interest to the Langley weapons controllers.  That is a reference to the last known location of track B032, AA 77, in the vicinity of the Pentagon. Six minutes later, at 10:00 EDT, one of the Quit fighters was directly overhead the Pentagon at 23,000 feet as the flight began its assigned mission, a combat air patrol. None of that had anything to do with Venus 77 which continued south to fly a precise race track orbit centered on Richmond, Virginia, as clearly depicted on the graph, above.

The fact that the weapons controllers were focused on track B032 is, in and of itself, evidence that they had no interest in Venus 77.

AFIO

[Added January 12 2012: The precise term is “Authorization for Interceptor Operations.” FAA Handbook, 7610J, Appendix 16, dated Nov 3, 1998 details the authorization, conditions, and responsibilities and procedures.  The Appendix does not specify a specific Mode 3 code for the interceptor fighters, but the convention was, and is, that the fighters would switch to Mode 3 code 7777, ‘quad sevens.’]

The declaration of AFIO was a serious move, with broad implications; NEADS assumed responsibility to clear a path through traffic for the advancing fighters.  Air traffic control was still in contact with the Quit flight but was no longer responsible for air traffic safety in the vicinity of the fighters.

The more important point is that NEADS, and only NEADS, had positive control of the fighters. There can be no notion, no matter how speculative, that someone else directed the fighters toward Venus 77.  It was a weapons controller error at NEADS, pure and simple, the transposition of two digits in the initial CAP coordinates.

Further, had Venus 77 been any kind of air traffic hazard because of proximity, there would have been advisory weapons controller communications to that effect.  There were none.

Comment

This story is straight forward. Two flights with two different missions happened to be in the same general area in the same general time frame. There is no evidence to correlate the two flights.  Speculation to the contrary is, at best, misguided analysis without primary source or other evidence to the contrary.

 

9-11: Chaos Theory; The Air Defense Response, Sensitive Dependence on Initial Conditions

A Note of Caution

It is  not possible to take snippets of information about 9/11 or snapshots of the Commission staff’s work and speculate that into a coherent narrative, with meaning.

Introduction

I have been asked by a family member to comment on a recent speculative article posted on the web that spoke to anomalies in the air defense response on September 11, 2001, specifically concerning the fighters scrambled from Langley Air Force Base.  I subsequently learned that there is a companion You Tube video which extends that speculation to include the fighters scrambled from Otis Air Force Base.  Both the article and the video try to construct a narrative without awareness of or understanding about the totality of  information that defined the 9/11 Commission Report.  Both the article and the video are unreviewable and I won’t attempt to try and make sense of them.

Instead, I will use chaos theory to explain why the air defense response on 9/11 was fatally flawed and had little to no chance, given the times of notification to the military as discussed in the Commission Report.  But first a brief discussion of anomalies, the thesis of the article and the video.

Anomalies

In any event such as 9/11 there will always be anomalies, some explainable, some not, and some that will never be resolved. There are just four air defense response anomalies worth discussing, in my estimation. All other suggested anomalies are on the margin and most of those are the result of four errors by the author(s) of the article and the video–time compression, conflation of events, hind sight, and reliance on anecdotal information instead of available primary source evidence and documents of the day.

Three of the four anomalies, the Otis initial flight path, the Langley initial flight path, and the Langley flight deviation to the south are all resolved in the facts of the day. The fourth, the Langley battle station order in the 9:10 time frame, can be explained by the facts of the day, but can only be resolved retrospectively.  To put it another way, the participants that day knew about the first three anomalies as they occurred; they did not know about the fourth in real time.

The Otis initial flight path. The path was accounted for in the air traffic control communications from Cape TRACON (Traffic Control) at Otis and the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA’s) New York Center (ZNY), coupled with the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) discussions at the Senior Director (Fox) and Mission Crew Commander (Nasypany) positions.  It is clear that the Otis fighters were vectored to a holding pattern in a military training area.  They held there for one-half orbit and then broke for New York City.  All of the decisions that contributed to that path occurred in the heat of battle in an uncertain situation.  They are all logical, in context and in real time.

I wrote a comprehensive article about the Otis scramble.  The authors of the anomalies article and video have clearly read that article but have chosen snippets of information which appear, out of context, to support their speculations. Discerning readers will have no trouble sorting fact from fiction when they read my article.

The Langley initial flight path. As at Otis, the Langley fighters took off to the East, but did not turn as did the Otis fighters.  I covered the reasons for this in detail in one of my early articles. Regardless of scramble order, the operating procedures in place required the Langley fighters to fly runway heading to 4000 feet altitude, which they did.  As they approached that decision point (the Delmarva Peninsula) the flight leader, in discussion with the Norfolk controller, decided to continue East.

There is no mystery here.  That is what happened as recorded at Norfolk TRACON. When I played that recording for the flight leader he was brutally honest, commenting, “There was an opportunity missed.” In the heat of battle, the fog of war, a decision was made. It was the wrong decision.

Here is my work on the Langley scramble

The Langley diversion to the South.  Both Lynn Spencer (Touching History) and I reported the reason for this error. It was a simple transposition of two digits in a coordinate.  That was established conclusively on the NEADS tapes. There is no correlation between the Langley fighters and the E4B, Venus 77, as some have suggested by simply looking at a radar screen print.  The Langley fighters were intent in establishing a CAP (Combat Air Patrol) point and had no interest in the E4B, if they even know about it.

Here is the story of the approach of the Langley fighters to Washington from the perspective of the Mission Crew Commander, Major Kevin Nasypany.

Venus 77 was the so-called “mystery” plane, but there was nothing mysterious about it.  It took off under visual flight rules at 9:43 after the Air Threat Conference was convened by the National Military Command Center, a conference with SIOP (Single Integrated Operation Plan) overtones, a “doomsday” scenario.  The E4B declared for Wright Patterson Air Force Base, reversed course over Rock Creek Park (as captured on media video), and proceeded to establish a 60-mile, north-south racetrack orbit centered on Richmond, Virginia, to support the possible arrival of Air Force One.

The evidence for all three anomalies is conclusive in the primary source information of the day, the audio and radar files.  That is partially the case for the final anomaly that I will discuss.

The fourth anomaly.  9:10 EDT was a significant time, the only time that the facts of the day presented an opportunity for an air defense response to American Airlines flight 77 (AA 77).  By 9:10, lacking any operational information to do otherwise Colonel Robert Marr, NEADS commander overruled his Mission Crew Commander and ordered that the Langley fighters remain on battle stations and not be scrambled.  That was a prudent and proper decision at the time; those were the last two air defense fighters available to NEADS.

Unbeknownst to Colonel Marr, in the same timeframe, the FAA’s Indianapolis Center reported AA 77 as lost to its next higher headquarters, Great Lakes Region, and concurrently, per standing operating procedures, to the United States Air Force Rescue Coordination Center at Langley AFB.  That notification triggered a rescue response at the local and state level in several states as law enforcement officials started rescue coordination procedures.

Also in that same time frame, and only known by retrospective analysis by the 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron, the NEADS supporting Joint Surveillance Radar System (JSS) reacquired AA 77 as a primary only (search, radar only) track. Surveillance technicians on the NEADS sector floor were not aware; they were focused on New York and Boston airspace, as explained on the NEADS tapes.

That critical confluence of three pieces of information–AA 77 reported lost, AA 77 reappearing on NEADS radar, and the battle station order, remained uncorrelated and not recognized by the two people who, working together, were the only two people that stood a chance to accomplish anything air defense-wise that morning–Colonel Marr and his counterpart at the FAA’s Air Traffic Control System Command Center (ATCSCC), Benedict Sliney.

And that leads us to chaos theory and sensitive dependence on initial conditions.

Chaos Theory

I have established in my work on chaos theory that while we cannot use the rigorous math and geometry of chaos theory for a situation such as 9/11 we can use chaos theory metaphorically.  Specifically, we can use the language of chaos theory.  Without elaboration, some of the language we can use includes: strange attractors, cascading bifurcation, non-linearity, and disruptive feedback.  There is another more important term that is relevant here, sensitive dependence on initial conditions.

Initial conditions are not know in real time and can only be identified retrospectively.  In the case of the air defense response on 9/11 the sensitive dependence centered on the two people I previously mentioned, Robert Marr and Benedict Sliney.  Here is that story.

9/11, an attack against the National Airspace System (NAS).

The NAS is a precisely defined subsystem of the National Transportation System.  It was operated on 9/11 by the National Operations Manager, Ben Sliney, at the ATCSCC (Herndon Center).  It was defended in the Northeast [bolded text added Nov 16, 2013] on 9/11 by the Commander, NEADS, Bob Marr.  The sensitive initial condition was that there is no evidence that the two men or their predecessors had ever met, that either was aware of the others existence or role.

So, the initial condition precluded any possibility that Bob Marr and Ben Sliney would ever communicate, let alone share a common operating picture of the battlefield.  Not only did they not share information in common, neither knew at 9:10 that AA 77 had been reported lost.  Neither the ATCSCC or NEADS knew to look for the plane.

Here is how I briefed that to an Air Force historians symposium, “Global Air Power, 9/11 and Beyond,” in November, 2011. (Panelists were myself, Major General Larry Arnold and Dean John Farmer)

•Herndon and NEADS never shared a common operational picture on 9/11
•They had never met, staff visits or during exercises
•NEADS was “center-centric,” it dealt individually with the en route FAA centers
•Therefore, things self organized around NEADS and Boston Center
•That was foretold during ongoing exercise “Vigilant Guardian.”

Strange Attractors

Given the lack of communication between the two organizations who could jointly do something, the information inevitably flowed to and between people who were trying to do something. And, by name, those two people were Colin Scoggins, Military Specialist, Boston Center, and Master Sergeant Maureen “Mo” Dooley, Chief, Identification Section, NEADS. The two did the best they could that day, but it should not have been their job to share real time information. That flow of information should have been between the ATCSCC and NEADS, not Boston Center and NEADS.

There are multiple reasons why that came about. The most important is that in all the exercises and training over the years there is no evidence that the link between the two was actually practiced or even known. The primary reason, however, is the fact that NEADS was a “center-centric” operation. Its day-day operations were focused on establishing lines of communication to and relations with the FAA en route centers that controlled over ocean airspace. Specifically in the Northeast, that was Boston Center and that part of New York Center that controlled overseas arrivals.

All of that was foretold during exercise Vigilant Guardian.

Vigilant Guardian

I spent the better part of five months writing a series of articles concerning Vigilant Guardian during the days preceding 9/11. All of the NEADS tapes for those days are in the public domain and my work can be replicated. Vigilant Guardian was a series of discrete events, at a gradually escalating pace each day. An important event was the transfer of air sovereignty from one air defense sector to another. That event occurred twice at NEADS.

On the first occasion, NEADS was required to assume air sovereignty from the Southeast Air Defense Sector (SEADS), both exercise and real world while concurrently maintaining operations in its own area. The key section of operational interest on the NEADS floor was and is the Identification Section.  The Identification Technicians immediately established contact with the FAA’s Miami Center to guard the Florida Strait. Not once did they contact the ATCSCC. All information flowed to and from the FAA’s en route centers in the Southeast.

The second occasion was more complex and required a double transfer. First, NEADS transfered its operations, exercise and real world, to SEADS. Then, NEADS went to work to assume air sovereignty from the Western Air Defense Sector (WADS). The end result was that NEADS was guarding the West Coast and SEADS was guarding the East Coast.  Again, NEADS Identification Technicians established contact with the en route centers; there was no interface of any kind with the ATCSCC.

That foretold how NEADS would respond on 9/11. Just as soon as Sergeant Shelly Watson heard Sergeant Powell announce the real world hijacking information received from Joe Cooper at Boston Center she dialed Boston Center and reached Colin Scoggins. The ATCSCC was out of the loop, the link to Boston and Colin Scoggins was firmly established.

Colin Scoggins

The central role of Colin Scoggins was also foretold during Vigilant Guardian on September 9, 2001. It is clear from a recorded conversation between the exercise control cell and a person on duty in the Identification Section that the exercise structure used Boston Center, specifically the persona of Colin Scoggins, to pass critical information to the NEADS Identification Section. When I first heard this exchange while writing the Vigilant Guardian articles I immediately forwarded it to Colin and he assured me that the voice on the tape was not his.

0909133749 ZBW Scoggins Call

The totality of the NEADS Vigilant Guardian tapes establishes that the caller was the Exercise Director, Lieutenant Colonel “Grover” Cleveland. The person on duty was Sergeant Rose. On 9/11 Rose was pressed into duty as a Surveillance Technician (NEADS personnel were and are cross-trained), and it was she who followed Delta 1989, radar return by radar return as it “meandered” and then landed at Cleveland.

The Exercise Director, acting as Colin Scoggins, passed critical exercise information about a United flight from Heathrow (London) that posed a threat to New York City. According to information “Scoggins” received from FAA there were two terrorists on board who were going to detonate a bomb while the plane was over New York City. “Scoggins” reported that FAA received the information from the FBI, who obtained it via a phone call from Heathrow where terrorists on the ground had been apprehended. There was no hijacking, the cockpit was unaware of the threat, and air traffic control was talking to the pilot.

By this stage of exercise Vigilant Guardian military units had increased the force protection alert. The terrorist scenario was a force protection event, not a hijack event. It was intended that the NEADS floor work with FAA to divert the flight away from New York City, but not to Bangor, ME, a tanker base. The NEADS Mission Crew Commander did not pick up on that nuance and NEADS allowed the United flight to “land” at Bangor. The exercise controllers immediately declared that the plane had blown up on the tarmac closing Bangor as a tanker base for several hours.

This vignette, alone, foreshadowed exactly how NEADS would operate on 9/11. Most relevant information would come from Boston Center. At no time during exercise Vigilant Guardian or on 9/11 was the Air Traffic Control System Command Center at Herndon, Virginia ever “contacted” or even mentioned.

My Assessment

I have studied the air defense response in detail for nearly a decade. It is my professional estimate that the only chance for any kind of air defense response was if the NOM, Ben Sliney, and the NEADS Commander, Bob Marr, were communicating in real time and were sharing a common operating picture of the battlefield, to include real time information from the en route centers, particularly Indianapolis Center, and the TRACONS, particularly Dulles TRACON.

Absent that capability there could be no effective air defense response, regardless of actions taken at NEADS, Otis, Langley, or by military pilots in the sky.  All other anomalies, real or imagined, are simply noise in an assessment of what happened on 9/11.

A Question for the 9/11 truth community

A fixation on the air defense response, the last possible defense, begs a question which the 9/11 truth community and the authors of the article and the video about air defense “anomalies” fail to address and likely cannot answer. What is it, exactly, the air defenders were supposed to do, given a successful intercept?

Exercise Vigilant Guardian provides a single clue. When notional air defense fighters intercepted a rouge F-18 fighter, in one scenario, they were initially given shoot down authority by the NEADS floor. When the controllers injected that the fighters were over a populated area that authority was withdrawn.

 

9-11: AA11; a Different Perspective

Introduction

This article is an extension of my orginal work several years ago about transponders and ghosts, (here and here).  There is still considerable confusion in the blogosphere about the rebirth of American Airlines flight 11 on September 11, 2001, and why that came to be.  I still have research to do on this issue, but thought this detailed review, based exclusively on primary sources, the recorded conversations of the day would be useful to serious researchers, academicians and historians. To begin, let’s briefly review the attack against the World Trade Center.

The Attack

The terrorist plan of attack was a model of military planning, rehearsal, and execution. The attack was classic; two axes of advance, each axis with a two-pronged assault. Such an attack is meant to sow seeds of disorganization and confusion, to maximize chaos and minimize awareness. The attack succeeded on the northern axis because of tight planning and execution which leveraged luck at key points. The attack on the southern axis was less well planned and executed and failed in its final prong, United Airlines flight 93 (UA 93).

We as yet do not know the details of the plan and may never know. What we do know is that the planning for the attack against the World Trade Center eliminated one key variable which was a potential hindrance to success. The northern attack succeeded in part because the hijackers selected two planes scheduled to take off from the same airport in the same timeframe. That allowed al Shehhi in United Airlines flight 175 (UA 175) to see the result of the impact of AA 11 and immediately change the transponder code for UA 175.

In the south, United Airlines 93 (UA 93) was 40 minutes late in taking off and was not on the scene to either precede or follow AA 77. We do not know the planned sequence. UA 93 was brought down well short of its destination through the courageous actions of the passengers and remaining crew.

Overall, the attack did create confusion and the resultant chaos and uncertainty was unfathomable by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and its en route traffic control centers, traffic control (TRACON) facilities, and airport towers. Here is the story of that chaos and confusion and we begin with the impact of AA 11 into the World Trade Center (WTC), North Tower.

The Impact

According to radar and seismic data AA 11 impacted shortly before 9:46:30 EDT.  The 9/11 Commission, by convention, used National Traffic Safety Board (NTSB) derived times and reported an impact time of 9:46:40. Commission staff grappled with the question of whether to report times in minutes or in minutes and seconds. The solution was to report in minutes and seconds but use NTSB times, by definition.

It didn’t matter. The time issue paled in comparison to the magnitude of the problem that immediately faced air traffic control. It was sufficient to know that shortly after 8:46 EDT a catastrophic event had occurred.

There were two situations, two questions. Where was AA 11? What hit the WTC? Although some controllers and supervisors intuitively knew that it was AA 11 that hit the tower that intuition did not gain traction. The reason is simple. The last known altitude for AA 11 was 29,000 feet and air traffic control thought it had confirmation of that altitude from other planes in the sky, to include, ironically, UA 175.

Here is the impact and immediate aftermath in the voices of the day as captured on air traffic facility tapes at multiple locations. We begin with La Guardia Tower.

La Guardia Tower

At about 8:46:43 a helicopter, Bravo Quebec asked La Guardia, “?did a?” southbound go off your scope?” The Tower missed the transmission and asked for a repeat.  Bravo Quebec responded: ?Did a? south go off your scope down by the World Trade?” And by 8:47 EDT Bravo Quebec reported that ‘[it] looks like something just collided.  0847 Looks Liike Something Just Collided

Concurrently, a different controller also fielded a call from a helicopter that there was a fire at the WTC. 0847 Fire at the World Trade Center The controller reported that the Port Authority was being notified. 0848 Calling the Port Right Now

At that time La Guardia was uncertain if something had hit the WTC or something had happened inside. Either way, By 8:55 EDT, La Guardia was working with police and news helicopters to clear air space around the WTC. A helicopter reported that “we possibly have a plane into the World Trade.”  0855 Possible Plane into the World Trade

By 9:00 EDT, at the tower controller level, there was still uncertainty as to what happened and Tetterboro and La Guardia controllers exchanged views as to whether the explosion was inward or outward. Soon thereafter, a police helicopter reported that the explosion was inward and a news helicopter, Chopper 4, reported he could see the impact area. A controller speculated that it might be a small airplane.  Chopper 4 reported that “we can’t tell how big it is right now.  0900 Helicopter reports police and news

At 9:03 EDT, an unknown caller reported that a 737 just struck the World Trade Center.  The controller was incredulous and responded, “a seven thirty seven??”  That was not a belated reference to what struck the tower earlier. That was a near-real time report that UA 175 had struck the south tower. 0903 A 737 Just Struck the World Trade Center

To recapitulate at the tower level: as of 9:03 EDT two planes had struck the WTC, one perhaps small and one a 737. At La Guardia, the controllers were simply incredulous about the chaos before them. They knew nothing about developments well to the West where Indianapolis Center had lost contact with AA 77. La Guardia was not alone.  No one else in the air traffic ccntrol system knew about AA 77, to include New York TRACON, the next higher echelon in FAA.

New York TRACON

By 8:52 EDT, New York TRACON was looking for AA 11. In an extended exchange, Mike Sammartino, the Air Space Branch Manager, Eastern Region, a manager without access to a radar, called a traffic manager, Carl, at the TRACON Traffic Management Unit to get instructions on how to located a track on “TMS” (Traffic Management System, sometimes referred to as TSD, Traffic Situation Display). Sammartino was looking for AA 11.

During the conversation, Carl told Sammartino that he had lost AA 11 on the radar. Sammartino saw AA 11 on the TSD, but it is not clear if he was watching the original flight plan for AA 11 or a new track, 11A. Both were visible on TMS/TSD.  More on that later.

More important, during that conversation someone broke in and told Sammartino that “an airplane crashed into the side of the WTC.”  Sammartino immediately said, “hey Rick,” a reference to Rick DuCharme, the Assistant Regional Air Traffic Manager. 0852 Hang on Whats That By 8:53 EDT, both Region and TRACON knew some about the developing WTC situation.

By chance, an off duty sector supervisor called in to Liberty Sector, New York TRACON, to discuss his shift time. The several minute exchange between the two supervisors provides a glimpse of how uncertain the situation was at a sector supervisor level. (Warning: this audio file contains profanity) 0852 TRACON Discussion

At this point, TRACON (Possibly the Operations Manager, Bob Burch)  called New York Center ( ZNY) to ask if they had a track on “that American.” TRACON was told that “he went into coast and we lost the target on him.” In that exchange the “into coast” reference was to the radar track, not the TMS/TDS display. The ZNY voice was, himself, incredulous when told that an airplane hit the WTC.  “Who said an airplane hit it?”  He was told it was on the news. 0852 twenty west of Kennedy

That conversation between ZNY and NY TRACON established that the last reported position of the track of AA 11 was “twenty west of Kennedy.” Twenty west of Kennedy (in miles) is over the Northeast corner of Staten Island, near the New Jersey border.

And that leads us to ZNY (New York Center) and one of the  most important recorded conversations concerning the relationship between AA 11 and  UA 175, a conversation that tied both New York Center and New York TRACON together at the senior manager level.

New York Center

The situation as of 8:53 EDT.  Dave Bottiglia, an Area B air traffic controller, was handling both AA 11 and UA 175.  He became aware that UA 175 was not responding to his calls and he had the Operations Manager In Charge (OMIC), Bruce Barrett in his area.  Concurrently, the Facilities Manager, Mike McCormick called Carl at TRACON Traffic Management to speak to the Operations Manager there, Bob Burch.  Before McCormick could get on the phone with Burch he received a call from Barrett in Area B about UA 175, but not by name.  Bottiglia’s voice can be heard in deep background.  In the course of the near two minute clip McCormick equated Bottiglia’s new situation with AA 11.  I have transcribed the clip because of its importance.

0853 McCormick, Burch, Barrett in real time

Carl: TRACON Traffic Management, Carl.

McCormick: Hello Carl, it’s Mike McCormick, how ya doin?

Carl: Good

McCormick: Who’s got the watch?

Carl: Ah, Bob Burch does right now. Ah, He’s on the phone, I guess, we’ve got con.., well we’ve got some reports of a plane hitting the World Trade Center.

McCormick: Okay

Carl: So, ah I think he’s trying to follow up on that right now. Ah.

McCormick: Okay, hold on, I’m on, I’m on two phones at the same time. Who’s, who’s this callin’ me on Area B line?

McCormick: Okay Bruce, what have you got?

Barrett: (Barrett’s voice is not heard)

Bottiglia: in background, Hey, ah, you see this target? I don’t know what he’s doing but he’s not answering me right now.

McCormick: Right, OK.

McCormick: (back to TRACON) New, New York Tower’s confirmed that?

Carl: I don’t know, you wanta talk to Bob real quick?

McCormick: Yep. Okay

Carl: Let me put Bob,

McCormick: Go ahead and put Bob on

Carl: hang on one, hang on

McCormick: (to Barrett) I’ve got TRACON on the other line.

McCormick: Okay, it’s not lookin’ good

Burch: Hi Mike, how ya doin?

McCormick: Hey Bob, Ah, New York Tower’s (sic) tellin us it looks like they have a confirmed hit.

Burch: On the Trade Center?

McCormick: Yeah

Burch: Okay, I’m talkin’ to my Deputy right now, hold on.

Background: pretty sure…We’re not positive…

Burch: Okay, Mike, I’ve got to go, I’m on another line, right now, I’m talking to [indistinct]

McCormick: Bob, Bob, we may have two things going on at once.

Burch: Okay

McCormick: Alright. Because there, we have another aircraft we’re also tracking, also appears to be a hijack [possible reference to both AA 11 and UA 175]

McCormick: We might have multiple terrorist activity going on. [Clear reference to more than one hijack]

Burch: So, is that American Eleven?

McCormick: Right, so

Burch: Where is he at, can you tell us? Cus..

McCormick: We don’t know for sure, we’re tryin’ to track him down. We got a primary target we’re also trackin’ that appears to be the American.

Burch: Okay

McCormick: Be careful, don’t make assumptions

Burch: Alright, check

McCormick: Okay

This three-way conversation clearly depicts the confusion and chaos that the attack caused. In real time, McCormick was conflicted about what he was hearing. He knew there were two incidents, possibly separate, AA 11 and whatever flew into the North Tower. Even though he heard Bottiglia in background, McCormick assumed what he was hearing pertained to AA 11, as he relayed to Burch.  It bears restating at this point. Dave Bottiglia was handling both AA 11 and UA 175 and he did not say “UA 175” in the background conversation heard by McCormick.

Several minutes before that, at 8:49 EDT, there was an important exchange between Bruce Barrett at New York Center and Ron Ruggieri a manager at Eastern Region. Eastern Region was a largely administrative headquarters between air traffic control facilities and FAA Headquarters.  That morning, Eastern Region interjected itself operationally, co-opting what should have been a flow of operational information between air traffic control facilities and the Air Traffic Control System Command Center (Herndon Center).

In the exchange it is clear that Eastern Region lagged in its understanding of the situation and took a leap of logic forward to assume that AA 11 was “South of Kennedy.”  It is the Eastern Region bridge (telecon) to which Colin Scoggins at Boston Center was listening and it is one likely source of the later misinformation that AA 11 was still airborne, as reported by Scoggins to the Norheast Air Defense Sector.  0849 ZNY Eastern Region South of Kennedy

Back to New York TRACON

While that senior management conversation between Barrett, McCormick and Burch took place, a person at TRACON named Joe called Newark Tower to confirm that there was something going on at the Trade Center; answer was “a lot of smoke.”  The two individuals determined that whatever struck the tower was nothing that TRACON was working and that the hijacked airplane was “high altitude.”   This conversation shows that the last known altitude for AA separated the World Trade Center impact from AA 11 in the minds of some controllers and managers as they attempted to grasp what was happening. 0854 Uncertainty over high altitude

Concurrently, a US Air representative, Bruce,  called Carl at New York TRACON to ask if the plane that hit the World Trade Center was one of theirs. Bruce was told that it was not even confirmed that a plane hit the Center. “We’ll have to turn on CNN to find out.”  Immediately thereafter, Wanda at the Air Traffic Control Command Center (Herndon Center) called Carl to ask about the larger traffic control issue, what to do with other air traffic. The answer, “At this time we’re just trying to ascertain what’s going on.” There were no traffic stops in place at any facility at that point. 0855 TRACON called by US Air and Herndon Center

As that conversation concluded, Bob Burch passed on the information he received from Mike McCormick about multiple terrorist activity. In that pass Burch distinguished that AA 11 was the possible second hijack separate from the report from Newark Tower that an aircraft hit the top of the World Trade Center. Burch also passed McCormick’s caution “don’t  assume anything.” They didn’t know of AA 11 “was involved in that [WTC], or if he’s still flying around.” 0857 Burch relays McCormick report

As of 8:58 EDT, at the TRACON and Tower level. there was no correlation between the plane that impacted the WTC and AA 11 except that “they had lost AA 11 on radar.” Before we return to New York Center and higher FAA echelons, however,we need to find out what was going on at NEADS.

Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS)

The first location for AA 11 was passed to Major Dawne Deskins by Joe Cooper, Boston Center, at 8:40EDT, the time that NEADS entered into its official log the MCC/T (Mission Crew Commander/Technician) log as the time of notification to the military by FAA. Even though the phone rang just prior to 8:38  EDT, and the conversation between first Sergeant Jeremy Powell and then Major Deskins began shortly thereafter, that time was not actionable.

Some researchers push the notification time to 8:38 or even 8:37, rounding down. That is a glib, slight-of-hand bit of analysis that historians should avoid.  Two pieces of information establish that the notification time was 8:40 EDT–the official log entry and the time in the Cooper/Deskins conversation that actionable information was passed, the coordinates.

0911121826 Deskins Cooper First Exchange

The coordinates, 4115N 07346W, were just south of Yorktown Heights, New York, 38 nautical miles (43 miles) north of JFK airport. A weapons control at NEADS can be heard in foreground on the Deskins/Cooper call saying “40 north of Kennedy” just after Deskins spoke the coordinates. The weapons controllers were listening in to her conversation and got the location as soon as Deskins did. However, it took a few minutes for the NEADS operations floor to get itself organized and a “Z” point at the location passed by Boston Center was not established until 08:44 EDT.  By that time, AA 11 was south of the search area.

NEADS Identification Technicians struggled to find any information they could, primarily from Colin Scoggins at Boston Center. Scoggins told them that Boston was no longer tracking AA 11 and that they should call New York. The Identification Technicians called New York Center Air Management Information System (AMIS), an entity that did not have direct access to radar and which did not know that AA 11 had been hijacked. The woman they reached ultimately provided them a new location, 4039N 7403W at 8:48 EDT and advised that, “right now, he is primary only.”

The location passed by New York AMIS was four nautical miles (4.7 miles) south of the World Trade Center. over the Upper Bay midway between Bayonne, New Jersey, and Brooklyn, New York.  The coast track of AA11 extended at least that far and was passed to NEADS as an actual track

1248 Coordinates from New York AMIS

That was the last specific location NEADS would get from anyone concerning AA 11. Note that at the same time the Identification Technicians took the initiative to obtain a tail number for AA 11. They subsequently tracked down the tail number from Boston Center and it was recorded in the MCC/T log.

It was that single log entry, a tail number without reference to a specific plane, which became the fatal flaw in the government’s reconstruction of events in the ensuing months and years. The entry was equated to be a reference to AA 77. No one ever cross-checked the initial work done by NEADS action officers in their analysis. More importantly, the entry was not cross-checked by anyone at NORAD at any echelon to prepare its representatives to testify before the 9/11 Commission.

Recapitulation

The audio files referenced so far are sufficient to establish the high degree of uncertainty at all levels concerning the fate of AA 11. Even though individuals with radar scope access intuitively knew that the loss of the track of AA 11 was somehow associated with the event at the WTC that intuition did not gain traction. The equation was briefly made with a degree of uncertainty–“we are not going to confirm that at this time”– at Boston Center, as reported to NEADS by Colin Scoggins.  0857 Scoggins Dooley WTC and AA 11 Tail Number

This is a direct communication between the two most important voices of the day concerning the air defense response, Colin Scoggins, military specialist at Boston Center, and Master Sergeant Maureen “Mo” Dooley, chief of the Identification Technician section at NEADS.  Scoggins had told Tech Sergeant Watson that AA 11 crashed into the WTC, but Dooley wanted confirmation.  Scoggins could not and did not confirm. Dooley further pushed the issue of the tail number of AA 11 and obtained it, “November 334 Alpha Alpha,” and that was how it was logged. Had NEADS staff officers who helped prepare the NORAD 18 September 2001 press release timeline listened to this important exchange they would have avoided a serious error that plagues the 9/11 story to this day.

That raises an important question. Why was it that Boston Center, the FAA facility most knowledgeable of AA 11, and all other entities at all levels could not make the equation between AA 11 and the WTC North Tower? And the answer is, again, simple:  “Flight Level 290.”

Flight Level 290

No other piece of information influenced the misunderstanding of events more that the fact the the last known altitude for AA 11 was twenty-nine thousand feet.  That was confirmed information which stayed with the hunt for AA 11 the rest of the morning. We begin this discussion with Colin Scoggins.

Scoggins was on break when the first news of the hijacking of AA 11 spread through Boston Center.  He went to the operations area but initially held back, not wanting to interfere with busy people at work.  However, when he understood that AA 11 was being tracked, current altitude unknown, he jumped in immediately. As he told Commission staff when interviewed, he was the only person at Boston Center who knew that NEADS radars could read altitude on a primary only track. FAA en route radars could not.

He assumed that NEADS was tracking AA 11 and the resultant second communication between he and Tech Sergeant Watson was a cross communication. Scoggins was focused on determining altitude. Watson’s concern was in obtaining data, a mode 3, so that NEADS could locate the plane. In the first communication, the basic facts were established. Here are those two conversations, one at about 8:39 EDT and the second at about 8:42 EDT. Note, especially, how Scoggins struggled to deal with the altitude issue while Watson focused on the identification and location issue.

0839 First Watson Scoggins Call

0842 Second Watson Scoggins Call

On the civilian side, flight level 290 was confirmed by other planes in the sky to include, ironically, UA 175 at 8:38 EDT.

083757 AA11 two planes one UA175 affirm 29K Tape 20R

At 8:43 EDT, ZNY told NY TRACON that the plane was confirmed at flight level two nine zero and that it looked like it was not going to Kennedy. 0843 ZNY to TRACON Not Going to Kennedy

And at 8:46 EDT, as AA 11 was impacting the WTC North Tower, ZNY, Pete Mulligan, told Dave West at Washington Center (ZDC), that the plane was confirmed at flight level two nine zero. 12 miles Northwest of the Kennedy VOR. 0846 ZNY to Herndon Flight Level 290

Finally, at 9:03 EDT, just as UA 175 was flying into the WTC South Tower, Mulligan had a brief conversation with the National Operations Manager (NOM), Ben Sliney. This is one of the few times that we actually hear Sliney’s voice on the tapes of the morning. Sliney was returning a call in reference to military support.  In the course of the conversation Sliney asked if Mulligan “had information that indicates American 11 is flying?” Mulligan, told Sliney “we are involved with something else,” but did not elaborate and cut Sliney off without passing information about UA 175. 0903 Sliney call to Mulligan

Despite radar evidence to the contrary, the air traffic control system and the air defenders could not and did not make the equation that AA 11 had, in fact, struck the WTC North Tower. There was too much uncertainty because of the last known altitude, flight level 290. In subsequent actions the altitude was a given and showed up in the scramble orders for both the Otis fighters as an immediate response and later the Langley fighters when scrambled after the false report that AA 11 was still airborne.

084608 AA11 Panta Scramble Cape Tape

0924 Langley Scramble Norfolk Tower

The last know altitude issue was compounded by a deliberate action by Boston and New York Centers to facilitate the hunt for AA 11, the entry of a new track for AA 11, AA 11A.

American Airlines flight 11A

To review, I have long held the analytic position that the transponders were the primary terrorist weapon after the cockpits were successfully taken over. We do not know the plan but, retrospectively, we can make the observation that each of the transponders on the four hijacked aircraft were manipulated differently and each manipulation presented a different problem to each of the four en route centers in whose airspace the planes were hijacked.

The transponder on AA 11 was turned off before the turn south towards its target. The transponder code on UA 175 was changed concurrent with AA 11 exploding into the WTC North Tower. The transponder on AA 77 was turned off during the turn east towards its target. The transponder on UA 93 was turned off after the turn back towards its target.

The three en route centers faced with the problem of a trasnponder turned off made three different decisions, each with different consequences. Indianapolis Center determined that AA 77 was lost/down and reported that loss in rescue coordination channels. Cleveland Center knew that Washington DC was the target for UA 93 and entered a new flight plan in order to help Washington Center. New York Center inherited the AA 11 problem from Boston Center but not the control responsibility; that remained with Boston Center.

The Centers left the original flight plan for AA11 in the system and entered a new track for the plane, AA 11A. Systemically, AA 11 had become two airplanes.

(Note: I am still researching this aspect of the story.)

American 11 and American 11A

The fact of two distinct flights in the system was established in a conversation between James Kurz at ZNY and Newark Tower that began about 8:58 EDT. Kurz told a Newark caller asking for the type airplane, “American Eleven Alpha, they’re callin’ it.” He further specified that “they just typed in a ‘seven five’ here ’cause we were just tracking it to LA.” He then confirmed that the AA 11 flight plan, itself, confirmed that it was a “seven six seven.” Not only were there two flights in the system, one was a 757 and one was a 767. 0859 Newark Call AA 11A discussed

A sidebar of interest. The Newark-ZNY conversation resumed just before 9:03 EDT when Kurz called Newark to look out the window. That call captured a real time reaction to the UA 175 impact. 0903 ZNY DC Oh my God

Back on Topic

AA 11/11A was lost shortly after 8:46 EDT on all radar scopes  tracking or with the potential to track the plane. That universe included, NEADS, Boston Center, New York Center, Washington Center, New York TRACON, and towers at Kennedy, Newark, and La Guardia. All of those facilities except NEADS were in the air traffic control chain-of-command responsible to the FAA’s Air Traffic Control System Command Center at Herndon, Virginia. NEADS, one of three CONUS air defense sectors under NORAD, was responsible for the air defense of that system.

However, all commercial fights with a flight plan were also followed via a non-time sensitive display system by non-air traffic control facilities, routinely. Those facilities included FAA Headquarters, Herndon Center, and regional FAA administrative headquarters, specifically Eastern Region and Great Lakes Region. All airlines also routinely followed their own commercial flights. In FAA, the system was referred to as TSD, traffic situation display, or TMS, traffic management system. At the airlines the system was referred to as ASD,  aircraft situation display. Regardless of nomenclature, the system was the same for both FAA and the airlines.

In this next sequence of calls, all recorded at Operations Position 14 at Herndon Center, we will hear that Herndon Center was confident that AA 11 had struck the World Center and so told Washington Center and Cleveland Center. However, it is clear that Herndon Center was also following both AA 11 and AA 11A on TSD.

At 8:44 EDT, Herndon Center alerted a Washington Center traffic manager that AA 11 [11A] could be headed its way.  Washington Center observed the flight on a TSD. 0844 Herndon call to ZDC re AA11 on TSD

At 8:50 EDT. American Airlines called Herndon Center to request that the number for AA 11 be changed in the ASD system because CNN had the capability to follow the flight.  0850 AA call to Herndon to change number on ASD

At 8:53 EDT, Herndon Center told both Washington Center and Cleveland Center that AA 11 was no longer in the air, that it had struck the WTC. That was Herndon with its air traffic control hat on passing air traffic control information.  0853 Herndon to ZDC and ZOB that AA 11 no longer in air

At 9:28 EDT, however, Herndon Center with its traffic management hat on called Cleveland Center to inquire if AA 11 was in its area because the TSD showed that to be the case. Note that the reference is to the original flight plan for AA 11 which was never taken out of the system. My recall in watching the TSD replay on the Commission staff’s last visit to Herndon Center is that AA 11, notionally, “landed” at Los Angeles as the flight plan specified.  0928 Herndon call to Cleveland about AA 11 in area

Chaos and Confusion Manifested

We come full circle back to the attack described at the beginning of this article. All of the hard work of the dedicated men and women in the front lines, the “fox holes”, that day, civilian and military, provided just one effective counter attack, not including the heroic actions of the passengers and remaining crew aboard UA 93. That was the unilateral action of the National Operations Manager, Ben Sliney to first order a nationwide ground stop and then order the grounding of all commercial aircraft.

The terrorist action on the morning of September 11, 2001 was an attack against the National Airspace System (NAS)  Just two individuals working together had any chance at all to counterattack and then only against the southern axis of attack against the nation’s capital.  There was no chance in the North.

Those two individuals were Sliney, the National Operations Manager of the NAS and Colonel Robert Marr, commander of the Northeast Air Defense Sector, defender of the NAS in the Northeast. The two men and their predecessors had likely never met, were not aware of the others role and, certainly on 9/11, did not share a common operating picture of the battle as it unfolded.

Marr’s troops were focused on working with the FAA’s en route centers, as was clearly evidenced in the vignettes in exercise Vigilant Guardian in the week prior. As a result, the flow of critical FAA information came not from Sliney but from Colin Scoggins at Boston Center. And the galvanizing piece of information was the false report that American Airlines flight 11 was still airborne and headed for the nation’s capital.

0911 0924 AA11 Stilll Airborne ZBW to NEADS

Sliney, for his part was subverted by the well intended but interfering actions of Eastern Region and, by extension FAA HQ. One final conversation recorded at Herndon Center puts in stark comparison the awareness of Herndon Center and the lack of awareness on the FAA tactical net, shared by the Regions and FAA Headquarters. The caller was FBI Boston, asking for an update.  The story that was passed was so garbled that Herndon Center, in frustration, broke in and set the record straight.  Herndon Center had it right. The time was about 9:35 EDT, just before the alarm was sounded that a fast-moving unknown [AA77] was moving toward the White House.

0934 FAA Update for FBI Boston

Epilogue

We began with Colin Scoggins insistent that NEADS could help locate AA 11 because its radars could read altitude from a radar return. NEADS did not need a transponder code return to determine altitude but they did need a code, or other specific data to locate the aircraft in the first place.

None of that would have helped for AA 77. There was one radar supporting NEADS which could not read altitude from a radar return.  That radar was a older model at The Plains, Virginia.  It was the radar tracking AA 77. Lacking a code, but with reasonably accurate location data, “six miles west of the White House,” NEADS did find AA 77 and did establish an actionable track, B32, which in turn could be linked to the Langley fighters. The track faded immediately and was lost.  AA 77 had slammed into the West side of the Pentagon.

The Langley fighters were scrambled not because of the approach of AA 77 but because of the false report that AA 11 was still airborne. Sometimes ghosts are useful.

 

9-11: The Actual Story and the “official” story; clarified

Introduction.

I get the occasional Google Alert email reminding me that the myth of an “official” story concerning the events of September 11, 2001, is still floundering around in the blogosphere. There is an actual story of what happened on 9/11; there is no “official” story as is speculated in the 9/11 truth community. This article clarifies the issue for academicians, historians and serious researchers.

The Actual Story

The 9/11 Commission and the Congressional Joint Inquiry before it gathered a comprehensive body of information that established that the event known as 9/11 was a surprise attack on American soil accomplished by 19 terrorists who hijacked four commercial airliners and flew them to catastrophic end, destroying the World Trade Center complex and damaging the Pentagon in the process. The evidence for that narrative is compelling and conclusive.

Additional responsible work has been done that expands on the work of the Commission and the Joint Inquiry. Here is the primary body of information (not inclusive) that establishes the actual story:

The Confusion

A small group of people known collectively as the 9/11 truth community has arbitrarily decided that the actual story is an “official” story that has, itself, been largely discredited.  That is, at best, disingenuous; at worst, intellectually dishonest.

Writ large, the logic is:

  • The 9/11 Commission Report, alone, is the “official” story;
  • Some Commissioners and staff have said that the “official” story is false;
  • Therefore, the narrative of the 9/11 Commission Report is false.

That logical fallacy allows the introduction of wildly speculative alternate scenarios, none of which has a factual base.  The resultant propaganda suggests that there is general public agreement with the fallacy, and that has resulted in a ground swell of activism and support for vocal members of the 9/11 truth community. The “truth” of that community is that the activism and support is small and a few individuals have found a way to make a living off of that activism and support.

None of the activism, support, or work of those making a living off the 9/11 truth community has moved the false narrative forward in any measurable way.  The 9/11 truth community was effectively dealt with and dismissed by Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan in their 2011 book, The Eleventh Day, the Full Story of 9/11 and Osama bin Laden. In Part Two, “Distrust and Deceit,” the authors conclude:

Wonder one may, but the authors have seen not a jot of evidence that anything like a false flag scenario was used on 9/11…Nor, after more than four year’s research, have we encountered a shred of real information indicating that the Bush administration was complicit in 9/11. Subjected to any serious probing, the suspicions raised by Professor Griffin and his fellow “truthers” simply vanish on the wind.

Unmasking the “Official” Story

If there is an “Official” story it concerns the day of 9/11 and it is the narrative that was in place when the Commission began its work in 2003; the Joint Inquiry did not examine the events of the day.  That narrative had been allowed to accumulate based on faulty staff work, incomplete analysis, and extensive anecdotal evidence, to include participant recall, eye witness accounts, and media and literary accounts.

The Commission came face to face with that story on May 22 and May 23, 2003, when Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator Jane Garvey, Transportation Secretary Norman Minetta, and officers representing North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) attempted to testify to what actually happened on 9/11 and failed.

That failure caused Team 8 leader, John Farmer, to write a memo to the Commission front office which established for the record that the “official” story was false.  Here, in part, is what Farmer told the front office:

In perhaps no aspect of the 9-11 attacks is the public record, as reflected in both news accounts and testimony before this Commission, so flatly at odds with the truth (emphasis added)…The challenge in relating the history of one of the most chaotic days in our history…is to avoid replicating that chaos in writing about it.

Here, for the record, is how John Farmer referred to the stories in the introduction to his book, The Ground Truth; the Untold Story of America Under Attack on 9/11.

The account of the nation’s response to the 9/11 attacks set forth in The 9/11 Commission Report is accurate, and true (emphasis added)….In the course of our investigation…the 9/11  Commission staff discovered that the official version (emphasis added) of what had occurred that morning…was almost entirely and inexplicably, untrue.

For the record, therefore,  the “official version” as found by the Commission was “flatly at odds with the truth,” and “was almost entirely and inexplicably, untrue.”  The actual story as established by the 9/11 Commission was “accurate and true.”.

So, how did the Government go so badly astray?

The “Official” Story

It began in the immediate aftermath as FAA and NORAD struggled to come to terms about notification to the military.  NORAD pre-empted the process and unilaterally published its timeline via a press release on September 18, 2001.  That timeline was fatally flawed.

NORAD established a notification time of 0924 EDT for American Airlines flight 77 (AA77).  Staff officers involved in preparing the timeline apparently never listened to tapes.  That initial error became etched in stone in October, 2001, when General Eberhart testified to Senator Levin during an Armed Services Committee Hearing that the time of notification for AA 77 was 0924 EDT.

The government never recovered from that initial error and built a narrative which suggested that key individuals were in place and responsive to the approach of AA 77 to the nation’s capital.  The narrative, as testified to by Norman Mineta, was an hour off.

Key officials were in place for the approach of United Airlines flight 93 (UA93).  However, they were following a notional path in a flight-tracking program based on a new flight plan for UA93 entered by the FAA’s Cleveland Center.  That notional flight “landed” at Reagan National airport at 1028 EDT, according to landing records at the airport, and as noted by a controller at Reagan National who was told at 10:28 that UA 93 was no longer in  the system. 1028 United 93 no longer in the system

Out of those simple facts an “official” story emerged.  That story had the President and the Vice President in communication concerning shootdown authority.  The President was and is convinced he gave that authority prior to the crash of UA93, as he so stated in a National Geographic special prepared for the 10th anniversary of 9/11.

The “official” story narrative was embellished and elaborated by the Air National Guard and the fighter wing at Andrews Air Force Base.  In that narrative, published as Air War Over America (The Filson book) and perpetuated by Lynn Spencer in Touching History, the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) watched UA93 meander (Delta 1989, actually), and NEADS believed it was prepared to take lives in the air to save lives on the ground.  The Andrews pilots believed that they participated in the hunt for UA93.   None of that is accurate.

In the absence of accurate information, participants that day, at all levels, assimilated events in a narrative that made sense to them.  The fact that the narrative, the “official” story, was nonsensical was not established until the Commission did its work and published its report.

If you run across the term “official” story in your research be sure you find the antecedent to the reference.  I suspect I may be preaching to the choir.

 

9-11: A Framework for Analysis

Foreword

This article was updated on April 9, 2012, in order to add primary source audio to establish what was known and when about the impacts of AA11 and UA175 with the World Trade Center.  All the added material is at the end of the article.

Original Article

The 9/11 Commission and the Congressional Joint Inquiry before it determined that 19 terrorists in four groups  hijacked four commercial aircraft to use them as guided missiles to attack four buildings on September 11, 2001. Three attacks were successful; the fourth thwarted by passengers aware of their probable fate.  The Inquiry and Commission reports were published in the Spring 2003 and Summer 2004, respectively, and are generally accepted as an accurate accounting of what happened that day and in events leading up to that day.

The Commission and the Joint Inquiry gathered and considered a large body of evidence that considered the terrorist attack and the events leading up to the attack. In addition to pre-attack evidence and primary source evidence about the attacks, the Commission also examined post-attack information.

The dates and times in the following chart provide one way of defining the  pre-attack, attack and post-attack phases.

Phase Begins Ends
Pre-Attack Feb 26, 1993 5:45am Sep 11, 2001
Attack 5:45am 10:03am
Post-Attack 8:46am Present

The starting date for the Pre-Attack is the date of the first terrorist strike on the World Trade Center. Depending on one’s interest, different starting points can be taken—the bin Laden Fatwah, for example. The Pre-Attack ends as soon as Atta and one accomplice enter the National Airspace System (NAS) in Portland, Maine; the attack has begun. The attack ends when United Airlines Flight 93 (UA 93) plummets to ground near Shanksville, PA.

The commencement of the attack can be described in military terms. The Commission established the scheduled takeoff times of the four hijacked aircraft to be:

7:45 AA 11

8:00 UA 175

8:10 AA 77

8:00 UA 93

That establishes a line of departure (LD) at Boston Logan Airport between 7:45 and 8:00 a. m. for the attack against the World Trade Center and an LD at two locations, Newark Airport and Dulles Airport between 8:00 and 8:10 for the attack against Washington D. C. It is speculative but the timing suggests that the overall attack plan was synchronized with the four impacts to occur in a short span of time, but with the northern attack to precede the southern attack.

This description in military terms now allows us to place Atta’s departure from Portland Airport in perspective. Colgan Air flight 5930 departed at 6:00 a. m., on time. That became, then, an initial or preliminary line of departure. Actually, Atta entered into the National Airspace System at 5:45 a.m. when he passed through security and was free to board.

We can further speculate that Atta established that tactical procedure as a backup plan;  he only needed one plane to hit one target for the day to be a success. Anything else was simply value added. So, he, together with one accomplice, traveled as a team to enter the system at a remote location, with a backup plan to attempt to hijack AA 11 with just a two-man team. There is one piece of evidence that supports this speculation. Atta was, according to a Commission Staff Report of August 24, 2004, visibly upset when he learned he would have to pass through screening a second time at Logan Airport.

As it turned out, a backup plan was not needed. According to the same Staff Report. Atta received a phone call at 6:52 a.m. from Terminal C, the departure terminal for United Airlines Flight 175 (UA 175). By the time that three minute call ended all 10 hijackers for the attack against the World Trade Center had passed through security and were in the NAS. In military terms, they achieved tactical superiority; they were inside the decision cycle of their enemy. They were well on their way to demonstrating mastery of a key principle of war; surprise.

Surprise was achieved between 8:46 and 8:47 a.m.; the Post-Attack phase began with the impact of AA 11. It overlapped the Attack phase and it continues to this day. From that moment personal recall started and the reporting and telling of events were shaped by what people thought they saw, what they recalled doing, and what the media reported.

Added Information

How News of AA11 and UA 175 was Received

La Guardia and Newark Towers

La Guardia Tower, Class B airspace position,  was the initial Air Traffic Control facility to learn of the first collision at the World Trade Center.  The controller was in routine communication with a helicopter, Bravo Quebec, whose description of the event was brief.  That first description was that it “looks like somethin’ just collided [with the World Trade Center].”  0847 Looks Liike Something Just Collided 

Shortly thereafter, the La Guardia controller compared notes with a colleague at Newark Tower.  The latter reported that there was a huge amount of smoke coming from the top ten floors. “All of sudden a huge plume of smoke came out of the World Trade Center.  0848 Newark Huge Amount of Smoke

At that same time, 8:48,  an unidentified plane asked the Newark Tower Ground Control position  about the “smoke coming off the World Trade building.”  The controller advised that they were “calling the port right now about it , it just started.”  The plane reported that they saw it, “a couple minutes ago, big puff of smoke.”  The controller advised that “they werenot sure if something hit it or something happened inside.” 0848 Calling the Port Right Now

A few seconds prior, acknowledgement of a fire at the World Trade Center was recorded at the Newark Tower Local Control position.  That controller also told an unidentified plane that the Port Authority had been called. 0847 Fire at the World Trade Center

At 8:55, a law enforcement helicopter reported in with La Guardia and directed that all traffic above 2000 be diverted, “we possible have a plane into the World Trade.”  0855 Posslble Plane into the World Trade

Shortly after 9:00, the La Guardia controller compared notes with Teeterboro and speculated that “personally, I don’t think it was an airplane.”  He soon corrected the record in a discussion with, first, the police helicopter (PD 14) and then a news helicopter (Chopper 4)  The police helicopter reported “unknown size [of the airplane] at this time.”  The news helicopter reported, “can’t tell  how big [size of the airplane] it is right now.” 0900 Helicopter reports police and news 

At 9:03 the  La Guardia controller received a report from an unidentified caller [likely PD 14] that a 737 [UA175] hit the World Trade Center.  0903 A 737 Just Struck the World Trade Center

Immediately thereafter, La Guardia worked with the police helicopter to ensure that all aircraft under La Guardia control were exiting the airspace. That effort spanned two minutes during which it was not clear from observers in the sky or at La Guardia what planes and of what size had struck the two towers.  0904 La Guardia Traffic Control Sequence

At Newark Tower, the Local Control position acknowledged that they saw the impact as it occurred.  Within a minute the controller advised, “everbody just stand by.”  Within another minute he took action to stop all takeoffs;  “just stand by, there is a situation, just, all departures are stopped, stay with me.  Everybody just monitor my frequency, please don’t call me, I will call you.” 0903 Yes I Saw It

It is clear from this series of conversations recorded at New York area towers that observers closest to the scene did not have accurate situational awareness.  The helicopters in the vicinity and the Class B airspace controller  knew only that two aircraft, possibly 737s had flown into the World Trade Center and that they had an emergency situation on their hands.  And that became the focus of attention at that level.

The next entity in the air traffic control chain-of-command was New York TRACON and we next look at the situational awareness at that level.

New York TRACON

New York TRACON first learned of a problem with AA11 shortly after 8:40 when it joined a telecon with Boston Center linked by the FAA’s Air Traffic Control System Command Center (Herndon Center).  That call was taken at the Traffic Management Unit, Departure Director position (TMUDD).  The call was a continuous exchange of information, first with Boston Center and Herndon Center, and then New York Center (ZNY), which broke into the conversation. The exchange lasted nearly three minutes.

The fear was that AA11 would land at Kennedy without advanced notice. However, the ZNY caller reported that he had learned that the aircraft was still at 29,000 feet and would bypass Kennedy.  Here is the conversation as recorded at New York TRACON. 0840 ZBW TRACON ZNY AA11 notification

At 8:51,  a caller asked for assistance in locating AA11 on the TMS (traffic management system).  the TMUDD specialist reported that he had lost the plane on radar and at 8:52 learned of the news.  “Hang on, what’s that?”  A background voice responded,  “An airplane crashed into the top of the World Trade Center.”  The response was at once cryptic and clear.  “What?”  “Wow?”  0852 Hang on Whats That 

Immediately thereafter, the Operations Manager in Charge of New York Center, Mike McCormick, called New York TRACON.  That nearly two minute call is important for three reasons.

  1. All key senior managers in the New York area; McCormick, his next in command, Bruce Barrett, and the Operations Manager in Charge at Newark TRACON, Bob Burch, participate.
  2. The initial alert about UA175 by the New York controller to Bruce Barrett is heard in background (amplified)
  3. Initial reporting information became conflated and confused at New York Center, New York TRACON, and at least one of the area towers, Newark.

McCormick stated that two things were going on, but he had not assimilated that UA175 was yet a third thing.  He conflated the alert about UA175 to pertain to AA11 as one thing.  The unidentified plane that struck the World Trade Center was the other thing.  Here is that call as recorded at New York TRACON. 0853 McCormick, Burch, Barrett in real time 

The TMUDD position then took two calls in sequence which, taken together, show the uncertainty in the National Airspace System.  The first caller, a traffic manager from U.S. Air called to see if the incident at the Word Trade Center involved one of their aircraft.  the New York TRACON traffic manager, Carl, said “we don’t know [what happened]” and “I guess we’ll have to turn on CNN to find out.”

The second caller was Wanda, a traffic manager from Herndon Center, who inquired about the impact on the air traffic control system.  Carl told her, “we’re just trying to figure out what actually occurred and what is going on, and what needs to be done.” 0855 TRACON called by US Air and Herndon Center 

 

9-11: History Commons; a good compendium, not a reliable source

Introduction

A correspondent recently asked me to track down a specific audio clip, the “Oh My God,” reaction by an Identification Technician at the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS)  That search led me to the History Commons timeline and information that was at once helpful but also erroneous.  My purpose in this article is to provide insight for researchers, historians, and academicians who routinely use History Commons as a reference or source.  I personally use the timeline and have a link to it on my home page.

My 9/11 Commission Experience

The antecedent to the History Commons timeline, the Cooperative Research timeline, was the first public domain timeline we used in our staff work.  Early on, as we began to develop our own timeline, we dropped the Cooperative Research timeline because of its inherent inaccuracy.  We found it to be a conglomeration of anecdotal information, derived extensively from eyewitness accounts, participant recall, media accounts, and, as time as passed, published books.  It is not grounded in the primary source information of the day and is, therefore, not reliable.

Post Commission Interest

I followed, with interest, the hearings held by Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney, primarily because one of her witnesses was Paul Thompson. Thompson was instrumental in the creation of the Cooperative Research timeline and my hope was that his testimony would extend that work in a positive direction by correcting the anecdotal record he had created. That did not happen. His testimony was a static reiteration of his understanding of events based on his timeline.  He did not move the analytical ball forward.

The Case at Hand

Here is what the History Commons timeline has to say about NEADS when it learned that American Airlines flight 11 struck the World Trade Center, North Tower.

8:51 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Learns of Plane Hitting WTC, Informs FAA’s New York Center
Technicians on the operations floor at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) receive what is apparently their first notification that a plane has hit the World Trade Center, in a phone call from the FAA’s Boston Center. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] NEADS ID technicians are currently trying to locate Flight 11, when they are called by Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the Boston Center. ID tech Stacia Rountree answers the call. In response to Scoggins’s information, Rountree says to her colleagues, “A plane just hit the World Trade Center.” She asks Scoggins, “Was it American 11?” He tells her this is not confirmed. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 50] Another of the ID techs, Shelley Watson, starts murmuring in response to the news: “Oh my God. Oh God. Oh my God.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] A computer maintenance technician then runs onto the operations floor and announces that CNN is broadcasting that a 737 has hit the WTC. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 51]

Here is what I transcribed in 2003 as archived by the National Archives in my work paper “NEADS CDs.”

08:50:30 They dial New York. They show him heading, what did she say north coastal.
Coastal, I didn’t know what she meant. They show him headed coastal now. Primary
only. They’re going to give us 3 and 5 minute updates on lat lons. Dialed number didn’t
go through
08:50:03: That last lat long was 4039 7403W. They’re going to give us 3 and 5 minute
updates.
08:50:08: (In background. A plane just….) What? A 737. Like the WTC. Who’re you
talking to. Oh my God. Oh God. Oh my God. (Dooley) Update New York. See if
they lost altitude on that plane all together

With that background we can now refer to the NEADS audio files and find out what happened, in context.

First Air Force

Shortly after 0850 EDT, Sergeant Watson took a call from Sergeant Tibbets, First Air Force Public Affairs.  Tibbets was seeking information about the hijacked airplane and in the course of the conversation told Watson, “Wait a minute, a plane just hit, a plane hit the World Trade Center, I just saw that on the news.”  He then said “it may be a 737.”  [DRM1, Channel 7,cut 123030] 0850 First Air Force Call 

Here is how that call and the reaction was recorded on a different channel. [DRM1 Channel 5, cut 122917] 0851 Watson First Air Force Patch to MCC

The reaction to the call was recorded on yet another channel. [DRM1 Channel 4, cut 121806].  The “Oh God” voice is not that of Watson, she was on the call with First Air Force.  The voice is that of Stacia Rountree.  0850 Oh My God Reaction

The patch to the Mission Crew Commander was answered by Sergeant Joe McCain, the Mission Crew Commander/Technician (MCC/T).  It is his voice that sounds like Colin Scoggins when heard on the MCC channel.  Here is the continuation of the First Air Force Call as recorded at the MCC/T position.  Note that there are multiple conversations going on, to include one involving Major Nasypany, the MCC.  0852 First Air Force Call McCain  [DRM1 Channel 3, cut 123212]

And here is how all that came together as recorded at the MCC position, where, out of context, McCain’s voice sounds like that of Colin Scoggins. 0852 the MCC Perspective [DRM1, Channel 2, cut 121800]

Nearly 5 minutes later, Colin Scoggins at Boston Center became aware of the impact at the World Trade Center and that information was shared immediately in the course of a conversation between Sergeant Watson and Scoggins.  As we pick up the audio, NEADS found the Boston line to be busy but Watson persisted in dialing anyway and reached Scoggins.  In the latter part of the call we hear Master Sergeant Maureen Dooley on the phone.   Dooley Obtained a critical piece of information, the tail number for AA11, N334AA. [DRM1 Channel 7, cut 123304]  0855 Watson Scoggins Dooley AA11 

Assessment

It is clear from this event that it is not possible to use the NEADS tapes out of context or in isolation, one channel from another.  It takes a concerted effort across all channels to gain an accurate picture of what is actually happening.  It is always useful to start with the MCC channel, channel two, because the MCC position was the focal point for decisionmaking.  Moreover, it was the MCC, and the MCC only, who constantly updated the Battle Cab, specifically Colonel Marr, the NEADS commanding officer.

Understanding of this single event required audio recordings from 5 different channels; the MCC, the MCC Technician, and three devoted to the Identification Technicians.

It is also clear from this event that the History Commons timeline is unreliable as a definitive source.  It is useful to gain a starting point for analysis but it cannot and should not serve as the analytical answer because of its reliance on anecdotal information.