9-11 – Page 11 – 9-11 Revisited

The Ghosts of 9-11: AA 77; a real ghost, still unseen; now looking for UA 175 (part 3)

Introduction

In the previous two articles we discussed the approach of a primary only track, AA 77, into Dulles TRACON airspace. We established that no one at any level was aware of the looming threat. We also established that FAA’s Eastern Region, an administrative headquarters, was directing the air traffic control search for missing aircraft.

The Region prompted the ZDC manager to call his counterpart at ZID to look for AA 77. The ZDC manager then briefed his area supervisors that they were looking for limited data tag planes at altitude, specifically AA 77 and UA 175. In this short article we will show that as late as 9:30 UA 175 was a matter of concern to Eastern Region. AA 77 was not

Eastern Region

Eastern Region had jurisdiction over two of the four FAA Air Traffic Control centers involved on 9-11, Washington (ZDC), New York (ZNY), and it worked through them and their subordinate Towers and TRACONs to gather information. For example, instead of calling Indianapolis Center (ZID) direct, the Region had ZDC call ZID to inquire about the loss of AA 77 over Indiana.

Concurrently, Eastern Region was trying to sort out what happened in New York City and was concerned with both AA 11 and UA 175.

AA 11

Here, we return, briefly, to a discussion of the most troublesome ghost on 9-11, the apparent rebirth of AA 11. During interview, Ron Ruggeri, the Eastern Region Quality Assurance Staff Manager, stated he took the following action:

“[He] called the watch desk at ZNY, and was informed from Bruce Barrett that the impact was a terrorist event. Barrett checked a Situational Display per Ruggeri’s request to locate AA 11, and it showed AA 11 in Whiskey 105 but on a coast track (since the computer was searching for the target, and projecting its flight path).”

The Commission Staff was never able to pin down the source of the erroneous information concerning AA 11 but estimated it was derived from conversations on the Eastern Region telecon, an unrecorded conference. Ruggeri’s mental picture of the track of AA 11 over water south of New York City supports that estimate.

Whiskey 105 is the military training area to which the Otis fighters were first vectored after takeoff. Lynn Spencer in Touching History described it as “a military airspace training area over the Atlantic just south of Long Island.”

UA 175

Shortly after 9:29, Ruggeri called IAD to inquire about UA 175. The call lasted less than a minute and IAD established that it did not have a flight plan in its computer for UA 175. That conversation can be heard at this link. 1 IAD 27 DEPARTURE DATA Ruggeri Call 175

At no time does either Eastern Region or IAD make reference to the primary only track, the “no tag,” fast approaching the nation’s capital.

Google Earth

Here is the spatial position of AA 77 at the time of the Eastern Region call. Permit me the irony to note that AA 77 flew just south of the ongoing construction of FAA’s Potomac TRACON facility; a new facility to solve known obsolescence and traffic control issues in the greater Washington DC area.

Location of AA 77 when Eastern Region called IAD about UA 175

Summation

The time is now 9:30 and we have established that the primary only track later determined to be AA 77 is rapidly approaching the nation’s capital and no one has recognized the threat. We have established that FAA’s Eastern Region is collecting information. There is no evidence of awareness at any level, including the White House that AA 77 is a looming threat. At 9:30, AA 77 is 34 miles from the Pentagon, according to Google Earth.

A Preview of What’s up next

We will establish in a later article that, according to a second call to IAD, Eastern Region was in direct, near real-time contact with FAA Headquarters and was passing information along as it was received at Eastern Region. We will also establish that AA 77 is not mentioned until after Danielle O’Brien and her supervisor sound the alarm.

The Ghosts of 9-11: AA 77; a real ghost, unseen (part 2)

Addendum March 22, 2010

The purpose of this addendum is to insert an audio clip of a conversation shortly after 9:25 between Herndon Center and Indianapolis Center (ZID). Herndon initiated the call to learn whatever it could about the loss of AA 77.

Indianapolis reported that the aircraft was off radar and presumed lost. ZID assessed that AA 77 was not involved in the World Trade Center events because the time of loss was at the same time as events in New York.

The Herndon Center caller assessed, based on time and distance factors that the most likely target in danger was the Sears Tower in Chicago. The conversation can be heard here. 092506 Herndon and ZID discuss AA77

My Assessment

This conversation is clear evidence that FAA Herndon Center and, by extension, FAA Headquarters did not know that AA 77 was bearing down on the nation’s capital. It is further evidence that Norman Mineta was clearly mistaken in his recall of events that morning. There is no reasonable way that he could have known about AA 77.

At that time, 9:25, no one above the scope level at Dulles TRACON had any information whatsoever about AA 77. Although two controllers spotted a “no tag” they had no idea what they had seen and information available at Dulles TRACON did not become actionable until 8 minutes later when the general alarm was sounded.

Original Article

In part one we established that Washington Center, ZDC, was not looking for AA 77 as a primary-only target and never detected the plane. Moreover, its conversation with Indianapolis Center about AA77 and its internal conference among area supervisors were not shared with Dulles TRACON, IAD. In this article we continue the track of AA 77 and relate it to IAD using primary sources–air traffic control conversations, the flight data recorder, and radar files. And we start with IAD, itself.

Dulles TRACON, IAD

Dulles TRACON no longer existed by the time the Commission began its work. In December, 2002, FAA commissioned a consolidated facility, Potomac TRACON, which assumed the responsibilities of the TRACONs at Dulles, National, and Baltimore airports and Andrews Airfield to solve known air traffic inefficiencies and obsolescence issues as detailed in the linked document.

The Commission Staff toured both Dulles and National Towers and TRACONS. Concerning the latter, we simply saw empty rooms at both locations. To interview participants of the day we had to track them down wherever they were; several at Potomac TRACON, which we twice visited.

We determined that around 9:25 IAD did see, but did not recognize the threat posed by AA 77. This is the IAD story and we begin with the first known primary source evidence.

See that no tag?

In the 9:25 timeframe a controller at the IAD South Departure position said: “see that no tag, there?” A co-worker responded, “I do.” The controller then said, “I’ll just flash him on to Wash or Center,whatever.” The co-worker responded, OK. That short six second exchange can be heard here No Tag.

It is speculative, but probable, that the controllers were seeing the track that was AA 77. It is also possible that they were referring to something else entirely. Given that it was AA 77 they did not recognize it as a threat and there is no evidence that the information was shared internally to IAD or that “Wash or Center” saw the flash.

According to the flight data recorder readout AA 77 was at 18,000 feet, technically just entering Class E airspace. Whatever the technical division of air space responsibility no FAA facility recognized the threat. Further, no one cued NEADS to look for that “no tag.”

FAA did acknowledge that early spotting of a “no tag” in its secondary source documents provided to the Commission. We will consider those documents but first we need to talk about a second opportunity to see the AA 77 primary only track, this one by IAD South Departure and two ZDC Sectors, separately.

A Second IAD opportunity

In my Commission work I identified one plane that might have caused IAD (or ZDC) to recognize the approach of AA 77. A graphic of the track of that plane, labeled M3 1531, is part of a series of slides concerning the approach of AA 77 and is inserted here, updated.

M3 1531 and AA 77

The two aircraft were separated vertically by more than 6000 feet. AA 77 was just passing through 10,000 feet altitude into IAD designated airspace. The point of spatial intersection was just West of Warrenton, Virginia.

In air traffic communications we first hear about M3 1531 around 9:26. Dulles South Departure attempted a manual hand off of the southwesterly transiting aircraft to ZDC Casanova Sector. That controller exchange can be heard at this link. M3 1531 Casanova Tape 19 side 1.

In a second attempt a minute later a different ZDC controller acknowledged “not that VFR guy.” “VFR” in this context is not a reference to AA 77; it is a reference to a transponding aircraft. IAD successfully handed M3 1531, who was VFR, off to ZDC, Azalea Sector.

At no time does any controller notice or comment on a primary only aircraft headed east. Here is the relevant conversation. M3 1531 Azalea Tape 19 side 1 and M3 1531 Azalea Tape 19 side 2 It is in two parts because the transmission occurred at the end of one cassette tape and the beginning of another, as provided to the Commission and as archived by NARA.

Here is a Google Earth plot of the spatial intersection of AA77 and M3 1531 just West of Warrenton, Virginia. As established earlier the two aircraft were 6000 feet apart in vertical separation.

I know of no other primary source air traffic control transmissions which relate in any way to the approach of AA 77. To see how FAA treated this information we next turn to a discussion of FAA assessments in the aftermath.

FAA Assessments

To sumarize, FAA established a time of 9:25 in its early assessments. That assessment held at least through September 18, 2001, as memorialized in the Administrator’s Briefing Book.

In later assessments, including a March 2002 draft report, the 9:25 time no longer appeared. By then FAA had settled on a time that equated to IAD sounding the alarm to National TRACON/Tower and to the White House/Secret Service.

Retrospectively, FAA established that IAD controllers may have seen the primary only track as early as 9:25, but there is no evidence that IAD recognized the threat any earlier than 9:32.

A FAA “Chronology of Events“, unattributed, but fax time-stamped “6:18AM SEP 12, 2001” demonstrates the confusion within FAA as to what happened. A 9:25 entry states: “AAL77 Lost at 9:25AM York Kentucky.” A 9:33 entry states: “DCA notified check Hotline activated; primary 3 miles south, now 1 mile.” No mention is made of anyone noticing the track that would later be identified as AA 77.

The next day, in an internal summary prepared at 9:00 on September 13, 2001, FAA’s AAT-20 documented this information: “0856 Radar contact is lost. No Further contact with aircraft. Dulles ATCT [IAD] (bolding in original) 0925 (estimate) Controller observes primary target at high-speed transitioning west to east toward DC. 0933 Controller informs Operational Supervisor, whom in turns advises Washington National (DCA).”

That is an accurate statement, based on primary source information. As we have established, a controller saw a “no tag” at 9:25 and did not recognized it as a threat. The use of the word “controller,” singular, morphed into “controllers,” plural, as FAA prepared its Administrator for Congressional hearings.

That morphing from singular to plural was likely based on individual controller statements taken as part of FAA’s accident package preparation for submission to NTSB. Retrospectively, individual controllers may have recalled that they did see the primary only track.

The fact remains, however, that none of them saw it as a threat and none of them alerted their supervisors. That alert did not come until Danielle O’Brien recognized a problem; we will discuss that in a subsequent article.

The Administrator’s Briefing Book

As of September 18, 2001, at 5:20 PM the Administrator’s Briefing Book for Congressional hearings contained the following entries. “0925:00 Between 0925:00 and 0930:00 (time is approximate based on personnel statements) – Several controllers at Dulles TRACON observe a primary radar target (unidentified but later confirmed to be AAL 77).” “0933:00 (Time is approximate based on personnel statements – Dulles TRACON advises…Secret Service of an unknown aircraft heading in the direction of the White House…”

This version of the briefing book is the day after the White House meeting to discuss the events of the day and is likely the same version used by FAA representatives at that meeting.

The acknowledgment that the controller’s 9:25 observation may have correlated to AA 77 was dropped in subsequent FAA summaries. An undated “Chronolgical Events at Dulles Tower on September 11, 2001,” contains this entry: “1332;20 (time approximate) Controller at Dulles Tower working the Final West position informs the other controllers in the radar room about the target observed moving estbound.”

Months later, in its 21 March 2002 draft report “The Air Traffic Organization’s Response,” the first mention of AA 77 as a threat is the 9:33 alert.

A Personal Comment

This look at FAA staff work in some detail does indicate that FAA was aware of all the relevant air traffic control tapes. They went into the White House meeting with accurate primary source information. I extrapolate from this that they knew, from their perspective, the actual notification times to the military.

I estimate they must have know the centrality of NEADS to the military equation. They certainly knew there was no 9:24 notification time to NORAD concerning AA 77. Whatever their position, it was subsumed at the White House meeting.

The Commission Report

The Staff wrote: “At 9:32, controllers at the Dulles Terminal Radar Approach Control “observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed.” This was later determined to have been Flight 77.”

At one time we considered a time of 9:25 but the convergence of information dictated a later time. We concluded that 9:32 was the earliest time that situational awareness developed at IAD; they processed what they were seeing and then sounded the alarm.

Next Up

Before we turn to the awareness and subsequent alarm we will briefly examine a phone call between FAA’s Eastern Region and IAD in the 9:29 time frame. Recall that we established that Eastern Region, an administrative headquarters, was dictating the exchange of information. As a preview of the next article, Eastern Region called to inquire not about AA 77 but about UA 175.

After that we will turn to Danielle O’Brien and the actions she and her supervisor took.

The Ghosts of 9-11: AA 77; a real ghost, unseen

Addendum added February 6, 2014

My recall of the arrangement of transponder knobs on American and United planes, below, is not accurate. Here is what I wrote in November 2003 in Commission MFR 04017215.

“The transponders on United B757 and B767 airframes are identical. The transponders on American B757 and B767 are also identical and differ from the United version in a single detail. There are four knobs on the American version that change the transponder code. There are only two on the United Version [sic]. In both versions the knobs are stacked in groups of two. Therefore, there are two stacks of two knobs each on the American version and one stack of two knobs on the United version. In all cases the upper knob is smaller than and easily distinguished from the lower knob.” The following paragraph in the MFR is redacted, “9/11 Closed by Statute.”

Addendum added Nov 20, 2009

Here is a slide version of this article. Slides are timed and will advance automatically. Included are screen prints of a Google Earth plot and data from the FDR, as well as a brief summary slide. Embedded audio not yet active; working on it.

American Air Flight 77 ZDC ZID Slide Show

Original article

In my original “Transponders and Ghosts” article I wrote: “Plane by hijacked plane, each transponder manipulation presented a different problem set to air traffic control, to managers of the National Airspace System and ultimately, to the National Command Authority.”

To briefly summarize, the four transponders on the hijacked airplanes were each manipulated differently. Three were turned off at distinctly different times in the flight paths of those planes and a fourth, the transponder on UA175, was changed to a different code.

We now have more insight into the problem that latter manipulation caused. I hasten to add that we have no direct knowledge of the hijacker tactics concerning the transponders; what we do know is that retrospectively the tactics, planned or serendipitous, were effective.

AA77, itself a ghost

At 9:18 the Operations Supervisor at Washington Center, ZDC, Cary Johnson, called Indianapolis Center, ZID. The call can be heard at this link. ThomasJohnson He reported that he had observed on TSD (Traffic Situation Display) that AA 77 was a ghost somewhere over Indiana and asked if ZID was working the aircraft. The Operations Supervisor at ZID, John Thomas, told Johnson that AA 77 had been reported lost but may have turned around and was heading somewhere else.

During the course of the conversation the two managers established that they were looking for an aircraft at last altitude of 35,000 feet, and that ZID had initiated rescue procedures.

ZDC

After concluding the ZID call Thomas convened a conference call with his Area Supervisors; that conversation began shortly before 9:22 and lasted less than one minute. The call can be heard at this link. johnsonarea They agreed they were looking for an aircraft with a limited data tag and one with a transponder code change. The reference was to AA 77 at 35K feet and UA 175 over New Jersey at 31K feet.

UA 175

In the “Ghosts” article we established that concurrent with the impact of AA 11 into the North Tower the transponder code on UA 175 was changed, and then changed again. The code was first changed to 3020 and then to 3321. There is a logical explanation for that sequence.

When the Commission Staff visited the “Companies,” American and United Airlines, we were provided in-cabin and in-cockpit orientations on both B757 and B767 aircraft at each Company. While in the B767 cockpit with the United senior pilot I had him show me the transponder and change the code. His technique was a two-step sequence. On the first step he changed the first and third digits, the second and fourth defaulted to zero. On the second step he changed the second and fourth digits.

~~At the time, United transponders had four knobs in two stacks of two each. The American transponders had four separate knobs.~~ [See addendum of February 6, 2014 at the beginning of this article.] In retrospect, that is my best explanation for why the transponder code on UA 175 changed, and then changed again.

Among others, FAA’s Eastern Region knew of the code change and it was Eastern Region, not Herndon Center that was advising the air traffic control operations managers. We will return to that point later, but first back to ZDC.

ZDC, Continued

At no time did ZDC managers and supervisors discuss or did Johnson direct activating the primary switches on their scopes. ZDC never looked for and never recognized a primary only target approaching the nation’s capital from the west. By then, it was too late. The time was approaching 9:23 and a very real ghost, AA 77 was upon them and had begun a descent, not from flight level 35, but from flight level 25.

AA 77, Flight Data Recorder

According to the flight data recorder, a primary source, AA 77 left 35000 feet altitude at 9:01 soon after the hijackers took over. By 9: 14 it was at flight level 25,000 and remained there during the course of the air traffic control conversations between ZDC and ZID and among the area supervisors at ZDC. About 9:22 it began its final descent and by 9:29 it was below 10,000 feet altitude.

Given that primary source data and given the instructions the ZDC operations manager passed to his area supervisors, ZDC had no chance to detect AA77. Moreover, it was quickly moving into IAD (Dulles Tracon) air space as we shall see by considering another primary source, radar files from the 84th RADES.

AA 77, radar track.

NEADS radar reacquired AA 77 shortly before 9:10, but as a primary only track. Moreover, as opposed to the situation with AA 11 where NEADS could have determined altitude it could only have done so for AA 77 during the period 9:16 and 9:27 while the Oceana Radar was acquiring the aircraft. Thereafter, the radar feed was coming from The Plains, Virginia, the only radar in the Joint Surveillance System that could not provide altitude information on a primary only track. Shown here is a Google Earth plot of 84th RADES files from The Plains radar for the period 9:18 to 9:28.

According to the plot, AA 77 was just approaching Virginia, west of Harrisonburg, while Thomas and Johnson were conversing, and was passing north of Harrisonburg and crossing I81 while Johnson was conversing with his area supervisors. At the same time, after crossing the mountains, Hani Hanjour began the descent from flight level 25 headed for air space controlled by Dulles TRACON, IAD.

We will address the IAD story later in a separate article. For now we need to document what is and is not happening in the hunt for AA 77.

Observables in real time

First, at no time do either Thomas or Johnson talk about or consider NEADS or military assistance.

Second, they are not taking their cues from or responding to Herndon Center. ZDC is responding to FAA’s Eastern Region, an administrative headquarters. Recall that we established in a previous article that the two entities fighting the battle (second article at link) that morning were NEADS and Herndon Center.

Third, at no time do Johnson and his Area Supervisors mention Dulles TRACON; they are concentrating on their mission which is handling transponding aircraft at high altitude.

Finally, ZDC does not turn on the primary switches on its scopes; instead they are looking for a limited data block, as was the case with UA 175. I made a separate, final trip to ZDC on the very point of primary switches to confirm that they did not turn them on. They did not.

A personal comment

We will likely never know the attack plan, in detail. What we do know is the Atta and al Shehhi had extended periods of quality time together, measured in days, weeks, even months, to discuss ‘what-ifs’, do research, and speculate what might and what might not work as they finalized the battle plan.

Certainly they had sufficient time and the means to determine that a transponder turned off over West Virginia might cause problems; to determine that a transponder changing codes might also cause problems; and that a low level approach to the nation’s capital might escape detection.

Given the primary source information, including the flight data recorder data, we can reverse engineer Hanjour’s actions and make some informed observations. First, Hanjour immediately changed altitude after takeover and turn around. Second, he flew erratically for several minutes after reaching his new altitude of 25,000 feet.

That erratic flight reinforces the belief by some that Hanjour and the other hijack pilots were unskilled. Conversely, it also reinforces the belief by others that the plot was planned in detail and was sophisticated. It is plausible that Hanjour flew erratically to encourage the passengers to stay seated and belted. Either way, Hanjour did level the plane and it flew smoothly at flight level 25 until it came time to descend.

It is a technicality of course, but during the period 09:24 to 09:27, AA77 was in Class E airspace, between 18,000 and 10,000 feet, airspace that ‘belonged’ to neither ZDC nor Dulles TRACON. Even so, Dulles TRACON controllers did ‘see’, but did not recognize the significance of a ‘no tag’ approaching during that time. And that’s the next story to be told.

Future articles

As mentioned, I will continue the primary source analysis of the approach of AA 77 through Dulles TRACON airspace and will establish using primary source information the earliest that the NCA would know it had an immediate problem.

It is also appropriate that we now queue up a discussion of Norman Mineta and his testimony. It is clear from this article that as of 9:20, no one knew where AA77 was or that it was approaching the nation’s capital; not ZID, not ZDC, not IAD, not Herndon, not the FAA Eastern Region and, above all, not FAA Headquarters, NEADS/NORAD, the NMCC, Richard Clarke, Norman Mineta, the Secret Service or the Vice President and President.

It will be the initiative of one person, Danielle O’Brien, that anyone, anywhere, will have actionable information. By that time, AA77 will be “inside the Beltway,” a term that used to enjoy a certain cachet.

9-11: NEADS Tapes; an interesting quest

Correspondents have called to my attention that Kevin Fenton has blogged about the Commission Staff’s quest to obtain the NEADS tapes. Let me state up front that I have no quarrel with Kevin or the History Commons Scribd initiative to make available the Commission files. I have personally found that initiative invaluable. I have met Erik Larson and applaud the many hours he has devoted to a necessary and critical task.

I have also in other articles cautioned about applying post facto clarity and understanding to facto events. Here, the caution applies to both the events of 9-11 and to the Commission’s quest to understand and report on those events. I also cautioned about taking snapshots of the Commission’s work. One such quest was the effort to obtain all available NEADS tapes, which we ultimately did. One such snapshot is the History Commons glance at a segment of staff work.

Kevin wrote me a private email laying out his analysis which is both interesting and informative. It is a snapshot of the Commission’s work, one that has the beneficial effect of showing that the Commission Staff was working formal and informal channels at the same time. That should come as no surprise to anyone who has engaged in such research. I did respond to Kevin.

Insight provided to Kevin Fenton

I began by stating, “Kevin, that is a fair question. Let me say up front that, ultimately, it [NEADS production of the tapes] was not nefarious. So, please don’t try to make anything out of something that is not there.”

I continued: “In several discussions with our DoD POC we worked out how we would proceed. NEADS would digitize the remaining channels and provide them to us on site during our first visit. The original tapes were analog, reel-reel. We found that delivery [on site] to be insufficient for our purposes and we called a halt to the first visit. NEADS was offering up all the tapes, but it was piecemeal.”

I then explained what we did after we received the audio files. “Once we received the digitized files then we contracted out a transcription effort. One firm, Alderson, decided to use a technique of tracking individual voices, which is OK as long as folks understand what they were doing. I posted an article on this on my website one I realized that [other researchers] were totally askew in their analysis of the Alderson tapes vis D1989.”

I then elaborated on the original transcription effort by NEADS. “In the course of the NCO’s work [specialist brought in by NEADS to transcribe the tapes immediately after 9-11] NEADS thought it had lost the contents of one recording machine. Together with DoD we approached the manufacturer, Dictaphone [General Dynamics], and they were able to not only recover all the files but provide them to us in a format which was useful and effective.”

I then summarized: “Bottom line, we ultimately got all the NEADS tapes, it took a while. In the course of all our work we determined that the two channels that recorded the voices of the WD [Weapons Director, i.e. controller] and the WD/T for the Otis fighters were not recorded. My work files that run all that to ground have been uploaded by Erik. We know that the channels were never recorded because we never hear those two voices bleeding over into other tapes. Please don’t try to make more out of this then is there.”

I concluded: “Kevin, thanks for your continued interest and dedication. NEADS performed very well that day; not so well in the aftermath. They had a good story to tell [see Bronner, Vanity Fair] and the blew it, as General Arnold acknowledged.

For The Record

The resolution of the NEADS tapes is documented by DoD in its rolling production spreadsheet. Let me hasten to caution that this, itself, is a snapshot; the DoD spreadsheet was iterative, at least weekly. A relevant version of the spreadsheet is included in this file available on the History Commons Scribd site. Here is the embedded documentation.

NQRAD/NEADS/Department of the Air Force Materials
The NORAD tapes of interest to the Commission contain 46 channels.
NORAD is currently transferring the information on those channels to compact
disks. Those CDs are scheduled to be delivered to the Commission as indicated
below. The schedule is determined by the real-time process by which each 6-hour,
40-minute channel can be recorded onto a CD.
CDs containing:
• 10 channels were delivered November 5, 2003
• 8 channels are scheduled for delivery by close of business November 10,
2003
• 4 channels are scheduled for delivery by close of business November 12,
2003
• 6 channels are scheduled for delivery by close of business November 14,
2003
• 18 channels are scheduled for delivery by close of business November
19, 2003

Even after we determined the difficulties DoD and NEADS were having in copying the tapes and a subpoena was issued, it still took weeks for the audio files of all channels to be delivered. Retrospectively, NEADS could not make a complete delivery during our first visit.

The important question for historians, researchers and writers is: “Were all available tapes provided and considered?” How the Staff got to an answer of “Yes” is perhaps interesting and informative but it is of no probative value.

9-11: Air Defense Response; first things first, the Scott Trilogy (part 3)

This is the last article in the Scott series and it stands alone, independent of the other two articles. Scott chose the week of the first anniversary of 9-11 to publish “F-16 Pilots Considered Ramming Flight 93,” September 9, 2002. In his article Scott told the story of the Air National Guard at Andrews and literally set in stone a story contrary to the events of the day; one that has been difficult to unravel.

The Commission Staff thought we had put the Andrews story to rest when our final report was published. The story was resurrected in Lynn Spencer’s Touching History which compelled three members of the Staff, including me, to publish an OpEd article in the “New York Times.” I spoke to the Andrews Story in a previous article which should be read first. With the understanding that the primary and secondary sources of the day do not support Scott’s narrative we can now look at the issue that Scott raises in his title, rules of engagement.

The Facts

At no time during the battle of 9-11 did any military aircraft have authenticated rules to engage a target. NEADS, itself, did not have any such guidance until well after the fate of UA 93 had been determined. That guidance was not passed to either the Otis or Langley pilots that morning. No Andrews pilot had written “weapons free” authority until a pair of fully armed fighters lifted off after 11:00.

The Rationalization

Scott told us two things. First, he addressed the title of his article by writing: “all three [Hutchison, Sasseville, Lucky] acknowledge they were prepared to ram a terrorist-flown aircraft, if necessary.” Second, he further wrote: “Sasseville planned to fire from behind and ‘try to saw off one wing…and bring it down.” There is no primary or secondary souce information to support either supposition.

Scott did not address the Langley pilots, but we do know that the stated NORAD rationalization by both Arnold and Marr was that they would take lives in the air to save lives on the ground. That being said, they did not give the pilots in the air the authority to engage.

Since the circumstances never came to that Hobson’s Choice the ‘what if?’ is a matter of speculation. What we do know is that only the Langley fighters had authentication tables with them; the Andrews pilots did not, according to what they told me during interview. We also know that the Langley fighters were over the nation’s capital long before the Andrew’s fighters. We also know that only the Langley (and Otis) fighters under any plausible scenario could have conceivably had to take terrible, swift action.

So, we can set the Andrew’s fighter story aside with one final point about Scott’s narrative turning again to an issue with all eyewitness and participant recall information, time compression.

Time Compression

Scott wrote: “Within minutes of American airlines Flight 77 hitting the Pentagon on Sept. 11, Air National Guard F-16s took off from here [Andrews AFB, MD] in response to a plea from the White House to ‘Get in the air now’.” That establishes a takeoff time prior to 9:45, which is not possible. It is no wonder that Lynn Spencer had so much difficulty with time compression in her own narrative concerning the Andrews fighters. Three of the available seven pilots were in the skies over North Carolina.. The other four had no planes immediately ready for use.The first Andrews fighter airborne, Hutchison just returning from North Carolina, lifted off a hour later than Scott’s narrative has it.

The Realm of Speculation

I leave it to the reader to rationalize what might have happened. As you do so consider these points.

First, in my article on the Battle of 9-11 I make reference to rules of engagement and to my work on this last Scott article. I wrote: “All informal time-distance analyses that I have worked through in my mind [given a scramble at 9:09] indicate that AA 77 and the Langley fighters would have arrived over greater DC skies at about the same time. And the unanswered question is, “then what?””

Second, I have worked through in my mind the time distance factors for both the Otis and Langley fighters and in the most perfect of worlds there is a slender chance that the Otis fighters would have arrived over a heavily populated area at the same time as did UA 175. There is a slightly less slender chance that AA 77 and the Langley fighters would have also arrived over a heavily populated area at the same time.

Third, arriving on the scene and actually intercepting a target are two very different things. It takes time, time the pilots would likely not have had.

Fourth, there is the issue of authority and authentication. That, too, takes time.

Finally, there is the cognitive problem for the reader of where is it, exactly, the two hijacked airliners are going to go down?

With the possible exception of UA 93, NORAD was not going to take lives in the air to save lives on the ground, despite their rationalization.

AA 11 and UA 93

The Otis pilots had no chance to defend against AA11. FAA declared a hijack at 9:25. It took NEADS, once alerted, the Otis pilots, once scrambled, (edited Nov 1, 2009) on the order of thirteen minutes to get fighters (edited Nov 1, 2009) airborne. Air defense fighters fly at ‘military power,’ maximum subsonic. NORAD specified in its timeline a rate of advance of .9 mach. That approximates 9 nautical miles per minute. It is nearly 170 nautical miles from Otis to Manhattan according to Google Earth. I leave it to the reader to do the math.

The Langley pilots were in position to do something about UA 93, but they had no authority to engage. That is the one plane that could have been engaged to save lives on the ground. Except the passengers and crew aboard UA 93 had already figured that out for themselves.

A Final Observation

We have now completed a review of the Scott Trilogy. That body of work together with other published information in the aftermath of 9-11 established a story that was simply not true. The quote at the top of my home page is the Staff’s summation of the situation as we found it.

9-11: Exercises; additional information

A researcher has posted exercise-related information gleaned from the universe of available interviews conducted by the Commission Staff. This is valuable qualitative analysis now available to other interested researchers. The researcher caveats that this is a work in progress and should be treated accordingly. It is a significant level of effort, one that avoids the ‘snapshot’ analysis pitfall. I do have additional insight that may be helpful.

Still to be released by NARA are the audio files of the interviews. It is possible that not all recorded interviews were memorialized in MFRs. In most cases MFRs were created using both the notes of interviews and the recordings. My recall is MFRs were made of all unrecorded interviews.

Also still to be released are the database files of the Commission. All documents provided to the Commission were catalogued, stored and maintained in classified and unclassified holdings. Staff members copied docuemts from the master files as needed and some of those copies became part of the staff work files which have been released by NARA.

9-11: Delta 1989; an addendum

Following is an MFR extract from the Commission Staff interview with the Identification Technicians at NEADS. It explains the confusion about a destination of either Los Angeles or Las Vegas. The interview was recorded and the audio file will ultimately be made available by NARA

“They began looking for a Delta 89 (Note: the flight is actually Delta 1989) as another hijack. They found it on the scope and had him as a “confirmed hijack”. They originally believed Delta 89 was on a flight path to Las Vegas, but then realized it was to Los Angeles. They marked it as a “Special” flight for tracking purposes. They informed Cleveland Center of Delta 89’s status and that it was in Cleveland Center. They gave Cleveland Center the information that it was headed to Los Vegas, not Los Angeles. They were informed that it was actually Delta 1989, and they gave Cleveland Major Nasypany’s contact number.”

9-11: Delta 1989; relationship to UA 93

Recently, Fox News aired a special, “9/11: Timeline of Terror” on the 8th anniversary of 9-11. Major General Larry Arnold was among the voices heard describing the events of the day. It is not clear if the clips featuring General Arnold were made for the special or were file footage. My speculation is that it was file footage since General Arnold misspeaks about NORAD knowledge of UA 93. The plane he is heard describing was Delta 1989. NORAD had no knowledge of UA 93 in the time frame to which General Arnold refers.

The Commission Staff spent time with General Arnold explaining to him, using a radar presentation based on 84th RADES radar files, that the plane they observed meandering that day was, in fact, Delta 1989. He acknowledged that fact.

As I have stated elsewhere, the only hijacked plane track forward told (electronically linked) by NEADS that morning was track B-89. That was the track for Delta 1989. That fact that it was track number 89 is coincidental.

Here is a graphic, based on 84th RADES radar files showing the relationship of Delta 1989 and UA 93. The graphic was created on September 16, 2009. UA93 and Delta 1989

9-11: NRO Exercise; a case of over-analysis

In the Bobcat article I made the following observation: “Snapshots of the Commission’s work are prone to misinterpretation…the imposition of post facto understanding and awareness on facto and pre-facto conditions. Discrete pieces of staff work are just that, pieces of a vastly larger puzzle; sometimes they fit, sometimes they don’t.” In this article we will consider another piece of the puzzle that did not fit, the radar track of the early morning DC-area traffic helicopter and its relationship to the NRO exercise. There was no relationship.

The NRO Exercise, a first order of business

High on my list of early things to do was to get to the bottom of the NRO exercise scheduled for the morning of 9-11. Without access to the scenario assessing the NRO exercise was problematic. The 84^th RADES radar files were the first delivery of actual data; they included a RADES workup of an aircraft which not only flew near the NRO, it flew near the Pentagon, CIA Headquarters, NSA, NIMA, Ft Belvoir and Quantico. It also appeared to have taken off from Andrews AFB. It got my attention for a time. Following is a screen print of the flight.It took off from near Andrews at 6:46 and landed at the same site at 7:27; it flew between 0900 and 1200 feet. The green returns are reinforced (radar and beacon), the red returns are beacon only. The reason so much of the flight was picked up as beacon only was its altitude.

The Traffic Helicopter

Intuitively obvious in hindsight, it was not immediately apparent that the track of interest to the 84^th RADES was the early morning traffic helicopter. So I spent time reviewing the radar files and comparing the track to 1:250,000 maps. I focused on agencies and facilities and overlooked the fact that the aircraft was also following, in general, the I95/395 and I66 corridors and the 95/495 beltway. I discussed the track with DoD and FAA personnel at several locations. No one had any particular insight or knew of anything operational that morning that was relevant. In a discussion with Andrews Tower personnel it occurred to them that the morning traffic helicopter lifted off early every morning from a private pad in the area. And that was the end of that.

Snapshots in the work files

One snapshot is a comment in the Andrews MFR, linked above. A second snapshot is a coversheet filed with the NRO exercise scenario, itself. That cover sheet was applicable to RADES radar track screen prints and to 1:250,000 maps hung throughout our office to plot planes and areas of interest. It had no relation to the NRO exercise scenario itself.

Even though I had handwritten “NRO” on it at an early stage in our work it was not a piece of the puzzle that fit anywhere. I over-analyzed a non-event.

9-11: Air Defense Response; first things first, the Scott Trilogy (part 2)

This is the second in a series of three articles concerning the Scott trilogy. To set the stage, I recommend a reading of the short introductory article and the article concerning the first of William Scott’s three articles published in 2002. In this article we will consider Scott’s second article, “Command Cells Speed Airspace Reactions,” published June 10, 2002.

FAA/Military Interface

Government functions because agencies establish relationships with each other to facilitate work and the flow of information. Since the military is a constant presence in air space controlled by the FAA it is natural that such relationships would have developed over time between the military services and the FAA. In this article we will identify and discuss three such relationships in existence on 9-11. The three are the Air Traffic Services Cell (ATSC), the Central Altitude Reservation Function (CARF) and the exchange of liaison officers.

Some have speculated that because of these relationships the FAA had direct, immediate, and responsive communication with the military concerning the events of the day, in other words what FAA knew in real time the military, especially NORAD, also knew in real time.That was not the case as we shall see. None of the three relationships was structured to help with the battle that morning.

Two, the CARF and the liaison function, were ultimately helpful in establishing a secure communications link between the NMCC and FAA, but not until the fate of all four hijacked aircraft had been determined. All three, especially the ATSC, were extremely helpful the rest of day as the nation transitioned to military control of the sky; they were not helpful in fighting the battle itself.

Scott’s first article, setting the stage

Scott’s first article is a departure point for our discussion. In that article Scott stated, “the…hijack notification was being passed by phone to a Norad [sic] command center…and the joint FAA/Defense Dept. Air Traffic Services Cell (ATSC) colocated with the …Command Center in Herndon…” Scott provided no antecedent to tell us who made those two passes.

Moreover, Scott’s own reference is to a page in a December 2001 AW&ST article which simple shows the floor layout at Herndon. There is a desk specifically designated for the DoD/CARF, but not the ATSC. It was not a desk normally occupied except when needed, according to Herndon managers who briefed the Commission Staff. Two desks in the immediate vicinity were for the Air Traffic Association and the National Business Aircraft Association. Scott’s source article stated that the latter two organizations were represented on the operations floor and “in a fluke, so was what Herndon called the ‘military cell’.”

Scott set up his second article with this passage in his first article: “The Air Traffic Services Cell [was]created by the FAA and the Defense Dept. for use when needed to coordinate high priority aircraft movements during warfare or emergencies. The Pentagon staffs it only three days per month for refresher training, but Sept. 11 happened to be one of those days.”

He segued smoothly into a discussion of a small office “established after the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War to facilitate movements of military aircraft in U.S., Pacific and European airspace. Reservists assigned to ATSC have strong backgrounds in fighter, tanker, AWACS and strategic airlift operations. Many were also pilots.” This was not a crisis management operation, it was simply a routinized process set in place to manage significant military use of domestic and foreign airspace.

Scott goes astray

As we discussed in the first article, Scott had little help to validate what he was being told. He clearly gained the impression that the ATSC was something more than it turned out to be. He assessed it this way. “That experienced cadre…paid dividends on Sept. 11, when the cell quickly became a key communications node during the military’s response to terrorist attacks.” Scott then goes on to give a reasonable account of how valuable the ATSC was, except that value came in the aftermath, well after the battle was over. The ATSC played no role in the response to the four hijacked aircraft that morning. Before we can establish what actually happened we first need to consider the other two interface functions, the CARF and the liaison officers, and we start with the CARF.

Central Altitude Reservation Function

The CARF operated a secure facility co-located with the ATSC. Its function is further described in the Robert Williams MFR. Among other activities, “the primary space they reserve is for military movement overseas, and for mass military movements. They also handle ‘more unusual’ circumstance [sic] like the dropping of rocket boosters for a space shuttle launch..”

As a secure facility it had phone lines capable of linking to the NMCC. The Commission Staff determined that sometime in the 10:15 time frame a CARF member, Rayford Brooks, was monitoring the Air Threat Conference Call. Brooks and Williams, both civilian, were two people on duty in the CARF that morning. Although the CARF mission was to provide military interface its work force was civilian, no military personnel were assigned. ATSC was the military cell which, according to the Williams MFR, “co-join[ed] the CARF office for the practicality of proximity for secure information.”

In order to find out how the CARF ended up as the FAA node on the Air Threat Conference Call we first need to discuss the last of the three interface functions, liaison officers. Scott did not discuss the liaison function in his article.

Liaison between FAA and NORAD

A long-established liaison relationship existed between FAA and NORAD. At FAA Headquarters that relationship was formalized as “Detachment Two,” the military liaison office at FAA headquarters, commanded that day by Colonel Sheryl Atkins. Each service had its own liaison officer who reported to his/her service directly but worked administratively under Atkins.

FAA regional offices also had military liaison officers assigned. In the Northeast those officers were accredited to both the New England Region and the Eastern Region and split their time between the two. None of the liaison officers at any level had crisis management responsibilities.

In Atkins case she was en route work when AA 11 struck the North tower and was at FAA Headquarters by the time the second plane struck. She went to the 10th floor shortly after AA 77 struck the Pentagon, but reported to the Air Traffic Situation Room not the Washington Operations Center. Atkins and the other liaison officers were effective in the management of airspace in the aftermath but were not engaged in the crisis, itself.

The liaison relationship was a two-way arrangement. FAA liaison officers were accredited to key NORAD echelons, including NEADS. At NEADS, Steve Culbertson was at the Headquarters when the World Trade Center was twice struck. (Note: Leslie Filson’s notes at one point have Culbertson at the Headquarters after the second plane struck and, later, headed for the SOCC before the second plane struck.) My recall is that when he learned that FAA was having difficulty communicating with the military he went to the Sector Operations Center to help. That would be closer to 9:30 and that initiative is documented in the primary sources of the day. The NEADS tapes show that a few minutes after 9:30 Steve Culbertson was looking for a STU-III (secure telephone) and Major Nasypany is heard asking the SOCC Director if Culbertson can use his STU-III. According to the Staff’s interview with Culbertson he estimated that the line was established around 10:15.

Culbertson and Bill Ayers, the DoD Airspace Manager for NEADS, are among the unsung group of people who struggled that day to bring order out of chaos. Their effort, according to Filson’s notes, became the Domestic Events Network (DEN).

Back to William Scott

Scott, in his second article discusses only the ATSC.and that’s OK, given the time at which he was writing. He focused on the visible and the tangible and that was the ATSC embedded with the Herndon Center. Our treatment here of the CARF and the Liaison Function between FAA and NORAD completes the record. He teed up the ATSC in his first article and made it the centerpiece for his second article. In his opening sentence to the second article he gets the story right, “a small group of Air Force reservists and FAA air traffic experts [including CARF] started working on the inevitable next phase–how to restore the National Airspace System.”

And that was their proper role. There should be no expectation that the three linear process in existence discussed in this article could have or should have been engaged earlier than they ultimately were. I will add these three processes/functions to the growing list of identifiable linear procedures in effect on 9-11.