Author: Oredigger 61

9/11: Air Threat Conference Transcript; DoD Release, in perspective

Author’s Note, February 5, 2014

Minor typo corrections, bolded, have been made.

Background

On the morning of September 11, 2001, the National Military Command Center (NMCC) convened  an Air Threat Conference. The tape of that conference and accompanying transcript are among the most important primary source documents of the day. The tape has never been released. Only late last year, via a FOIA request in 2006, has a heavily redacted copy of the transcript been released. (Link added February 3, 2014, an oversight in the original posting.)

The release underwhelms and DoD has done a great disservice to the families, the public, and most of all to itself by releasing an important document in a way that confuses rather than clarifies. However, the release, while largely unhelpful, does provide some noteworthy insight.

It is my purpose in this article to provide insight for researchers and historians as they attempt to fathom what the Air Threat Conference transcript in its current public form adds to the conversation. But first, some overarching comments and then some perspective.

Overarching Comments

The initial report to the NMCC was stark, two aircraft into the World Trade Center and one confirmed hijack, AA11, headed towards the nation’s capital.  There was no mention of either AA77 or UA93. That information from the Air Threat Conference, or lack thereof, should have been a part of the DoD/NORAD preparation of General Eberhart for testimony before Congress, construction of the NORAD timeline, and preparation of General McKinley, General Arnold, Administrator Garvey, and Secretary Mineta for testimony before the Commission. None of that happened. Instead, a garbled government story emerged.

The initial NMCC attempt to switch from a Significant Events Conference to an Air Threat Conference failed because the classification level,  TOP SECRET, was too high for some intended conferees; FAA specifically, according to Commission Staff interviews with NMCC officers.  The conference was reconvened at the SECRET level but FAA was still unable to join.

Most important, the redacted transcript clearly establishes that the Air Threat Conference was “SIOP,” (Single Integrated Operations Plan).  My estimate is that this is the genesis of the national level attempt to implement Continuity of Operations (COOP) and Continuity of Government (COG) procedures.

The redacted transcript clearly depicts the confusion at the national level. Confusion about the threat, the attack, and its aftermath is understandable.  What is not is the consistent confusion about the disposition of friendly forces. The transcript, even in redacted form, describes chaos.

Chaos Theory Considered

In other articles I have established that Chaos Theory is useful in examining the events of the day, not in its pure mathematical form but in its language. We can use the language of Chaos Theory as a metaphor to aid in understanding what happened, retrospectively.  Specifically in this instance, chaos is nonlinear. Linear processes and procedures such as the NMCC attempt to convene a suitable conference, therefore, are largely futile and may even be counter-productive.

The series of teleconferences available to the NMCC were all linear processes, set procedures that allowed the orderly convention of the right voices at the right time to deal with a crisis. Except that never happened that morning. The attack was against the National Air Space system, a system operated by a single individual, Benedict Sliney, the FAA’s National Operations Manager, and defended on the East Coast by a single individual, Colonel Robert Marr, Commander of NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector.

For the nation to have any chance at all that morning those two individuals had to be in communication and sharing a common operating picture of the attack. Nothing the NMCC did during the actual attack and defense that morning ever assisted the operator and defender of the National Airspace System.

The Tape and Transcript

At about 9:29 EDT, as a precursor Significant Event Conference was being convened, the acting Duty Director of Operations (DDO) pushed the record button on a small, inexpensive reel-reel recorder on his desk.  That was the state of the art in the NMCC that morning.  The recording was not time stamped and the system required that the DDO turn the tape over at the end of each side.  He missed the fact that the first tapes first side had run out, according to his interview with Commission Staff. As a result, there is a period of time, perhaps a minute or so, that was not recorded.

The fact of an Air Threat Conference was determined by Commission Staff based on information contained in NORAD documents. A formal request to DoD surfaced the fact of the existence of the tape which was not released to the Commission until DoD had time to make a transcription, not a trivial process.  As DoD staff worked through the tape making the transcript they found that the equities involved in the conference exceeded DoD. Thereafter, the tape and transcript came under the purview of the National Security Council (NSC).

The Commission negotiated a protocol that allowed DoD to retain a copy of the transcript for Commission staff use during interviews. A second copy, the original as I recall, was retained at the NSC.  At no time did Commission Staff have either the transcript or tape available at our offices for a detailed contrast and comparison with other responsive information.  No copy of the transcript or tape will be found in the Commission’s archived files; we had nothing to archive.

Commission Staff was allowed to listen to the tape at the NSC under the supervision of a junior staffer whose task was to stop the tape at certain specified times and fast forward beyond brief snippets of information.  It was a boring job for the staffer and on one occasion as I listened he forgot to stop the tape.  What he was supposed to suppress in that instance was specific call sign reference to Continuity of Government (COG) helicopters.  To me, it was nonsensical. What he was suppressing was the same information I had routinely heard on air traffic control communications provided by FAA.

There is, in my estimation, no credible reason for the tape and transcript, unredacted, to be withheld beyond the minimum statutory limits for doing so.

A Note for Researchers and Historians

The redacted transcript is best used in conjunction with two other, more definitive documents. First, is the Commission Report, itself. A critical portion of the narrative concerning the events of 9/11 was based on the Air Threat Conference, as detailed in Chapter One notes. Keep the Report handy as you make your personal assessment of the DoD redacted transcript

Second, is the staff generated transcript surfaced under a Mandatory Declassification Review orchestrated by Robbyn Swan, co-author of the Eleventh Day. That document, “Air Traffic Conference Call, DJH Notes,” provides needed time correlation and should be concurrently used in order to understand the times and timing of the line entries in the redacted transcript. The staff made that transcript in order to integrate the Air Threat Conference into our own timeline.

With that background and guidance let us now consider the recently released redacted transcript.

The Situation

The national level did not start to get itself organized until 9:16 EDT, when CIA convened a NOIWON (National Operational Intelligence Watch Officer’s Network) to find out what was going on. The NOIWON, with which I had personal familiarity, is a desk/center level analyst information exchange network to quickly discuss things that go bump in the night. The network ties the WAOC consortium (Washington Area Operations Centers) together in real time.

No one on the NOIWON had any information beyond that which was being learned from news networks.  The important point is that all the key organizations, specifically the FAA and the NMCC, were on the network. The network, however, was not suited for operational coordination. The FAA node, for example, was on the 3rd floor of the FAA building, several floors below the FAA’s crisis center.

At 9:20 EDT, FAA activated its primary net, a mechanism for crisis coordination outside the FAA. One of the first entities called was the NMCC. The officer who answered told Commission Staff that he quickly learned that nothing was happening on that net.  He tasked a newly assigned non-commissioned officer, one not yet assigned to a specific NMCC watch team, to sit and listen to the network.  I interviewed her and found that nothing happened on the net that morning.

What happened was the FAA relied primarily on its internal tactical net. The NMCC was never a party to the FAA’s tactical net.

At 9:25 EDT, the SVTS (Secure Video Teleconference System) was activated. It became operational at 9:40 EDT, when the FAA Administrator and the CIA Director entered the conference. The SVTS was a cold war legacy system heavily layered with security which isolated conferees from their staffs. While both the NMCC and the FAA were active on the conference, participants had to communicate via runners to the DDO and the FAA crisis center.

Amidst all this activity the NMCC, which had simply been listening in on the NOIWON conference, decided it had to do something and a Significant Event Conference was convened at 9:29 EDT.  Staff officers told Commission Staff during interviews that they were literally pulling binders off the shelves in their effort to convene an operational conference that made sense.

The Conference Begins

The NMCC soon learned that FAA was not a party to the Significant Event Conference and decided to do something else. In response to information from the Air Force that they had established a crisis action team, the DDO said, “I concur, convene an air threat conference.”  NORAD concurred and announced it was “proceeding with an air threat conference.” Notably, NORAD also verified that “hijacked aircraft is still airborne heading toward Washington DC.”

The Threat

The threat was established immediately after the SECRET level Air Threat Conference was convened. The DDO announced, “An air attack against North America may be in progress.” NORAD concurred; “We have radar and visual indication of a possible threat to CONUS. Unknown country of origin.”

Given that a Russian air launched cruise missile exercise was scheduled, the die was cast. The nation prepared for an air attack not a terrorist attack and a COOP/COG response was required.

In NORAD’s defense it did attempt to dampen the situation. A possible hijack was mentioned. No CINC’s assessment, a critical necessary step was forthcoming; “CINC NORAD is not declaring air defense emergency at this point. And, NORAD recommends that this conference be reconvened when further information and unconflicted reports are available.”

By then it was too late.  The next communication recorded was, “This is the DDO providing an update. There’s a report that an aircraft has crashed into the Mall side of the Pentagon.”

Chaos ensued. The next threat report was that Delta flight 89 was possibly hijacked. That was followed by a report of a “possible inbound to D.C. 25 minutes out..” The NORAD response was explicit. “NORAD has no indication of a hijack heading to Washington, D.C. at this time.”

Things then took another chaotic turn for the worse. The DDO asked the Air Force for an update “on fighter cap” for the D.C. area. No one knew, Air Force or NORAD, even though three Langley fighters were in the process of establishing the ‘cap.’ The NMCC further request was, “I say again my previous request. Have any aircraft been scrambled in response to this United 93 and what is that status of fighter cap over D.C.?”

The NORAD response was nonsensical, in retrospect. “Roger, We currently have two aircraft out of Atlantic City; additional scramble pending and stand by for ETI (sic, should read ETA) to Washington, D.C. NORAD complete.”

Andrews mentioned

In other articles I have established that the Andrews fighters were not part of the air defense force that morning. They did not have the tactics, techniques, and procedures, or authentication tables to engage.  Even when finally tasked it took them well over an hour to get fighters in the air, well after the United 93 threat had been resolved.

Nevertheless, Andrews was considered. The DDO asked; “Have the assets out of Andrews been launched?” NORAD responded, “NORAD, no information on assets out of Andrews.”

The FAA joins

Sometime after 10:15 EDT, the FAA joined the conference, not from FAA headquarters but from the CARF (Central Altitude Reservation Function) at the FAA’s Air Traffic Control System Command Center, Herndon, Virginia.

The specific question to FAA was, “This is the DDO. Vice Chairman would like to know who’s controlling the aircraft over Washington D.C.”  The response: “If there are any aircraft that are airborne over the Washington area they are being controlled by our Washington Center.”

The NMCC did not have a grip on the disposition of friendly forces. The FAA voice advised that “we understand that there are some military fighters that have been launched to patrol the Washington area.” The DDO responded, “That’s correct. We have reports of two aircraft currently over Washington.”  There were actually three, from Langley.

The FAA voice responded, “That I do not know. I’m back in secure area in the command center. I’d have to go out on the floor to find out who is out there.” He reiterated that “Washington Center is controlling all aircraft in the Washington area at this time.” That was an accurate statement.

The confusion goes on and is worth reading even with the redactions keeping in mind the Commission Report and the Commission Staff version of the Air Threat Conference.

Other Interesting items

Page 62 contains a direct reference to COOP/COG operations. The DDO reported, “We’re still working the number of passengers for that first aircraft for SITE-R.”

Page 78 establishes NMCC awareness of the accurate disposition of friendly forces. CONR reported, “total of 7 airplanes over Washington D.C. right now. Four F-16s [Andrews] and three F-15s [Langley] over Washington D.C. Two F-15s [Otis] over New York City at the moment.”  That time was no earlier than 11:15 EDT, or so.

Page 93 establishes the arrival of Air Force One in Barksdale. General Arnold, CONR, reported, “ABC news, unfortunately, just announced that Air Force One is in Barksdale.”

Page 150 establishes that MOLINK was at least periodically on the conference.  During a polling of conferees, “MOLINK: this is MOLINK.”  MOLINK was/is a long existing Moscow-Washington hot line established in the early 1960’s.

It was likely a charter member any time an air threat conference was convened since the most likely threat was Soviet/Russian.  It is possible that MOLINK was used that morning in the concerted effort to convince the Russians to cancel their ongoing live fire exercise. They did.

As an example of the effort, during my work on the Congressional Joint Inquiry we established from logs of the NMIC (National Military Intelligence Center) that the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency directed the DDI (Duty Director of Intelligence) to call the Defense Attache’ in Moscow to ask the Russians to cancel the exercise.  A later log entry established that the Director, himself, made the call to the Attache’.

Page 164 establishes that “VENUS CONTROL” was responsible for Presidental movement. “VENUS CONTROL: This is Venus Control confirming that we did just talk to Air Force One and they are airborne on their way to Andrews Air Force Base.“

Recall that the so called “mystery plane” was Venus 77, an E4B that took off hurriedly at 9:43 EDT, headed west and then turned back east to establish a 60-mile long racetrack orbit centered on Richmond, Virginia in support of the departure of Air Force One from Florida.  It was that turn back east which was noticed and photographed with subsequent ungrounded speculation as to its presence.

The continued DoD insistence on heavy redaction of the air threat conference ensures that unwarranted speculation will continue.

 

9-11: United Airlines; Cabin Channel 9, a policy change

Introduction

United Airlines Cabin Channel 9, Flight Deck, has long been available to passengers interested in communications from the cockpit to air traffic controllers.  That line of indirect communication was likely available to hijackers Mohammed Atta and Marwan al Shehhi on September 11, 2011.  As of January, 2014, the ability to listen to Flight Deck is no longer available on United Airlines flights, at least on Airbus 320 flights.

Recent Information

During the period Jan 21-29, 2014, I flew cross county on United Airlines fully expecting to listing to air traffic control conversations as I always have in the past.  I flew Airbus 320 flights both ways.

On the outbound trip to the West Coast the Airbus had just been reconfigured inside.  I asked a flight attendant where the plug for audio channels was and she pointed to the arm rest. Except there was no plug in, much to her surprise.

After looking a bit she consulted with the rest of the crew and reported back that there was no longer an in-flight capability for either audio channels or movies.  She reported that United had made a corporate decision to no longer provide such service because the majority of passengers used their own electronic devices.  The plane was wifi-capable, at a cost, of course.

On the return trip the Airbus had not been reconfigured and an audio plug was available, but not useable.  When asked, the flight attendant responded that the in-flight audio and media equipment had been removed.  That plane was also wifi-capable.

Comment

This United Airlines policy change ends an era.  A quick web search suggests that there was at least a small segment of the flying population that routinely listened to Flight Deck and was unhappy with the decision to remove the audio channel equipment.

The hijacker pilots on 9/11 would have known of the existence of the Flight Deck channel because of their cross-country orientation flights in preparation for the attack.  On 9/11, because of the narrow departure route out of Boston, American Airlines flight 11 and United Airlines flight 175 were on the same air traffic control frequency at the same time.

Whether or not  Marwan al-Shehhi heard Mohammed Atta’s communications on frequency it is likely that the hijacker plan was that he could and that Atta’s communication, “we have some planes,” was a cue to al-Shehhi that Atta had cockpit control of his flight.

 

9-11: Twelfth Anniversary; a quick update

I continue to  be largely inactive because of a continuing family situation. Nevertheless, there are some important developments that deserve mention on this the 12th 9/11 anniversary.

Congress

Both the Commission and Joint Inquiry Staffs considered Congress to be dysfunctional in its ability to provide proper oversight of the terrorist threat to the nation. That dysfunction continues, to the point that Commission chairs Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton  co-authored a serious New York Times article today, “Homeland Confusion.”

The former co-chairs of the 9/11 Commission specifically address the oversight of the Department of Homeland Security. The pair wrote:

In a cumbersome legacy of the pre-9/11 era, Congress oversees the Department of Homeland Security with a welter of overlapping committees and competing legislative proposals. The department was created in 2002 out of 22 agencies and departments. More than 100 congressional committees and subcommittees currently claim jurisdiction over it. This patchwork system of supervision results in near-paralysis and a lack of real accountability.

That “patchwork” system existed prior to 9/11 concerning oversight of the government’s counterterrorism policies and practices.  Kean and Hamilton pull no punches. “That has to change.”

Syria

“Carrie Cordero, writing for the “Lawfare” blog,  recently wrote an assessment, “What the 9/11 Commission Report says about Syria.”

Cordero twice quotes the Commission Report

Our enemy is twofold: al Qaeda, a stateless network of terrorist that struck us on 9/11; and a radical ideological movement in the Islamic world, inspired in part by al Qaeda, which has spawned terrorist groups and violence across the globe. The first enemy is weakened, but continues to pose a grave threat. The second enemy is gathering, and will menace Americans and American interests long after Usama Bin Ladin and his cohorts are killed or captured. Thus our strategy must match our means to two ends: dismantling the al Qaeda network and prevailing in the longer term over the ideology that gives rise to Islamist terrorism.

and,

The U.S. government must define what the message is, what it stands for. We should offer an example of moral leadership in the world, committed to treat people humanely, abide by the rule of law, and be generous and caring with our neighbors. America and Muslim friends can agree on respect for human dignity and opportunity. To Muslim parents, terrorist like Bin Ladin have nothing to offer their children but visions of violence and death. America and its friends have a crucial advantage—we can offer these parents a vision that might give their children a better future. If we heed the views of thoughtful leaders in the Arab and Muslim world, a moderate consensus can be found.

She concludes:

Government leaders, in considering whether it is appropriate to take action in Syria, and to what degree, should, this week [article written August 13, 2013] in particular, reflect on the advice and observations provided by the 9/11 Commission. I think they will find that the takeaway is, to borrow a phrase that is of the moment, don’t blink.

American Airlines Flight 77 (AA77)

Serious, important work has been done on the radar issue concerning AA 77 by Tom Lusch.  Lusch has published his extensive work in a detailed article, “Radar Sort Boxes in the area of American Airlines Flight 77’s Turnaround/Disappearance,”  that refines the work of the Commission staff.  Two members of the Commission Staff have reviewed Lusch’s work and have found it to be an authoritative and responsible extension of our work.

Lusch has worked radar issues for many years and for at least the past four years has conducted a detailed investigation into both the work of the Commission and the disappearance of AA77.  He has published a chronology of that work since 2010.  It is fair to say that the false flag theorist, Paul Schreyer, played a key role in the final analysis.  Schreyer conducted detailed separate email conversations with both Tom and me.  Schreyer provided Lusch a link to critical information that he had not previously considered.  Schreyer’s analysis is available at this link.

Correction, Sep 12, 2013. Tom Lusch advises that the key information came via a conversation with Vincent Moreau  not Schreyer.

9-11: July 4, 2001; a retrospective comment

Today, July 4, 2013, we celebrate Independence Day, a symbolicly significant day a dozen years ago. On that day, the 9/11 terrorist attack transitioned from planning to exection. Not one government agency recognized that transition and the rapid, increasing activity that followed.

On July 4, 2001, Khalid al Mihdhar reentered the United States, unhindered, for the second time. He traveled alone and was the last of the 19 hijackers to enter the country.  The four designated pilots and Nawaf al Hazmi had been in the country for some time. The remaining hijackers infiltrated in five pairs and in one group of three between late April and mid-June.  Mihdhar’s entry three weeks later completed the infiltration phase of the attack.

The transtion from planning to attack was swift; just two months and one week. Mohammed Atta traveled to meet with Mihdhar and then left the county for Spain to coordinate with Ramsi binalshibh. Atta reentered with ease, the second time that year he had done so. After Atta’s return, plans were finalized, tickets were purchased, and the teams moved to assembly areas near their departure airports. None of that activity caused any national, state, or local agency to sound the alarm.

On the day of September 11, 2001, the hijackers passed through every required wicket to enter the National Airspace System–arrival, check-in, security, boarding, push-back from the gate, and takeoff. They passed through the jurisdiction of multiple national, state, and local agencies with little difficulty. Not one agency hindered their progress.

Once in the air only two agencies were left to defeat, FAA and NORAD. The battle had long since been won; nothing the remaining two agencies did was to any avail. The failure of those last two agencies continues to fascinate people who, out of proportion, believe that failure was paramount.

The fact is that failure pales in comparison to the multiple failure of national, state, and local agencies, across the board. Once Mihdhar arrived on July 4, those agencies had two months and a week to thwart the attack.  FAA and NORAD had less than two hours.

Presumably, national, state, and local agencies have paid extra attention today, a dozen years later, to who might be arriving on the nation’s shores.

9-11: NORAD; the Crux of the Matter, two perspectives

Introduction

On January 16, 2013, Kevin Ryan published a “Foreign Policy Journal” article: “The Case Against Ralph Eberhart, NORAD’s 9/11 Commander.” Ryan’s work will stand or fall on its own merit and needs no further comment. General Eberhart’s Air Force biography is at the following link

https://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bioID=5317

Researchers, Historians, and Academicians will need additional perspective to judge the “case.” The issue of NORAD performance is long standing, and I have written multiple articles that directly relate to the issue at hand. The purpose of this article is  to pull together a body of information, including my articles, that illuminates the issue for those interested in the subject. But first the crux of the matter.

Crux of the Matter

The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) failed, in the aftermath of 9/11, to reach agreement on the essential times of the day. Specifically, they could not agree on the military response times. NORAD, unilaterally, made a rush to judgment and published its own flawed timeline as a news release on September 18, 2001. NORAD’s haste was to get something pulled together for a pending White House meeting to discuss how the nation responded.

The NORAD timeline carried the day and doomed national level entities and persons from that point forward to construct a nonsensical narrative to fit the NORAD timeline.The timeline was set in concrete later that year when General Eberhart testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

FAA, for its part, acquiesced and several months later published its own timeline which did nothing to set straight the original NORAD news release. As a result, FAA poorly prepared Administrator Jane Garvey and Transportation Secretary Norman Minetta for their May 2003 testimony to the 9/11 Commission. Both presented testimony that confused rather than clarified.  They were immediately followed by NORAD representatives who not only stuck closely to the original timeline but compounded the matter by making yet another error in timeline preparation.

NORAD made three small but critical staff errors in three years worth of work. NORAD’s failure to validate and verify simple facts caused national level leaders, including the President, to believe that the government had been responsive to the attack against the nation’s capital and gave the appearance of being responsive to the second plane in the attack against New York City.

The Errors

NORAD determined in September, 2001, that it was notified about American Airlines Flight 77 at 9:24 EDT. Concurrently, they determined that the notification concerning United Airlines Flight 175 came at 8:43 EDT. During preparation for its May, 2003, testimony NORAD determined that it had been notified of  United Airlines Flight 93 at 9:16 EDT. All three time were wrong. Two of the three (AA 77 and UA 93) were the result of a staff failure to read the official log of the day. The third (UA 175) was the result of the NORAD and FAA failure to reach agreement.

The 9/11 Commission staff sorted all that out and reported an accurate timeline, one based on primary source information, the radar and audio files of the day, and the key secondary document, the official Northeast Air Defense Sector log.

With that understanding of the crux of the matter and the errors that were made we now turn to the body of information necessary for researchers and historians to judge Ryan’s perspective and my perspective, which follows. And we begin with two in-depth articles I wrote in past years which provide my perspective.

A Different Perspective

January 2010: “9-11: NORAD; Should It and Could It Have Done More”

June 2011: “9-11: NORAD and FAA Timelines; in perspective”

Those two articles, taken together, provide a detailed account of the events of 9-11 based on primary source information and supporting secondary source material, specifically the official Northeast Air Defense Sector record, the Mission Crew Commander/Technician log.

The January, 2010, article includes a discussion of a NORAD analysis, “9-11 Excursion (AA77 and UA93),” directed by General Eberhart.

The perspective I provide is also based on the cumulative history of my continued interest in the events of 9-11 since the Commission was disestablished. For additional background information we begin with the conclusion of the work of the Commission Staff and the referrals we made.

Referrals

The Commission Staff understood that work on the issue of NORAD and FAA notification and response times was not finished. The matter was referred to the Inspectors General, Department of Defense and Department of Transportation on July 29, 2004. Both officials, statutory appointees confirmed by the United States Senate, took the matter for action.

Here is a link to the Scribd.com file concerning the referral. That referral concluded the formal work of the Commission on this issue. It is noted for the record that we have ready access to these documents because of the dedicated, persistent work of Erik Larson. His diligent work to upload all of the released Commission files saved me, personally, hundreds of tedious hours to retrieve my own staff work.

Finished in final draft but unpublished, was the Team 8 Monograph, an audio project that told the story in the air on 9/11 through the actual voices of those involved. The Monograph lacked formal agency clearance and the embedded audio files had not been transcribed. More on that later.

I summarized my perspective in a 2006 letter to the Editor, Washington Post, unpublished, but directly relevant to this discussion.  I used a Sudoku metaphor to highlight how an early error in analysis makes a puzzle or problem unsolvable.  Once the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) staff made a critical error in reading its master log of the days events it was not possible for anyone, at any level up to and including the President, to make sense of what happened that day.

And there the matter stood in my mind until Lynn Spencer published her book, Touching History, in June 2008.

An Old Story Resurfaces

Spencer’s book caught former Team 8 members by surprise.  We thought that we had laid to rest any notion that the air defense on 9/11 had been responsive or that the Andrews Air Force Base fighters had been involved in the hunt for any of the hijacked planes. Yet, the story, largely told in 2004 by Leslie Filson in Air War Over America, emerged once again.  Team 8 wrote an OpEd article in rebuttal, published in the New York Times on September 13, 2008.

And looming on the horizon was a date certain in the work of the 9/11 Commission, August 2009.  By agreement, our files as archived at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), were to be made public five years after the Commisson’s charter ended.

The NARA Release

NARA released primarily work files and officials files that had been committed to paper and stored. The full release of Commission files is an ongoing project and will ultimately include electronic files and classified files not yet agency-cleared.

I had printed out and boxed an extensive amount of my own work so that I and others would have access to it.  Again, thanks to Erik Larson, we have access to most of that work. For my part, I struggled with how to manage future work, based on the release of the work files, and decided to create my own website so that I could work on issues important to me and so that I could control establish my own baseline to address (edited Feb 27, 2013, underlined text added) the questions posed by others. (www.oredigger61.org) That has worked well over time and has allowed me to set the pace of my own work. I have also started a second website (www.9-11revisited.org) to serve as a more concise, Cliff Notes version of my primary site.

The most important outcome  of the release of Commission files was the reconstruction of the Team 8 Audio Monograph, “A New Kind Type of War.”  That effort required that NARA find the text and audio files; both had been archived separately.  That was a non-trivial task which required that I review file listings and point archivists in the right direction.  They succeeded in finding all the files and I contacted Team 8 leader, John Farmer, who orchestrated the transcription of the audio files and publication of the Monograph in “The Rutgers Law Review,” on September 8, 2011. (Correction made Feb 28, 2013)

Concurrently, Jim Dwyer, New York Times, wrote a front page article publicizing the effort and the imbedded audio files.

A second important outcome was that I have been able to develop a theoretical construct, Chaos Theory, that helps explain and clarify how events of the day occurred and the impact those events had in the aftermath.

Chaos considered, briefly

The 9-11 attack was a two-axis assault on the National Airspace System, each axis with two prongs. One expected outcome of such an attack is to cause confusion and chaos for the defenders. One aspect of chaos is disruptive feedback. The attack that day produced at least four disruptive feedback events: the false report that AA11 was still airborne; the false report that Delta 1989 had been hijacked; the creation of a new flight plan for UA93 which gave the illusion that it was still airborne well after it crashed; and the report of a fast-moving unknown near the White House.

The ripple effect was such that NORAD and FAA, working together and separately, were unable to provide national level authorities an accurate account of the attack and the defense against it. The ripple effect continues to this day and has transcended the events of September 11, 2001, to the continuing worldwide unrest, most recently in Africa.

That ripple effect was best captured by Ted Koppel in a statement several months ago.  Koppel said, “Could bin Laden in his wildest imaginings, have hoped to provoke greater chaos.” Current events aside, Koppel’s statement perfectly describes the government’s failure in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, to explain to the administration, the people, the Commission, and, ultimately, the families, what happened that day.

So, What Did Happen?

We do not have to guess. The primary sources of the day, radar files and audio communications, in conjunction, tell us what happened.  And that is the account told in the Commission Report and augmented by the publication of “A New Kind of War” by the Rutgers Law Review in August, 2011.

I have also augmented the Commission Report by telling the story of that day from multiple perspectives. The most important perspective is that of the voice of the single individual on point that morning to fight the air defense battle, the NEADS Mission Crew Commander, Major Kevin Nasypany. That story was recorded in Nasypany’s voice in real time.

We know how NEADS operated that day and we also know how they operated in the days leading up to 9/11. NARA has archived the NEADS audio files for Exercise Vigilant Guardian for the period September 3-11, 2001, and has made those files available.  The Vigilant Guardian story is also told by real voices recorded in real time.

Historical Perspective

My assessment will also stand or fall on its own merit.  The broad reach of history will decide those merits. Historians may well conclude that the air defense story and its interpretations are interesting, but pale in comparison to the long list of defensive failures that occurred in the hours, days, weeks, months, and years before an air defense response was necessary.

 

9-11: Hijack Procedures: A Deliberative Process, the AA Flight 269 story

Background

Prior to 9/11, handling hijack situations was a deliberative process under the assumption that the end result would be the landing of the hijacked aircraft at a negotiated location. FAA scope level procedures were also deliberative for both hijack situations and aircraft experiencing electrical and mechanical problems.  American Airlines flight 11 was in the latter category until Mohammed Atta announced his presence in the cockpit over the air.

The exchanges between an air traffic controller at Boston Center and the cockpit of American Airlines flight 269 (AA 269) provide specific real-time information on how the hijack situation was handled.  Here is that story as recorded at the Departure Flow Management Position, Traffic Management Unit, Boston Center (ZBW). (NARA Batch 5, tape 148-911-03007988L1.s1 for the period 1200-1245Z)  The traffic management position was monitoring the channel of the controller for AA 269.

Controller-Cockpit Communications

AA 269 was handed off from Boston TRACON to Boston Center at 8:18 EDT climbing out of flight level 190 for 230.  The flight was cleared to proceed to flight level 350.

0818 AA 269 Checks in with ZBW

Previously, shortly before 8:14, AA 11 turned 20 degrees right at controller direction and was then told to climb and maintain flight level 350.  There was no response to that second controller direction.  AA11 was over northwestern Massachusetts when AA 269 checked in with Boston Center.

Concurrently, the controller for AA 11 had begun a series of deliberate steps to regain contact with AA 11 by contacting Boston TRACON to see if AA 11 had inadvertently reverted to a previous frequency, a not unusual happenstance.

Then, at 8:21, AA 269 became part of the Boston Center attempt to gain contact with AA 11.  The AA 269 controller advised that AA 11 was “nordo” (no radio), 80 miles to the west, and asked AA 269 to contact “company” (American Airlines) to assist.

0821 AA 269 Contact Company AA 11 Nordo

At the time, Boston Center had no indication that the situation with AA 11 was anything other than a technical problem.  The AA 269 controller routinely asked the crew what their projected mach speed would be (.80) and AA 269 volunteered to try to reach AA 11 “on this frequency.”  The crew was told that was not necessary since AA 11 had never been on the frequency.

At that same time the transponder aboard AA11 was turned off and the plane became a primary only, a search only, target.  The last reinforced (radar and transponder) return from AA 11 was at 8:20:51, as recorded by the Riverhead radar supporting the Northeast Air Defense Sector. (84th RADES radar files)

0822 AA 269 Tried to Assist Further

Boston Center was trying everything, to include using planes in the air. Boston had ample evidence of a serious electrical or mechanical problem but no evidence that AA 11 was hijacked.  The state of thinking at Boston Center was communicated to the crew of AA 269. Shortly after 8:23, the AA 269 controller advised the cockpit that “there may be some kind of electrical problem with your company flight.” AA 269 was also advised that Boston Center had “lost the transponder.”  Boston Center also advised that AA 11 was “overhead Albany VOR.”

 0823 AA 11 transponder lost and over Albany VOR

The estimate that AA 11 “had some kind of electrical problem” changed dramatically shortly before 8:25 when the microphone in the AA 11 cockpit was keyed at least twice followed by two pronouncements by Mohammed Atta in short order.

Summation to this point

Commission Staff concluded, “8:14 Last routine radio communication; likely takeover,” (p. 32, Commission Report). For nearly ten minutes Boston Center struggled with the problem of trying to gain contact with a commercial flight gone astray, with no success. This is a good example of the amount of time it takes in real time to identify, assess, and deal with unexpected circumstances. What was not known was that a member of the cabin crew aboard AA 11 had reported shortly before 8:20 to American Airlines that “I think we’re getting hijacked.” (Commisison Report, p. 5) Absent that information, Boston Center first knew the seriousness of the problem when Atta came on the air at 8:25.

Controller activity continues

At 8:27, the controller for AA 269 vectored a Northwest flight to avoid “nordo traffic.” At least one controller or traffic manager  thought that AA 11 might be landing Albany and advised that the airspace needed to be cleared.

0827 Might Land Albany Clear Airspace

It was at that time that Boston Center made the first call to Herndon Center to advise about AA 11 and to request a patch to notify New York and Cleveland Centers of a potential problem aircraft entering their airspace.

The AA 269 controller then advised its crew to “make future attempts to contact company.” The crew asked if Boston Center had got a hold of him (AA 11) and was told “can’t talk about it.”

0829 Can’t Talk About It

Comment

This short, focused article provides researchers, historians and academicians a different perspective on the hijack of AA 11. It records the actions taken by a controller not directly involved with the situation, as monitored by the departure traffic manager. The fact of the traffic manager’s monitoring is established in the next clip. The traffic manager took a phone call about 8:32 in which advice was given to stop all departures going to the Kingston Sector, we have an “emergency down there.” Concurrently, the controller on position can be heard conducting a turnover with his relief in which AA 11 is discussed.

0832 TMU Guidance and Controller Turnover

At 8:38, about the time that Boston Center was contacting the Northeast Defense Sector for the first time, AA 269 was handed off by the new controller to a different Boston Center sector.

 0838 AA 269 So Long

9-11: Hijacker seating arrangement; interesting tactical move, prior planned

Introduction

During the period November 17-21, 2003, I traveled with Team 7 during their site visits to American Airlines and United Airlines headquarters. I wrote an MFR to “list certain details from Mr. Kara’s perspective.” Those details included transponders, cockpit vision, flyability, ACARS, and ASD (Aircraft Situation Display). Here I focus primarily on the hijacker seating, with brief comment on other items of interest.

Hijacker Seating

Here is what I wrote:

The hijacker seating arrangement of 1-2-2, with pilot to the front on the B757s was clearly pre-meditated and different from the 2-1-2 seating arrangement aboard the B767s with the pilot in the middle. On the B757 there is only one cabin crew (one of four or five), the purser, sitting forward immediately aft the cockpit. On the B767, as many as three (of nine) sit forward immediately aft the cockpit.

This is an example of the detailed planning for the attack and is based on information that would have been obtained from the several cross-country orientation flights taken by the hijacker pilots and associates.

My Assessment

I estimate that the plan was to have each pilot seated as close to the cockpit as tactically convenient, based on availability of seating when reservations were made. The B767 crew arrangement, however, dictated that accomplices be seated forward of the hijacker pilot.

Other Brief Comments

According to my MFR, the senior pilots for both United and American assessed that the UA 175 hijacker pilot likely did not see AA 11 fly into the World Trade Center north tower, but  “it was near certain that he would have immediately seen the fire/plume.”

According to the senior pilots, “The cockpits of the B757 and B767 are virtually interchangeable in their essential elements. Both are “easy to fly.”

The United Airlines alert to UA 93 about cockpit intrusions was sent at 1324:24Z. UA 93 crew asked for confirmation at 1326:10Z. That was the last crew communication from the cockpit. In a recent update to the 9/11 Report Card, I downgraded Herndon Center for not following up on a Boston Center request to notify pilots in the air to increase cockpit security. That Boston request was made at 9:15, nearly 10 minutes before the warning was sent to UA 93.

The Aircraft Situation Display was not time sensitive and refreshed each minute or more. Its sensitivity allowed United to maintain continuity on UA93, but did not allow American to gain situational awareness of AA 77.

9-11: UA175; Boston Center; Reaction in Real Time, Ground Stop

Purpose

This short article documents for researchers and historians how Boston Center (ZBW) learned of the impact of a second airplane [UA175] into the World Trade Center and its immediate reaction to a request from New York Center (ZNY) to ground stop everything.

The Impact

ZBW learned of the second impact as it occurred, as recorded at the Severe Weather position Traffic Management Unit (NARA Batch 5, tape 3007988-s2, certification length 42 seconds). ZBW was on the phone with ZNY discussing the fact that ZNY was not taking any hand offs, any overflights. Wanda at the Air Traffic Control System Command Center (Herndon Center) facilitated the conversation. Thus, Herndon Center also learned of the second impact in real time. Here is that three-way conversation.

0902 ZBW ZNY second WTC struck

The Reaction

Within seconds, ZBW Traffic Management Unit complete a series of brief calls to airports in its area ordering a ground stop. There is an important aspect to the notifications. The traffic manager at ZBW started by declaring that all commercial traffic was ground stopped.  By the third call he had shortened his message to a requirement to “ground stop everything.” This is an example of how FAA facilities became confused as to whether or not the ground stop and the later order to land all commercial air traffic pertained to the military, law enforcement, and first responders. Here is that series of calls.

090340 ZBW Ground Stop Calls to Towers

I will add to this article as I find examples of FAA facilities asking for clarification.

9-11: AA11; Initial Notifications, the Boston Center perspective

Introduction

This article is an extension of my recent conversation with Paul Schreyer and is the second of two articles that deal directly with inaccuracies in Schreyer’s “Anomalies” article published in the Journal of 9/11 Studies. The first article dealt with the non-correlation between the Langley fighters and the B747, Venus 77, the so-called “mystery” plane. In this article we turn to Schreyer’s speculation that NEADS was notified as early as 8:31 EDT.

Schreyer’s Position

Schreyer believes that Colin Scoggins, Military Specialist, Boston Center, called the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) as early as 8:31 EDT and that conversation directly calls into question the timeline of events as established by the 9/11 Commission. Schreyer’s argument is based on anecdotal information, in this case the recall of events by Scoggins.  Schreyer judges that the established timeline of events is off by several minutes.

At this point it is useful to discuss, briefly, a 9/11 truth community tendency to bias times as early as possible, to round down vigorously when convenient to do so. For example, I have seen mention in the blogosphere that NEADS was notified at 8:37, based on the original alert call to NEADS. That call rang through shortly before 8:38 and was answered at 8:37:55. A Mission Crew Commander was summoned to the phone and she was on the call by 8:39.  She received actionable information, a set of coordinates, at 8:40.  The Mission Crew Commander/Technician logged the notification in the official log as 8:40. The point is it takes time, measurable time, for events to unfold.

In Schreyer’s case he takes Scoggins recall of a position for AA11 as “20 miles south of Albany,” and extrapolates his argument based on the time that AA11 was 20 miles south of Albany.  The more likely case, even if Scoggins’ recall is accurate, is that by the time he made his call AA11 was south of the position Schreyer extrapolates.

Commission Staff findings

The staff interviewed Scoggins and considered his recall information in light of available primary source information, specifically the audio files from NEADS, Boston Center, Cape TRACON, and the Air Traffic Control System Command Center (Herndon Center). The staff understood that eye witness and participant recall information was useful if used in conjunction with primary source information and any logs and other secondary material that might be available. The staff determined that Scoggins first talked to NEADS soon after 8:38 EDT when he was called by NEADS.

The Evidence

There is no disagreement with Schreyer about the radar tracks. He has them right. What is at issue is the other primary source information, the audio files, which do not support either Scoggins’ recall or Schreyer’s extrapolation.

The Commission Staff received two deliveries of audio tapes from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The first delivery consisted of copies of the tapes that FAA provided to the National Traffic Safety Board as part of its accident investigation submissions. Those tapes contained only audio files that directly pertained to information about the air traffic control of the four hijacked airplanes. FAA was duly diligent in compiling those files and did provide all information required by the NTSB. The tape from each relevant air traffic control information contained several minutes of information before and after each relevant transmission or sequence of transmissions. The Commission received those files on cassette tapes in .mp3 format.

However, the body of evidence contained in those mandatory submissions fell well short of what the staff needed. We requested and received four hours of continuous recordings (0800-1200 EDT) from every phone line in the Traffic Management Units (TMU) of the responsive FAA en route centers, as well as tapes from the towers and TRACONS involved. We also asked for and received tapes for the air traffic control of the Otis, Langley, and Andrews fighters, which were not part of the FAA submission to the NTSB. That second delivery of tapes was also on cassette tapes but in .wav format.

Concerning Boston Center specifically, that second delivery of tapes provided a record of all calls into and out of the TMU, to include the desk of the Military Specialist, Colin Scoggins.

What The Record Reveals

Note to historians and academicians.  The audio files, below, come from the NARA collection, Batch 5, tape 148-911-03007988H1.s1.wav.  The tape contains a 45-second certification at the beginning that identifies the position recorded as “Severe Weather.”  There are no earlier responsive conversations on any of the other Traffic Management Unit (TMU) tapes from Boston Center. Altogether, eight phone lines in the Boston Center TMU were recorded.

The first call out was shortly after  8:27 to Herndon Center by Dan Bueno alerting first Herndon and then Cleveland and New York Centers. Bueno told Herndon Center that AA11 was West of Albany, southbound. Tony at Herndon Center immediately responded “I see him.”  Herndon Center did not have a radar feed.  What Tony was seeing was the path of AA11 on a traffic situation display (TSD).

082715 AA11 ZBW to Command Center

That call continued at 8:29 when Herndon Center linked Boston, New York and Cleveland centers on a teleconference. During that conference Boston Center reported the location as “one five” miles south of Albany. Tony advised the conferees that “you can tag him up on the TSD.” Further, Boston established the altitude as flight level 290. Altogether, the communication from Boston to Herndon and on to New York and Cleveland took three minutes. This is a good example of the measurable time it took, and takes, to process events in real time.  Here is the continuation.

0829 ZBW Continuation to ZNY and ZOB

The second call was at 8:34 to Cape TRACON asking if Otis fighters could respond. Dan Bueno also made that call and was handed off to the “sup” [supervisor]. Approximately 8:35:15 he told the Cape supervisor  that AA11 was 40 miles south of Albany. That call is consistent with Scoggins’ recall, except that the call was made by Bueno, not Scoggins, and it was to Cape TRACON not NEADS. Here is that call.

 0834 ZBW call to Cape TRACON

Scoggins recall, therefore, is not the 8:31 time that Schreyer extrapolates, but a time at least four minutes later. Scoggins, Bueno, and Cooper worked in close proximity and all were aware of what the other was doing. It is natural that Scoggins might recall that he made the call. If Scoggins had called NEADS that call would have been recorded on one of the TMU lines.

Thereafter, Cooper made the 8:38 call to NEADS and alerted the Senior Director/Technician who called a Mission Crew Commander to the phone. By the time she took the call an Identification Technician had already dialed Boston Center and was talking to Colin Scoggins.

At NEADS, the two calls overlap on the tapes and the tapes from both facilities prove a clear and conclusive record of the notification to the military by FAA, just as the Commission staff wrote in Chapter One of the Commission Report.

Comment

Schreyer’s urge to extrapolate a single piece of information, out of context,  in favor of an explanation that calls into question the established facts of the day is understandable given that he is pursuing a false flag thesis concerning 9/11. Scoggin’s compression of time and conflation of events is typical of most eye witness and participant recall of events such as 9/11. My consistent position is that the story of the day of 9/11 is best told in the recorded voices of the day. Further, the air defense story is best told using radar data and voice communications in conjunction.

9-11: The Langley Scramble; a different perspective

Background

I have been in an extended email discussion with Paul Schreyer concerning the Langley Scramble. My position was established in the “gang aft agley” paper (and Addendum) several years ago. Succinctly, the Langley scramble was a serious of understandable, logical individual events that did not cohere in the aggregate.

Schreyer’s position is based on a false flag theory which let to his “anomalies” paper published elsewhere on the web. To try and help Schreyer clarify his understanding I came up with a different perspective, one I shared with him.

A Different Perspective

Schreyer believes that the scramble order, itself, was changed. That is not accurate, it remained the baseline for the scramble as it developed. Langley Tower could not translate the scramble order to a flight plan that they were confident the air traffic control system would accept without trial and error. Therefore, they used a proven flight plan, one of long standing, zero nine zero for 60 (090 for 60) nautical miles.

Comparing a scramble order to a flight plan is problematic. It is an apples and oranges comparision; two distinct and separate processes. A scramble order is simply a device to get the air defense fighters into the air so that weapons controllers can then tell them what to do. The flight plan is the air traffic control means of getting the fighters safely into the national airspace system. It requires a direction and a distance. The scramble order issued did not included a distance. However, Langley Tower air traffic controllers were confident using a standard flight plan, knowing from experience that weapons controllers would take over. Except they didn’t, and therein lie the details.

What happened

The procedures in place, to include 090 for 60 (a flight plan) were cold war era practices that survived into the anti-drug era. Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) weapons controller radios could not reach the Langley fighters at low altitude once airborne, but that didn’t matter because the flight plan 090 for 60 delivered the fighters to military airspace controlled by Navy air traffic controllers at a facility known as Giant Killer. Those controllers were responsible for air traffic control in off shore training areas.

Giant Killer could then act as a relay to NEADS, just as they did on 9/11. It was Norfolk TRACON/Tower’s intermediate responsibility to take control of the fighters once in the national air space system and then hand them off to Giant Killer prior to entry into the training area, as they did on 9/11, unless the lead pilot requested otherwise.

On 9/11 the flight lead, Quit 25, did not tell Norfolk to send him North to get back on the scramble azimuth. In the heat of battle, in the chaos of the morning, he elected to continue east and was handed off to Giant Killer. Giant Killer was in contact with NEADS and did turn the fighters at NEADS request, direct Baltimore.  Nothing was known about AA 77 and the threat it posed. The perceived threat was AA 11 bearing down on the nation’s capital from the North.

There is no fault that accrues to Langley, the tower controllers did their job and, in their words, would do the same thing again if they had it to do over. I did mark NEADS  down in a report card issued on 9/11/11 for not knowing how scrambles actually proceeded at Langley, by the way.

Why it happened

Here, we turn to chaos theory for an understanding.  The Langley scramble, writ large and in detail, is an excellent example of sensitive dependence on initial conditions. Those initial conditions include a cold war era structure and policy; an emphasis on counter drug operations; and a requirement to identify all planes entering the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).  NEADS (and NORAD) was, as General McKinley testifed to the Commission in May, 2003, “focused outward.”

Scramble missions had to do with either drug runners (counterdrug operations), special cold war-related tracks (Aeroflot, China Air, Cubana), or DVFR (Defense visual flight rules) flights–fish spotters, cable checkers, doctors and dentists, “Moms and Pops,” who filed to exit the ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone) and then forgot to turn their transponders back on when re-entering the ADIZ. The standard flight plan at Langley Tower was a proven method of getting the fighters to altitude, over water, and headed East to prosecute any of those missions.

NEADS controllers on 9/11 did not understand the standard techniques in place at Langley.  As the NEADS tapes reveal, the weapons controller technician did “not know why” the fighters were headed toward an off shore training area.

For perspective, interested readers should review my series of Vigilant Guardian  articles covering the period Sep 3-11, 2001. (scroll down to third article in the category) The “Moms and Pops” reference comes from my interviews of nearly two dozen Southeast Air Defense Sector (SEADS) Mission Crew Commanders during my work on the Brothers To The Rescue project while at the Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General.

Who participated

Altogether, eight individuals, who I will identify by position, caused the Langley scramble to happen as it did, up to the point that NEADS realized the flight had gone astray.  All eight—four at NEADS, two at Langley Tower, one at Norfolk TRACON/Tower, and the lead pilot—were duly diligent and did their jobs as best they could given the information available to them.  None were negligent and there was no outside voice, no unseen false flag opportunist that intervened.  Their combined story is complete, coherent, and logical, understanding that NEADS did not appreciate the impact of what were standard operating procedures at Langley.

At NEADS, the weapons controller and weapons controller technician were responsible for the metrics that produced the scramble order, azimuth 010, flight level 290.  The flight level was based on the last known altitude for AA 11.  The senior director approved the order (with the knowledge of the Mission Crew Commander and the NEADS Commander) and it was broadcast by the senior director technician.

The broadcast was heard by Langley command post, Langley tower, the fighter detachment, Giant Killer, and Norfolk Tower/TRACON.  At Langley Tower, the duty air traffic controller and his supervisor entered the flight plan, 090 for 60, into the national airspace system.  Control, “radar contact,” was passed to Norfolk Tower while the fighters were taking off.

The Norfolk Tower controller knew by SOP that the fighters were to proceed on runway heading (runway 8, 80 degrees) to an altitude of 4000 feet before turning.  At that point he asked the flight lead which way he wanted to go.

Quit 25, the flight lead concluded that the flight plan was later information than the scramble order and turned slightly right to a heading of 090 and continued.  When I played the controller conversation back to him after our interview he said he did not recall that and that it “was an opportunity missed.”

Perspective

The Langley scramble is not nearly as askew as the graphic picture portrays.  The fighters were airborne at 9:30 EDT and were not going to turn for at least two minutes.  Had they turned as soon as possible, the turn would have occurred over the Delmarva Peninsula and the remaining flight time to the nation’s capital was on the order of 10-12 minutes, too late to be in position for AA 77 but well in time to guard against the approach of UA 93.

Altogether, including the false turn south on approach to Washington, DC, the Quit flight lost on the order of 15 minutes.  The combat air patrol to protect the National Command Authority began at 10:00 EDT, twenty-two minutes after AA 77 slammed into the Pentagon at 9:38 EDT.

In a perfect world it is conceivable that the Langley fighters would have reached the nation’s capital concurrent with the arrival of AA 77, but with no authority to do anything, as General Larry Arnold testified to the Commission.  The national level was just getting organized.  When the Pentagon was hit the National Military Command Center had just convened an Air Threat Conference; FAA had not yet joined.  At the White House, the Richard Clarke-chaired secure video teleconference convened at 9:40 EDT when FAA Administrator Jane Garvey joined the conference.