Oredigger 61 – Page 14 – 9-11 Revisited

The Ghosts of 9-11: AA 77; a real ghost, still unseen; now looking for UA 175 (part 3)

Introduction

In the previous two articles we discussed the approach of a primary only track, AA 77, into Dulles TRACON airspace. We established that no one at any level was aware of the looming threat. We also established that FAA’s Eastern Region, an administrative headquarters, was directing the air traffic control search for missing aircraft.

The Region prompted the ZDC manager to call his counterpart at ZID to look for AA 77. The ZDC manager then briefed his area supervisors that they were looking for limited data tag planes at altitude, specifically AA 77 and UA 175. In this short article we will show that as late as 9:30 UA 175 was a matter of concern to Eastern Region. AA 77 was not

Eastern Region

Eastern Region had jurisdiction over two of the four FAA Air Traffic Control centers involved on 9-11, Washington (ZDC), New York (ZNY), and it worked through them and their subordinate Towers and TRACONs to gather information. For example, instead of calling Indianapolis Center (ZID) direct, the Region had ZDC call ZID to inquire about the loss of AA 77 over Indiana.

Concurrently, Eastern Region was trying to sort out what happened in New York City and was concerned with both AA 11 and UA 175.

AA 11

Here, we return, briefly, to a discussion of the most troublesome ghost on 9-11, the apparent rebirth of AA 11. During interview, Ron Ruggeri, the Eastern Region Quality Assurance Staff Manager, stated he took the following action:

“[He] called the watch desk at ZNY, and was informed from Bruce Barrett that the impact was a terrorist event. Barrett checked a Situational Display per Ruggeri’s request to locate AA 11, and it showed AA 11 in Whiskey 105 but on a coast track (since the computer was searching for the target, and projecting its flight path).”

The Commission Staff was never able to pin down the source of the erroneous information concerning AA 11 but estimated it was derived from conversations on the Eastern Region telecon, an unrecorded conference. Ruggeri’s mental picture of the track of AA 11 over water south of New York City supports that estimate.

Whiskey 105 is the military training area to which the Otis fighters were first vectored after takeoff. Lynn Spencer in Touching History described it as “a military airspace training area over the Atlantic just south of Long Island.”

UA 175

Shortly after 9:29, Ruggeri called IAD to inquire about UA 175. The call lasted less than a minute and IAD established that it did not have a flight plan in its computer for UA 175. That conversation can be heard at this link. 1 IAD 27 DEPARTURE DATA Ruggeri Call 175

At no time does either Eastern Region or IAD make reference to the primary only track, the “no tag,” fast approaching the nation’s capital.

Google Earth

Here is the spatial position of AA 77 at the time of the Eastern Region call. Permit me the irony to note that AA 77 flew just south of the ongoing construction of FAA’s Potomac TRACON facility; a new facility to solve known obsolescence and traffic control issues in the greater Washington DC area.

Location of AA 77 when Eastern Region called IAD about UA 175

Summation

The time is now 9:30 and we have established that the primary only track later determined to be AA 77 is rapidly approaching the nation’s capital and no one has recognized the threat. We have established that FAA’s Eastern Region is collecting information. There is no evidence of awareness at any level, including the White House that AA 77 is a looming threat. At 9:30, AA 77 is 34 miles from the Pentagon, according to Google Earth.

A Preview of What’s up next

We will establish in a later article that, according to a second call to IAD, Eastern Region was in direct, near real-time contact with FAA Headquarters and was passing information along as it was received at Eastern Region. We will also establish that AA 77 is not mentioned until after Danielle O’Brien and her supervisor sound the alarm.

The Ghosts of 9-11: AA 77; a real ghost, unseen (part 2)

Addendum March 22, 2010

The purpose of this addendum is to insert an audio clip of a conversation shortly after 9:25 between Herndon Center and Indianapolis Center (ZID). Herndon initiated the call to learn whatever it could about the loss of AA 77.

Indianapolis reported that the aircraft was off radar and presumed lost. ZID assessed that AA 77 was not involved in the World Trade Center events because the time of loss was at the same time as events in New York.

The Herndon Center caller assessed, based on time and distance factors that the most likely target in danger was the Sears Tower in Chicago. The conversation can be heard here. 092506 Herndon and ZID discuss AA77

My Assessment

This conversation is clear evidence that FAA Herndon Center and, by extension, FAA Headquarters did not know that AA 77 was bearing down on the nation’s capital. It is further evidence that Norman Mineta was clearly mistaken in his recall of events that morning. There is no reasonable way that he could have known about AA 77.

At that time, 9:25, no one above the scope level at Dulles TRACON had any information whatsoever about AA 77. Although two controllers spotted a “no tag” they had no idea what they had seen and information available at Dulles TRACON did not become actionable until 8 minutes later when the general alarm was sounded.

Original Article

In part one we established that Washington Center, ZDC, was not looking for AA 77 as a primary-only target and never detected the plane. Moreover, its conversation with Indianapolis Center about AA77 and its internal conference among area supervisors were not shared with Dulles TRACON, IAD. In this article we continue the track of AA 77 and relate it to IAD using primary sources–air traffic control conversations, the flight data recorder, and radar files. And we start with IAD, itself.

Dulles TRACON, IAD

Dulles TRACON no longer existed by the time the Commission began its work. In December, 2002, FAA commissioned a consolidated facility, Potomac TRACON, which assumed the responsibilities of the TRACONs at Dulles, National, and Baltimore airports and Andrews Airfield to solve known air traffic inefficiencies and obsolescence issues as detailed in the linked document.

The Commission Staff toured both Dulles and National Towers and TRACONS. Concerning the latter, we simply saw empty rooms at both locations. To interview participants of the day we had to track them down wherever they were; several at Potomac TRACON, which we twice visited.

We determined that around 9:25 IAD did see, but did not recognize the threat posed by AA 77. This is the IAD story and we begin with the first known primary source evidence.

See that no tag?

In the 9:25 timeframe a controller at the IAD South Departure position said: “see that no tag, there?” A co-worker responded, “I do.” The controller then said, “I’ll just flash him on to Wash or Center,whatever.” The co-worker responded, OK. That short six second exchange can be heard here No Tag.

It is speculative, but probable, that the controllers were seeing the track that was AA 77. It is also possible that they were referring to something else entirely. Given that it was AA 77 they did not recognize it as a threat and there is no evidence that the information was shared internally to IAD or that “Wash or Center” saw the flash.

According to the flight data recorder readout AA 77 was at 18,000 feet, technically just entering Class E airspace. Whatever the technical division of air space responsibility no FAA facility recognized the threat. Further, no one cued NEADS to look for that “no tag.”

FAA did acknowledge that early spotting of a “no tag” in its secondary source documents provided to the Commission. We will consider those documents but first we need to talk about a second opportunity to see the AA 77 primary only track, this one by IAD South Departure and two ZDC Sectors, separately.

A Second IAD opportunity

In my Commission work I identified one plane that might have caused IAD (or ZDC) to recognize the approach of AA 77. A graphic of the track of that plane, labeled M3 1531, is part of a series of slides concerning the approach of AA 77 and is inserted here, updated.

M3 1531 and AA 77

The two aircraft were separated vertically by more than 6000 feet. AA 77 was just passing through 10,000 feet altitude into IAD designated airspace. The point of spatial intersection was just West of Warrenton, Virginia.

In air traffic communications we first hear about M3 1531 around 9:26. Dulles South Departure attempted a manual hand off of the southwesterly transiting aircraft to ZDC Casanova Sector. That controller exchange can be heard at this link. M3 1531 Casanova Tape 19 side 1.

In a second attempt a minute later a different ZDC controller acknowledged “not that VFR guy.” “VFR” in this context is not a reference to AA 77; it is a reference to a transponding aircraft. IAD successfully handed M3 1531, who was VFR, off to ZDC, Azalea Sector.

At no time does any controller notice or comment on a primary only aircraft headed east. Here is the relevant conversation. M3 1531 Azalea Tape 19 side 1 and M3 1531 Azalea Tape 19 side 2 It is in two parts because the transmission occurred at the end of one cassette tape and the beginning of another, as provided to the Commission and as archived by NARA.

Here is a Google Earth plot of the spatial intersection of AA77 and M3 1531 just West of Warrenton, Virginia. As established earlier the two aircraft were 6000 feet apart in vertical separation.

I know of no other primary source air traffic control transmissions which relate in any way to the approach of AA 77. To see how FAA treated this information we next turn to a discussion of FAA assessments in the aftermath.

FAA Assessments

To sumarize, FAA established a time of 9:25 in its early assessments. That assessment held at least through September 18, 2001, as memorialized in the Administrator’s Briefing Book.

In later assessments, including a March 2002 draft report, the 9:25 time no longer appeared. By then FAA had settled on a time that equated to IAD sounding the alarm to National TRACON/Tower and to the White House/Secret Service.

Retrospectively, FAA established that IAD controllers may have seen the primary only track as early as 9:25, but there is no evidence that IAD recognized the threat any earlier than 9:32.

A FAA “Chronology of Events“, unattributed, but fax time-stamped “6:18AM SEP 12, 2001” demonstrates the confusion within FAA as to what happened. A 9:25 entry states: “AAL77 Lost at 9:25AM York Kentucky.” A 9:33 entry states: “DCA notified check Hotline activated; primary 3 miles south, now 1 mile.” No mention is made of anyone noticing the track that would later be identified as AA 77.

The next day, in an internal summary prepared at 9:00 on September 13, 2001, FAA’s AAT-20 documented this information: “0856 Radar contact is lost. No Further contact with aircraft. Dulles ATCT [IAD] (bolding in original) 0925 (estimate) Controller observes primary target at high-speed transitioning west to east toward DC. 0933 Controller informs Operational Supervisor, whom in turns advises Washington National (DCA).”

That is an accurate statement, based on primary source information. As we have established, a controller saw a “no tag” at 9:25 and did not recognized it as a threat. The use of the word “controller,” singular, morphed into “controllers,” plural, as FAA prepared its Administrator for Congressional hearings.

That morphing from singular to plural was likely based on individual controller statements taken as part of FAA’s accident package preparation for submission to NTSB. Retrospectively, individual controllers may have recalled that they did see the primary only track.

The fact remains, however, that none of them saw it as a threat and none of them alerted their supervisors. That alert did not come until Danielle O’Brien recognized a problem; we will discuss that in a subsequent article.

The Administrator’s Briefing Book

As of September 18, 2001, at 5:20 PM the Administrator’s Briefing Book for Congressional hearings contained the following entries. “0925:00 Between 0925:00 and 0930:00 (time is approximate based on personnel statements) – Several controllers at Dulles TRACON observe a primary radar target (unidentified but later confirmed to be AAL 77).” “0933:00 (Time is approximate based on personnel statements – Dulles TRACON advises…Secret Service of an unknown aircraft heading in the direction of the White House…”

This version of the briefing book is the day after the White House meeting to discuss the events of the day and is likely the same version used by FAA representatives at that meeting.

The acknowledgment that the controller’s 9:25 observation may have correlated to AA 77 was dropped in subsequent FAA summaries. An undated “Chronolgical Events at Dulles Tower on September 11, 2001,” contains this entry: “1332;20 (time approximate) Controller at Dulles Tower working the Final West position informs the other controllers in the radar room about the target observed moving estbound.”

Months later, in its 21 March 2002 draft report “The Air Traffic Organization’s Response,” the first mention of AA 77 as a threat is the 9:33 alert.

A Personal Comment

This look at FAA staff work in some detail does indicate that FAA was aware of all the relevant air traffic control tapes. They went into the White House meeting with accurate primary source information. I extrapolate from this that they knew, from their perspective, the actual notification times to the military.

I estimate they must have know the centrality of NEADS to the military equation. They certainly knew there was no 9:24 notification time to NORAD concerning AA 77. Whatever their position, it was subsumed at the White House meeting.

The Commission Report

The Staff wrote: “At 9:32, controllers at the Dulles Terminal Radar Approach Control “observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed.” This was later determined to have been Flight 77.”

At one time we considered a time of 9:25 but the convergence of information dictated a later time. We concluded that 9:32 was the earliest time that situational awareness developed at IAD; they processed what they were seeing and then sounded the alarm.

Next Up

Before we turn to the awareness and subsequent alarm we will briefly examine a phone call between FAA’s Eastern Region and IAD in the 9:29 time frame. Recall that we established that Eastern Region, an administrative headquarters, was dictating the exchange of information. As a preview of the next article, Eastern Region called to inquire not about AA 77 but about UA 175.

After that we will turn to Danielle O’Brien and the actions she and her supervisor took.

9-11: The Air Threat Conference Call

The tape and transcript of the Air Threat Conference (ATC) are among the most important documents concerning events on the morning of 9-11. Without them historians and other researchers cannot accurately report on the national level response. The purpose of this article is to fill the gap; to detail what we do know and to place the ATC in perspective.

We have at least three sources of information in addition to the Commission Report; the memorandum of the Staff’s tour of the NMCC, the personal notes of an NMCC officer, Major Chambers, and the notes of interviews with NMCC personnel, specifically Commander Gardner. Interview MFRs will be forthcoming from NARA; but we have enough information to get started and we start with the orientation and tour of the NMCC.

Orientation and Tour of the NMCC (MFR)

The NMCC manages crises through a series of conferences according to established checklists. Typically, the first action is to convene a Significant Events Conference (SIEC); a ‘catch-all’ conference to address any significant event. If the event escalates the conference may transition into a threat conference. The NMCC briefly convened an SIEC but was immediately faced with a threat and a decision. The NMCC had two courses of action available; one to continue the SIEC as an Air Event Conference; the other to terminate the event conference and convene an Air Threat Conference. The NMCC chose the latter, a serious decision with strategic level implications, as we shall see.

Major Chambers (personal memoir within a week after 9-11)

It is Major Chambers who wrote about the immediate aftermath of the second Tower impact that, “The world had just changed, forever.” He described the first NMCC action, the SIEC, as a mechanism to “ensure all the military command centers have the same information at the same time on events that aren’t a military threat.” He further wrote that, “The SIEC was taking much longer than expected to bring up. The FAA wasn’t in the conference, they couldn’t go secure, and so we couldn’t get first-hand information from them.”

Chambers also provided perspective on the ATC. “The ATC is reserved for when aircraft are considered hostile. For [NORAD], tasked with defending the U.S. and Canada against enemy aircraft, the term “hostile” carries a lot of weight.” Because of the significant high level of the participants the NMCC elected to simply drop the SIEC and start over. Some agencies did not hang up as they should have so, “as with the SIEC, it took longer than expected to convene the ATC.” According to Chambers, the ATC was convened within “a couple of minutes after the Pentagon attack.

Chambers also alluded to Continuity of Government (COG) and Continuity of Operations (COOP). “While one group was focusing on the President’s status another was putting some other plans into effect. The Speaker of the House and a few others on the chain of succession were whisked away to another secure location…” It is not clear if this draconian step would have been taken if an Air Event Conference had been convened instead of an ATC. Nevertheless, COOP/COG plans were implemented.

Chambers spoke to the issuance of the shoot down order and his memoir does not support the testimony of Norman Mineta. Chambers wrote, “I heard one of the most chilling orders I could imagine. VPOTUS passed on the order via the ATC that any aircraft confirmed to be under hijacker control was to be shot down. Instinctively I knew this was the right thing to do. Every passenger on the first three aircraft (emphasis added) were dead, along with thousands of others.”

Chambers also commented on the fighters at Andrews. He wrote, “The Air National Guard fighters at Andrews AFB, just east of D.C. weren’t part of the active air defense system, so they weren’t available.” Readers who are familiar with the ‘roles and missions’ of the military and why the specification of such duties is necessary will understand immediately why the NMCC did not consider the Andrews fighters an asset.

Commander Gardner interview notes

After the second WTC strike he and the ADDO (Leidig) knew they needed a national conference. They arrived at the need for an SIEC and were frustrated that it was not brought up more quickly. According to notes of Gardner’s interview the ADDO directed an SEIC at 9:20, the same time that FAA activated its primary net.

Gardner was concerned about convening a threat conference. According to him a threat conference would have conveyed SIOP overtones that weren’t needed. SIOP stands for Single Integrated Operational Plan, the nuclear scenario. SIOP is serious business and perhaps the ATC did, in part, drive the national level to implement COOP/COG with no clear understanding of what the threat was.

Gardner further explained his concern by stating that threat conferences were for external attacks, however, there was no good domestic conference to convene.

Looking ahead to an SVTS article, Gardner commented that “we lost principals throughout the day to SVTS.” There were no runners [courier] or connectivity to the SVTS. All the NMCC knew was what the principals brought back. In his words, the ATC and SVTS were “competing venues for command and control and for decision making.” He was further frustrated that they lost principals to COG.

Commission Report

Commissioners and Staff had access to both the ATC tape and the transcript, and a copy of the transcript was made available during interviews of key NMCC personnel. Considering all information received, including the source material cited above, the Commission established and reported the following details.

The FAA primary net was activated at 9:20 and Major Chambers answered the phone at the NMCC. However, that net never became operational. The NMCC convened a Significant Event Conference at 9:29 and immediately learned of the a reborn AA 11 as a threat. The event conference was terminated at 9:34 in favor of a threat conference call which convened at 9:37 as an Air Threat Conference, at the same time that AA 77 slammed into the Pentagon.

Ultimately, the ATC prevailed as the dominant means of communication among government agencies but the battle had passed them by.

In Summary

The NMCC did not have an adequate mechanism in place to address the threat that day. Given that a threat conference was needed they turned to the air threat conference. By doing so they apparently complicated matters at the national level driving the NCA to SIOP-like decisions it perhaps did not want to make, included a COOP/COG decision.

Readers should consider this article a work in progress. It serves to get some things on the record and to establish the Air Threat Conference as another in a series of linear processes the government used on 9-11 to try and deal with the situation.

NOIWON, additional considerations

As the NMCC was preparing for an SIEC, CIA convened a NOIWON conference. According to the orientation MRF; “The NMCC abandoned its attempt to convene a SIEC so its Watch officers could participate in the NOIWON Conference. After the NOIWON call the NMCC briefly considered convening an Air Event Conference, but decided to go directly to an Air Threat Conference.”

Ironically FAA was on the NOIWON call but at the Intelligence Watch on the 3d floor at FAA Headquarters. We need to note at this point that FAA participants in the NOIWON, themselves, did not have first-hand information either, so the NOIWON could not have been a source of FAA air traffic control information at that point. The fact that the NOIWON was a potential connectivity workaround, however, did not register at either FAA or the NMCC.

Gardner recalled the NOIWON as both a source of information and a detractor, it kept the ADDO involved. According to the MFR from the NMCC orientation the White House Situation Room insisted on having a flag officer on an open line to them. As we described in another article BG Seipe, a trained DDO who happened to be present was that flag officer and he had continuous line-of-sight to the DDO on duty. Gardner did not remember with “any fidelity” what he learned from the NOIWON and did not recall if FAA participated.

The Ghosts of 9-11: AA 77; a real ghost, unseen

Addendum added February 6, 2014

My recall of the arrangement of transponder knobs on American and United planes, below, is not accurate. Here is what I wrote in November 2003 in Commission MFR 04017215.

“The transponders on United B757 and B767 airframes are identical. The transponders on American B757 and B767 are also identical and differ from the United version in a single detail. There are four knobs on the American version that change the transponder code. There are only two on the United Version [sic]. In both versions the knobs are stacked in groups of two. Therefore, there are two stacks of two knobs each on the American version and one stack of two knobs on the United version. In all cases the upper knob is smaller than and easily distinguished from the lower knob.” The following paragraph in the MFR is redacted, “9/11 Closed by Statute.”

Addendum added Nov 20, 2009

Here is a slide version of this article. Slides are timed and will advance automatically. Included are screen prints of a Google Earth plot and data from the FDR, as well as a brief summary slide. Embedded audio not yet active; working on it.

American Air Flight 77 ZDC ZID Slide Show

Original article

In my original “Transponders and Ghosts” article I wrote: “Plane by hijacked plane, each transponder manipulation presented a different problem set to air traffic control, to managers of the National Airspace System and ultimately, to the National Command Authority.”

To briefly summarize, the four transponders on the hijacked airplanes were each manipulated differently. Three were turned off at distinctly different times in the flight paths of those planes and a fourth, the transponder on UA175, was changed to a different code.

We now have more insight into the problem that latter manipulation caused. I hasten to add that we have no direct knowledge of the hijacker tactics concerning the transponders; what we do know is that retrospectively the tactics, planned or serendipitous, were effective.

AA77, itself a ghost

At 9:18 the Operations Supervisor at Washington Center, ZDC, Cary Johnson, called Indianapolis Center, ZID. The call can be heard at this link. ThomasJohnson He reported that he had observed on TSD (Traffic Situation Display) that AA 77 was a ghost somewhere over Indiana and asked if ZID was working the aircraft. The Operations Supervisor at ZID, John Thomas, told Johnson that AA 77 had been reported lost but may have turned around and was heading somewhere else.

During the course of the conversation the two managers established that they were looking for an aircraft at last altitude of 35,000 feet, and that ZID had initiated rescue procedures.

ZDC

After concluding the ZID call Thomas convened a conference call with his Area Supervisors; that conversation began shortly before 9:22 and lasted less than one minute. The call can be heard at this link. johnsonarea They agreed they were looking for an aircraft with a limited data tag and one with a transponder code change. The reference was to AA 77 at 35K feet and UA 175 over New Jersey at 31K feet.

UA 175

In the “Ghosts” article we established that concurrent with the impact of AA 11 into the North Tower the transponder code on UA 175 was changed, and then changed again. The code was first changed to 3020 and then to 3321. There is a logical explanation for that sequence.

When the Commission Staff visited the “Companies,” American and United Airlines, we were provided in-cabin and in-cockpit orientations on both B757 and B767 aircraft at each Company. While in the B767 cockpit with the United senior pilot I had him show me the transponder and change the code. His technique was a two-step sequence. On the first step he changed the first and third digits, the second and fourth defaulted to zero. On the second step he changed the second and fourth digits.

~~At the time, United transponders had four knobs in two stacks of two each. The American transponders had four separate knobs.~~ [See addendum of February 6, 2014 at the beginning of this article.] In retrospect, that is my best explanation for why the transponder code on UA 175 changed, and then changed again.

Among others, FAA’s Eastern Region knew of the code change and it was Eastern Region, not Herndon Center that was advising the air traffic control operations managers. We will return to that point later, but first back to ZDC.

ZDC, Continued

At no time did ZDC managers and supervisors discuss or did Johnson direct activating the primary switches on their scopes. ZDC never looked for and never recognized a primary only target approaching the nation’s capital from the west. By then, it was too late. The time was approaching 9:23 and a very real ghost, AA 77 was upon them and had begun a descent, not from flight level 35, but from flight level 25.

AA 77, Flight Data Recorder

According to the flight data recorder, a primary source, AA 77 left 35000 feet altitude at 9:01 soon after the hijackers took over. By 9: 14 it was at flight level 25,000 and remained there during the course of the air traffic control conversations between ZDC and ZID and among the area supervisors at ZDC. About 9:22 it began its final descent and by 9:29 it was below 10,000 feet altitude.

Given that primary source data and given the instructions the ZDC operations manager passed to his area supervisors, ZDC had no chance to detect AA77. Moreover, it was quickly moving into IAD (Dulles Tracon) air space as we shall see by considering another primary source, radar files from the 84th RADES.

AA 77, radar track.

NEADS radar reacquired AA 77 shortly before 9:10, but as a primary only track. Moreover, as opposed to the situation with AA 11 where NEADS could have determined altitude it could only have done so for AA 77 during the period 9:16 and 9:27 while the Oceana Radar was acquiring the aircraft. Thereafter, the radar feed was coming from The Plains, Virginia, the only radar in the Joint Surveillance System that could not provide altitude information on a primary only track. Shown here is a Google Earth plot of 84th RADES files from The Plains radar for the period 9:18 to 9:28.

According to the plot, AA 77 was just approaching Virginia, west of Harrisonburg, while Thomas and Johnson were conversing, and was passing north of Harrisonburg and crossing I81 while Johnson was conversing with his area supervisors. At the same time, after crossing the mountains, Hani Hanjour began the descent from flight level 25 headed for air space controlled by Dulles TRACON, IAD.

We will address the IAD story later in a separate article. For now we need to document what is and is not happening in the hunt for AA 77.

Observables in real time

First, at no time do either Thomas or Johnson talk about or consider NEADS or military assistance.

Second, they are not taking their cues from or responding to Herndon Center. ZDC is responding to FAA’s Eastern Region, an administrative headquarters. Recall that we established in a previous article that the two entities fighting the battle (second article at link) that morning were NEADS and Herndon Center.

Third, at no time do Johnson and his Area Supervisors mention Dulles TRACON; they are concentrating on their mission which is handling transponding aircraft at high altitude.

Finally, ZDC does not turn on the primary switches on its scopes; instead they are looking for a limited data block, as was the case with UA 175. I made a separate, final trip to ZDC on the very point of primary switches to confirm that they did not turn them on. They did not.

A personal comment

We will likely never know the attack plan, in detail. What we do know is the Atta and al Shehhi had extended periods of quality time together, measured in days, weeks, even months, to discuss ‘what-ifs’, do research, and speculate what might and what might not work as they finalized the battle plan.

Certainly they had sufficient time and the means to determine that a transponder turned off over West Virginia might cause problems; to determine that a transponder changing codes might also cause problems; and that a low level approach to the nation’s capital might escape detection.

Given the primary source information, including the flight data recorder data, we can reverse engineer Hanjour’s actions and make some informed observations. First, Hanjour immediately changed altitude after takeover and turn around. Second, he flew erratically for several minutes after reaching his new altitude of 25,000 feet.

That erratic flight reinforces the belief by some that Hanjour and the other hijack pilots were unskilled. Conversely, it also reinforces the belief by others that the plot was planned in detail and was sophisticated. It is plausible that Hanjour flew erratically to encourage the passengers to stay seated and belted. Either way, Hanjour did level the plane and it flew smoothly at flight level 25 until it came time to descend.

It is a technicality of course, but during the period 09:24 to 09:27, AA77 was in Class E airspace, between 18,000 and 10,000 feet, airspace that ‘belonged’ to neither ZDC nor Dulles TRACON. Even so, Dulles TRACON controllers did ‘see’, but did not recognize the significance of a ‘no tag’ approaching during that time. And that’s the next story to be told.

Future articles

As mentioned, I will continue the primary source analysis of the approach of AA 77 through Dulles TRACON airspace and will establish using primary source information the earliest that the NCA would know it had an immediate problem.

It is also appropriate that we now queue up a discussion of Norman Mineta and his testimony. It is clear from this article that as of 9:20, no one knew where AA77 was or that it was approaching the nation’s capital; not ZID, not ZDC, not IAD, not Herndon, not the FAA Eastern Region and, above all, not FAA Headquarters, NEADS/NORAD, the NMCC, Richard Clarke, Norman Mineta, the Secret Service or the Vice President and President.

It will be the initiative of one person, Danielle O’Brien, that anyone, anywhere, will have actionable information. By that time, AA77 will be “inside the Beltway,” a term that used to enjoy a certain cachet.

9-11: NEADS Tapes; an interesting quest

Correspondents have called to my attention that Kevin Fenton has blogged about the Commission Staff’s quest to obtain the NEADS tapes. Let me state up front that I have no quarrel with Kevin or the History Commons Scribd initiative to make available the Commission files. I have personally found that initiative invaluable. I have met Erik Larson and applaud the many hours he has devoted to a necessary and critical task.

I have also in other articles cautioned about applying post facto clarity and understanding to facto events. Here, the caution applies to both the events of 9-11 and to the Commission’s quest to understand and report on those events. I also cautioned about taking snapshots of the Commission’s work. One such quest was the effort to obtain all available NEADS tapes, which we ultimately did. One such snapshot is the History Commons glance at a segment of staff work.

Kevin wrote me a private email laying out his analysis which is both interesting and informative. It is a snapshot of the Commission’s work, one that has the beneficial effect of showing that the Commission Staff was working formal and informal channels at the same time. That should come as no surprise to anyone who has engaged in such research. I did respond to Kevin.

Insight provided to Kevin Fenton

I began by stating, “Kevin, that is a fair question. Let me say up front that, ultimately, it [NEADS production of the tapes] was not nefarious. So, please don’t try to make anything out of something that is not there.”

I continued: “In several discussions with our DoD POC we worked out how we would proceed. NEADS would digitize the remaining channels and provide them to us on site during our first visit. The original tapes were analog, reel-reel. We found that delivery [on site] to be insufficient for our purposes and we called a halt to the first visit. NEADS was offering up all the tapes, but it was piecemeal.”

I then explained what we did after we received the audio files. “Once we received the digitized files then we contracted out a transcription effort. One firm, Alderson, decided to use a technique of tracking individual voices, which is OK as long as folks understand what they were doing. I posted an article on this on my website one I realized that [other researchers] were totally askew in their analysis of the Alderson tapes vis D1989.”

I then elaborated on the original transcription effort by NEADS. “In the course of the NCO’s work [specialist brought in by NEADS to transcribe the tapes immediately after 9-11] NEADS thought it had lost the contents of one recording machine. Together with DoD we approached the manufacturer, Dictaphone [General Dynamics], and they were able to not only recover all the files but provide them to us in a format which was useful and effective.”

I then summarized: “Bottom line, we ultimately got all the NEADS tapes, it took a while. In the course of all our work we determined that the two channels that recorded the voices of the WD [Weapons Director, i.e. controller] and the WD/T for the Otis fighters were not recorded. My work files that run all that to ground have been uploaded by Erik. We know that the channels were never recorded because we never hear those two voices bleeding over into other tapes. Please don’t try to make more out of this then is there.”

I concluded: “Kevin, thanks for your continued interest and dedication. NEADS performed very well that day; not so well in the aftermath. They had a good story to tell [see Bronner, Vanity Fair] and the blew it, as General Arnold acknowledged.

For The Record

The resolution of the NEADS tapes is documented by DoD in its rolling production spreadsheet. Let me hasten to caution that this, itself, is a snapshot; the DoD spreadsheet was iterative, at least weekly. A relevant version of the spreadsheet is included in this file available on the History Commons Scribd site. Here is the embedded documentation.

NQRAD/NEADS/Department of the Air Force Materials
The NORAD tapes of interest to the Commission contain 46 channels.
NORAD is currently transferring the information on those channels to compact
disks. Those CDs are scheduled to be delivered to the Commission as indicated
below. The schedule is determined by the real-time process by which each 6-hour,
40-minute channel can be recorded onto a CD.
CDs containing:
• 10 channels were delivered November 5, 2003
• 8 channels are scheduled for delivery by close of business November 10,
2003
• 4 channels are scheduled for delivery by close of business November 12,
2003
• 6 channels are scheduled for delivery by close of business November 14,
2003
• 18 channels are scheduled for delivery by close of business November
19, 2003

Even after we determined the difficulties DoD and NEADS were having in copying the tapes and a subpoena was issued, it still took weeks for the audio files of all channels to be delivered. Retrospectively, NEADS could not make a complete delivery during our first visit.

The important question for historians, researchers and writers is: “Were all available tapes provided and considered?” How the Staff got to an answer of “Yes” is perhaps interesting and informative but it is of no probative value.

9-11: Air Defense Response; first things first, the Scott Trilogy (part 3)

This is the last article in the Scott series and it stands alone, independent of the other two articles. Scott chose the week of the first anniversary of 9-11 to publish “F-16 Pilots Considered Ramming Flight 93,” September 9, 2002. In his article Scott told the story of the Air National Guard at Andrews and literally set in stone a story contrary to the events of the day; one that has been difficult to unravel.

The Commission Staff thought we had put the Andrews story to rest when our final report was published. The story was resurrected in Lynn Spencer’s Touching History which compelled three members of the Staff, including me, to publish an OpEd article in the “New York Times.” I spoke to the Andrews Story in a previous article which should be read first. With the understanding that the primary and secondary sources of the day do not support Scott’s narrative we can now look at the issue that Scott raises in his title, rules of engagement.

The Facts

At no time during the battle of 9-11 did any military aircraft have authenticated rules to engage a target. NEADS, itself, did not have any such guidance until well after the fate of UA 93 had been determined. That guidance was not passed to either the Otis or Langley pilots that morning. No Andrews pilot had written “weapons free” authority until a pair of fully armed fighters lifted off after 11:00.

The Rationalization

Scott told us two things. First, he addressed the title of his article by writing: “all three [Hutchison, Sasseville, Lucky] acknowledge they were prepared to ram a terrorist-flown aircraft, if necessary.” Second, he further wrote: “Sasseville planned to fire from behind and ‘try to saw off one wing…and bring it down.” There is no primary or secondary souce information to support either supposition.

Scott did not address the Langley pilots, but we do know that the stated NORAD rationalization by both Arnold and Marr was that they would take lives in the air to save lives on the ground. That being said, they did not give the pilots in the air the authority to engage.

Since the circumstances never came to that Hobson’s Choice the ‘what if?’ is a matter of speculation. What we do know is that only the Langley fighters had authentication tables with them; the Andrews pilots did not, according to what they told me during interview. We also know that the Langley fighters were over the nation’s capital long before the Andrew’s fighters. We also know that only the Langley (and Otis) fighters under any plausible scenario could have conceivably had to take terrible, swift action.

So, we can set the Andrew’s fighter story aside with one final point about Scott’s narrative turning again to an issue with all eyewitness and participant recall information, time compression.

Time Compression

Scott wrote: “Within minutes of American airlines Flight 77 hitting the Pentagon on Sept. 11, Air National Guard F-16s took off from here [Andrews AFB, MD] in response to a plea from the White House to ‘Get in the air now’.” That establishes a takeoff time prior to 9:45, which is not possible. It is no wonder that Lynn Spencer had so much difficulty with time compression in her own narrative concerning the Andrews fighters. Three of the available seven pilots were in the skies over North Carolina.. The other four had no planes immediately ready for use.The first Andrews fighter airborne, Hutchison just returning from North Carolina, lifted off a hour later than Scott’s narrative has it.

The Realm of Speculation

I leave it to the reader to rationalize what might have happened. As you do so consider these points.

First, in my article on the Battle of 9-11 I make reference to rules of engagement and to my work on this last Scott article. I wrote: “All informal time-distance analyses that I have worked through in my mind [given a scramble at 9:09] indicate that AA 77 and the Langley fighters would have arrived over greater DC skies at about the same time. And the unanswered question is, “then what?””

Second, I have worked through in my mind the time distance factors for both the Otis and Langley fighters and in the most perfect of worlds there is a slender chance that the Otis fighters would have arrived over a heavily populated area at the same time as did UA 175. There is a slightly less slender chance that AA 77 and the Langley fighters would have also arrived over a heavily populated area at the same time.

Third, arriving on the scene and actually intercepting a target are two very different things. It takes time, time the pilots would likely not have had.

Fourth, there is the issue of authority and authentication. That, too, takes time.

Finally, there is the cognitive problem for the reader of where is it, exactly, the two hijacked airliners are going to go down?

With the possible exception of UA 93, NORAD was not going to take lives in the air to save lives on the ground, despite their rationalization.

AA 11 and UA 93

The Otis pilots had no chance to defend against AA11. FAA declared a hijack at 9:25. It took NEADS, once alerted, the Otis pilots, once scrambled, (edited Nov 1, 2009) on the order of thirteen minutes to get fighters (edited Nov 1, 2009) airborne. Air defense fighters fly at ‘military power,’ maximum subsonic. NORAD specified in its timeline a rate of advance of .9 mach. That approximates 9 nautical miles per minute. It is nearly 170 nautical miles from Otis to Manhattan according to Google Earth. I leave it to the reader to do the math.

The Langley pilots were in position to do something about UA 93, but they had no authority to engage. That is the one plane that could have been engaged to save lives on the ground. Except the passengers and crew aboard UA 93 had already figured that out for themselves.

A Final Observation

We have now completed a review of the Scott Trilogy. That body of work together with other published information in the aftermath of 9-11 established a story that was simply not true. The quote at the top of my home page is the Staff’s summation of the situation as we found it.

Chaos Theory: 9-11; NOIWON, a linear process you may not know about

In a previous article I said: “At the most crucial time national level entities were pulling standard operating procedures off the shelf and attempting to jump start antiquated and outmoded linear processes.” That list of processes includes the FAA’s primary net, the NMCC’s significant event conference/air threat conference call, Richard Clarke’s secure video teleconference (hereafter SVTS), and something we have not previously discussed, NOIWON.

This is the first in a series of three articles that deal with national level processes that worked but were either irrelevant or non-productive, or both on 9-11. In the next two articles we will adress SVTS and a thing called CRITIC.

NOIWON

Sometime in the 9:20 timeframe on 9-11 the Central Intelligence Agency initiated a NOIWON conference call. That simple act accomplished what the NMCC’s Significant Event Conference and the FAA’s Primary Net could not do, it linked DoD and FAA together in a secure multi-agency conference.

The NOIWON (National Operational Intelligence Watch Officer’s Network) has been around for a long time. It is a hotline that allows the several WAOC (Washington Area Operations Centers) 24-hour alert centers to informally discuss things that go bump in the night. Among its subscribers on 9-11 were the CIA, NSA, DIA, State Department, NMCC, FAA, and the White House Situation Room (WHSR). I knew from previous experience as a user of the NOIWON that it was not a recorded line. Nevertheless, the Commission Staff persistently asked agencies, specifically DoD, if the line was recorded that day. The ultimate answer was that it was not.

Any node on the network could activate the line at any time. Typically it was used to quickly share information and ask questions about untoward events. It was, primarily, an intelligence/information sharing line not an operational line. Despite its fancy sounding name and despite the fact it linked multiple locations together it did not play a major role on 9-11.

Twice Activated

We know from secondary source information that the NOIWON hotline was at least twice used on the morning on 9-11. A Log from the FAA’s Intelligence Watch shows that the line was activated by the CIA sometime after 9:16 and before 9:25. According to interviews with concerned FAA personnel CIA was asking what was going on, the line was left open, and subsequent conversations consisted mostly of people asking questions; what little information was exchanged was second hand. None of the primary source information from NEADS or the FAA’s Herndon Center was directly fed into the NOIWON conference.

NSA initiated a second NOIWON conference at 10:20. We will speak to that conference in a subsequent article on CRITICS.

NOIWON treated seriously by the NMCC

The NMCC considered the NOIWON link a primary source of information and devoted a general officer solely to the line. Brig Gen Seipe, himself a trained DDO, was present that day attending the same closed door promotion board meeting as did the designated DDO, BG Winfield. In fact the NMCC had four trained DDO’s available for duty that morning; Winfield, Seipe, Navy Capt Leidig (the ADDO), and Army Colonel Susan Kuehl, the supervisor of day-day operations at the NMCC.

The NOIWON line rang in the DDO’s office and later after Winfield relieved Leidig he always had line-of-sight contact with Seipe.

NOIWON not recognized by FAA as a secure line of communication

By contrast, the FAA’s node was in the Intelligence Watch several floors below the Washington Operations Center and there was no direct secure communication link even within FAA headquarters. The Watch did maintain a small secure room off of the Operations Center but that capability was not immediately activated. The NOIWON conference was never a factor in FAA’s attempt to gain operational contact with FAA DoD (corrected Oct 22, 2009).

Chaos not managed

We have consistently shown that linear processes, the default government solution across the board that morning, were ineffective if not counter-productive. The government’s habitual reference to checklists, SOPs, and established protocols was not just a ‘failure of imagination’ it was a failure of performance. No one at any level solved the ‘strange attractor’ equation and linked Herdon Command Center and NEADS together to fight the battle.

NOIWON was one status quo linear process available to share information. It was not value added to the battle fought by Colonel Bob Marr at NEADS and Ben Sliney at the Herndon Command Center.

9-11: Exercises; additional information

A researcher has posted exercise-related information gleaned from the universe of available interviews conducted by the Commission Staff. This is valuable qualitative analysis now available to other interested researchers. The researcher caveats that this is a work in progress and should be treated accordingly. It is a significant level of effort, one that avoids the ‘snapshot’ analysis pitfall. I do have additional insight that may be helpful.

Still to be released by NARA are the audio files of the interviews. It is possible that not all recorded interviews were memorialized in MFRs. In most cases MFRs were created using both the notes of interviews and the recordings. My recall is MFRs were made of all unrecorded interviews.

Also still to be released are the database files of the Commission. All documents provided to the Commission were catalogued, stored and maintained in classified and unclassified holdings. Staff members copied docuemts from the master files as needed and some of those copies became part of the staff work files which have been released by NARA.

Response to Ryan

Dear Kevin,

I took the time to listen to your March 15, 2006 lecture “A 9-11 Whistleblower Examines the Official Conspiracy Theory“ to gain an appreciation of your point of view. Let me say at the outset that your lecture of that date is not debatable at any level. I would be interested in viewing an updated version to see if your vision has matured, especially now that the files of the 9-11 Commission are becoming available. Absent an update, let me address a few points.

Your Response

Here I will address some of the topics you mention and, for convenience, in the order you introduce them.

First, I did not work on the New York issue except as it concerned FAA and NEADS. However, I have read enough of the NIST report to know that it is not “dismally weak, highly inconsistent, and complete false,” as you have it. Further, I know of no verification of the “independent discovery of explosive residues in the WTC dust.” I find that supposition tenuous, misleading, and scientifically ungrounded.

Second, let me clarify a point. You site my “stated appreciation for Joel Hirschhorn.” I mentioned Joel Hirschhorn for one reason and one reason only. He is trying, within your movement, to point out some essential issues and to move you out of a “do loop.” I hope you see that and understand what he is telling you. I don’t subscribe to his basic point of view any more than I do yours.

Third, you mention that you have met with your own Congressman. Ironically, it was such a Congressman, Representative Burton, who directed the DoD IG to investigate the Cuban shoot down of two Brothers to the Rescue aircraft. Either your Congressman–perhaps it is Burton–or Lee Hamilton could compel a similar inquiry for you were your issue sufficient. As you are also aware Hamilton has a new public platform for action, the National Security Preparedness Group. You might consider approaching that group.

Fourth, since you have not read Dean John Farmer’s new book I suggest you do so and verify in your own mind that Ekonomou’s characterization of “flat-out misrepresentation” is valid. I am confident you will find differently.

Fifth, I gather from your site logo and your statement “we know it was a terrorist attack” that you accept the fact that four planes were hijacked and used to attack New York City and Washington D.C., and that you distance yourself from any suggestion to the contrary. Your hypothetical statement/question “What we don’t know is: Who were the terrorists?” does in fact beg a question. If not Atta and company, then who?

Sixth, you speak to FOIA, a lack of transparency and the extreme redaction that is involved. I share your concern and do what I can to pry more out into the public domain. I archived my work files so that I could get at them and continue to explore the events of the day. The lack of some information is frustrating. What we do know is that NARA has second and third levels of effort in the offing, but that will take time. By their own accounting they have released about 35% of the holdings. Still to come are the master paper files, the audio files of recorded interviews, and the electronic files on the two servers, one classified and one unclassified. NARA does have a mechanism for requesting release of redacted information if a case can be made; you might want to selectively pursue that. I understand that approach was successful in obtaining the redacted phone number concerning the Olson call, for example.

Finally, let me speak briefly to a non-issue, “we have some planes.” The convergence of evidence, a term with which I am sure you are familiar, is that the term from air traffic control primary sources correlates to American Air 11 and Mohammed Atta. There is no credible evidence to suggest otherwise. I am puzzled that a simple analytical problem such as this causes you any degree of consternation.

Additional Comments

Independent of the construct of your letter and considering your 2006 presentation, let me address a few other things that caught my eye.

First, there is no such thing as an ‘Official Conspiracy Theory.” As I said in my initial letter the facts of the day are straight forward and tell a consistent story. If it is your purpose to tell a different story then you are obligated to establish what that story is and provide a body of evidence—pre-event, event, and post-event—that supports your story. You have not done that.

Second, your presentation is wrong on so many levels that it defies analysis. For example, the facts are compelling, conclusive, and definitive that American Airlines flight 77 impacted the Pentagon. To argue otherwise does a disservice to the men, women and children who died there that day. Visit the Pentagon Memorial and sit on the bench of the youngest victim. Look around and ask yourself why the Memorial is constructed as it is and reflect on the story the Memorial tells you.

Third, ask yourself one simple question. Why is it that you have not been successful in the media, the courts, and the Congress? If your postulation has any credibility at all it would gain some traction, somewhere. You can endlessly speak about the need for a new investigation as a mantra but without Congressional will, jointly or individually, that won’t happen. It will be helpful if you can gain a Senate sponsor, but the work of Dan Burton shows that you can also work at the Representative level.

Last, on the subject of your position and your perspective, I take your letter to be a singular voice and not necessarily the consensus voice of the Bloomington Group. I would be very much interested in hearing other voices; surely there is diversity of view, exposition and discussion. I cannot believe that all members take, for example, your 2006 presentation as gospel. Having said that let me shift gears back to my own perspective.

My Perspective

First, read my Welcome and my page on Becoming a Commission Member. It was my pleasure to associate with two hard working and dedicated staffs during my tenure with the Congressional Joint Inquiry and the 9-11 Commission. Both endeavors and their final reports were fact-based, verifiable, and definitive. Both staffs wrote the reports, by the way.

Can more be learned? Certainly. Will finer-grained and more complete analysis be done? Inevitably. One example is the Creed/Newman work on Firefight: Inside the Battle to Save the Pentagon on 9/11. I paraphrase the authors here, but one key point they made was once AA 77 touched the Pentagon the laws of physics and chemistry took over. We can extend that statement to the World Trade Center complex. Once AA 11 and UA 175, separately, touched the Towers, the laws of physics and chemistry took over. And those laws explain everything that happened subsequently, including the collapse of buildings one, two, and seven.

Second, as I said before, I am beyond debate and Q&A in my own continuing work. I have expanded on specific subjects such as Delta 1989 and the Bobcats as the occasion warranted and, based on my work files, will place other things in perspective on request, such as the Otis Scramble. Further, it remains my intention to set the Scott Trilogy in context. That Trilogy is a primary source for the public record concerning events of the day as the Commission Staff understood it when we began work. I am two-thirds done and am now looking at the rules of engagement issue which is the subject of Scott’s third article.

Third, and most important to me, I am continuing to look at events of 9-11 through the lens of Chaos Theory and that is where I try to devote the most time. That focus has led me, for now, squarely back to the final episode in the Scott Trilogy.

Finally, the facts of the day and events leading up to that day have been credibly established by the Congressional Joint Inquiry and the 9-11 Commission. Nineteen terrorists hijacked four commercial airliners and flew them to a grim fate. n the process the World Trade Center was destroyed, the Pentagon damaged, and a final target saved by the only people that day, ultimately, who could make a difference, the passengers and crew aboard UA 93.

Amicably,

Miles Kara

Ryan Response

Dear Mr. Kara,

Thank you for your “Open Letter to the 9-11 Working Group of Bloomington.” As a member of that group, I’m glad to see you express interest in our work and I appreciate your invitation to further discuss the 9/11 Commission report in a public forum. It’s unfortunate that you’re not willing to engage in Q&A, however, as the questions are many and, to this day, the answers are very few. It is also unfortunate that you are not willing to debate the facts, because we would be happy to have you come to Bloomington for a public debate. But a dialogue of any sort is a welcome start.

For six years now, I’ve been focused on the work of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the ongoing independent investigation into what happened at the World Trade Center (WTC). The WTC reports finally generated by NIST have been shown to be dismally weak, highly inconsistent, and completely false. Frankly the NIST reports are a shameful excuse for science. Add to this the independent discovery of explosive residues in the WTC dust, which NIST did not test for or even consider, and we must suspect that a cover-up has been intended with regard the events of 9/11.

Although I have not had as much time to evaluate the 9/11 Commission report, my understanding is that it too is mostly, if not entirely, false. This is evident from the very start, where the report states its primary aim to “provide the fullest possible accounting of the events surrounding 9/11.” It is now widely known that many of the most important events of 9/11 were never mentioned in the 9/11 Commission report at all, let alone presented in the fullest possible accounting. These complete omissions include the destruction of WTC building 7, the testimony of FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds, Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta’s testimony concerning the Vice President and the approach of Flight 77, the connections between al Qaeda and the Pakistani ISI, and many other examples. A number of the omissions and distortions in your report have been detailed by Dr. David Ray Griffin in an easy to reference book.

Considering these facts, our group’s excitement about your offer to collaborate with us is tempered by the suspicion that you might continue to engage in the same “exacting investigative work” that the Commission report attributes to you. For my own part, this suspicion is aggravated by your stated appreciation for Joel Hirschhorn, who you claim is “value added.” My experience with Hirschhorn, someone I’ve met and presented with, is that he does not strive for a “paradigm shift” by any means. In fact, he appears to promote a futile pandering to the status quo that would result in the 9/11 Truth movement becoming as useless as a concrete parachute. Worse yet, Hirschhorn was involved with misrepresenting an honest group of investigators and promoting a poorly considered draft bill for Congress that called for investigation of WTC theories that literally no one supports.

Therefore I’m not encouraged by your suggestion that we subscribe to a new three-part plan of action, which in fact is not new. There have been countless attempts at engaging corporate media sources in reporting the basic facts about 9/11, and most of those attempts have failed. There have also been a number of 9/11 lawsuits filed, and to date, all of those have been rejected before the evidence could be discovered or presented. Finally, there have been many attempts to reach Congress with the facts. The 9/11 Working Group has met with the staff of our own congressman, and also with our former congressman, 9/11 Commission co-chair Lee Hamilton. Unlike you, Mr. Hamilton was not opposed to a new investigation, and he gave us a long list of excuses for why your 9/11 Commission investigation report was not sufficient.

We can no longer afford to ask our politicians and media to cure our corrupt system. It is the corporate media itself, and the corporate-funded politicians that maintain the corrupt system, and that are the problem. We must rebuild our media and our government, and the truth about 9/11 has the power to do just that. In doing so we will need to be aware, as you wrote, of “the frauds, opportunists, and paper millers who serve primarily as a major distraction.”

This brings me to John Farmer and his new book, which I agree does not intend to state that the 9/11 Commission report is completely false. To the contrary, although I have not read the book I understand from others that its approach is much the same as that of the Commission’s report. I learned this through attorney John Ekonomou, who wrote to Farmer a few weeks ago and later copied me on his message. Ekonomou purchased the Farmer book and was appalled at how quickly he realized that it was a “flat-out misrepresentation” of the facts.

But getting back to the struggle for truth, and your offer to help, we should see if there is common ground as you mentioned. You say that an event occurred on 9/11, and you call it a terrorist attack. Having met many of the Americans around the country who are alarmed by the lack of truth about 9/11, I can tell you that this appraisal is shared by almost all of them. We know it was a terrorist attack. What we don’t know is: Who were the terrorists?

You can help us continue building an honest answer to that question. As you’re no doubt aware from our website, our group has received a number of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) responses from government agencies. Some of those responses are enlightening, while others are not particularly useful due to the ongoing lack of transparency surrounding the events of 9/11, and the extreme redaction that is involved. But among the documents we received, we have noticed many facts that do not support your Commission’s report, and we’ve noticed a number of surprising things that should have been in your report but were not.

Starting out in a small way, let’s talk about “We have some planes.” Can you tell us where this phrase originated from, in terms of records made by air traffic controllers or others involved in the events of 9/11, and how you attributed it to the alleged hijackers? It is the title of one of the chapters of the 9/11 Commission report, and I believe you have taken credit for that analysis to some degree.

With a small step such as this, I think we might be able to begin working together for the benefit of all.

Sincerely,

Kevin R. Ryan