Author: Oredigger 61

9-11: NORAD; Should It and Could It Have Done More

NORAD was, in the minds of some, the court of last resort on 9-11 and failed to prosecute the case.  Those voices ask why it is the defender of air sovereignty failed?  NORAD had the mission and it exercised regularly, often imaginatively, yet did not recognize that the nation was in danger nor respond in time that morning.  Multiple levels and organizations of government failed long before NORAD’s opportunity came; yet some believe that it was NORAD that dropped the ball with the game on the line.

If NORAD is indeed the court of last resort, then what about the ‘courts’ that went before?  Amy Zegart in Spying Blind provides some perspective.  She wrote that the CIA had “eleven different opportunities to penetrate and possibly disrupt the…attacks.”  She further wrote that, “FBI agents had twelve opportunities to try and derail al Qaeda inside the United States before September 11.  Like the CIA, the bureau missed them all.”  Skipping over other agencies with failed opportunities—State, INS, FAA, e. g.—we can also say that the airlines had 19 opportunities and missed all of them.

A Paradigm Unchanged

An irony of the day is that despite NORAD’s imagination in planning exercise hijack scenarios none of that imagination changed the paradigm one bit.  As the 9-11 Commission concluded, 9-11 was a failure in imagination.  Part of the failure was a lack of recognition that the paradigm had changed.  The paradigm, as cited in interview after interview conducted by the Commission Staff, was that a hijacking would be a singular event with the outcome to be a safe landing somewhere for political or publicity gain.  It then became a law enforcement problem, if domestic, not a NORAD problem.

The Joint Inquiry Staff Director, Eleanor Hill, in her first public staff statement eloquently laid out the history of planes as weapons, a compilation of information available to the Intelligence Community.  She cited 12 specific examples during the period 1994 to 2001 of intelligence reporting the use of planes as weapons, eight overseas and four domestic. Separately, during the same period NORAD exercise planners were routinely creating imaginative hijack scenarios, some of which included the use of planes as weapons. Yet the translation from information reporting and imagination to real world actionable intelligence was not made.

We can point at the NORAD exercises scenarios but cannot lay the blame solely on NORAD.  If there was, in part, a NORAD failure it was that the exercise planners who came up with the scenarios were intelligence officers, members in some way of the Intelligence Community and with input to it.  Yet the Intelligence Community did not provide NORAD or anyone else an updated threat assessment that was actionable.  Amy Zegart told us in relentless detail why this is so.  To lay the blame for an unchanged paradigm at NORAD’s feet is disingenuous, at best.

The Exercise Scenarios

NORAD did imaginatively include hijacking scenarios in exercises for several years prior to 9-11.  Some of those scenarios likely had real planes scrambling to notional targets.  My exercise spreadsheet listing some of the scenarios, constructed while a member of the 9-11 staff, is clear evidence that NORAD exercise planners had thought up scenarios that, in hind sight, promised more insight than was actually the case.  The spreadsheet, however, is cryptic, out of context, and interpretation today may lead to false expectations.

One key column is “element.”  What appear to be multiple coordinated events turn out to be singular situations.  In the Vigilant Guardian series, for example, it was necessary for planners to give each NORAD sector a separate hijack situation; not necessarily linked.  So in a given year there might be as many as five different hijack scenarios, one each for the three CONUS sectors—NEADS, SEADS, WADS—the Canadian sector, CANR, and Alaska, ANR.  The spreadsheet also shows an example of sequential exercise inputs for a single scenario.  That does not mean, for example, 6 different hijackings; it means one hijacking with multiple updates in the scenario.  In sum, NORAD planners imagined descriptive scenarios but they were in most cases singular events.  No one imagined a coordinated suicide attack involving multiple hijacked aircraft.  Further to the point, nothing in the hijacking scenarios caused NORAD, operationally, to anticipate in any way the real world events that occurred on 9-11.

What is more relevant, as I look over the spreadsheet several years after its creation, is the clear intent to exercise coordination, command, and control, to include involvement of the NMCC and FAA and in several instances to use the existing hijack notification procedures.  None of that held sway on 9-11.  The hijack coordinator was never involved, the NMCC and FAA set up their own crisis conferences each under the assumption that the other was in the net, and the key conference mechanism that was apparently exercised, an Air Event Conference, was never established.  The NMCC first convened a Significant Events Conference.  Then instead of segueing to an Air Event Conference the NMCC established an Air Threat Conference.  In grappling with this, and in terms of my own work on Chaos Theory, I’m struck by Zegart’s discussion of “bounded rationality problems—making decisions with some degree of uncertainty and information about the future.”  This to me is far more important than spending time in the analytical box canyon of parsing past NORAD exercises.

Should NORAD have done more?

There could have been multiple NORAD exercises ongoing, even war games, CPX or FTX, but it didn’t matter.  Alpha and Delta Flights at NEADS knew what to do, exercise or real world.  Michael Bronner writing in Vanity Fair told the NEADS story eloquently and accurately.  Anyone seriously interested in the issue owes it to himself or herself to listen to the NEADS tapes, to hear, in real time, how NEADS responded that day.  Listen to learn how NEADS was able to balance the real world with the exercise world with relative ease.  At no time did NEADS drop the real world ball to cross over into the exercise world.  Did they acknowledge the exercise from time to time; certainly, but it had no impact.  Once Jeremy Powell established the nature of the task at 9:38 8:38 (edited Jan 6, 10) exercises went by the way side.

The nation had its first string on duty that day, these were not benchers filling in for the varsity; the varsity was on the Sector floor that day.  At least three of the NEADS personnel on duty, including their commanding officer, were on duty the last time the nation had experienced a real world hijacking, a decade earlier.  Moreover, one of the two Otis pilots on duty participated in the last domestic intercept of a real world hijacked aircraft prior to 9-11.

Further, the Air National Guard had saved the air defense mission from extinction.  Had the Guard not carved out a niche mission for itself to be the nation’s guardians at home, there would have been zero planes available that morning and no infrastructure with the tactics, techniques and procedures in place to interface with the FAA.

The Answer

In sum, the answer to the question should NORAD have done more that day (Edited Jan 6, 2010) is ‘probably not,’ with one exception.  NORAD had saved the air defense mission from extinction, the battle cabs at all echelons were fully manned, no call-up rosters were needed, and the NEADS sector floor quickly identified the attack as real world.  Should they have done more prior to 9-11 to translate the imagination shown in exercises to an awareness of what al Qaeda planned that day?  Perhaps, but that wasn’t their job alone to do.  They needed the help of the Intelligence Community and the Law Enforcement Community.  As Zegart reported, the combined Communities had a score of 0 for 23.

The Exception

NORAD should have known, based on its exercise scenarios, how to communicate with the FAA (and the NMCC) at the national level.  The failure cuts both ways, however.  FAA should also have known how to do that at its end, and it did to the extent that its procedures allowed.  FAA activated its primary net at 9:20 and did, in fact, establish communication with the NMCC. We have some insight into what happened.  Major Chambers, the officer who picked up the phone, wrote down his recollection in a personal memo. Concerning the NMCC end we also know what happened.  Because of the classification level of the Air Threat Conference Call, FAA was unable to sync and continually dropped out of the call. Added, Jan 6, 2010.  Based on NORAD exercise scenarios, the NMCC should have known about the communications issue with FAA.

Could NORAD have done more?

Unlikely.  NORAD was dependent on someone tasking them and that tasking came too late to do anything about AA 11, UA 175 and AA 77.  The cueing to NEADS came at two discrete times, 9:38 8:38 (edited Jan 6, 2010) for the northern attack against the WTC and at 9:21 for the southern attack against the nation’s capital.  Even though the southern cue was for a plane that did not exist, AA 11, it was sufficient to get the last two NEADS assets, the Langley air defense fighters, airborne and over the nation’s capital to guard against a plane they did not know about, (Edited Jan 6, 2010) the oncoming UA 93.  So, how is it they could have done more?  To answer that we need to focus on two distinct times 8:25 and 9:09.

8:25

Post facto, the FAA’s Boston Center determined that AA 11 was a hijack at 8:25.  The combination of prior factors—no radio and transponder off—simply told FAA controllers that they had an aircraft in mechanical distress, nothing more.  There should be no expectation, retrospectively, that the situation called for air defense support.  All that changed when Mohammed Atta announced, “we have some planes” at 8:24.  That and an immediately following second transmission by Atta changed the situation fundamentally and Boston Center started spreading the word.  Even though their records show that a hijack was declared at 8:25 it was not until a few minutes later that they told anyone outside of Boston Center.  By 8:34, on their own recognizance and with no authority from above, Boston Center cut through all the standing procedures and began the process of reaching NEADS directly, which they did at 8:38.

But for our purpose in determining if NORAD could have done more we need to hypothesize a perfect world. And in that world NEADS would have been notified at 8:25, the time that Boston Center determined it had a hijack situation.  We are setting aside here the fact that American Airlines had earlier information that their plane was a hijack.  There was no protocol in place for American Airlines to notify the military.

We know that with an 8:38 notification time to NEADS the Otis fighters were scrambled at 8:46, and airborne at 8:53. It is not a given that the Otis fighters would have been airborne in 15 minutes, given a call to NEADS by Boston Center at 8:25.  The intervening variable is that the Otis pilots had a heads up to the actual situation because one of the pilots happened to hear the initial 8:34 call to Cape TRACON and the pilots, in effect, put themselves on battle stations before the scramble order was broadcast.  But let’s give NORAD the benefit of the doubt.

Therefore, given an 8:25 call to NEADS—the earliest reasonable time possible–we can project that the Otis fighters would have been airborne at 8:40.  We know that their rate of progression was going to be maximum subsonic, despite what the pilots said and despite any urge by anyone to have it otherwise.  It was long established in the air defense business that a rate of progression on the order of .9 Mach was both efficient and effective.  NORAD’s own timeline published on September 18, 2001, is definitive on this point. In lay terms, and for ease of calculation, a speed of maximum subsonic approximates 9 nm per minute, 90 nm in ten minutes.

That puts the Otis fighters over New York, assuming they proceeded directly, which they did not, too late to do anything about AA 11, but just there to do something about UA 175 on its final leg.  But, what?  NEADS had no target and without a target there can be no vectoring of the fighters.  The earliest cue available from New York Center would have been the perfect, instantaneous knowledge figured out by (edit Jan 6, 2010) Pete Dave Bottiglia, the controller who equated the transponding intruder Code 3321 to UA 175.  In a perfect world, therefore, and given the authority to do so, the Otis pilots would have possibly been in position to interdict UA 175 in its final moments.  But, how, and to what end?  A considerable number of people in the greater Manhattan area, on the ground, were doomed if somehow the Otis fighters had been able to bring UA 175 down.  It was, truly, a Hobson’s choice of terrible magnitude.

Getting there and doing something are two very different things.  Once there, the target had to be found and identified, a firing or interdiction position had to be established and authority had to be given.  There was no authority in place for the Otis pilots to do anything other than act on their own.  The bravado of post facto statements aside, no one knows how the interdiction scenario might have played out; and we will never know.

9:09

The set of circumstances at this time is quite different than for the New York attack.  First, by 9:09, knowledge of the lost status of AA 77 was known to both FAA and the Air Force at locations outside both Indianapolis Center and NEADS.  No one knew where AA 77 was but the very specific knowledge that it was lost was known to the FAA’s Great Lakes Region and to the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) at, ironically, Langley Air Force Base.  Great Lakes Region eventually shared its information with FAA and its Herndon Center.  The RCC, with no cue or reason to do otherwise, went about its business and started the search and rescue process.  Their actions subsequently led to erroneous circular law enforcement reporting the AA 77 had crashed.  Within FAA, the lost status of AA 77 apparently became the false report that AA 11 was still airborne.  Even though no one knew that AA 77 was headed to the nation’s capital from the west the alarm was sounded under the false assumption that the attack, AA 11, was coming from the north. At Langley, the certain knowledge of the lost AA 77 at RCC did not make it across the base to the air defense fighter detachment.

Further, the Langley fighters had actually been put on battle stations at 9:09 as a contingency for the New York situation.  The Mission Crew Commander wanted to scramble them; the Commanding Officer judged differently, not wanting to squander his last two air defense assets with no known target.  It was an opportunity to respond and perhaps pre-empt the developing attack on the nation’s capital, except it didn’t happen.

(Added Jan 6, 2010) We know, retrospectively, that by 9:10 the Joint Surveillance System, (the radars supporting NEADS) reacquired AA 77 as a primary only target.  Promptly cued by FAA, NEADS could have quickly established a track.  At a minimum the Langley fighters would have been scrambled.

No organization had the situational awareness to make it so.  Specifically, none of the following organizations with the ability to quickly marshal resources had actionable information; the National Military Command Center, NORAD’s Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, the FAA’s Herndon Command Center, or the FAA’s Washington Operations Center.  The disconnect between the national level and the field is nowhere more starkly revealed than in this instance.  What Indianapolis Center, Great Lakes Region, and the RCC knew was nowhere else known where it could make a difference.

The NEADS notification about AA 11 still airborne came at 9:21; Langley fighters were scrambled at 9:24 (from battle stations, remember), airborne at 9:30 and at the decision point on where to go by 9:33, a total of 12 minutes.  The fighters were on the order of 12 additional minutes flying time from the Pentagon.  Given a 9:09 start time and even allowing time to transition to battle stations and then scramble, it is clear that they could have been in the skies over the Pentagon by the time that National TRACON established an “S” tag on the fast moving unknown that was AA 77 and, more important, by the time that the surveillance technicians at NEADS established track B32 on the same target. The problem would have been that there were only a few short minutes to find the target, establish an interdiction position, and get the authority to act.  It would have been another Hobson’s choice of terrible magnitude; the pilots would have to act on their own.  As in New York, a considerable number of people on the ground in Fairfax County, or Alexandria, or Arlington were doomed, had the pilots acted.

Recapitulation

We have shown that sufficient information was available that under near perfect circumstances would have allowed the air defenders to take positive action against UA 175 and AA 77.  They were not going to interdict AA 11 under any circumstances.  They would have been in position for UA 93, but it is not clear that they would have had the authority even then to do anything but act on their own recognizance.

We have also shown that in the case of both UA 175 and AA 77 they would have had very little time to react and that lives on the ground would have been lost.  People who argue that NORAD could have done something need to complete their thought process and acknowledge that NEADS was not going to be able to take lives in the air to save lives on the ground.

NORAD’s own analysis

General Eberhart tasked his operations research staff to do a “9-11 Excursion (AA77 and UA93),” a what-if exercise to determine what NORAD could have done.  General Eberhart did not task the same study for AA11 and UA175, but did testify before the Commission that with perfect notification from FAA NORAD could “shoot down the planes [AA11, UA175, AA77].”

The NORAD “Excursion” assumed that the Langley scramble order was given after the “2nd WTT (sic) hit,” 9:03, with takeoff at 9:10 and arrival “on station over the NCR flying air patrol” at 9:25.  Here NORAD allowed 15 minutes flying time which is consistent with the 9:09 scenario, above, which includes the time to fly runway heading to 4000 feet altitude.  NORAD then allowed 3 minutes for the FAA notification to NEADS, based on an FAA awareness time of 9:33 and concluded that “there was at most 1.5 minutes for the F-16s to respond.”  One NORAD slide has been withheld, but looking at their discussion of UA 93 we can conclude that one of the bullets most likely covered the time to receive authority (presumably in the cockpit).  NORAD said, “The analysis of AA77 demonstrated that once the NORAD fighters have intercepted a hostile, it still takes at least four minutes to receive the authority to shoot.”

Addendum, January 30, 2010

NARA has released additional relevant information, a post facto study to determine if a more robust air defense posture from previous years would have made a difference.  The paper concludes that perhaps the continued existence of the Atlantic City site could have made a difference, but for UA 175, only.  Even so, the response time portrayed is consistent with my what-if analysis in the main article.

The paper also acknowledges that Andrews was not an alert site at any time.  Had it so been then Andrews might have had the tactics, techniques and procedures in place to respond to AA 77, again a postulation consistent with the what-if analysis in the main article.

Chaos Theory: 9-11; times of interest

A few months ago I created a list of linear processes that the government used or attempted to use on 9-11.  We will ultimately return to that list.

First, we need to build a separate list of critical times, expanding on a previous article under the category “times of interest”.

As we focus more closely on Chaos Theory concerning events of the day it is important that we have both lists; the processes and the times.  I list specific times, but the frame of interest will be a few minutes fore and aft.  We begin with the first declaration of a hijack.

8:25

FAA declared a hijack in progress.  Linear processes prevailed; it was considered to be a plane that would fly to a destination with demands to be met.  Notifications were made up the chain; the military was not notified.  Once it became clear to Boston Center, ZBW, that it would get no military help via the hijack protocol in place, the Center took action on its own recognizance.  That decisive action effectively short-circuited the protocol and, in terms of chaos theory, established ZBW as a focal point for the flow of information.  ZBW contacted Otis Tower at 9:34 and NEADS at 9:38, independent actions which led to NEADS being twice informed by 9:40 that assistance was needed.  More to the point, NEADS became another focal point for the flow of information, primarily via ZBW.

8:53

The linear process of managing AA 11 became nonlinear and chaotic.  What was a singular event bifurcated, twice.  First the northern attack bifurcated as New York Center, ZNY, determined that it had a hijacking in progress concerning a transponding intruder, code 3321 (UA 175).  Soon thereafter the main attack bifurcated into a southern component; Indianapolis Center, ZID, lost radio and radar contact with AA 77.

9:03

Terrorism is theater, according to Brian Jenkins since at least the early 1970’s.  AA 11 set the scene for UA 175 to enter, stage left, and show to a watching world that the attack was at once, horrifying, mesmorizing, and transcending.  Shortly thereafter, ZBW, determined that Mohammed Atta said, “we have some planes,” as in plural.  No one at ZID understood that their situation was something other than a lost aircraft.

9:10

ZID had by now notified its higher headquarters, Great Lakes Region, about AA 77 and had initiated rescue coordination by notifying the United States Air Force Rescue Coordination Center.  Concurrently AA 77 reappeared in the Joint Surveillance System, the series of radars supporting the air defense system.  The plane was trackable by NEADS; no one told them where to look, or to even look at all.  The possible became improbable.  Concurrently NEADS decided to preserve its assets and opted to put the Langley fighters on battle stations vice scrambling them.

9:21

Constantly alert for information that would help NEADS, ZBW either garbled or heard garbled information about the loss of AA 77 in ZID airspace.  Whatever the circumstance,  the result was that AA 11 was reborn as a threat to the nation’s capital from the north, a fact well documented in the primary and secondary sources of the day.  Meanwhile, AA 77 was bearing down on the capital from the West, unreported.

(Added Mar 16, 2010) Between 9:19:25 and 9:20:37 Denzel Simmonds at Herndon Center called the Dulles Traffic Management Coordinator, Mark Masaitis.  Here is that conversation. 091925 Herndon Dulles AA 77 Conversation There is no evidence that Masaitis as Traffic Management Coordinator was aware that an unknown primary track was approaching from the West.  He verified that AA 77 was not on the ground at Dulles.

During the conversation Simmonds broke in to say that they just had word a 757 disappeared off radar west of Virginia.  Concurrently, Masaitis can be heard saying that the plane was over Indiana. (/add)

9:33

Danielle O’Brien and her supervisor sounded the alarm about the unknown intruder from the west; an alarm that resonated all the way to the White House.  Concurrently, one of the Battle Commanders, Ben Sliney, began the second of two definitive actions to try and bound a chaotic situation.  He directed an airborne inventory of all planes in the air.  This followed a previous decision to ground stop all planes, nation-wide.  The inventory surfaced immediately the fact that UA 93 may have a bomb on board; the southern attack had also bifurcated.

No one at any level above Ben Sliney and Colonel Bob Marr, Sliney’s military counterpart fighting the battle, could help them.  The FAA’s primary net was still born; the NMCC was segueing from a significant event conference to an air threat conference; Richard Clarke had activated an SVTS conference which has yet to convene; and Norman Mineta was en route the White House.

In the next few minutes the military twice tracked the fast moving unknown, the only time any military asset would see any of the four hijacked planes.  NEADS quickly established a track, B-32, which soon faded as AA 77 slammed into the Pentagon.  The Minnesota Air National Guard C-130H saw the plane, identified it by type and followed it to its destiny.

9:40

I discussed this in an earlier article; the transponder on UA 93 was turned off, a final terrorist tactic.  Soon thereafter, the passengers and crew aboard UA 93 took matters into their own hands.

9-11: The Andrews Fighters; standing up, not so easy

Recently, a 9-11 researcher posted this article, “The 90-Minute Stand Down on 9/11:  Why was the Secret Service’s Early Request for Fighter Jets Ignored?” My initial instinct was to let my article on the Andrews fighters stand and not comment.  However, it later occurred to me that the article has considerable utility because it tells the beginning of the Andrews story, something I did not do in my article.  However, the author has the thesis backwards.

Standing Down or Standing Up?

It is intuitively obvious that there cannot be a stand down without a preceding stand up.  What the author actually reports are early attempts to stand up the Andrews fighters.  He reports conversations involving staff officers at four locations; the Secret Service, FAA Headquarters, Andrews Tower, and the fighter wing, itself.  The only actionable conversation is the one between the late General Wherley and the Secret Service.  General Wherley, however, was not a battle commander that morning.

In other articles we have talked about the battle commanders; Ben Sliney and Colonel Bob Marr.  None of the conversations referenced in the article involve either person or their staffs.  Nor do they involve the only other organization that could take action, the NMCC.  It would not have made any difference, the Andrews fighters were not relevant to the nation’s air defense that day.

Roles and Missions

We have gone over this before.  The only organization with the air defense mission was NORAD.  The only assets performing the role were four dedicated fighters, two at Otis and two at Langley.  Andrews was never seriously considered for good reason.

Major Chambers summed up the NMCC perspective; the Andrews fighters were not part of the air defense system and not available.   NEADS never considered the Andrews fighters because the Andrews Wing did not have the tactics, techniques and procedures in place to perform the role.  Moreover, they did not carry authentication tables, according to the pilots the Commission Staff interviewed.

Further, NEADS had the New York and DC skies covered by its own fighter assets.  Concurrent with the conversations referenced in the article, Colonel Marr started his own search for additional assets, but his focus was on the Midwest.  The only additional threat of which he was aware was D 1989.  NEADS had no immediate need for the Andrews fighters.

The Critical Moment

A few minutes after 9:30 Danielle O’Brien and her supervisor sounded the alarm about the fast approaching unknown (AA 77).  Shortly thereafter, and in part because of the preliminary conversations referenced, General Wherley took action, prompted by the Secret Service.  Even so, he wanted to hear from someone higher up in the food chain than the person calling him.

Concurrently, NEADS was redirecting the wayward Langley fighters and followed that redirection with a declaration of AFIO, Authority For Intercept Operations.  The Langley fighters established a combat air patrol over the nation’s capital at 10:00, 36 minutes from time of scramble.

Standing Up Andrews

It should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with the roles and missions of the United States armed forces why the Andrews fighters were never a factor and were not tasked by the military chain of command that morning.  They could not, and demonstrably did not, respond in any meaningful time frame.  To do so was beyond their capability.

That is not a knock on the Andrews Wing, their personnel or their pilots.  They worked diligently to get assets airborne, once tasked.  It took them over an hour to do so and that was as fast as they were going to be able to do it under any scenario that day.

Correcting the Math

The referenced article headlines a 90-minute stand down.  Assuming that the clock starts about 9:05 the activities described became actionable by 9:35 when General Wherley was directly tasked by the Secret Service.  The implied 90 minute stand down was actually a 30-minute prelude to a concerted Andrews effort to get fighters in the sky, to stand up.  The best they could do was to launch a single sortie over an hour later; a pilot with virtually no fuel, no armament, and no authority.

A Final Comment

I appreciate the author’s initiative and effort.  He provides specificity concerning staff level discussions about protecting the nation’s capital in the immediate aftermath of the impact of UA 175 and the FAA’s determination that Atta said, “we have some planes.”

And a Postscript

The Washington Post, shortly after release of the Commission Report, published an editorial cartoon that portrayed the USAF and the Secret Service ‘Air Force’ butting heads in the sky.  I have not been able to find a link to that prescient cartoon.

9-11: 9:40-9:47; fleeting window of opportunity, where was everyone?

Why this article

While working on part 1 of the UA 93 trilogy, the controller story at Cleveland Center, I drafted a summary of what else was going when the transponder on UA 93 was turned off.  The summary deserves its own time slot; it is filed under “Times of Interest.”

Recall that the transponders were manipulated differently in each of the hijacked aircraft and each manipulation presented a different problem in the National Airspace System.  Aboard UA 93 the transponder was turned off after the turn back to the east.

In this article we draw extensively on two sources; previous articles on Chaos Theory and the 84th RADES radar files. In one article I specified that the attack that morning was a battle in a larger war and that the Battle Commanders were Ben Sliney at FAA’s Herndon Center and Colonel Bob Marr at NEADS.  We established that they were not talking to each other and that the Battle Managers, General Arnold and Jeff Griffith, the next higher echelon, had neither the information nor the wherewithall to make that happen.  We also established that higher echelons were irrelevant and properly so.  Their job was to manage a war, not fight a battle.

Here is a Google Earth screen print depicting the seven minutes between transponder off to loss of coverage by the Joint Surveillance System radars supporting NEADS.

UA 93 Transponder Off

The situation

The UA 93 transponder was turned off at 9:40:30.  NEADS will have a seven minute window to establish a track.  UA drops out of NEADS radar coverage at 9:47:30.  It will not reappear until moments before it plummets to ground at 10:03.  At 9:47:30 UA 93 is just approaching the Ohio/West Virginia/Pennsylvania tri-border area.

Sliney and Marr are not in communication and cannot exploit the window of opportunity.  NEADS does not know about UA 93 and will not until after it plummets to earth.

NEADS did establish a track on Delta 1989 and  forward told that track to CONR and NORAD.  A few minutes earlier NEADS briefly established a track for AA 77 which it did not have time to forward tell.  Even earlier, it had learned about the rebirth of AA 11, as reported by Boston Center.  That fortuitous mis-report actually triggered the Langley scramble, which went astray.

At 9:40 the Langley fighters are under AFIO (Authority for Intercept Operations) and have been redirected toward the nation’s capital.  One of the three planes will fly directly over the Pentagon at 10:00.  Two of them will be captured on BBC video footage as they turn west over the nation’s capital to begin a combat air patrol.

Who was doing what

23,000 feet directly below the Langley fighter the NMCC is in an Air Threat Conference which it convened as the Pentagon was being struck.  The NMCC knows little of the approach of the Langley fighters, in itself a bizarre state of affairs.  They know nothing of the window of opportunity to track UA 93

The key agency, FAA, is not on the Air Threat Conference.  Concurrently, the NMCC is a participant in a CIA-convened NOIWON along with the FAA security watch seven stories below the FAA’s Washington Operations Center at FAA Headquarters.  No real-time information is available on that link

However, seven stories higher the FAA WOC is getting near real time information concerning UA 93.  That information is not being shared on FAA’s primary net because that net, activated at 9:20 to include the NMCC, was still born.  (I will speak to the primary net in a future article.)

Concurrently, Administrator Garvey, as of 9:40 is a participant in a just-beginning, closed-system SVTS conference with Richard Clarke.  She is disconnected from the WOC and is not aware of the near real-time information being passed by Cleveland Center via Herndon Center to the WOC.

No one at levels above Clarke is effectively engaged.  Secretary Rumsfeld has left his office for the Pentagon crash site.  General Myers has departed Senator Cleland’s office and is en route the Pentagon.  The Vice President is on his way to the PEOC at the insistence of the Secret Service.  Secretary Mineta is out of pocket en route the White House to join the Vice President.

At 9:40, the President is on his way to board Air Force One; he departs at 9:55.  It is his intention to return to the nation’s capital.  Concurrent with the arrival of the Langley fighters to protect the capital the President’s advisors and protectors recommend he not return.  At 10:10, with the nation’s capital protected, Air Force One turns west and heads for Barksdale Air Force Base.

During the fleeting window of opportunity for others to act, the passengers and cabin crew aboard UA 93 learn of the fate of other hijacked aircraft and of their own certain fate.  They take matters into their own hands.  They will do what no one else at any level can accomplish; they counter-attack, successfully for the nation, tragically for themselves.

9-11: NEADS MCC/T Log; a definitive secondary source

In previous articles we discussed the Mission Crew Commander/Technician (MCC/T) log kept at NEADS.  The purpose of this article is to provide historians, researchers, and other interested persons additional information about that important document.

It is the definitive secondary source document of the day to establish what NEADS knew and when they knew it.  Why definitive?  Because it is validated and verified by definitive primary sources, the NEADS and FAA tapes.

Explanation of copies of the log

My estimate is that the Commission Staff archived as many as three copies of the MCC/T log.  I archived one and it is likely that the New York office archived an additional copy.  Dana Hyde archived a third, unannotated copy.  The copy I linked in an earlier article was annotated by either Geoff Brown or John Azarrello while we were at NEADS; that is not my handwriting.

I note that we must have discussed the log with the several non-commissioned officers who performed the MCC/T duty that morning.  We established who made what entries via the handwriting.  For example, “Sgt Bianchi” made the 1324 entry.  Sgt Bianchi’s entries begin at 1240, the initial call from Boston Center.  He turned over the log to Sgt Perry sometime between 1401 and 1407.

A master copy of the log, as forwarded to the Commission via DoD, will ultimately be available when NARA uploads the Commission’s master paper files.  In the interim, the copy archived by Dana Hyde is an accurate rendition of the original log book, less redactions made by NARA.

The original log book, a general purpose ledger available in any office supply store, was and likely still is maintained in a safe at NEADS.  Each morning during our visits the NEADS staff would deliver the original to us for use during interviews; it was returned to them at the end of each day.  The approximate one-inch thick ledger was difficult to copy.  Readers familiar with the process will note that the book was opened to the relevant pages and copied under pressure to flatten the pages as much as possible.

Helpful background

Much work on the NEADS floor was accomplished by trained, experienced non-commissioned officers.  Each of the two key officers, the MCC, Major Nasypany, and the Senior Director, Major Fox, had such senior non-commissioned officers to constantly assist them.

For example, those familiar with the NEADS tapes will recognize that every scramble order that morning was broadcast by Sgt Powell, the SD/T.  Major Nasypany had three MCC/T on duty at various times, Sgt Bianchi, Sgt Perry, and Sgt McCain.

It is worth noting that McCain, Powell, Fox, and the Commander, Colonel Bob Marr, were all on duty the day of the Lufthansa hijacking a decade earlier.  This was an experienced crew, they knew what they were doing.

MCC/T log accuracy

Each critical entry was accurately posted, probably no longer than a minute or two after the fact.  For example, consider the first notification of the day, the call from Boston Center concerning AA 11.  That call was picked up by Sgt Powell a few seconds before 9:38.  It took a minute or two to gain actionable information.  We do not know when Sgt Bianchi actually made the log entry, but we do know that he determined the entry to be 8:40.

That pattern of accurate log entries by Sgt Bianchi continued.  He established the notification time for UA 175 as 9:05 and the notification time for AA 77 as 9:34; both consistent with the primary source audio files.  That pattern continued with Sgt Perry who recorded a notification time for UA 93 as 10:07.

Serious researchers, writers, and historians will appreciate and accept the work done by the non-commissioned officers, the ‘Technicians,’ at NEADS.

A key document thrice misinterpreted.

NEADS staff misread the MCC/T log in their initial review and established a notification time for AA 77 as 9:24, despite primary and secondary source information to the contrary.

NEADS staff again misread the MCC/T log  five days later under questioning by CONR and failed to accurately inform General Moore about the AA 77 notification as he was consulting with FAA, which knew the 9:24 time was not supportable.

NEADS staff, together with Col Scott, again misread the MCC/T log in preparation for the May 23, 2003 air defense hearing before the Commission.  It is then that an erroneous hijack time of 9:16 for UA93 was entered into the public record by NORAD.

9-11: NEADS tapes and logs; an update

This update provides additional information concerning NEADS primary source information, the NEADS tapes, and secondary source information, the NEADS logs.  Specifically it addresses the question of whether NORAD/CONR/NEADS reviewed relevant documents prior to the White House meeting on September 17, 2001 and the subsequent release of the NORAD timeline on September 18, 2001.  The answer is yes they did.

The Moore email and response

John Farmer in The Ground Truth wrote that “the Commission staff obtained the e-mail…sent late in the evening of September 16, 2001, from Brigadier General Doug Moore at CONR, under General Arnold’s command, to NEADS.”  That email exchange is available at the History Commons Scribd web site.

Moore was asking for additional clarification to pass to FAA to use “to brief the White House tomorrow.”  The night Director of Operations (DO) at NEADS, Clark Speicher, did the research and provided the answer.  At the time, Col Clark Speicher was the Deputy Commander, NEADS.  He reported directly to the NEADS Commander, Col Bob Marr.

AA 77 notification time to NEADS

Moore posed this question: “AA 77 1324Z, Which FAA organization passes notification of ‘a possible track heading to DC’?”  Clearly, CONR/NORAD wanted that pinned down.  Speicher responded, citing , in part, his research: “I have reviewed the crew MCC log book…The MCC log reveled (sic) the following:  “1st question: AA 77, 1342Z: (emphasis added) Boston FAA says another A/c is missing AA77 flight to LA lost unable to contact.”  However, my notes taken directly from the MCC/T log book reflect that the time was actually 13:34 (9:34), as recorded at NEADS.  Col Speicher and NEADS got the entry right, but not the time.

Further, the MCC/T log book never mentioned AA 77 at 9:24 and Speicher did not confirm to Moore a 9:24 entry concerning the tail number of AA 11 which NEADS originally conflated to be AA 77.  That original conflation is what Moore was now questioning.  He did not get a direct answer to his original question.

In the rush of the moment NEADS and CONR made two errors.  First, Col Speicher provided an incorrect time to Col Moore which appeared to simply transpose two digits.  Second, Col Moore was in contact with FAA and knew that they could not support a notification time of 9:24, as we have discussed in recent articles concerning AA 77.  Moore stayed with the original time of 9:24; he was not given a true reading  of the accurate 1334 (9:34) entry.  FAA apparently did not force the issue.

Additional information concerning the NEADS tapes

Col Speicher provided this additional information on the NEADS review.  First, he established that NEADS did review the tapes.  “…one of our MCC’s and I reviewed the audio tapes to answer your questions.”

Second, he detailed the difficulty and complexity of the tape review process.  “We spent six hours trying to retrieve data from the voice tapes but the system has 24 channels recording two postions each channel and four tapes total from the llth.”  He further elaborated: “the system is complex…it is rather cumbersome so analyzing the information is difficult to say the least.”

In the latter part of September, 2001, NEADS brought in a technician to try and transcribe the tapes.  It is his work that became the NEADS partial transcript provided to the Commission.  During his work one of the tapes was thought to be accidentally erased and his task was terminated and never completed.

Additional information about NORAD preparation for the May 2003 air defense hearing

A detailed radar review was accomplished by NORAD Headquarters to assist General McKinley, General Arnold, and, specifically, Col Scott in preparation for their May 23, 2003, testimony.  Graphics related to that review have been made available by NARA.

Two things are noteworthy.  First the FAA notification time for AA 77 continued to be 9:24.  Second, accurate paths for the Otis and Langley fighters were provided to Col Scott.  He blurred them as I wrote in a previous article.

My perspective

I told both Michael Bronner and Phil Shenon during interview that my personal estimate was that the NORAD Generals were victims of shoddy staff work.  That remains my perspective.  The Colonels let the Generals down.  The Generals did not put the Colonels ‘through the hoops,’ they trusted them to get it right.

9-11: SVTS; a cold war system, warmed over

This is one of a continuing series of articles about the linear management processes used by the government on 9-11.  I use the term ‘linear’ deliberately.  My overall construct for analysis is chaos theory.  Chaos is non-linear and my point about linear processes is that they were ill-suited to the task at hand.  SVTS, Secure Video Teleconference System, pronounced by many as ‘civ its’ is one such linear process.

Key Points

There are two key things to know about SVTS.  First, it was–and likely still is–a closed system.  It was immune to new information in real time.

Second, it was the management process of choice for Richard Clarke; he had others as we shall discuss.  Clarke wrote in Against All Enemies; “…I want the highest-level person in Washington from each agency on-screen now, especially FAA…”  ‘On-screen meant SVTS.

In fairness to Clarke, I can’t say that I or anyone else would have reacted differently at the time.  It was an available secure means of communication.

SVTS Background

I personally watched the establishment of the SVTS system.  One node was built in my office spaces in the 1987 time frame.  I watched the building of that closed system daily as each succeeding layer of security was added, layer, by layer, by layer…you get the idea.

I then operated that node for several years and was familiar with its inner workings.  I’m sure the workings have changed over the years, but my observation while on both the Joint Inquiry and 9-11 Commission staffs was that it was little changed by 2001.

Once inside a node participants had no access to their staff or to real-time information.  They were stuck with whatever staff they had brought with them and with the information they had brought to the table.  Moreover, the layers of security were such that if a door opened at any node the conference came to a screeching halt while the identity of the entering person was established.

The operating principle was one of cold war paranoia.  It was important that everyone at every node know exactly who was privy to the subject at hand.  It was also important that there be no separate electronic inputs and that the SVTS conference, itself, not be electronically exportable.

So, when Clarke then wrote in response to a Condi Rice question; “We’re putting together a secure teleconference to manage the crisis…I’d like to get the highest-ranking official from each department,” he effectively decapitated each agency at a critical time.

Commission staff notes from our interview with Commander Gardner at the NMCC are a good summary of the situation.  According to our notes; “re SVTS, we lost principals thruout day to SVTS, no runners to SVTS other than what Principals brought back.”  In comparison with the Air Threat Conference our notes have Gardner saying, “re ATCC & SVTS, They were competing venues for C&C [command and control] & decisonmaking (sic).”

Activation vs Convening a Conference

Once staffs were alerted to bring up a secure conference the activation process took time.  SVTS was not a 24-hour operation so the key in the ignition had to be turned, so to speak.  Staff woud then work to make sure everything was functioning and that all nodes were up on the line.  That was not instantaneous,  Concurrently the principals had to be summoned from wherever they were and logged in and accounted for.  My recall is that the whole process of bringing a conference on-line took a while, on the order of 15-30 minutes.

I have read Clarke’s description of the conference and my sense is that it conflates information.

The conference was activated at 9:25 and convened at 9:40.  Here is what the Commission Report says: “At the White House, the video teleconference was conducted from the Situation Room by Richard Clarke, a special assistant to the president long involved in counterterrorism. Logs indicate that it began at 9:25 and included the CIA; the FBI; the departments of State, Justice, and Defense; the FAA; and the White House shelter. The FAA and CIA joined at 9:40.”

That  means it took 25 minutes to bring the conference on line.  Clarke wrote, “Okay, Let’s start with the facts.  FAA, FAA, go.”  That keynote statement was made no earlier than 9:40, according to information available to the Commission Staff.

What else was available?

First, we have established that a NOIWON conference was convened at 9:20 which linked together the NMCC, the White House Situation Room and the FAA.  The problem was that the phones were manned primarily by analysts, no principals and, in the case of FAA, those analysts were on the third floor, seven floors below the FAA’s operation center.  I am also familiar with NOIWON and my estimate is that it was not suited for the operational need at hand.

Second, Clarke, himself, acknowledges that an Air Threat Conference had convened.  “On my way …[the] Situation Room deputy director, grabbed me. ‘We’re on the line with NORAD, on an air threat conference call.”  As we know, FAA was never effectively on that conference until well after 10:00.  It, too, was unsuited for the purpose at hand.

Third, the FAA activated its primary net at 9:20 and secondary source information shows that the NMCC link worked.  However, as the Commission Staff learned that link was still born; it was never used.

Retrospective Comments

With the clarity of hindsight we can conclude that the FAA’s primary net was a better vehicle for Clarke to use.  He apparently didn’t know about it and Jane Garvey apparently did not suggest it.

So, at 9:45 clock-time on 9-11, we can  link to other articles and categories and summarize what is happening.  Herndon Center has just ordered an airborne inventory and is accumulating information about possible wayward flights, to include UA 93 and AA 77.  Garvey reports to Clarke on AA 11 and UA 175, only.  She reports there are eleven other potential problems but she does not have the specificity that is rapidly being accumulated by Herndon because of the order for an air inventory.

Mineta, according to Clarke is not yet in the loop. “Jane, where’s Norm?”  Langley fighters are rapidly approaching the DC area and will be directly overhead by 10:00.  The President is en route Air Force One and will take off at 9:55 for the nation’s capital.

None of the real time information concerning the airborne inventory or the Langley fighters, or UA 93 and AA 77 is finding its way into the SVTS conference.  The only way to communicate with SVTS participants is, according to Commander Gardner, via runners, which they didn’t have.  So they waited for the principals to return with news.

On 9-11 a cold war-conceived closed system was immune to current information via electronics, semaphore, or smoke signals.  SVTS was a convenient venue to manage a crisis, it was not the right venue

Chaos Theory: 9-11; Ghostbusters, Herndon Center takes charge

Introduction

In separate articles we have established three things that now converge.  First, we established that Chaos Theory, metaphorically, can be used to analyze events on 9-11.  Second, we established that AA 77 approached the nation’s capital undetected and that FAA’s Eastern Region was chasing ghosts.  Third, we established that the battle commanders that day were Colonel Bob Marr at NEADS and Ben Sliney at Herndon Center and that they weren’t talking to each other.  In this article we begin to explore two things, the convergence of events and the convergence of my separate analytical threads.

Eastern Region, ZDC and IAD

In the immediate aftermath of the first tower strike Eastern Region established a teleconference and continued to try and figure out what happened in New York City.  That task became unmanageable when UA 175 struck the second tower.

Nevertheless, Eastern Region kept trying to establish a body of information concerning past events and was trying to determine what happened to the towers and to locate AA 11 and UA 175.  It was by no means established in the immediate aftermath of the impact of UA 175 what had in fact happened to either tower.  Individual FAA managers and controllers intuitively knew the fate of both planes but that was not a corporate understanding.

We will learn in a later article that Eastern Region had reached an erroneous estimate of the situation.  As they tried to give one update to FAA Headquarters, a traffic management officer at Herndon broke in and set the record straight.  That stark contrast between what Eastern Region knew and what Herndon Center knew will reveal  how conflicted FAA was in its management of the battle.  But that is a later story.

At this point in our research Eastern Region is reaching backward in time and is making skip-echelon calls to Centers, Towers and TRACONS to sort out what had already happened.  We have documented two of those calls, one to ZDC asking about AA 77 and another to IAD asking about UA 175.

Concurrent with that second call Herndon Center, taking a completely different tack, called all the air traffic control centers to pass on specific guidance to fight the tactical battle still ahead.  Herndon Center took that action at 9:30, effectively shoving aside Eastern Region.  Ben Sliney, on his first day at work in his new job was learning quickly and he made, in short order, two critical decisions.

First, at 9:25 he culminated a series of local ground stops by ordering that all traffic nationwide on the ground stay on the ground. Second, he ordered an inventory of all aircraft in the air; the subject of a 9:30 call by one of Sliney’s traffic managers that can be heard at this link. Ghostbusters Call Herdon to all Centers

Herndon Center and Managing Chaos

Chaos is deterministic; it is bounded randomness; it is self organizing.  In order to combat the chaos of the morning someone had to got a grip on the bounds; and that someone was Ben Sliney.  His two key actions, a ground stop and an airborne inventory, were belated but each singularly effective in damping down the chaotic nature of the double bifurcated attack.  His actions assured the attack would not further bifurcate, even though that was not in the terrorist attack plan.  But he did not know that.

The nationwide ground stop assured that no more problematic airliners would enter the National Air Space.  The airborne inventory gave specific actionable orders to all air traffic control centers to let Herdon know immediately of any problems.  Cleveland Center responded within seconds.

Cleveland Center

Immediately, Cleveland Center, ZOB, reported what it knew about UA 93.  That call can be heard at this link.  UA 93 First Reported to Herndon Center.

This call establishes the fact that FAA knew about UA 93 at some level above an air traffic control center soon after 9:30.  FAA also knew that AA 77 was lost but neither ZID  or ZDC had yet provided any specificity to Herndon Center.  They did not do so because they did not know where the plane was.

Readers will recall that in the original Transponders and Ghosts article we established that each transponder manipulation presented a different problem to air traffic control.  We will never know why Ziad Jarrah waited until well after the turn back to turn off UA 93’s transponder, except that it was a fourth variation on a theme.  Whatever the reason, ZOB was able to effectively follow and report on UA 93.

What is happening and what isn’t happening

The most obvious point is that only one of the battle commanders, Sliney, has actionable information.  No one has shared critical information with Colonel Marr at NEADS.  No one has recognized that Marr and Sliney needed to be in contact.  We do know that NEADS was able to effectively follow D 1989.  Demonstrably, we know that they would also have been able to follow UA 93, but they were never cued to do so.

Herndon Center has now exerted itself and will do so more forcefully as the minutes go by.  Specifically, it will set the record straight at FAA Headquarters.  Even so, that accurate information will not find its way to the NCA or to NEADS.

By 9:42, Jane Garvey will be the captive of an SVTS conference and will not know what air traffic controls knows or what air traffic control has passed to FAA Headquarters.  At the same time, Norman Mineta is en route the White House, a fact established by Richard Clarke who convened the SVTS.

As John Farmer wrote in The Ground Truth, “Thus, years later, Richard Clarke could still believe that his high-level videoconference had been the nerve center of the nation’s response; no one had done the thoroughgoing analysis that would have exposed the reality that national leadership was irrelevant during thos critical moments.”

9-11: UA 93; an air traffic control trilogy, part 2

Addendum, December 1, 2009.

Here is a Google Earth plot of the final radar returns from UA 93 as received at The Plains radar site and provided by 84th RADES.

UA93 Final Radar Returns
UA93 Final Radar Returns

The blue pins depict primary returns.  The green pin depicts the first recording of the transponder back on.  Green represents a reinforced return, radar and beacon (transponder).  The red pin depicts the second and final transponder return, beacon only.

This is the air traffic control story of UA 93, told in the primary source voices of the day, and we begin with part 2, the Herndon Command Center story.  The next two articles will tell the same story from the Cleveland Center (ZOB) perspective,  Part 1,   Then, in Part 3, we will the FAA’s Washington Operations Center story, as told to them by air traffic control.  There will be at least one additional article to tell the story after it leaves the domain of air traffic control.

First notice to Herndon

The story begins at 09:49 when Margaret at the Herndon Severe Weather position convenes a conference with Washington Center, ZDC, at the request of Cleveland and Chicago.  The purpose is to address the issue of the Attorney General’s return to Washington.  Cleveland breaks in to tell Chicago about Delta 1989.  That conversation is at this link. ZDC ZOB Herndon Chicago Teleconference

The conversation immediately continues and by 9:50 Cleveland Center has also put Washington Center on alert but about a different airplance, UA 93.  That continued conversation is at this link.  ZOB alerts ZDC about UA 93

After a short pause ZOB estimates a UA 93 arrival in 25 minutes to Dulles (approximately 9:16).  Concurrently, ZOB updates both Chicago and ZDC as to the status of both D 1989 and UA 93.  That continuation is at this link.  ZOB updates D 1989 and UA 93

Some researchers have speculated that FAA was treating one of the two aircraft but not the other as a hijack; that the two were somehow confused by air traffic control.  It is clear from the primary source information that the two situations were distinct and clearly separated by Cleveland Center in its reporting to adjacent centers and to Herndon.  There was no confusion within the system as to which was which.   The status of D 1989 was never conflated with UA 93 by FAA.

Conversation continues at 09:53

The situation continues as ZOB updates all participants on the status of both airplanes.  Margaret informs ZOB that Herndon knew about UA 93 but not about D 1989 and she will pass the word.  That update can be heard at this link.  ZOB Undates Participants at 0953

D 1989 apparently resolved

In a conversation at 9:56 Herndon determines that D 1989 is not a ‘trip,’ that he is fine and that he is going to Cleveland.  In this conversation we learn that the concern about D 1989 originated with Boston Center, ZBW.  That conversation can be heard at this link.  ZOB D 1989 Going to Clevelend

Real time updates on UA 93

By 9:58 ZOB enters a new flight plan for UA 93 to assist ZDC.  ZDC acknowledges and sees the airplane at their TMU desk.  ZOB is trying as best it can to associate tracking information with the data blocks.  They did not have an altitude.

The implication is that ZDC can see the plane on radar as long as it is flying and can track the flight plan on a TSD display.  The exchange of information between the TMU at ZOB and the TMUat ZDC can be heard at this link.  ZOB UA 93 new flight plan and alert to ZDC.  I should note here that when I observed the TSD playback of 9-11 at Herndon Center the icon for UA 93 visably jumped on the screen to its new location as determined by ZOB.

Shortly thereafter, in the 9:59 time frame,  ZOB did obtain altitude information on UA 93 from a VFR aircraft.  That information can be heard at this link.  ZOB reports altitude on UA 93 Whenever Ricky Bell at Severe Weather keeps the microphone open you can hear voices in the background.  We will cover that in Part 3 when we talk about Herndon continuously updating FAA Headquarters.

Next, ZOB provides altitude and heading information in real time to Herndon.  You can, again, hear voices in the background and you hear Ricky Bell repeating information as he hears it so that others at Herndon are aware.  This minute long conversation segment  begins approximately 10:00 and can be heard at this link.  ZOB provides location and heading for UA 93

From 10:01 to 10:02 the real time updates report erratic flying.  That near one minute conversation segment can be heard at this link.  ZOB reports erratic flying

UA 93 transponder back on

The UA 93 transponder did come back on, briefly for two sweeps just  before 10:03.  84th RADES radar lost coverage on the plane soon after 9:47, but reacquired the aircraft near the end of its flight.  Radar data from The Plains radar shows the transponder back on for just two radar returns.  Based on those two returns the aircraft dropped at a significant rate.  It was in extremis.  The last recorded RADES radar return is at 10:02:57 at 6100 feet altitude.  Location was 40 040 04N 78 55 02W.

ZOB describes the transponder event to Herndon as heard on this link.  ZOB Reports Transponder Back On.  The ZOB report is time consistent and altitude consistent with RADES radar.  ZOB reports an altitude of 8200 feet when the transponder came back on.  The RADES radar files show an altitude of 7800 feet at that time.

Here is a circa Summer 93 graphic I prepared concerning UA 93.  My complete set of UA 93 powerpoint slides has been uploaded to the History Commons Scribd site; I can’t find the link for now, and is available at this link.

UA 93 Final Radar Returns
UA 93 Final Radar Returns

UA 93 lost by ZOB

Just before 10:03 ZOB reports losing UA 93 on radar except for one primary return.  ZOB defers to ZDC as can be heard at this link.  ZOB losing UA 93 on radar

A few moments later Herndon reconnects with ZOB to ask about both UA 93 and D 1989.  Herndon learns that ZOB has lost UA 93; it was last headed toward Washington.  Herndon also learns at the same time that D 1989 is not a hijack.  That exchange can be heard at this link.  ZOB advises UA 93 lost D1989 not a hijack

And, to finish off part 2 of this trilogy, at 10:10 ZOB and Herndon have a concluding converstion that reaffirms that ZOB has lost UA 93 on radar and that D 1989 is not a hijack.  This conversation segment provides additional insight in how Herndon was operating and what it knew.  ZOB Herndon Discusses Both Planes

Observations in real time

First, at no time at the desk level, do air traffic control personnel speak to or even mention contacting the military.  That is to be expected, their job was to track and report.

Second, at no time did Herndon or ZOB conflate information concerning UA 93 and D 1989.  Both planes were monitored distinctly and separately and reported that way.  FAA up to the Herndon level had situation awareness in real time.  Researchers who argue differently are simply wrong.

Third, separately, ZOB is learning of the fate of UA 93 and we will discuss that in Part 1 of this trilogy.  For now, the embedded graphic provides useful data points.  Gofer 06 soon after turning north at ZOB direction reported shortly after 10:04 that the pilot saw smoke in the direction of UA 93.  The private jet, N20VF? on the graphic, was vectored by ZOB to the crash site.  The Falcon circled once and provided GPS coordinates around 10:14.

Finally, at the national level. Norman Mineta is arriving at the PEOC during the final moments of UA 93.  Subsequently he will receive information from Monte Belger about that aircraft, most likely as seen on a TSD display.  That track, terminating at Reagan National at 10:28 is a ghost and has been since shortly after 10:03.

That begs a question.  Given that Herndon had near real time information and was immediately passing that information to FAA Headquarters, how was that being passed, if at all, to the national level?  We will grapple with that in Part 3.  For now I would simply point out that the SVTS link was activated at 9:25 and Richard Clarke convened the conference soon after 9:40.  He wrote in Against All Enemies, “Okay, I began.  Let’s start with the facts.  FAA, FAA, go.”  Jane Garvey was at the FAA end.

What do we make of that?

I am separately publishing articles on the linear processes the government attempted to use that day.  So far I have spoken to NOIWON.  Once I get an Air Threat Conference article out I will then turn to SVTS.  Suffice it to say for now that, as I’ve elsewhere attributed to an NMCC staff officer, the SVTS process was counter-productive.

So, I will speak to SVTS, probably before I write Part 3 of this air traffic control trilogy concerning UA 93.

At some point, of course, we will ultimately need to address the Mineta story.