Author: Oredigger 61

9-11: NEADS; Exercise Vigilant Guardian, in perspective, Sep 3-6

Preamble (added Nov 30, 2010)

Here is a link to Vigilant Guardian information from NEADS as contained in the records of the 9-11 Commission.  This clarifies the hours of the exercise.  According to an included email from Col Marr, NEADS Commnder, “Exercise VIGILANT GUARDIAN N0 1-2 is a NORAD-sponsored Transition to Wartime Operation Command Post exercise that will be conducted in two phases: Crisis Action Team (CAT) Planning and 24/7 Operations.  CAT Planning will be conducted from 20-31 Aug 01, weekdays only and 1/2 day play TBD by NORAD. The Operational Phase will be conducted from 1400Z 6 Sept 01 to 0200Z 9 Sept 01 and the 24/7 Operational Phase will be conducted from 10 Sept to 13 Sept.

Introduction

I am working with NARA to obtain copies of the NEADS audio files as they were originally provided to the Commission.  In a first delivery, NARA provided DVD copies of the following three Commission documents, by accession number:  RDoD0312646, 1 of 2, NEADS GSA Box 110; RDoD03012647, 2 of 2, NEADS GSA Box 110; and RDoD04020857, NEADS Dictaphone remake DRM1, GSA Box 141.  The files are too massive for me to upload to RapidShare. I am looking for a work around to put the files in the public domain.

These three DVDs are not the files originally forwarded piecemeal to the Commission in the immediate aftermath of our first visit to NEADS and the resultant subpoena,  NARA is still looking for those files.  These files are .wav versions submitted to the Commission for the record.  Of interest to researchers and historians is the fact that these files go back to September 3, 2001 and help document Exercise Vigilant Guardian.

Each subfile on the DVDs is for a specific day.  For example, DVD 1 of 2 contains five subfolders for Sep 3 through Sep 7.  The subfolder for Sep 4, the first day of the exercise, is D20010904DRM3-20010903-234840_DRM003_1.ARC.  The first nine characters establish the date of the included files.

For each date there are two sub-folders.  One is an Access .mdb file which provides the start and end times for each .wav file.  The .wav files are conversation dependent and range in duration from a few seconds to more than 20 minutes.  Many of the short duration files are dial tones.

The second sub -folder for each day contains folders for 24 channels.  The Access file, printed out, will tell you which channels were recorded and which are empty.  Knowing that will save time; one need only open the folders containing data.  Once opened there is an additional single sub-folder which lists the .wav files by a sequence number (Zulu time) which can be correlated to the Access .mdb file.  The size of each .wav file is included; it doesn’t take long to figure out which files are substantive and which are not.

One last point.  It is near imperative to exploit the files using a program such as Adobe Audtion. Use of a media player will quickly lead to frustration.  I use Adobe Audition in order to quickly find conversations, identify dial tones, and, when necessary, amplify background conversations.

Here is Exercise Vigilant Guardian based on the audio files provided by NARA.  In this first article we start with the period Sep 3-6, 2001.

Exercise Vigilant Guardian

Vigilant Guardian was primarily a command post exercise controlled by a “sim cell” (simulation cell).  Non-NORAD entities such as FAA were portrayed by the exercise controllers.  The exercise was separate and distinct from the real world.  Here are the highlights of the first days, Sep 4-6, 2001.  As with every exercise in my experience, both field and command post, the pace starts slowly.

Monday, Sep 3, 2001.

Although an audio file was provided it appears to be a placeholder only.

Tuesday, Sep 4, 2001.

It is uncertain that the exercise itself started on this day.  The day’s activity consisted of “evals,” evaluations for three controller teams.  The scenario was defensive counter-air featuring blue on red forces operating over established training ranges, in this case Falcon Axe.  The fighters were Burlington-based, Jaws call sign vs Grunge call sign.  Each evaluation lasted 30-45 minutes the first beginning around 1pm (probably Zulu time, in context).  The next two were at about 4:45 and 7:20.

Of interest, the first team was lead by Major Fox who would be the Senior Director on duty the morning of Sep 11, 2001.  Demonstrably, Fox was the best of the three, his competence and confidence come through loud and clear.  Here are some audio segments which highlight the days activity.

Fox’s voice identified. In the following clip we clearly hear the voice of Major Fox; those familiar with the NEADS tapes will recognize him immediately.  In an earlier floor conversation he did identify himself by name.  Here he gives a succinct description of the mission in which he places the opposing fighters (Grunge) as the DCA [defensive counter-air] force.  0904122350 Fox describes DCA

Fox puts Vigilant Guardian in contest. In the following clip Major Fox distinguishes “VG” (Vigilant Guardian) from the evaluations and establishes that the time is before 10:00 local.  0904122918 Fox Vigilant Guardian Perspective

Fox’s fighters, Jaws, declare “Miller Time.” In this clip Major Fox is heard directing a successful attack.  0904131130 Miller Time and Success

The entire engagement directed by Fox is in the audio files, primarily sequence number 130713.  Later files describe the second two evolutions of the day, similar to the engagement directed by Fox.  A better description of the defensive counter-air mission is included in sequence number 161531.  0904162726 Mission Described The language is cryptic and mission-specific.  Readers familiar with the language of air defense training will appreciate the insight into NEADS operations.

There was no other activity recorded on Sep 4, 2001; the day was devoted to controller evaluations at NEADS.

September 5, 2001

There was little, if any, discernible exercise activity.  There was one additional combat air engagement, similar to the three events on September 4.  That additional event does provide specific examples of how air-air combat exercises were started and terminated.  In this case HUNTRESS was controlling a flight with call sign Mad Dog.

The battle begins  0905191547 Fights On, and ends  0905193437 Knock it off.  HUNTRESS ended its control by handing the Mad Dog flight off to GiantKiller.  09055193822 Contact GiantKiller.  I have discussed GiantKiller in other articles.  It is the military (Navy) control center for designated military training areas.  It is located in Virginia Beach, VA., and operates using FAA procedures.  GiantKiller would have handed the flight off to the appropriate FAA Center for the return flight to base.

The only other notable activity in the audio files is the HUNTRESS ID section validating and verifying the “modes and codes” with several military planes, a procedural test possibly part of the exercise.  Here is one example.  0905155326 Swordfish Mode Check

September 6, 2001

The day started slowly but picked up pace in the evening. Here are selected  audio clips of interest.

First is a clip of a late afternoon simulated scramble of two fighters, HOPS 71 and 72 from Langley.  The scramble call is made to the simulation cell.  0906174716 Simulated Scramble Langley

Second is an evening call to the simulation cell which clearly shows that the exercise equipment was separate from real world and that the controllers did not want all the exercise equipment to be functional.  0906182747 Exercise Equipment Separate

Third is a background announcement shortly after 8pm announcing that exercise hours would be 1000-2200 hours each day, including weekends, until 24-hour manning was required.  I amplified the conversation and suppressed some of the clicks for clarity.  0906200336 Exercise Hours

Fourth is a conversation concerning a special track on a Aeroflot flight, JFK to Moscow.  0906201638 Aeroflot flight special track

Fifth is an extended discussion with the simulation cell about the hours of the exercise and a planned expansion.  (The expansion will be one of coverage, NEADS will assume control for WADS (Western Air Defense Sector) while they do a planned evacuation.  More on that later.)  0906201733 Expansion

Sixth is clear evidence that the simulation cell was simulating all outside agencies, in this case Giantkiller and FAA’s Washington Center.  The issue is a C-130 that is squawking 7700.  Listen as the exercise team discusses the situation.  Note that Huntress ID goes down a check list and asks the key question, “requesting any assistance?”  0906202145 C130 squawking 7700

That is an important point. The hijack procedures in place on Sep 11, 2001, required an FAA request for assistance.  The only hijacked plane on 9-11 for which NEADS assistance was requested was AA 11; the request came from Boston Center.

Seventh is an admission by the simulation cell that they started an exercise inject one hour early.  NEADS, therefore, initiated a “Jersey Scramble” early.  The Commission records obtained from Atlantic City define the Jersey Scramble as the standard lanuch of Atlantic City fighters, 090 for 90 (head East for 90 nautical miles).  Note the similarity to the standard launch from Langley, 090 for 60, which is the heading, direction and distance the Langley fighters went on the first leg of their flight to the nation’s capital on 9-11.  This Jersey Scramble, if properly in sequence, most likely pertained to the C-130.  0906203024 Sim Cell started inject early

Eighth is a “May Day” call from the simulated C-130 in distress, Cargo 45.  0906203853 Cargo 45 May Day

To be continued, Sep 7, 2001 is next.

Chaos Theory: the butterfly effect; a ghostly experience

We will explain to you the nature of birds, the birth of the gods,

The genealogy of the rivers, the origin of Erebus and Chaos…

In the beginning there existed only Chaos…

(Aristophanes, Chorus, to you men down there)

It is time to take a closer look at Chaos Theory itself and to add substance to my early articles.  And we begin with the butterfly metaphor.

Modern Literature

Ian Stewart in Does God Play Dice? The Mathematics of Chaos, described the butterfly effect this way: “The flapping of a single butterfly’s wing today produces a tiny change in the state of the atmosphere. Over a period of time, what the atmosphere actually does diverges from what it would have done. So, in a month’s time, a tornado that would have devastated the Indonesian coast doesn’t happen. Or maybe one that wasn’t going to happen, does.”

James Gleick who made chaos a bestseller topic in Chaos, Making a New Science, began an article he wrote in 2008 this way: “Can a butterfly stirring the air in Beijing today transform storms in New York next month?”

The website “whatis.techtarget.com” credited the meteorologist Edward Lorenz with the first use of the metaphor.   “The butterfly effect , first described by Lorenz at the December 1972 meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Washington, D.C., vividly illustrates the essential idea of chaos theory. In a 1963 paper for the New York Academy of Sciences, Lorenz had quoted an unnamed meteorologist’s assertion that, if chaos theory were true, a single flap of a single seagull’s wings would be enough to change the course of all future weather systems on the earth.”

Arthur Fisher, writing in MOSAIC, Jan-Feb 1985, in an article “Chaos: The Ultimate Asymmetry,” informed us differently about the genesis of the butterfly as a metaphor.  His attribution was to Ray Bradbury who in “A Sound of Thunder,” a short story first published in Collier’s in 1952, described time travelers going back 60 million years.  They were admonished to “stay on the path.”  One traveler stepped off the path and “inadvertently tramples a butterfly.”  When the travelers return to the year 2055 the “world is unutterably and irrevocably altered.”

The essential point in modern literature is that initial conditions define the future and that those initial conditions cannot be predicted.  However, the Chinese long ago extended the notion of initial conditions to be a vision of cosmology and the human condition.

Early Taoism

N. J. Girardot, Myth and Meaning in Early Taoism: The Theme of Chaos (hun-tun,) Berkeley, 1983, addressed an earlier genesis for the butterfly metaphor in chaos.  “The “meaning” of hun-tun as the mythological and metaphysical principle of chaos embraces…the fundamental question of the meaning of meaning.”  “Chaos…is not ultimately a negative concept but rather a vision concerning the true order of cosmic and human life.”  “As the true meaning of the inner life-order of nature and man, hun-tun is a condition that is not outside…[the] ‘Butterfly Way’ of the universe.  The Chinese word and symbol for ‘butterfly’  (hu)…connotes…the mythological story of that gloriously free creature of air, pollen and nectar…that issues forth from the great ‘transformation of things’…”

Girardot further elaborated in a whimsical reference to Lewis Carroll.    “…a hun-tun myth of primordial chaos was certainly present in China…and is a key technical term in all of the early texts.  The word “hun-tun” in its Taoist use is, above all, an excellent example of what Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty called a “portmanteau” word—that is, a word “packed up” with several meanings.  And that leads us to 9-11.

9-11 A Day of Meanings

Glass and Mackey in From Clocks to Chaos, The Rhythms of Life, provide the following explanation useful to our understanding of the chaos of 9-11 as described differently by eye witnesses, participants, researchers, writers and historians.  All use the word chaos; none define it.

“Although ‘chaos’ is often used as a popular synonym for noise, it has developed a technical meaning that is quite different.  Technically, chaos refers to randomness or irregularity that arises in a deterministic system…An important aspect of chaos is that there is a sensitive dependence of the dynamics to the initial conditions.”

The National Airspace System (NAS) was attacked on September 11, 2001.  The NAS was, and is, a deterministic system, operated by the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Air Traffic Control System Command Center (Herndon Center).  The system is calibrated to guide thousands of commercial, private, and military aircraft through the nation’s skies from takeoff to landing as determined by flight plans entered into the system.

The NAS is subject to randomness or irregularity on a frequent basis due primarily to weather, the flap of a butterfly’s wings, but also to any other irregularity that may arise, to include airplanes out of communication (NORDO), not transponding the right code, or off course.  The NAS knew how to manage such events; one key position at Herndon Center was “Severe Weather.”

Procedures were in place to handle hijackings, something the NAS had not experienced in a decade.  Nevertheless, the old paradigm was known to all controllers, comply with hijacker demands and guide the hijacked plane safely to a demanded destination.  That might include military escort but at a distance and unknown to the cockpit.

That “sensitive dependence of the dynamics to the initial conditions” set the stage for everything that would follow.  That dependence was predicated on the understanding that a hijacking would be a singular, non-suicide event.  Mohammed Atta changed the paradigm when he announced “we have some planes.”

Chaos ensued, not in the attack but in the government’s awareness of the attack.  The higher the echelon the more chaos prevailed, to the point that the Secretary of Transportation and the National Command Authority were chasing ghosts, butterflies if you will.

9-11: The national level; descent into Chaos, a look ahead

Ted Koppel

Today’s (Sep 12, 2010) Washington Post featured an above-the-fold editorial in the “Outlook” section by Ted Koppel; “Let’s stop playing into bin Laden’s hands.”  At the end of the continuation, “Our overreaction to 9/11 continues,” Koppel posed a rhetorical question.  “Could bin Laden in his wildest imaginings, have hoped to provoke greater chaos?”

Readers will pardon me from leaping ahead of my own story; that question by Koppel is too good to resist.  (Koppel, as does nearly every other writer, researcher, and historian, uses the word “chaos” without definition.)

I need to speak to his use of the term in the context of his article, my own understanding of chaos, and my understanding of political revolutionary warfare.

As I am writing David Gregory on “Meet the Press,” (Sep 12, 2010) is discussing the Koppel article with Rudy Giuliani.  Gregory quotes Koppel extensively including the text: “Through the initial spending of a few hundred thousand dollars, training and then sacrificing 19 of his foot soldiers, bin Laden has watched [al Qaeda] turn into the most recognized international franchise since McDonald’s.”

My initial intent

It was, and remains, my intention to write a series of articles detailing the national level’s descent into chaos the morning of 9-11.  I have posted an initial article depicting the friendly situation at 10:10, the time that Air Force One turned away from a return to the capital.

A paradigm shift

Koppel’s narrative is a game changer.  He extends the chaos metaphor far beyond the events of 9-11 by stating that we have “played into bin Laden’s hands.”  And that leads me to the subject of political revolutionary warfare.

My experience

For six years (1974-1980) I was the lead instructor and course manager for the Navy’s Counterinsurgency Orientation (COIN) course at the Naval Amphibious School, Coronado.  During those six years we changed the focus of the course to revolutionary warfare.  The course name changed as well to become a political revolutionary warfare seminar, “Political Warfare Studies.”

We developed a detailed framework to analyze revolutionary and political movements.  I will write about that framework in the future.  For those interested, I did address the framework in this thread on the Small Wars Council forum.

For now it is sufficient to simply state two things that are inherent in any qualitative revolutionary movement.

First, the goal of any revolutionary movement that knows what it is doing is to give the opposition every opportunity to believe in the myth of a military victory.

Second, in the words of Dr. Tom Grassey, Capt (USN-retired), one of our lecturers, an objective of revolutionaries is to encourage the status quo to “strangle in its own strength.”  (Tom Grassey is the former James B. Stockdale Professor of Leadership and Ethics, Naval War College; and former Editor, Naval War College Review.)

Today, Ted Koppel said, “The goal of any organized terrorist attack is to goad a vastly more powerful enemy into an excessive response.”  He  is saying the same thing that Grassey articulated a quarter century ago.

Have we learned nothing?  I will have much, much more to say.

9-11 Education: a 2010 update

On September 10, 2010, the Christian Science Monitor published a pertinent article: “September 11 in schools: How teachers are helping students understand.”  The Monitor reports that: “a coalition of 9/11 organizations has created age-appropriate lesson plans in subjects ranging from art to social studies. They’re available online at www.911dayofservice.org. More than 6,500 teachers have downloaded the plans so far.”

The lesson plans at the “daysofservice” link are available at the elementary, middle school, and high school levels.

It is comforting to see a fact-based approach to 9-11 education, one suitable for all ages.

9-11: NSA; setting the record straight

Introduction

Today, Sep 10, 2010, my Google alerts surfaced a post by Phil Shenon in “The Daily Beast” titled, “The Secret Files 9/11 Investigators Missed.”  Here Shenon extends an argument he first made in his book The Commission, the uncensored history of the 9/11 investigation. His reference is to the National Security Agency (NSA).

I was interviewed by Shenon, I don’t recall us discussing  the subject of his “secret files,” the NSA.  Retrospectively, I wish we had shared more fully his NSA agenda; I could have put this issue in perspective for him and for his reading public.

The Congressional Joint Inquiry

Shenon doesn’t mention the fact that the Joint Inquiry staff had a team dedicated to NSA; it lived and worked at NSA headquarters during the course of the Inquiry.  That team thoroughly explored the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) holdings concerning the reporting leading up to the events of 9-11.

The Staff Director, Eleanor Hill, discussed the SIGINT issue fully in her final report.  As reported by Hill and by the 9-11 Commission, the only three individuals linked to the events of 9-11 in the SIGINT reporting were Khalid al-Midhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi, and Salem al-Hazmi.

The NSA provided a “SIGINT Retrospective” and an “Addendum” to the Inquiry Staff.  Those document resides in the paper files of the Congressional Joint Inquiry.  The Retrospective and Addendum included every relevant SIGINT report published and unpublished, unilateral and third-party, concerning the intelligence leading up to the attacks.

I, personally, spent hours sifting through the Retrospective.  I was not directly involved in the writing of the final report and had time to do a thorough analysis of the SIGINT reporting.

I created a work paper that included the text from every one of the SIGINT messages, some three dozen or so, in total.  I then integrated in time sequence all information concerning what the government knew, what government actions had been taken, and what was known about the activities of the 19 hijackers, apart from the SIGINT information.  That work paper resides in the Inquiry files in three variations.  I printed out iterative paper copies.  There are companion electronic files to the paper copies.  I copied all my substantive work files, including my work on the Retrospective, to compact discs.

The Commission

One task of the Commission was to build on the work of the Congressional Joint Inquiry.  In addition to NSA the Joint Inquiry had teams dedicated to and working at CIA and the FBI.  My team, the Other Agency Team, had offices at DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) and at NIMA (National Imagery and Mapping Agency).

The Commission knew about and did build upon the prior work of the Joint Inquiry.

Updating Shenon

In his blog Shenon wrote: the Commission “failed to conduct a thorough inspection of the government’s most important library of raw intelligence on al Qaeda and the 9/11 plot.  And nobody appears to have inspected that intelligence since.”  And, “There is no sign that anyone from Capitol Hill or elsewhere in the government has attempted to get back into the NSA to review its pre-9/11 terrorism archives…”

Capitol Hill did thoroughly investigate and review the pre-9/11 terrorism archives of the NSA.  That information was shared with the Commission.  I personally examined the SIGINT holdings in detail and archived that work.

The 9-11 Compendium

All researchers and historians know–and Shenon knows this–that the public body of investigative knowledge about 9-11 includes the Commission Report, the Joint Inquiry Report, the records of hearings by both entities, the multiple staff statements by both Staff Directors, and, in the case of the Commission, the separately published monographs.  It also includes the Commission’s referral to the Inspectors General of the Department of Transportation and the Department of Defense and the formal reports by both.

To focus on a single component of that body of knowledge and extrapolate a narrow conclusion is misleading, incomplete, and counter-productive to the public’s understanding of the events of the day.

Chatted with Phil Shenon

This morning, I sent a quick email to the “Daily Beast” for forwarding to Shenon.  He called me as I was finishing up this article.  He is aware I am posting this article and he raised the issue of Iran.

I reviewed the Commission Report (the search engine link is invaluable) and Shenon’s treatment of the issue.  My recall of the SIGINT files and the additional work of the Inquiry NSA team is that this issue has been substantively addressed; there is no smoking gun.

9-11: The National Level; descent into chaos, disposition of friendly forces

Introduction

This article is the first in a series.  It sets the stage for a discussion of the national level’s descent into chaos as it pursued a plane which no longer existed, UA 93.  I will show that, threat aircraft aside, real or imagined, the national level had little situation awareness of friendly forces.

National Level

I define the national level as the National Command Authority; the Vice President; relevant Departments of government, specifically Defense and Transportation (including the FAA); and certain supporting organizations, specifically the National Military Command Center and the White House Situation Room.

The national level did not start getting organized until 9:20–I will speak to that in a later article-and never gained situational awareness of the threat during the terrorist attack.  What is little understood is that decision makers and their supporting staff apparently had little awareness of the friendly situation.

The Decision

The decision at hand was whether or not to allow Air Force One to continue north and return the President to the nation’s capital.  The collective wisdom dictated that the President not return, that he seek safe haven to the west, ultimately Omaha, Nebraska, with a short stop in Louisiana.

The danger was knowledge of another hijacked aircraft (UA 93) and a vague, false threat to Air Force One.  Yet, there were adequate friendly forces available to support the President’s return.

Friendly Force Disposition

At 10:10 EDT, the moment Air Force One turned west just south of Ocala, Florida, there were at least six fighters in the air that could have provided protection or escort, and there was an E4B, Venus 77, that had been positioned south of Washington D.C. specifically to support Air Force One.

Friendly Forces 10:10 EDT, September 11, 2001

Three Langley air defense fighters, two fully armed, had established a combat air patrol over the nation’s capital at 10:00.  Three Andrews fighters had just been recalled from scheduled training over Dare range in North Carolina.  One, Bully 2, was already en route home base, the other two were just beginning the flight north.

Other military aircraft, Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine, were active in Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia.  Here is a powerpoint screen print of the Mode 2 (military) tracks during the period 10:00-10:30, as contained in the 84th RADES radar files from the Southeast Air Defense Sector.

Military Air Activity (view as slide show for better clarity)

Although the Andrews fighters had training ammunition only, they did have tanker support and could have escorted Air Force One until the Langley fighters, also supported by tankers, could take over.

Retrospectively, it is clear that the National Military Command Center and, by extension, the White House Situation Room, was not able to accurately advise the National Command Authority concerning either the enemy or the friendly situation.  That was more than a failure of imagination it was a failure of execution.

9-11: Chaos Theory; Unbuilding the World Trade Center, dealing with Chaos

I just finished reading American Ground, Unbuilding the World Trade Center, by William Langewiesche, paperback version with afterword.  The author copyrighted his research in 2002 and the paperback version was published in 2003.

I did not work on the World Trade Center story while on the Commission and, therefore, have not written much about it.  However, Langewiesche touches on an issue important to me, Chaos Theory, and I need to address it.

Chaos Theory

Langewiesche, as do nearly all writers, researchers and historians, uses the word “chaos” ubiquitously and without definition.  The word is used as an accepted descriptor, understood by all.

In earlier articles I have established my use of Chaos Theory to understand and put in context the events of 9-11.  In particular, I have established that we can use Chaos Theory as a metaphor and that we can use its language to describe things.

One such description is the fact that in Chaos things self organize in ways that cannot be predicted and strange attractors emerge because information flows to entities or people around which things can reorganize.

Langewiesche describes such a set of circumstances concerning the “unbuilding” of the World Trade Center, one in which an unlikely entity and actors emerged and around  whom things organized to deal with what the author, time and again, refers to as chaos.

[page 9] “The agency charged with managing the physical work was an unlikely one.  It was the Department of Design and Construction (DDC), an obscure bureaucracy…whose offices were not even in Manhattan but in Queens.  The DDC was given the lead for the simple reason that its two top officials, a man named Kenneth Holden and his Lieutenant, Michael Burton, had emerged from the chaos of September 11 as the most effective of the responders.”

And later, [page 11] “Their success in the midst of chaos was an odd twist in the story of these monolithic buildings that in the final stretch of the twentieth century had stood so visibly for the totalitarian ideals of planning and control.”  But the buildings were not buildings anymore, and the place where they fell had become a blank slate for the United States.  Among the ruins now, an unscripted experiment in American life had gotten under way.”

And finally, a description of the task [page 12]: “The weight alone defied imagination.  What does a chaos of 1.5 million tons really mean?”  Thereafter, the author will refer to the debris pile, itself, as “chaos.”

But how good is Langewiesche as a contemporary historian?  The author provides us the answer.  He took the time to describe the flights of AA 11 and UA 175 in a way that allows us to gage his research.

Primary source information, accurately reported

Beginning on page 75 and in seven succinct pages, Langewiesche, accurately told the primary source story of AA 11 and UA 175 using transcripts of the audio files from air traffic control and from American Airlines.  His account is flawless, based on my own understanding and my own work with the air traffic control tapes.  Using that benchmark to establish Langewiesche’s due diligence as an historian and writer, we can reasonably accept the rest of his work, specifically the following:

1.  Beginning on page 54 Langewiesche described the deaths of, first, the South Tower, and then the North Tower as a specific result of the impacts of UA 175 and AA 11.  “One of the many astonishments of that day was that the building [South Tower] was able to swallow an entire 767 and slow it from 590 MPH to a stop in merely 209 feet.”  “…the building would have remained standing indefinitely.  But then, of course, there was the fire…”

2.  “On the debris pile in the northeast corner the fire melted the remnants of the shattered airliner, which half an hour after entering the building began to flow in a stream of molten aluminum down the tower outside.”

3.  With its support giving way beneath it the top of the [South] tower tilted  east and then south., rotating in a clockwise direction, and suddenly slammed down.” “…it was not felled from below, it was hammered from above and it accelerated as it fell crushing the core and peeling back the exoskeleton with each successive floor.”

4.  [North Tower] “…the 351-foot transmission tower on the roof sank a little…Half a second later the floors above the impact zone dropped as a unit straight down through the office fire, creating a flare-up and the illusion of a secondary explosion before striking the first blow in the chain of blows that pancaked the monolith to the ground.”

5. The words of one of the last persons found alive, one who survived the fall of the North Tower, Pasquale Buzzelli.  “Buzzelli felt the building rumble, and immediately afterward heard a tremendous pounding coming at him from above, as one after another  the upper floors collapsed in sequence.  Buzzelli’s memory of it afterwards was distinct.  The pounding was rhythmic, and it intensified fast, as if a monstrous boulder were bounding down the stairwell toward his head.”

Based on Langewiesche’s demonstrated due diligence in research and reporting I am confident that the conflagrations–the office fires–brought the towers down, that the molten metal “flowing out” was aluminum, and that the speculation by a few about controlled demolition is simply false.

Langewiesche’s work was criticized, but that criticism had nothing to do with his technical descriptions of the flights, their impact, the fires, or the collapse of the towers.  It had to do with his treatment of the stakeholders, primarily the New York Fire Department, in the demolition effort.  In the afterword to his paper back edition, Langewiesche showed his established due diligence by acknowledging and addressing the criticism of his original book.

9-11: Rules of Engagement; expanding on the Commission’s Report

Author’s note.  The audio clips in this article, with one exception, have been copied from the NEADS file, DRM 2 1 DAT 1 Channel 20 SD2.  I have run the clips through a noise suppression filter using Adobe Audition.

Introduction

This article is one of the primary reasons I established my web site.  I wanted to continue the work begun by the Commission, relying on the primary sources and secondary material of the day.  One such primary source is the NEADS audio files.

The NEADS files are difficult to listen to and even more difficult to transcribe.  The Commission-contracted effort with Alderson to transcribe the NEADs tapes is indicative of how difficult the transcription process was, and is.  Alderson attempted to provide continuity by concentrating on specific voices.  Captain Brian Nagel, the Senior Director 2, is male speaker 13, for example.  Their transcription effort for the Senior Director 2 position is available.

Background

The Commission [pp 42-43] reported that “The NEADS commander [Colonel Marr] told us he did not pass along the [shoot-down] order because he was unaware of its ramifications.  Both the mission commander [Major Nasypany] and the senior weapons director [Major Fox] indicated they did not pass the order to the fighters circling Washington and New York because they were unsure how the pilots would, or should proceed with this guidance.  In short, while leaders in Washington believed that the fighters above them had been instructed to “take out” hostile aircraft, the only orders actually conveyed to the pilots were to “ID type and tail.”

That set of circumstances pertained to the initial order that NEADS received over a chat network passed from the Region Commander [General Arnold] with explicit reference to the Vice President.  According to the Commission Report: “Okay? Okay, you read that the Vice President, right?  Vice President has cleared.  Vice President has cleared us to intercept traffic and shoot the down if they do not respond per [General Arnold].”

At the time, circa 10:31, the “DO [Director of Operations] [said] no.”  That would later change, as we shall hear as we examine the continued NEADS effort to generate fighters from bases in the Mid-West.  The position of interest on the NEADS floor is the SD2 [Senior Director 2] position manned by Captain Brian Nagel.

Nagel’s chain of command was Nasypany to Marr.  His situational awareness was that Cleveland Center (ZOB) would evacuate and that there may still be unknown hostile aircraft in the sky.  His guidance became to protect major cities.

New Directions Coming Down

Captain Nagel time-stamped this primary source information for us.  He exchanged information with Cobra 1, the lead of a flight of two fighters out of Syracuse.  Cobra 1 told him his “play time” (time available in the air).  The Cobra flight was awaiting directions while in a holding pattern in Misty Thunder, a training area over Lake Ontario.

Nagel glanced at a clock or watch and verbalized the time as 1453 [10:53, actual tape stamp time is circa 10:55].  Cobra 1 informed Nagel that he and a second Syracuse pair of fighters (Apex) had hot guns only.  Nagel acknowledged that and informed Cobra 1 that there was new direction coming down and that he would brief him once he got the word.  That exchange can be heard here.  1453 New Directions Coming Down

Nagel briefs Cobra 1

Ten minutes later (circa 11:03 EDT) Nagel briefed Cobra 1. The new guidance coming down from above, “as in Presidential,” was to protect the major centers.  Nagel told Cobra 1 he would direct them to Pittsburgh once he arranged for tanker support.  He told Cobra 1, “there is clearance to kill, if required,” and that he would provide a further brief but had to “confirm the details on that.”  All subsequent clips in this article are a continuation and the first clip, the brief, can be heard here.  1503 Protect Major Cities

Cobra 1 responds

Cobra 1 advised that the previous transmission from Nagel was interfered with by Guard (emergency frequency) and he needed a repeat.  Nagel again told him the mission and advised that Cleveland Center was evacuated and that Cobra [and Apex] would be on “auto ops.”  He also made reference to the earlier report that one aircraft [UA 93] reported a bomb threat.  1504 ROE shortly

Nagel asks the MCC for clarification

Nagel asked for the “kill direction,” what to tell “these guys.”  He was just going to give them a brief, wasn’t going to tell them to do anything.  The MCC’s response was blocked by a concurrent transmission by Cobra 1.  150430 MCC When Able

Nagel again asks for clarification

Nagel briefed the MCC on what he was doing with the Syracuse fighters.  The MCC’s response can poorly be made out; he was speaking to lack of response [by a potential target] and divert procedures.  Nagel responded, “Wilco.”  1505 Wilco

Nagel briefs Cobra 1

Nagel told Cobra 1: “direction is…protect the major centers, when you are overhead the major center, it will be Pittsburgh in this case, you have intercept authority on any traffic in the area, if the traffic does not respond to hand signals, divert procedures, anything like that and they continue to press in a threatening manner towards the major center you are cleared to engage.”  Cobra 1, “copies.”  1506 Cobra Copies

Perspective

In the 10:50-11:00 time frame, after the battle of 9-11 was over, the nation began the transition to Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), protect the major centers, a labor-intensive, around-the-clock, resource-draining effort.  The exchange between Captain Nagel and Cobra 1 provides specific primary-source information that new guidance, Presidential guidance, had been issued and had reached the cockpit level.

At the same time, the NEADS sector floor, at the MCC position, became aware of the nation’s transition to DEFCON 3. That acknowledgment can be heard at this clip from DRM 1 DAT2 Channel 5 ID TK.  1505 DEFCON 3

It is an open question as to when ONE began.  In an earlier article I suggested that it began the moment the third Andrews fighter, Quit 27, lifted off; the first expansion of the established air defense mission.  It is also reasonable to establish that ONE began concurrent with the nation’s transition to DEFCON 3 and the new mission to protect the major centers, as we heard in the audio clips from the NEADS floor.

I leave it to the Air Force historians to set the time line for ONE; I am comfortable with either of the two times I have suggested.

9-11: exercises; Cheyenne Mt call to NEADS, routine admin request

Background

Previously, I have written about the inadequacy of the Alderson transcription of NEADS audio files.  I recommend that researchers and historians use the transcripts in conjunction with the audio files and, if appropriate, the radar files.  In other words, rely on primary source information.  The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how an apparent dramatic call, out of context, from Cheyenne Mountain to NEADS, turns out to be a simple administrative action, not apparent from a simple reading of the Alderson transcript.

Introduction

The relevant conversation is contained in NEADS audio file DRM2, DAT1, Channel 20, SD2 position.  The audio file was recorded at the position of Captain Brian Nagel.  He was dealing with track B089 (D 1989); the track that NORAD in the aftermath will conflate with concurrent information received about UA 93.

Nagel was busy trying to generate fighter assets from anywhere he could get them; Syracuse, Selfridge, Alpina, Springfield, and Toledo are mentioned.  Approximately 10:12, Nagel received a call from Captain Taylor, Cheyenne Mountain tech control.  Taylor asked that exercise inputs coming into Cheyenne Mountain be terminated.

Nagel, busy with real world activity, simply gave Taylor and administrative number to call.  The call, 101200 Cheyenne Mt Call, lasted just 15 seconds.  Nagel effeciently and effectively handled the call; it had no impact on his work.  In fact exercise activity is never mentioned during Nagel’s work to generate additional fighter resources.

A listen to Nagel’s work will serve researches and historians well as they strive to put together the pieces of the NEADS story.  Nagel’s position was “SD2,” Senior Director 2.  He worked directly for the Senior Director, Major Fox.

9-11: UA93; impact time, seismic data considered

Introduction

I recently obtained some of the seismic data concerning UA 93 and that provides an opportunity to discuss an old issue about 9-11, the impact time..

Readers may recall that there was at one time some speculation that a study based on the seismic data suggested that UA 93 impacted at 10:06, three minutes later than all available primary source information indicated.  The Commission Staff treated that speculation seriously and ran the issue to ground. 

This article is the story of the data and of how the Staff dealt with one of the 9-11 family questions.

Data Source

The Incorporated Research Institution for Seismology (IRIS) has protocols for assisting educators, researchers, students, committees, and the public.  The link provided is to the protocol for researchers.  I found the IRIS staff helpful in obtaining the information available.

To run the data I used GEE, Global Earthquake Explorer, and an IRIS-provided link to AmaSeis. (Amateur Seismometer).  Readers with seismology experience will find additional programs available from IRIS at the same link.

My point of contact provided me the files I actually used.  He obtained them by submitting a Seismic Query to determine what data were available.  He then submitted a request via email using BREQ-FAST.  Finally, he converted the files to .SAC format via rdseed.

The Data

An undated report, “Seismic Observations during September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attack,” concluded: “we infer that the Flight 93 crashed around  14:06:05 +/- 5 (UTC).”  The primary author, Won-Young Kim considered data from four seismographic stations.  From closest to Shanksville to the furtherest, the sites were: Mont Chateau, (MCWV); Standing Stone, (SSPA); Soldier’s Delight, (SDMD); and Millersville, (MVL)PA.

In his vertical component assessment, Kim initially considered all four seismic stations.  He assessed that the signal to noise ratio was too small for both the closest site (MCWV) and SDMD, on the order of 1:1.  Therefore, he reduced his analysis to the Standing Stone station where the ratio was 2.5:1.  He also established that the ratio at the most distance site, Millersville, was about 2:1.

Kim based his analysis on the Standing Stone station only, ignoring the fact that the data from the closest station was inconclusive.  Further he extrapolated only two minutes of data beginning with an estimated origin time of “14:06:05 (10:06:05)”  We have no evidence that Kim examined earlier times, specifically 10:03.

IRIS has available only the data from Mont Chateau and Standing Stone, the two stations closest to Shanksville. My contact provided 10 minutes of data, from 10:00 to 10:10.

I examined the data as far as my expertise would take me (undergraduate geophysics classes) and found nothing anomalous to support a time of 10:06 rather than 10:03.  I leave it to practicing seismologists that might be interested to provide a more definitive assessment.

Let’s now return to the issue raised to the Commission.

The Question Posed

A 9-11 Family Member told  me via e-mail that seismologists agreed that UA 93 crashed at 10:06, not 10:03 as NORAD said.  I took that request for action and we obtained a copy of the report.  It was not a U.S. Army document; the Army referred us to the Maryland Geological Survey website for a copy.

We found that the time in the study, 10:06, was at odds with all other primary source information, the convergence of which supported a crash time of 10:03.  Despite that convergence we took the time to fully consider an alternative time of 10:06, as requested.

Primary source information

Data from the UA 93 Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and Flight Data Recorder (FDR), air traffic control communications, FAA radar, and Air Force radar established a crash time of 10:03.

The seismic data was also primary source information; the study that inferred at time of 10:06 was not.  Statements that the seismic data show that UA 93 crashed at 10:06 are inaccurate.  Further, statements that leading seismologists and scientists concluded that UA 93 impacted at 10:06 are disingenuous.  The work was that of a single person, as it turned out.  Here is how we proceeded.

Steps taken

The study was sponsored by the Department of Natural Resources, State of Maryland under contract number SMGS/AG1-01-075.  The authors were Won-Young Kim, Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory of Columbia University, and Gerald R. Baum, Environmental Geology and Mineral Resources Program, Maryland Geological Survey.

Our first step was a request to the Maryland Geological Survey (MGS) asking them to validate and verify the study done by one of its employees. The MGS declined stating that the work was primarily that of Won-Young Kim and that we should address our request to him.  The MGS, literally, walked away from the issue.

The second step, then, was to contact Mr. Kim, which I personally did.  Over time, I exchanged a series of emails and phone calls with Mr. Kim.  I informed him that multiple other primary sources of information did not support his work.  His position was that, if so, he still had confidence in his work.  Ultimately Mr. Kim agreed to a statement that the seismic data was not conclusive concerning the crash of UA 93.

Given that statement, we reconfirmed that the preponderance of evidence supported a time of 10:03 and that became our position.  There was, however, another avenue we could explore.

Going the extra step

Even though we had a high degree of confidence in the 10:03 time, we decided to treat the two times as equal and sought and obtained additional primary source information, infra-red satellite data.  We asked the Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center (DEFSMAC) for the times it had established for the impacts of all four hijacked planes.

We had noticed in the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (CMOC) logs that some “IR [infrared] event” times had been entered that morning and assumed that DEFSMAC had recorded all four “IR events.”  They had, and the data provided was consistent not only with the 10:03 time for UA 93 but for the other three impact times, as well.  The DEFSMAC response is in the classified Commission files held by NARA.

To put it another way, we gave the two disparate times–10:03 and 10:06– equal weight and went to a tie breaker, even though there was no compelling analytical reason to do so.

A comment on DEFSMAC

Accurately reporting “IR events” is vital to the defense of the nation.  Missile launches are serious business and DEFSMAC provides the earliest possible indications and warning of  such a potential threat.  The DEFSMAC times, alone, are sufficient to establish the impact times of the four hijacked aircraft.

In the end

We spent considerable time running the seismic issue to ground.  Yet the answer did not matter, it wasn’t the “right” answer.  During the reading of Staff Statement 17 at the final air defense hearing we presented the list of sources for 10:03 time of impact for UA 93.  Behind us, someone in the audience commented, what about the seismic data?

Questions answered that don’t provide the expected or wanted answer become…more questions.