Category: 9-11

9-11: NEADS Mission Crew Commander; a valiant effort, ultimately futile, Part III

Introduction

This is the third in a series of articles describing the battle on the morning of September 11, 2001, from the perspective of the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), Mission Crew Commander (MCC) Major Kevin Nasypany.  The account is based on primary source information, the NEADS audio tapes.

In the first two articles (part I, part II) we covered Major Nasypany’s actions up to 0921 EDT,  concluding with a brief to the Battle Cab on the friendly situation, tankers and fighters.  He had recently talked with Colin Scoggins at Boston Center and concluded the conversation with a request.  “If you get anything…give us a yell.”  Scoggins was about to do just that and we resume the next twenty minutes of the story with the results of that call.

American 11, Reborn

As we listen in to Major Nasypany’s channel, DRM1, Channel 2, it is clear that something was going on in the background.  Nasypany’s immediate reaction was, “Shit.  Give me the location.”  He immediately began briefing Colonel Marr in the battle cab.  Explicitly, the reported aircraft is identified by tail number, “November three three four alpha alpha.”  That was the tail number for AA 11 and was so recorded in the official NEADS record of important activity, the MCC/T log.

After concluding the brief to the Battle Cab, Nasypany acknowledged the capability of his adversaries, “these guys are smart.”  A voice responded, “They know exactly what they want.”  Some researchers have taken it upon themselves to pronounce the hijackers as incapable of mounting the attack that unfolded on 9-11.  Major Nasypany and the men and women on duty at NEADS that day could afford no such speculation.  They knew, in real time, they were up against a sophisticated enemy and grudgingly acknowledged that fact for posterity.

Here is the most problematic clip in all the NEADS files concerning the NORAD and FAA failure in the aftermath to explain what happened. 

0911 0922 N334AA

There is no question that NEADS, and by extension, CONR and NORAD, had the information available after 9-11 to tell an accurate story.  Specifically, the NEADS staff had three pieces of information available; the MCC/T log, the recording of Nasypany’s actions and brief to the Battle Cab, and a transcript of the relevant portion of Nasypany’s audio channel.  The verifiable tail number information, alone, was proof that the plane at issue was AA 11.  Not only did Major Nasypany know that and so brief the battle cab, but MSGT Dooley announced it to all in the area of the MCC position, as heard in the background on this singularly important clip.

Nasypany continued to discuss the American Airlines, the first one, and then fielded a call from an unidentified person and provided  the call signs for the Langley fighters.  0924 Quit 25 and 26

He then briefed the Battle Cab on the armament of both the Langley and Otis fighters, updated the scramble and discussed tanker support.  A discussion concerning a tail chase occurred in the background.  The Battle Cab said no.  Nasypany then acknowledged that they could not locate AA11, “even though we couldn’t find him.”  0925 Forget the tail chase

Nasypany was listening in to a controller position working with tankers and much of his floor conversation was obscured.  There is one fragment available which captured his plans for the Langley fighters.  He wanted them at an intercept point north of the NCA (National Capital Area), “ten miles north.”   0928 Intercept point north of NCA

In another conversation fragment Nasypany documented that as of 0929 EDT NEADS had just three planes unaccounted for, AA 11 still airborne, UA 175 hit the World Trade Center, and a third one they were not sure about.  That latter comment was not a reference to AA 77.  In context, it accounted for the fact that something struck the north tower, if not AA 11. 0929 Three planes unaccounted for

Nasypany then updated someone, most likely the Battle Cab, in a conversation overridden by a weapons controller.  Thereafter, he asked Major Fox whether they launched two or three fighters at Langley.  He was told they scrambled two but there was an extra pilot and fighter available.  Nasypany, on his own recognizance, directed “let’s launch them too.”  0929 two or three at Langley

At this point the electronic feed for the exercise Vigilant Guardian resumed. The exercise, itself, never restarted that morning.  Major Nasypany’s immediate response was to order, “turn the sim switches off, get rid of that crap.” That order was carried out immediately as discussed in my recent article, “9-11: Exercise not a detractor, the definitive story.” The exercise was never a hindrance to Major Nasypany that morning.  Here is the audio of Nasypany’s reaction and order.  0930 Get rid of that crap

As of 0933, Major Nasypany knew that the Quit, flight of three, was airborne.  The weapons control team discovered that the fighters were headed for an offshore training area, Whiskey 386.  The assistant controller, Sergeant Huckabone observed, “Quit 25 is headed into Whiskey three eighty six, and I have no idea why.”  That was just after the lead pilot and Norfolk TRACON decided that the flight plan of “090 for 60” (fly heading 90 degrees for 60 nautical miles) took precedence over the scramble order. 093100 Langley What Heading would like hand off Giant Killer

Here is a graphic to aid the reader.  It was created in the 84th RADES RS3 software and imported into powerpoint for annotation.  The times depicted in red are radar times for key maneuvers and other actions.  The times associated with NEADS audio files are depicted in blue.

The Commission Report stated that at the time AA 77 impacted the Pentagon, the Langley fighters were “about 150 miles away.”  As this graphic shows, at 0938 the fighters were just beginning their turn north and were at their furthermost distance from the Pentagon.  The slight turn to the right at 0933 marks the decision by the pilot and Norfolk TRACON to proceed on a heading of 090.

The Langley fighters were going to proceed to about the Delmarva Peninsula in any event.  That was the standard procedure for an eastern takeoff, the normal practice since the air defense alert facility was at the far western end of the runway.  The SOP in effect in 2001 called for runway heading to 4000 feet on takeoff.   Thereafter, a turn north at that point was problematic since a warning area to the north, Patuxent, was an issue, if active.  It was not, but that fact had to be determined.

The point is that there was reason for Langley Tower to enter a flight plan of “090 for 60” into the system.  It was a known, problem-free, egress route, one used over and over again.  It is worth noting that the Otis fighters, earlier, also took off to the east and then circled back.  Much later, the Atlantic City fighters would also take off to the east on a flight plan of 090 for 120, the ‘Jersey scramble.’  All of the tactics, techniques and procedures in place that day were predicated on a threat over water.

As we pick up the story, Nasypany’s voice can be heard in the background confirming that the fighters were airborne, asking for the airborne time.  0933 Quit flight airborne (See the Langley category for details on how that happened.)

At 0934 NEADS learned that AA 77 was lost.  As Nasypany was confirming airborne time for the Langley fighters, MSGT Dooley made the announcement about AA 77.  Nasypany responded, “where from…AA 77, write that down.”  Nasypany was listening in to the Langley weapons controllers and his report to the Battle Cab was overridden as the controllers worked with Giant Killer to get the Langley fighters to go direct Baltimore. Giant Killer was and is a Navy facility that controls aircraft in military training areas using FAA procedures.

Nasypany’s voice is occasionally heard in background making his report.  At this point in time all NEADS knew, operationally, was that AA 77 was reported lost and that the Langley fighters needed to be redirected north.  There is no correlation between those two events, AA 77 was not yet known as anything other than lost.  It is this NEADS-Giant Killer conversation that led to the NEADS erroneous conclusion that it was Giant Killer’s fault that the fighters were headed in the wrong direction. 0934 AA 77 Write it down

As of 0936 the weapons controllers were still working with Giant Killer on the redirection of the Langley fighters to hold over Baltimore [BWI airport].  At the conclusion of that coordination–it was determined that Washington Center would maintain primary control–Nasypany learned that he had an unknown aircraft in the vicinity of the White House.  Nasypany directed, “Foxy, got an aircraft six miles east [Boston corrected that, subsequently, to be west] of the White House.  Get your fighters there.  Jesus, Fox.” 0936 Fighters to hold over Baltimore

Nasypany immediately briefed the Battle Cab.  Two other things were happening concurrently on his channel. The controllers acknowledged that the information came from Boston and prepared to “turn and burn,” a “monster marsh”  The lead tanker, Team 21, confirmed that he was hearing the fighters “loud and clear.”  Nasypany reported that the target was deviating and he received orders to send the fighters “straight in, run ’em.”  He also asked if Marr was authorizing AFIO (Authority for Intercept Operations.), a significant decision that required NEADS to exercise air traffic control.  Nasypany’s final comment on this next clip was to ask if they were going “direct to DC?”  Fox responded that they were running them “right now.”  0937 AFIO a monster mash

Except they were not.  At 0937, just prior to AA 77 impacting the Pentagon, the controllers tried to reach Quit 25, direct.  Unsuccessful, they immediately called Giant Killer and directed that the fighters go direct Washington.  Giant Killer advised that the fighters were being handed off to “Center [Washington Center]”.  Giant Killer turned the fighters north at 0938.  Thereafter, the controllers looked to link the fighters to track B032 just as NEADS lost the track.  At that point Major Nasypany asked Where’s Langley at, where are the fighters? 0938 Where are the fighters

At 0939, Nasypany appeared to have acknowledged that the fighters were in W386, the person speaking is likely him. Soon thereafter, he directed “go super if necessary…I don’t care how many windows you break.”  At the point Quit 25 changed his mode 3 code to 7777, the AFIO code and the fighters were being turned by Giant Killer and Washington Center to head northwest, but still on an azimuth for BWI.  0940 Don’t care how many windows you break

As of 0940 the weapons controllers were futilely looking for the track of interest, “where did 0032 go.  I’ve gotta find that track.”  Nasypany learned the reason why the Langley fighters were in W386, “because Giant Killer send them out there.”  Nasypany’s frustrated and profane response was immediate, “God dammit!”  Ironically, the voice of MSGT Dooley can be heard in the background obtaining the last known location of AA77, “08252 west.”  It was the ultimate futile moment for NEADS, they knew nothing about the location of AA 77, the unknown tracked as B032 had disappeared, and the Langley fighters were astray in an offshore military training area. 0940 Giant Killer sent them there

As of 0941 an unknown voice summed up what NEADS knew about hijacked aircraft, “No, we’ve heard three now, United one seven five, American Airlines eleven, and American seven seven.”  The “three now” comment linked back to the 0929 summation when only two were known, by name.   0941 We’ve heard three now

But “three now” was temporary.  NEADS and Major Nasypany would, within seconds of that summation, learn about Delta 1989.  0941 Delta what

To be continued


9-11: Exercise not a detractor; the definitive story

Introduction

This article pulls together primary source information concerning Exercise Vigilant Guardian on the morning of September 11, 2001.  Some have argued, based on conversational fragments from the audio files of the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), that the exercise hindered the nation’s air defense response that morning.  Others have inferred, based on listening to those audio files, that the exercise caused procedural problems on the NEADS operations floor.  In context, both the argument and the inference are in error.

I have posted bits and pieces of this story elsewhere.  In this article I pull all that together in one location to tell the complete story for the benefit of future researchers and historians.  My work can be replicated.  I begin with Exercise Vigilant Guardian, itself.

Exercise Vigilant Guardian

The NEADS audio files for Sep 3-11, 2001 are archived in the Commission’s files at NARA, and NARA has provided me a copy.  It took five months of work, off and on, to piece together the exercise as it actually occurred.  I documented that work in a series of articles as a reference for anyone interested in the subject.

Briefly, the exercise was building gradually over the days and, as of 9/11, NEADS was poised to move to 24-hour operations, twelve-hour shifts, as the pace accelerated.  The exercise was not continuous activity.  Rather, it was a series of discrete events, one or two major ones each day, some overlapping, some not.

One important task exercised was the assumption that one of the three sectors–NEADS, WADS (Western Air Defense Sector), and SEADS (Southeast Air Defense Sector)–became incapacitated thus requiring an adjustment in coverage.  Specifically, on the night of September 10, WADS became incapacitated and NEADS had to assume air responsibility for the western United States.  Concurrently, SEADS assumed air defense responsibility for the Northeast from NEADS.  In both cases the assumption of air sovereignty was for both exercise and real world activity.

The expansion, as it was called, transferred radar sites, one by one, a deliberate process that took time.  That nightime expansion by NEADS to the west and then reassumption of air sovereignty for the Northeast was the last Exercise Vigilant Guardian event.  The scheduled resumption of exercise play on the morning of 9-11 was overtaken by real world events.

Because NEADS was poised to resume the exercise, the Battle Cab was fully manned and additional watchstanders were on the premises and immediately available.  There was no need to recall anyone.  That state of readiness was succinctly captured by William Scott in the title of an Aviation Weekly and Space Technology article, written in 2002, “Exercise Jump-Starts Response to Attacks.”  That jump start began with the initial call to NEADS from Boston Center and we begin with Joe Cooper’s phone call to Sergeant Powell.

Exercise-related floor conversations

Powell, as trained to do and as practiced habitually during the previous days, immediately asked the critical question:  “Is this real world or exercise?”  That question and answer immediately established that NEADS was dealing with a real world event.  0911121716 Phone Rings Boston Calling

Subsequent mentions of the exercise were NEADS personnel answering outside calls, commenting among themselves or to themselves, or directing specific action.  For anyone who has worked in a 24-hour operations center, with both real world and exercise responsibilities, all the commentary captured on the NEADS tapes is normal, routine, and expected.  There is nothing that can be construed, in context, as a hindrance.

The first reference, at 0843, came from Major Fox, the Senior Director.  Fox, a long-time NEADS watchstander, had participated in the last real world hijacking event nearly a decade earlier.  He was intimately familiar with sector procedures.  As he launched into action he mused that “he had never seen so much real world activity during an exercise.” 0843 real world stuff

At 0844 the Air Surveillance Technician shifted his assets to accommodate the real world requirement.  He had one crew on the floor and, as did Powell before him, reacted based on his training and experience without the need for guidance from above.  He simply shifted one of his surveillance technicians,  commenting that “the exercise is gonna’ have to go on a little bit of hold here, that’s all.”  0844 AST Shift one of these guys down

At 0857 the Mission Crew Commander, Major Nasypany, during a briefing to Colonel Marr in the Battle Cab, opined with a laugh, “think we put the exercise on hold, what do you think?”  0857 MCC Exercise on hold

At 0915 an off duty person called in asking the ID section if the exercise had been put on hold.  He was told “not at this time, no, but I think they’re going to.”  At that time, exercise activity for the day had not yet started.  0915 Not at this time

In perspective, NEADS had now been involved with real world activity for thirty seven minutes and, other than the initial call, there had been just four exercise references, two in passing (Fox, Nasypany) one a statement of intent (AST) and one a response to an outside call. It would be another fifteen minutes before the exercise was again mentioned.

At 0930, two quick comments on two different channels provide explicit information that the electronic exercise feed had started and was immediately recognized by the MCC, Major Nasypany, as such.  Without seconds of Nasypany’s direction to suppress the feed a floor announcement was made to the surveillance section to turn off sim [exercise] switches.  As earlier, NEADS training kicked in and floor personnel responded immediately to orders. Major Nasypany effectively terminated the exercise as soon as it started, he did not wait for guidance or direction from above.  Here are two clips containing the MCC order and the rapid execution of that order.  0930 MCC Get rid of that crap 0930 Turn off sim switches

Ten more minutes passed before another reference was made concerning what was being seen on the scopes.  Although the comment appeared to be exercise related it was not.  The commenter said, “get the Goddam friendlies out of my face.”  That was the head of the surveillance section speaking on the same channel that contained the “turn off sim switches” order earlier. He was interested in primary tracks, only.  0940 friendlies out of my face

There was a single additional exercise reference prior to 1000.  Sergeant Powell had called a unit asking for their help and the person at the other end questioned the authority for such a request.  At the end of the call either Powell or another voice joked, “are you sure this isn’t an exercise.”  Here is that statement, in context. 0946 You sure this isn’t an exercise

At 1006 at the MCC Technician position, MSGT McCain took an outside call.  The caller asked if the exercise was knocked off.  McCain responded, “the exercise was cancelled, torn all that apart, sir.” That call established the reality of the situation at the key position on the NEADS floor, the MCC position.  The exercise had long since gone by the wayside.  1006 Exercise cancelled torn all that apart

Two minutes later, at 1008, MSGT McCain, in reaction to MSGT Dooley providing detail about a bomb on board UA 93, commented, in near gallows humor,  “if this is an exercise input, it’s a good one.”  1008 If exercise input, a good one

At 1011 Captain Nagel, a weapons controller, received a call from Cheyenne Mountain tech control requesting that all exercise inputs be terminated.  The caller had the wrong number and Nagel referred him to the right number.  Captain Nagel answered the phone “sim,” and immediately corrected himself.  That was not an exercise reference.  Captain Nagel had  been working in the sim cell previously and simply forgot his new position which was activated at 0947 to handle the Midwest and the search for UA 93.  1011 Cheyenne Mt call

at 1014 Sergeant Richmond, the Air Surveillance Technician, got the followup call from Cheyenne Mountain.  He was told to terminate all exercise inputs, “exercise side only.”  Richmond responded, “looks like all our exercise tracks are down, are gone.”  1014 Cheyenne Mt terminate all exercise inputs

At 1020 Cheyenne Mountain again verified in a conference call that all sectors had terminated exercise tracks.  NEADS responded, “Northeast, nothing going out, exercise.”  1020 Cheyenne Mt roll call

That bit of higher headquarters housekeeping ended the technical side of Exercise Vigilant Guardian.  The people side never started that morning and when the technical feed started Major Nasypany stopped it in its tracks, long before Cheyenne Mountain got around to a system-wide shutdown.

Summary

In the space of 100 minutes there were fourteen possible exercise-related references in the NEADS tapes, including the original alert from Boston Center.  That is a rate of one every seven minutes.  However, five of those references were after UA 93 crashed and the battle was effectively over.  Three of those five were housekeeping actions by Cheyenne Mountain technicians.

Of the nine references during the battle, three were NEADS floor operational decisions, two related to the MCC immediate decision to stop the electronic exercise feed once it started, and one related to the Surveillance Section shifting resources to the real world event.  One was the original call from Boston Center, and one was an outside caller asking for information.

That left just four references as possible sources of confusion.  Three were musings or opinions, one by Major Fox, one by Major Nasypany, and one related to Sergeant Powell.  None of the three related in any way to the three major activity centers on the NEADS operations floor–Identification, Surveillance, and Weapons Control.  The fourth apparent reference was not exercise related.

Based on the primary source information of the day, the voices of NEADS personnel at work, there was no exercise-related activity that interfered with the real world air defense mission.

9-11: Langley Scramble; CAP point confusion, explained

The purpose of this brief article, an addition to the Langley Scramble story, is to document why the Langley fighters made a turn to the south on approaching the Washington area.  It is a simple explanation.  The controller transposed two digits in the initial transmission to the flight lead, Quit 25.  The coordinates initially provided  at 0946 EDT were 3825N 07702W. Here is the audio clip from NEADS tape DRM 2, Channel 13, cut 131828.

0911131828 Quit wrong CAP point

In order to vector to those coordinates on approach to Washington the Quit flight had to turn south to a heading the pilots recognized as wrong.  In a subsequent exchange with the controller at 0952 EDT, the accurate coordinates, 3852N 07702W, were provided.  The CAP point was based on the faded track for what was ultimately determined to be AA77, B032, as captured in the audio record.  Here is the later audio clip from the same NEADS tape/channel.

0911131828 Quit correct CAP point

There was nothing mysterious or nefarious about the turn south and then back north by the Langley fighters.  The diversion was an error made in the heat of battle, nothing more.

9/11: AA77; NEADS located in 34 seconds, when cued

The purpose of this brief article is to document the NEADS successful search for AA77 when cued with accurate, timely information.

The primary source documentation is found on Ch 5 ID TK, in the first NEADS delivery of audio files to the Commission.  The Channel recorded as an open mike and the stream of audio conversations is chaotic, intermingled, and largely in the background.  Here is a 39 second segment of that file.  The time is approximately 0936 EDT.

There he is Ch 5 ID TK

From the moment MSGT Dooley announced the first results of a Colin Scoggins alert call to the Sector floor it took 34 seconds for the aircraft to be found.  Here is a partial transcript of what can be made out on the file

Watson:  OK, copy

Dooley:  We have an aircraft 6 miles southeast of the White House

Dooley:  Southwest

Dooley:  He’s deviating

Watson:  OK, sir, it’s six miles

Male Voice:  Here it is

For comparison, here is the clear call between Scoggins and Watson.  Dooley began here floor announcements as soon as Watson said, “OK, copy.”

093536 AA77 Scoggins VFR 6 Miles

This establishes the metric by which to measure the NEADS response time when provided timely, accurate information.  Note that in this case, they did not have specific information–a mode 3, a lat long, or a range and bearing from a known navigation point.  The general point out, “six miles from the White House” was sufficient.  NEADS was then able to establish a track, B032, which faded [Pentagon impact] before the track could be forward told to CONR and NORAD.

Some researchers speculate that NEADS was unable to locate targets on 9/11, based on the fact that AA11 was not found.  Those who so speculate overlook the fact that NEADS did not have timely, accurate information concerning AA11.  NEADS established a “last known” Z point to the north of where AA11 actually was.  Further, New York TRACON, when given a general reference was also unable to spot AA 11, as can be heard on this third audio file.

NY TRACON difficulty finding AA11

9-11: The Return of NORAD; an interesting article

Background

Many months ago I wrote a series of articles, “The Scott Trilogy.” to depict the state of public information when the Commission began its work.  There was one additional article of interest that needs mentioning.   That article is “The Return of NORAD,” written by Adam Hebert and published in the February, 2002, edition of Air Force Magazine. The purpose of this additional article, filed under “The Scott Trilogy,” is to document specific information provided by Hebert.

Alert Aircraft

Hebert made the following points

  1. NORAD operators were looking outward from US borders, seeking incoming aircraft
  2. NORAD did not anticipate attacks in which civil airliners would be hijacked
  3. Only seven locations—around the perimeter of the United States—were engaged in the air defense mission
  4. Alert locations had F-15 or F-16 fighters on the runways, fueled, and ready to take off in fewer than 15 minutes

That was an accurate summation with one exception.  The alert fighters were not on the runways, they were in the alert sheds with ready access to the runways.  Crews were on standby 24/7.

The Response

Given a standard of “less than 15 minutes,” both the Otis and the Langley fighters exceeded standards.  According to the author, accurately, the Otis fighters were airborne in 12 minutes and the Langley fighters were airborne in 6 minutes.  There was no delay in launching the fighters as some have speculated.  The Langley fighters were quickly airborne because they had been placed on battle stations previously.

The author’s summation of the response to the four hijacked aircraft is accurate with two exceptions.  First, he repeated the erroneous notification time of 9:24 for AA 77.  Second, he wrote that “F-16s patrolling the Washington area were in a position to have intercepted this [UA 93] airliner.  During these tense moments, the fighter pilots had permission to shoot down hijacked airliners if they were to threaten more targets.”

Neither the Langley fighters nor the Otis fighters were given shootdown authority during the terrorist attack that morning.

Scramble frequency, in perspective

Actual air defense scrambles were an infrequent event prior to 9-11.  It is also important to know that a scramble did not necessarily result in fighters actually launched.

Hebert provided this perspective.  “In the year 2000, during the period Sept. 10 through Oct 10, NORAD scrambled fighters a total of seven times (counting exercises).”  That extrapolates to 84 scrambles in a year, not just in the NEADS sector or CONUS but in Alaska and Canada, as well.

Hebert continued: “A year later, during the same Sept 10 through Oct. 10 period, fighters were scrambled 41 times.  In addition officers diverted 48 Combat Air Patrols to tracks of interest, for a total of 89 events.  That twelve-fold increase was roughly three a day across all of North America, not a high volume by any means.

Target consideration

Another noteworthy point made by Herbert concerns how NORAD considered and treated domestic aircraft.  “For some time, the FAA had been the lead agency for handling events of ‘air piracy.’  NORAD and the FAA had a cooperative arrangement that left control of domestic airspace to the hands of FAA.  Domestic airliners were considered “friendly by origin.””

That is consistent but slightly different than my understanding during work on the Brothers to the Rescue project for the Department of Defense Inspector General.  My understanding was that any aircraft departing from a domestic airport and squawking a Mode 3 code was friendly be definition.  However, any such aircraft that departed the ADIZ and returned was of continuing interest.  Those type flights were called DVFR, Defense Visual Flight Rules, and were always reported by FAA centers to NORAD sectors.  The Vigilant Guardian NEADS tapes contain multiple examples of such reporting.

Shootdown authority

Herbert’s last noteworthy point documents the delegation of shootdown authority post 9/11.  Herbert, quoting General Eberhart, wrote, “He said, ‘If there’s time, we’d go all the way to the President’ for approval to shoot down an airliner.  ‘Otherwise, the standing orders have been pushed down.'”

Herbert listed three individuals with that authority: “Maj. Gen Larry K. Arnold, commander of 1st Air Force…LT. Gen. Norman A. Schwartz, a three-star officer at Elmendorf Air Force Base [Alaska]…In Hawaii, Adm. Dennis C. Blair, head of Pacific Command.”

Audio Monograph Clip, Version 1.0

1.  080918 AA11 Check in

AA11:  Boston Center, good morning, American Eleven with you passing through one niner zero for two three zero

ZBW:  American Eleven, Boston Center, roger, climb maintain level two eight zero

2. 081335  AA11 20 Right

ZBW:  American Eleven turn twenty degrees right

AA11:  Turning right, American 11

3.  081352 AA 11 Lost Contact

Boston Sector:  American eleven, climb maintain flight level three five zero

Boston Sector:  [eight seconds later]  American eleven climb maintain flight level three five zero

Boston Sector:  [eight seconds later]  American Eleven, Boston

Boston Sector:  [10 seconds later]…Mike Lima how do you hear?

Mike Lima:  Mike Lima has you loud and clear

Boston Sector:  American eleven, Boston

Boston Sector:  [9 seconds later]  American one one, the American on the frequency, how do you hear me?

Athens Sector:  [5 seconds later] This is Athens

Boston Sector:  This is Boston, I turned American twenty left [sic] and I was going to climb him, he will not respond to me now at all

Athens Sector:  Looks like he is turning right

Boston Sector:  Yeah, I turned him twenty right

Athens Sector:  Oh, OK

Boston Sector:  And he’s only going to, I think, twenty nine [this is likely genesis of the flight level two nine zero reporting later]

Athens Sector:  OK

Boston Sector:  Well

Athens Sector:  That’s fine

Boston Sector:  But I’m not talking to him

Athens Sector:  He’s NORDO, roger

Boston Sector:  Thanks

Boston Sector:  [4 seconds later]…Mike Lima descend at pilot’s discretion and maintain flight level two four zero

Mike Lima:  …Two four zero, will begin now, Mike Lima

Boston Sector:  American eleven, Boston

Boston Sector    [8 seconds later] American eleven, if you hear Boston Center, IDENT [flash]

Boston Sector:  [11 seconds later] (handles another aircraft checking in)  American eleven if you hear Boston Center IDENT please, or acknowledge

Boston Sector:  [43 seconds later] American eleven, if you hear Boston Center recontact Boston Center on one two seven point eight two, that’s American eleven, one two seven eight two

4.  082350  AA11 Check Everything Company

Rockfield Sector:  Athens, this is Rockfield, couple of things…hey, also, are you trying to get through to company on the American eleven?

Athens Sector:  We are trying everything here

Rockfield Sector:  Has he really got no transponder

Athens Sector:  It appears that way

Rockfield Sector:  OK, bye

5.  ANKOW Gonzalez Ong

AAL:  American Airlines Emergency line, please state your emergency

Gonzalez:  Hey, this is Nidia at American Airlines calling, I am monitoring a call in which flight eleven, the flight attendant is advising our reps that the pilot, everyone’s been stabbed

AAL:  Fight eleven?

Gonzalez: Yeah

Gonzalez:  They can’t get into the cockpit is what I’m hearing

AAL:  OK.  Who is this I’m talking to?

Gonzalez:  Excuse me, this is Nidia at American Airlines at the Raleigh Reservation Center, I’m the operations specialist on duty

AAL:  I’m sorry what was your name again?

Gonzalez:  Nidia

AAL:  Nidia, and what’s your last name?

Gonzalez:  Gonzalez, G O N Z A L E Z

AAL:  Raleigh Reservations, OK

Gonzalez:  I’ve got the flight attendant on the line with one of our agents

AAL:  OK, and she’s calling how?

Gonzalez: Through reservations, I can go on the AAL line and ask the flight attendant questions

AAL:  OK, uh, I”m assuming they’ve declared an emergency, let me get ATC on the line here, stand by

Gonzalez:  Gotten any contact with anybody?  [to Betty]  I”m on with security, OK Betty?  You are doing a great job just stay calm.  We are absolutely…

AAL:  OK, we’re contacting the flight crew now, we’re also contacting ATC

Gonzalez:  OK

AAL:  Anything else from the flight attendant?

Gonzalez:  Uh, so far what I’ve gotten, the number five flight attendant’s been stabbed, but she seems to be breathing, the number one seems to be stabbed pretty badly, she’s lying down on the floor, they don’t know if she is conscious or not.  The other flight attendants are in the back, uh, and that’s as far as I know.  It seems like the passengers in coach might not be aware of what’s going on right now.

AAL:  These two passengers were in first class?

Gonzalez:  OK, hold on.  Hey Betty, you know any information as far as the men in the cockpit with the pilots, were they from first class?  They were sitting in two A and two B.  They are in the cockpit with the pilot.

AAL:  Who’s helping them, is there a doctor on board?

Gonzalez:  Is there a dcotr on board, Betty that’s [helping you guys?  You don’t have any doctors on board?  OK.  So, you’ve gotten all the first class passengers out of first class?

[Note: not sure I finished this one.  Miles]

6.  082444  Keying 2 Transmissions

[indistinct]

Mike keyed, twice

ZBW:  Is that American eleven trying to call?

Atta:  [indistinct]  We have some planes.  Just stay quiet and we’ll be OK.  We are returning to the airport

Background [air traffic comms]

ZBW:  And, uh, who’s trying to call me, here?

Background: [air traffic comms]

ZBW:  American eleven are you trying to call?

Atta:  Nobdy move, everything will be OK.  If you try to make any moves, you will injure yourself and the airplane.  Just stay quiet.

7.  082457  Nobody move

Atta:  Nobody move. Everything will be OK.  If you try to make any moves you will injure yourself and the airplane.  Just stay quiet

8.  082453  AAll Check Sup Already Did

Unknown:  Yeah, uh we got ‘im on primary

Unknown:  Hey, thirty eight?

38:  Yes

Unknown:  You guys heard anything from American?

38: No

Unknown:  Ok, we think there might be somebody in the cockpit right now takin’ it over

38:  OK

Unknown:  Yeah, we just [indistinct]

Unknown:  Call the Supervisor, please

Unknown:  Yeah, we’re already doin’ it

Unknown:  OK

9.  082542  AA11 Poiht Out Enter New Route

Dial Tone

[indistinct]:

Unknown:  Ah, not right now.  Go ahead thirty eight

Femaile Voice:  Yeah, American eleven.  Ah, we suspect there is someone in the cockpit that has taken over.  We have just put him in direct Watertown, Jamestown.  Last we knew he was on present heading, cleared to flight level two nine zero.  No one is talking to him.  ARINC has been called. We broadcasted on guard.  We’ve tried through company.

Unknown:  OK, thanks

Female Voice:  And two nine zero is not verified

Unknown:  OK, thanks

Female Voice:  You’re welcome

10.  082655  AAll Take Back Look West Albany

Dial Tone

Unknown:  Because he was just headin’ that way, yes

Femaile Voice: We’ve taken the American back because he appears to have turned

Unknown:  Yep, bye

Unknown:  {indistinct] [routne air traffic comms]

Unknown:  [indistinct]

Unknown:  Go ahead

Female Voice:  Yeah, I need you to look west of Albany, American eleven, and put ‘im on your scope.  He is, ah, NORDO, has been since he talked to Boston High.  We assume he’s at flight level two nine zero.  Ah, we’re not sure.  We think there is someone in the cockpit with him. Ah, we’ve broadcasted over guard, we’ve gone ARINC, we’ve gone company, no one is talkin’ to him.  We don’t know where he is going, we don’t know altitude he’s at.

Unknown:  OK

Female Voice:  OK

Unknown:  Thanks

11.  082924  ZBW Notification ZOB/ZNY

ZOB:  Cleveland

ZBW: Alright, Cleveland, New York.  Boston.  Ah, I got a little situation with American one one, American eleven.  He is a, uh, seven fifty seven, departed Boston, goin’ to LAX..  Ah, we don’t know where the aircraft is goin’.  He, ah, in, ah, supposedly goin’ to LAX, was goin’ Westbound, we lost his ah frequency, and we lost his transponder, and now the aircraft is ah just West of Albany, headin’due south

Unknown:  Oh, my goodness

Unknown:  K  We have, do we have a, a data block on him, who’s got the ah

ZBW:  Yeah, we, we a, it’s a primary target, presently, as I said, headin’ Southwest bound

Unknown:  OK, Uh, understand.

ZBW:[indistinct] right now

Unknown:  I’ll advise the area.

ZBW:  Last altitude ah observed was ah flght level two niner zero

Unknown:  twenty nine

Unknown:  headin’ South bound?

ZBW:  Headin’ Southwest bound, he’s like towards Hancock, ah, right right around there.  He’s Southwest of Albany, by one five miles

Unknown:  You have no idea where he’s goin;?

ZBW:  No idea, sir

Unknown:  Alrighty

Herndon Center:  You can tag ‘im on the ah TSD [Traffic Situation Display]

Unknown:  I’ve got ‘im tagged, primary only?.

Herndon Center:  You can pick ‘im up

ZBW:  Primary only

Unknown:  OK

ZBW  Ok

Herndon Center:  Thank you

12,  083053  AA11 Pascione Summation to Unknown

Herndon Center:  Well Boston Center claims that, uh, ah they lost radio communication with the aircraft:

Background:  And transponder, too

Herndon Center:  And the transponder.  And there’s also, ah , they’re trackin’ the primary target at this point, he was last known at ah flight level two nine zero.

Background:  Uh, huh

Herndon Center:  And he appears to have turned ah South, Southwest bound, and uh, also, there was some mention of some sort of a a threat bein’ made, or ah

Background:  He made?

Herndon Center:  A threat to the cockpit, or, some threat,

Background:  [indistinct]

Herndon Center:  In the cockpit.  [indistinct]  Boston is uncertain exactly what was said.  I guess they are goin’ to pull the tapes.as quick as they can

Background:  Hey Tom, where can I reach you back?  What number at?

Herndon Center:  seven oh three, ah seven oh eight, five one one five.

Background:  OK, alright, [indistinct] I’ll call you back.

13.  Boston Flight Service Segment One

Howland:  [indistinct] Ray Howland

Wyatt:  Ray Howland, Nancy Wyatt, ah, Boston flight service

Howland:  Yes

Wyatt:  OK, we’ve got the flight attendants on the line here

Howland:  You do have them on the line?

Wyatt:  From the plane, yeah.

Howland:  Can you conference them in with us?

Wyatt:  I have no idea how to do that, if you can help me out, uh, hold, ah  he’s getting some information, here

Wyatt:  I’m gonna read his notes for you.  Ah, it looks like ah he’s Middle Eastern.  Speaks no English.  He was in ten B, ten Baker

Howland: Right

Wyatt:  nine D and G, speaks no speaks no English. Ah, the plane’s in a rapid descent, ah

Howland:  [indistinct] Is the cockpit still

Wyatt:  Yep.  Ok, the flight attendants are concerned they don’t know what’s going on in the cockpit.  Are you in con, contact with them?

Howland:  No we’re not, [indistinct] we’re we’re tryin’ to get in contact with the cockpit.

Wyatt:  OK

Howland: Alright.  We really don’t want to tell her that

Wyatt:  OK.  don’t, OK got it.  Ok there, ah, we’re not sure. Ah,  OK, looks like there’s severe bleeding, that ah, he’s keeping her on line, there’s severe bleeding, there’s a slashed throat

Wyatt:  [off mike]  Michael, is that severe, is that slashed throat a flight attendant?

Michael:  No, the Captain

14.  Boston Flight Service Segment Two

Background:  Amy, What’s that?

Male Voice 1:  Boston flight service has another one of the flight attendants on the phone here.  Boston flight service.  You lost it?

Male Voice 2:  Ok, we lost the [indistinct].  I really need to get on the phone with her

Female Voice:  Something’s wrong.  Ah Amy, Amy Sweeney’s on the phone

Male Voice:  Amy Sweeney?

Female Voice:  Yeah she’s the number nine

Male Voice: OK

Female Voice:  and he’s having trouble talkin’ to her, right now

Male Voice:  Alright.  These are the two that are injured, one and five

Female Voice:  She started screaming and saying somethings wrong, and now he’s havin’ trouble

Male Voice:  Ok

Female Voice:  [indistinct] thinks he might be disconnected

Female Voice:  OK we just lost ah the connection

Male Voice:   Lost the connection

Female Voice: Yep

Unknown   [sigh]

Female Voice:  Something’s wrong with the airplane?  They’re not in the cockpit?  OK.  They’re in the back of the plane

Male Voice:  They’re in the back of the airplane

Female Voice:  Yeah, they’re in the back of the airplane, they’re not,  Oh, the hijackers are in the cockpit, Holy

Male Voice:  Oh no!

Background:  Number one number five

Female Voice:  OK, they’re in the cockpit

Male Voice:  Hey Craig, Craig.  They’re saying the hi, they’re in the cockpit

Background:  Amy said that

Femaile Voice:  Listen, let’s just see when the next flight to Kennedy is, just to see if he’s goin’ to Kennedy, so we can be ready

15.  083359  Nobody Move Please Going Back to Airport

Atta:  Nobody move please.  We are going back to the airport.  Don’t try to make any stupid moves

16.  083556  AA11 ZNY Kingston point out to Kennedy

Kingston:  Kennedy, Kingston, ninety six

Kennedy:  Kennedy

KIngston:  Yeah, heads up for you here.  I’ve got an American eleven.  He’s right over Kingston right now.  He’s at, we think he’s at flight level two nine zero.  There appears to be some possible problem with him.  He’s departed Boston, going to ah Los Angeles.  But, ah, somewhere along the way here he took a left turn and he’s not talking to anyone.  Hasn’t talked to anyone in about seventy five, maybe a hundred miles.  So, he’s Southeast bound right now, so he’s going to pass just, like, over Carmel, and again, we don’t have a verified altitude.  We think he’s at flight level two nine zero, we’re tryin’ to verify that now.

Kennedy:  You have a conde on ‘im?

Kingston:  Ah, no, he’s flying xray, there, there’s no code on the guy.  He’s flying xray, and we approved that, so he’s a primary now, right over Kingston, flight level two nine zero, supposedly.

Kennedy:  Supposedly, [indistinct] he’s headed Southeast bound?

Kingston:  Headed Southeast bound, and now he’s gonna go, between, ah, it looks like maybe right over Dewey’s intersection.  So I’m just giving you a heads up, we’re not talkin’ to him, no one’s talked to ‘im the last about twenty minutes

Kennedy:  And what’s the call sign?

Kingston:  American eleven

Kennedy:  American eleven

Kingston:  I’ll I’ll call you when he gets a little closer to your boundary, OK?

Kennedy: OK

[indistinct] plus routine air traffic conversation.  [May want to shorten this clip]

17.  083940  ZBW TRACON by Sparta

ZBW:  Boston Center here.  Can I get New York TRACON?

Herndon Center:  You bet  [indistinct]  with the ah  [indistinct]

ZBW:  Yeah, American eleven

Herndon Center: Say it again?

ZBW:  Oh, reference American eleven

Herndon Center:  Have you have you had any contact with ‘im yet?

ZBW:  Ah, no, no contact, ah it is confirmed ah hijack, though

NY TRACON:  Tracon

ZBW: K, TRACON, hi, Boston Center, ah good morning, American eleven, ah seven fifty seven, possible hijack

NY TRACON: K. American eleven seven, seven five and uh [indistinct].  Where’s he landing?

ZBW: Ah, right now, we don’t have any idea.  But ah, he was to the Northwest of Albany and now he’s ah down by Sparta, losing speed very rapidly, we believe he is a primary only, and uh, we believe he’s in a descent, and that’s why he’s ah he’s he’s slowing down

[Note, in continuation, TRACON could not locate the target as a primary only.  May want to put in a new clip to capture that]

18.  084739  AA11 Discussion to First Impact

ZNY:  Everybody copy?

Herndon Center:  Say that again, please

ZBW:  We, we, looks like we lost the primary target about twenty west of Kennedy, and we had a report of an ELT in the area.  We’re gonna ah, guess we’ll ah, get some Coast Guard activity up there

Unknown:  Well, we lost the track too

Unknown:  Hey Boston, this is New York, ah what type of aircraft was the American?

ZBW:  Seven sixty seven

ACI Watch:  This is the ACI watch.  Say again if you lost ah track of the aircraft, over

ZBW:  Boston has lost track, on our frequency we had some threats that it was a hijack, [indistinct] the tapes

ZNY:  New York confirms that we last track as well, and we  were ah had report of ah ELT in the area that the track was in

ZNY:  Kennedy Tower reports, [indistinct] you serious?  Kennedy Tower reports that there was a fire at the World Trade Center.  And that’s ah that’s  the area where we lost the airplane

19.  085017  ZNY Major Fire

Unknown:  Anybody know what that smoke is in lower Manhattan?

ZNY:  I’m sorry, say again

Unknown: Lot of smoke in lower Manhattan

ZNY:  A lot of smoke in lower Manhattan?

Unknown: [indistinct] coming out of the ah top of the World Trade Center building, a major fire

[indistinct]

20.  083355  Bueno Call to Cape Tracon

Cape Approach:  Cape Approach

Bueno:  Hey Cape, ah, Dan Bueno callin’ from Boston Center, hey we’ve got a situation with American eleven, a possible hijack

Cape Approach:  American eleven?

Bueno:  Yes sir, departed Boston going to L A X, right now he’s out to Albany, like to scramble some fighters to go tail him

Cape Approach:  Well, OK.  Well we’ll talk to Otis here

Bueno:  OK, and [indistinct] if you want just depart and ah we’ll put a flight plan in for him and ah we’ll aim him toward ah Hampton direct

Cape Approach:  American eleven [indistinct]

Bueno:  OK

Cape Approach:  And right now he’s [indistinct] Albany

Bueno:  No, no, no, no, no he’s ah right now southwest of, he’s airborne about forty, to south of Albany, primary only

Cape Approach: [indistinct] I’ll talk to them right now. And who is this here?

Bueno:  Dan Bueno from Boston, TMU

Cape Apprach:  Dan [indistinct] TMU,  OK

Bueno: Correct

Cape Approach: Alright

21.  083724  ZBW call to Powell and Reaction

Powell:  Huntress weapons, Sergeant Powell

Cooper:  Hi, Boston Center, TMU, we have ah a problem here, we have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New  New York and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble some F-16s or something up there to help us out

Powell:  Is, Is this real world or exercise?

Cooper: No, this is not an exercise, not a test.

Powell:  OK, hey, ah hold on one second, OK?  .

Cooper:  Yes

Powell:  Hey, hey, hey, hey, hey, hey, hey, seriously, [indistinct] big time [indistinct]

22.  083815  Powell Cooper Deskins

Powell:  Sir, sir, sir,

Cooper:  Yes sir

Powell:  IYeah, ‘ve got an MCC comin’ right now to talk to you so you can handle all that

Cooper:  Thank you

Powell:  Alright

[twenty seconds]  Sound of Deskins sitting down and hooking up at twelve seconds duration]

Deskins:  Hi, this is Major Deskins

Cooper:  Hi, Joe Cooper, Boston Center we have a

Deskins:  Yeah, Joe

Cooper:  hijacked aircraft headed towards the New York metro area, wonderin’ if you could uh send some one up there, some F-16s or somethin’ to help us out, maybe out of

Deskins:  New York metro

Cooper: Maybe out of Otis

Deskins:  Do you have a mode three on it?

Cooper:  No, no,

Deskins:  A mode 3 code?

Cooper:  It’s just a primary target only, we lost, ah, we lost the ah mode, the mode C on it, so you’d have to get up in the air and we’d have to vector you towards the aircraft

Deskins:  OK, so you’d wanta control the intercept, because

Cooper:  We’d have to, yeah

Deskins:  You’d have to, right

Cooper: Until you guys can pick ‘im up on primary radar

Deskins:  OK, do you have a general location as to where he is?

Cooper:  We’re still trackin’ him right now

Deskins:  You’re trackin’ him

Cooper:  Yeah

Deskins:  Can you, can you give me a lat long, where he is for our S A [situation awareness]?

Cooper:  Yeah, hold on a second

23.  083922  NEADS Weapons and MCC Battle Stations

Weapons Position, Deskins on phone with Cooper in background

Deskins:  Hey Nasty, lookin’ for assets [indistinct] lat long

Weapons:  Real world hijack, You got it,

Weapons:  [indistinct] Yep.  Once we ah, once he comes into our radar, we will, we’ll be takin’ it, give me those slides quick

Deskins:  four one one five north, zero seven eight four six west

Weapons:  [indistinct] make sure you know what’s goin’ on.   Real world hijack, forty mi, miles north of Kennedy

Deskins:[indistinct]

Weapons:  Otis on battle stations

Weapons:  Putting Otis on battle stations

24.  084000 AA11 Panta 45 Battle Stations Cape Tape

Tower:  Tower is on

Approach: Cape Approach is on

Powell:  Giant Killer

Giant Killer:  Giant Killer

Powell:  This is Huntress placing Panta four five, four six on battle stations, I repeat battle stations, time one two four one [Zulu], authenticate hotel romeo, all parties acknowledge with initials.  Command Post

Powell:  Giant Killer, Tower

Tower:  [indistinct]

Powell:  Approach

Approach:  Tango Juliet and say again the call sign

Powell:  Panta, papa alfa november tango alfa, four five, four six

Approach:[indistinct]

Powell  Juliet Papa, all parties are cleared to drop

25.  084259  NEADS SOCC Work to Scramble

Foxy:  [aside]  I’ve never seen so much real world stuff happen during an exercise

Background:  Deskins [indistinct]

Foxy:  Steve, lat long, forty one

Unknown:  Right

Unknown:  What was that?

Foxy:  OK Find this guy

Nasypany:  Yeah, forty one

Nasypany:  Yeah, we’re puttin’ it in

Background:  Fourteen forty three

Nasypany:  Fourteen forty three, look for it, right there, OK mode three, fourteen forty three, last known.  No, this is real world.  OK we’re in the high chair.

Background:  I’ve got a Z point, sir

Nasypany  Last known postion, that we got out this guy, was right there at the Z point, he’s headed one nine zero at twenty nine thousand feet, headin’ down, so we’re lookin’ for somebody, you know what start hittin’ up tracks all around that area, that Z point, OK, just north of ah

MCC/T:  SD, scramble Otis

Fox:  Copy, say mission

Fox:  I don’t know where I’m scramblin’ these guys to, I need a direction, ah destination

Nasypany:  OK, I’m going to give you the Z point, it’s just north of ah New York City

Fox:  I got this lat long forty one fifteen seventy four thirty six, or seventy three forty six:

Nasypany:  Head ’em in that direction

Fox:  Copy that

26.  083800  AA11 NEADS ID Techs React to Powell

ID Tech 1:  What?

ID Tech 2.  What was that?

Background:  Is that real world?

Dooley:  Real world hijack

Watson:  Cool.  Ribbit,  [humming]

Watson:  Boston?

Dial Tone

Watson:  Open line [elapsed time, 27 seconds]

Scoggins:  Boston, military desk

Watson:  Yeah, Huntress calling, ah in reference to the hijacked aircraft

Scoggins:  Yes

Watson:  We’re seeking to get some information from you, if we could

Scoggins: OK, what [indistinct] you need?

Watson:  We need call sign, type aircraft

Scoggins:  It’s ah American eleven

Watson:  American eleven?

Scoggins:  Type aircraft is a uh seven sixty seven

Watson:  And, number of souls on board, do you know that?

Scoggins:  Uh, I don’t, know, hold on, hey Dan do we got souls on board, and all that?

Scoggins:  No.  We don’t have any of that information

Watson:  You don’t have any of that?  OK

Scoggins:  We know the position about forty miles north of Kennedy

Watson:  Forty miles north of Kennedy?

Scoggins: Right

Watson:  Do you have ah mode three?

Scoggins:  No we don’t, he’s a primary target, only.

Watson:  Primary target only?

Scoggins:  Yeah

Watson:  OK, And you don’t know where he’s coming from or destination?

Scoggins:  No idea.  He took off out of Boston originally heading for ah  Los Angeles

Watson:  Boston to Los Angeles?

Scoggins:  That was his original destination, yeah

Watson:   And where are they going now, do you know?

Scoggins:  No idea.  He’s headin’ towards Kennedy, looks like his speed is decreasing, I’m not exactly sure where, nobody really knows

Watson:  Are you the controlling agency?  Or is New York?

Scoggins: Boston Center.

Watson:  Boston Center

Scoggins:  Right now we are he’s headed right for New York Center

Watson:  And is there any military assistance requested?

Scoggins:  Ah, Yes we’re actually trying to get ah F-15s to ah

Watson:  [indistinct] to get F-15s out

Scoggins:  Yeah, F15s out of Otis

Watson:  But you don’t have uh, you don’t have any modes or codes on him?

Scoggins:  Uh, no, right now, right now,  it’s just ah, no we don’t have any mode C

Watson: Is he inbound to JFK?

Scoggins We we don’t know.  Heh

Watson:  You don’t know where he is at all?.

Scoggins:  He’s been hijacked, the pilots having a hard time talkin’ to the, I mean, we don’t know, we don’t know where he’s going, he’s headin’ towards Kennedy, he’s ah, like I said he’s like thirty five miles north of Kennedy now at three hundred sixty seven knots

Watson:  OK

Scoggins:  No idea where he’s goin’ [indistinct]

Watson:  If you could please give us a call, and let us know, ah you know any information, that would be great

Scoggins:  OK, right now I guess we’re trying to work on, I guess there’s been some threats in the cockpit, ah the pilot

Watson:  Based on what?  I’m sorry.

Scoggins:  Ah.  We’ll call you right back as soon as we know more info

Watson:  Thank you

27.  084555  NEADS Powell Otis Scramble

Command Post:  Command Post up

Giant Killer:  Giant Killer’s on

Powell:  Approach

Approach:  Approach is on [Otis Tower]

Powell:  This is Huntress with an active air defense scramble for Panta four five, four six.  Time one two four six [Zulu].  Authenticate delta xray.  Scramble immediately, Panta four five, four six, heading two eight zero, flight level two niner zero.  Contact Huntress on frequency two two eigtht decimal niner.  Backup three six four decimal two.  All parties acknowledge with initials.  Command Post.

Command Post: Mike Kilo

Tower: [indistinct]

Approach:  Tango Julliet

Giant Killer:  [indistinct]

Powell:  All parties are cleared to drop, Juliet Papa here

28.  084629  NEADS CC Summary for BC 25 Miles Z Point

Nasypany:  Hi, sir

Nasypany:  OK, what, what we’re doin’, we’re tryin’ to [indistinct] locate this guy.  We can’t find ‘im via IFF.  What we’re goin’ to do, we gonna hit up every track within a twenty-five mile radius of the Z point that we put on the scope.  Twenty nine thousand, heading one nine zero, we’re just gonna do, we’re gonna try to find this guy.  They can’t find ‘im,  then he’s not in uh, there’s been supposedly there’s threats in the cockpit, so we’re just ah doin’ the thing.

Nasypany.  True.  And, probably right now, with what’s goin’ on in the cockpit, [indistinct] probably the crazies, so, it probably needs to simmer down and we’ll get better information.  I’ve scrambled Otis, already, per you direction.  We’re sendin’ them in that general direction, we’re sendin’ them right to that Z point, and then we can ah we can maneuver ’em as deemed uh

Nasypany: Right, we’ll we’ll work with them, make sure weapons works with ’em, now

29.  085207  NEADS Learns of WTC Continues Scramble

Naspany:  So, if we can find it we’ll intercept it.  Did you did you just say somethin’ hit the World Trade Center or somethin’ reported?  No keep on going with it.

Unknown:  I talked with ID, and we had a phone call that came down to us saying that they had a possible hijack out of Boston

Unknown:  OK

Unknown:  And uh, I just whipped around and we were just, we always watch the news, and a seven thirty seven hit the World Trade Center, and I was just curous at the same time if that was the aircraft.  Last I knew they had a primary on it.  Track was not squawking seventy five hundred but was

Nasypany:  Could be it

Unknown:  Under duress

Nasypany:  Send ’em to New York City, still, continued go

Unknown:  Sir, hold on

Nasypany:  K, OK, who’s pugged in up there?  Plug in.

Unknown:  Sir I have to have you hold on for a minute

Unknown:  OK

Unknown:  This is what i’ve got so far

Unknown:  OK

Nasypany:  OK, this is what we,

Fox: [indistinct]

Nasypany:  OK now we do.

Unknown:  Yeah

Nasypany:  This is what I got.  Possible news that a seven thirty seven just hit the World Trade Center, real world, and we’re tryin’ to confirm this.  OK, continue takin’ the fighters down to the New York City area, JFK area, as best as you can.  Make sure that the FAA clears a, you a route all the way through.  Just do what we gotta do, OK?.  Just press with it.  And it looks like somebody, looks like this guy could’ve hit the World Trade Center.

30.  085340  Panta Hold and work with FAA

[Otis fighters have just taken off]

Fox:  Alright, our last actual reported postion if he didn’t crash into the World Trade Center is twenty miles south of JFK.  So I want you to take him down into this area, hold as needed, whatever altitude they need to go for Center to make that work is fine with me.  That’s the area I want him to go and hold, right in that little gap there.

Fox: {to someone else]  Alright, this is what we’re doin’, we’re takin’ him down into this area to hold for now.  Whatever altitude Center needs for them to do that is fine.  But ah, is, the weapons team should have that.  The fighters should be talkin’ to Center they’re goin’ pass that to the fighters exactly what we want them to do

Nasypany:  Now, Foxy

Fox: Yeah, no, no, because if he’s still airborne

Nasypany: OK, right now, if you can hand the fighters over directly  to FAA

Fox:  They’re still under FAA control, we’re never goin’  take ’em.

Nasypany:  just take ’em all the, work with them, coordinate with them as best that you can with that, take them to the area and let them handle that airspace

[indistinct]

31.  083818  UA175 Affirms AA11 at FL 29

ZNY:  OK United one seventy five, you have him at your twelve o’clock, now five, ten miles

UA175:  Ah firmative we have ‘im, uh, he looks about twenty, say about twenty nine, twenty eight thousand

ZNY:  OK thank you

32.  083942  UA175 Vectored 30 Right for Traffic

ZNY: United one seventy five, [overridden] turn thirty degrees to the right, I want to keep you away from this traffic

UA175:  Thirty degrees to the right, United one seventy five, heavy

33.  084131  AA11 UA175 ZNY Reort of Suspicious Transmission Boston

UA175:  New York, United one seventy five, heavy

ZNY:  United one seventy five, go ahead

UA175: Ah, we figured we’d wait to go to your center, ah we heard a suspicious transmission ah on our departure out of Boston ah with someone ah uh sounded like someone keyed the mike and said uh everyone uh stay in your seats

ZNY:  Oh, OK I’ll pass that along over here.  Hey Kingston on ninety three line

Kingston:  Go ahead

ZNY:  That United one seventy five just came on my frequency, and he said that he heard a suspicious uh transmission when they were leaving Boston

Kingston:  Oh yeah?

ZNY:  Everybody stay in their seats, that’s what they heard as a suspicious transmission.  Now that USAIR five eight three code, the American he spotted him, was at twenty nine

34.  084826  This is New York Center

ZNY:  OK, this is New York Center, ah, we’re watching the airplane, he is fifteen west of Kennedy now,  we had two, one or two confirmations that he was still at twenty nine, excuse me, one at twenty nine, one at thirty one, didn’t couldn’t see ‘im

ZNY: Ah, I also had conversation with American Airlines, and they’ve told us that they believe that ah one of their stewardesses was stabbed and that there are people in the cockpit who have control of the aircraft, and that’s all the information they have ah right now.

35.  085146  UA175 ZNY Recycle Transponder

ZNY:  United one seventy five, recycle your transponder adn squack code of one four seven zero

[seven seconds]

ZNY:  United one seventy five, New York

[fifteen seconds]

ZNY:  United one seventy five, do you read New York?

[four seconds]

ZNY: Delta fourtenn eighty nine, do you read New York?

D1489:  Delta fourteen eighty nine, go ahead

ZNY:  OK, just wanted to make sure you read New York, ah, United United one seventy five, do you read New York?

36.  085323  UA175 ZNY Report to Sup and Code 3321

Dial tone

ZNY 1: Tim?

ZNY 2:  Hello?

ZNY 1   Do you ah see that United one seventy five anywhere?  And do me a favor, you see that target there, the thirty three twenty one code, at thirty three five climbin’? Don’t know who he is, but you got the USAIR five eighty three if you need to descend him down you can.  Nobody, we we have a hijack, we have some problems over here right now

ZNY 2:  Oh you do?

ZNY 1:  United one seventy five, New York

ZNY: 2  Yes

ZNY 1:  That  that may be real traffic, nobody knows, I can’t get a hold of United one seventy five at all right now, and I don’t where he went to

ZNY 2:  Alright. OK, I’ll see if I have one

ZNY 1:  Alright

ZNY 2:  OK

37.  085408  UA175 ZNY Controller works UA175 and AA 11 issue

ZNY:  USAIR five eighty three go ahead

USAIR583:  Yeah, yes, ah, reports off over the radio of a commuter plane hittin’ the World Trade Center,  is that, ah, seven ah seven six still in the air?

ZNY:  Don’t know but just stand by.  Delta twenty four thirty three turn left to a heading of one seven zero, now.  I have traffic, I”m not really sure if it’s good, out of thirty two, might be descending, might be climbing, I”m showin’ him at thirty one right now

D2433:  [indistinct] out of twenty four, thirty three

ZNY:  United, one seventy five, do you read New York?

Background::one o’clock, ten miles turning into your airspace, descending out of thirty thre

ZNY:  Delta twenty four thirty three, ah, can you climb to flight level three three zero, the traffic looks like he’s descended back down to thirty one, now

D2433:  Yeah, we can go up

ZNY:  OK, Climb and maintain flight level three three zero, Delta twenty four thirty three

D2433:  Climbin’ to thirty three, Delta twenty four thirty three

38.  085751  UA175 ZNY ID as UA175 complex traffic

Internal ZNY communication to start

Position 1:  John

Position 2: Go ahead

Position 1:  Oh, I’m sorry, I got some hand offs here.  We got some incidents goin’ over here.  Is Delta twenty four thirty three gonna be OK at thirty three?

Position 2.  [indistinct]

Position 1. I’ve [got him] climbin’ for traffic, if they can,  United one seventy five that just took off out of a, thing, we might have a hijack over here, two of ’em

Position 2:  [indistinct]

Position 1: So, Is Delta twenty four thirty three OK comin’ back?

Position 2: Yes, Delta thirty three

Position 1:  OK, and, uh, Delta fourteen eighty nine is comin’ to you, also

Position 2:  OK [indistinct]

Position 1:  Delta fourteen eighty nine, contact New York Center, now, on one three four point three two

D1489:  Delta fourteen eighy nine, three four three two

Position 1: Delta twenty four thrirty three, thank you for your help, that ah United just took off and we’re not really sure what he’s really doin’.  You thought is was United seven sixty seven, though?

D2433:  That’s, ah, that’s what it looked like

Position 1:  Thank you Delta twenty four thirty three.  [Climbing] at two seven zero, join J seventy five, reasonable navigation, thanks for the climb

39.  090113  Mulligan Bell

Mulligan:  Check with your NOM, do you know if any one down there has done any coordination to scramble fighter type airplanes?

Bell:  [indistinct]

Mulligan:  No, we have several situations goin’ goin’ on here, it is escalating big big time, and we need to get the military involved with us

Bell:  Why, what’s goin’ on?

Mulligan: Just get me somebody who has the authority to get military in the air, now.

Bell:  Alright, I’ll go tell ’em

40.  090021  Hey Joe ZNY TRACON x1085 TMU

Hey Joe, you see three three two one code just southwest of Newark by about fifteen, eighteen, twenty miles,

Joe: Hold on

Unknown: fifteen thousand, descending

Joe:  I’m looking, hold one, southwest of Newark by about fifteen twenty?

Joe:  I dont’ see any

Unknown:  They were trackin’ im’, made a hard left turn, he descended pretty rapidly, and especially with  just happened in there

Joe:  I got somebody that keeps coasting, but he looks like he’s goin’ into one of those small airports down there

Unknown:  Hold on a second, No, this guy’s a big boy

Unknown:  This guys a big boy cause he’s leavin’ some big contrails, I’m  trying to bring up here, get ya, there he is, right there, hold on.

Joe:  He’s out of ninety five hundred, nine thousand now

Unknown:  Know who he is?

Joe:  We just, we just, we don’t know who he is.  We’re just pickin; him up now

Unknown:  Alright, heads up man.  Looks like another one

Joe:  Alright

41.  090247  UA175 Vis United Report into Tower TRACOM TMUDD

[indistinct]

Unknown:  Hey, can you look out your window right now?

TRACON:  Yeah

Unknown:  Can you, can you see a guy at about four thousand feet, about five east of the airport right now,  look’s like he’s

TRACON:  Yeah, I see ‘im

Unknown:  Do you see that guy, look, is he descending into the building also

TRACON:  He’s descending really quick too, Yeah

Unknown:  Well that’s

TRACON:  forty five hundred fight now, he just dropped eight hundred feet in like, like one one sweep

Unknown:  That’s another situation

Unknown:  What kind of airplane is that, can you guys tell?

TRACON:  I don’t know, I’ll read it out in a minute

Background:  Another one just hit just hit the building

Background:  Wow

Background:  [indistinct] Wow. Another one just hit hard  [indistinct] World Trade

TRACON:  The whole building just ah came apart

Unknown:  Holy smoke.  Alright, I guess you guys are going to be busy

TRACON:  OK

[hangs up]

42. 090423 UA175 ZNY 2d aircraft into WTC

Unknown:  I think an airplane just plowed into the City

Unknown:  I, yeah, they did, ah, duh, the World Trace Center hit [indistinct]

Unknown:  Another one, we just saw another one do it.

Unknown:  Another one?

Unknown:  Yeah

Unknown:  Holy cow, that’s two, ah, one just hit an [indistinct] hour ago

Unknown:  Yeah, one just a moment ago

Unknown:  No shit

43.  090234  AA11 Jones thought some planes as in plural

ZBW:  Hey Tony, are you still there?

Herndon Center:  Yes I am, Terry.

ZBW:  Tony?  I’m going to reconfirm with ah with downstairs, but ah, the ah, as far as the tape, But,  Bobby Jones seemed to think that the guy said that we have planes.  Now I don’t know if it was because of the accent, or if there’s more than one.  But, ah, I’m gonna, I”m gonna reconfirm that for ya, ah, and I’ll get back to you real quick.  OK?

Herndon Center:  Appreciate it.

ZBW:  Planes, as in plural

44.  090322  AA11 Nother One Just Hit

ZBW:  Tony, it sounds like, we’re talkin’ to New York, that there’s another one aimed at the World Trade Center

Herndon Center:  There’s another aircraft?

ZBW:  A second one just hit the Trade Center.

Herndon Center: OK, yeah, we’ve gotta get the, we’ve got to alert the military real ah ah quick on this, ah.

Background:  Another, another airplane just crashed into the other tower

Herndon Center:  Do we know what type Terry?

ZBW:  No.  We just got that report from ah from New York Center.

Herndon Center;  Alright, alright, we’re standin’ by

45.  0904  Boston stops all airplanes

[Note, this is a duplicate of 47]

46.  090608  AA11 Confirmed on Tape We Have Planes Line

ZBW:  Tony, Terry, it’s confirmed on that tape that [indistinct] said we have planes

47.  090401  Ground Stop Boston

ZBW:  We’re gonna stop everybody, we’re gonna shut, we’re gonna shut Boston down, I’d suggest the same elsewhere

Herndon Center:  You’re gonna do what?

ZBW:  We’re shuttin’ the airplanes down, we’re not lettin’ anyone go, right now

Herndon Center:  That’s a good move

ZBW:  We’re pretty wrapped up on everything.  Ah, there’s a second plane that just hit the World Trade Center.

Herndon Center:  Stop all departures out of the center, please.

ZBW:  Yeah, that’s what we’re doin’

48.  090713  ATCSCC  ACARS Increase Security Internationals

Herndon Center:  Terry go ahead?

ZBW:  Ah is there a way, or, to try to get messages to the airborne aircraft to [indistinct] to increase security to the cockpit, or somethin’, the ACARS or somethin’?

Background:  I’d just as soon not have anyone else up there, that can…

ZBW:  We got internationals that are comin’ into the vicinity, we’re trying to talk to them but we don’t want to ah scare anybody, but we want the ah, we’re talkin’ about possibly makin’ some ah transmissions on frequency for these guys coming overseas to just ah, you know increase the security for cockpit operations.

Herndon Center:  Terry, we’re getting a lot of traffic on this bridge, I, I copied that, let’s keep doin’ that, ah, [indistinct] to the Command Center, the ATA rep, see if we can get the airline company operations to contact their aircraft.  I’d recommend, ah, maybe, possiblity of the stuff coming in from overseas, Bangor as an alternate site, but leave that up to them

ZBW:  Yeah, we’ll leave it up to them, but we’re also gonna let them know to increase the security for cockpit access.

Herndon Center;  Alright, that sounds like a good plan

49.  090933  Cockpit Security L2431 and ZBW 31R Tape

ZBW:  Delta twenty four thirty one, ah we have a message for you to heighten your cockpit security, ah due to some activity this morning

Delta 2431 OK, does, and that is, from ah company?

ZBW:  Negative, ah it is a general advisory to all aircraft ah this morning.  An aircraft hit the World Trade Center, it had been hijacked.  And we’re receivin’ reports that  there may have been a second one.

Delta 2431:  OK, thank you very much.  Is that a domestic cairrer that was ah hijacked?

ZBW:  It was an American airlines aircraft

Delta 2431:  OK, thank you.

50.  091042  Cockpit Security ZBW Advises 3 more planes

US 1168:  Boston, good morning US eleven sixty eight checkin’ in ah two eight oh:

ZBW:  [indistinct] sixty eight, Boston Center good morning.  Did you copy advisory to heighten your cockpit security, cockpit awareness?

US 1168: Ah, negative, sir, say again

ZBW:  [indistinct] sixty eight All FAA facilities are advising all air carriers to heighten their cockpit awareness.  There’s been at least one hijack this morning and possibly two

US 1168:  OK Roger, we copy, and just ah to confirm that was an airliner that crashed into the World Trade Center?

ZBW:  That’s what we understand.  Possibility of two.

US 1168  OK, thank you, sir, good morning

ZBW:  USAIR twenty forty seven, did you copy this?

USAIR 2047: Affirmative, thank you.

Southwest 1029:  Boston Center, good morning. Southwest ten twenty nine flight level three two zero, ah climbing to three five zero, and we copy all the reports

ZBW:  Southwest ten twenty nine, [indistinct]

51.  091532  Boston Cockpit Security

Herndon:  Command Center East

ZBW: Boston, listen ah both of these aircraft departed Boston, both were seven sixes, both heading to LA, and I’m lookin’ out on the TSD and I think that all departures out of Boston should have heightened cockpit security.  Is there any way you can bring up every center in the country and relay that message so that they can tell the aircraft that are ah out there flying right now to increase the cockpit security vigilance on this day?

Herndon:  I’ll get the message out

ZBW:  Thank you very much

52.  090230 NEADS Notified of UA175

ID Tech 1:  Huntress ID, unsecure line,  yes sir, go ahead.  What time sir?  That’ll be all sir, thank you.

Dooley:  They had a second possible hijack

ID Tech 2:  United one seven five?

ID Tech 1:  One seven five

ID Tech 2:  What is it?

ID Tech 1:  United one seven five is the other aircraft, mode 3, three three two one

ID Tech 2:  Who were you talkin’ to?

ID Tech 1:  I was talkin’ to New York

53.  090727 Panta Over Manhattan Some Kind of Play

Nasypany:  Ok, Foxy, this is what, this is what I foresee that we probably need to do.  We need to talk to FAA.  We need to tell ’em if this stuff is goin’ to keep on goin’ we need to take those fighters put ’em over Manhattan.  OK?

Unknown:  Sir

Nasypany:  That’s the best thing, that’s the best play right now.  So, coordinate with FAA tell em’ if there’s more out there, which we don’t know, let’s get ’em over Manhattan, at least we got some kind of play

54.  090830 Langley Battle Stations not Scramble

Nasypany:  OK, this is what I got goin’.  Tell Foxy to scramble Langley, send ’em in same location

Nasypany:  Battle, battle stations or scramble?  Battle stations only at Langley.  Ok, this is, ah who’s up there?  OK, are you listening?  What I told the SD so far we need to get the fighters over Manhattan cuz’ we don’t know how many guys are out of Boston, could be two, could be more.

Nasypany:  I don’t know, just in case.  Not down in Whiskey one oh five where they, where FAA wants to hold them,  We need to be more [indistinct] and stick ’em, you know,

Powell: [in background issues battle stations order

Background:  We’re workin’ it [indistinct]

Nasypany: Yeah, so this is, yeah, OK?  Yeah, well, we can’t they’re in ah FAA airspace.  Well we can, we can,  Yeah, they’re ours.  [chuckle] They’re mine!

55.  090925 Langley BS Norfolk Tower

Powell:  Giant Killer

Giant Killer:  Giant Killer’s on

Powell::  This is Huntress placing Quit two five, two six on battle stations, time one three one zero, authenticate  charlie victor, that is Quit two five two six on battle stations all parties acknowledge with initials, command post

Command Post: [no answer]

Powell:  Langley

Langley: [indistinct]

Powell: Tower

Tower [indistinct]

Powell:  How about command post?

Command Post:  [indistinct]

Powell:  O D C, Say again?

Giant Killer:  Giant Killer is out

Powell:  No, the female who was that?

[indistinct]

Unknown: [indistinct] needed?

Powell:  No you’re cleared to drop, Giant Killer you’re cleared to drop, Tower you’re cleared to drop

56.  085634 AA77 ZID Attempts to contact

ZID:  American seventy seven, Indy

579:

ZID:  Air Canada five seventy nine, Indy Center, roger

ZID:  American seventy seven, Indy

[seven seconds]

ZID  American seventy seven, American, Indy

[seventeen seconds]

ZID  American seventy seven, American, Indy, radio check, how do you read

[twelve seconds]

ZID:  American ah seventy seven, American, radio check, how do you read

Dial tone

Unknown:  This is, ah, Dacos

ZID:  This is ah Henderson, American seventy seven, I don’t know what happened to him, I’m trying to [overridden] plane took a turn to the south, and and now I’m ah, I don’t know what altitude he’s at or what he’s doin’,  [indistinct] headed towards Falmouth at thirty five

Unknown:  OK, just let me know

ZID:  OK, I’ll try to get a hold of ‘im. thanks

ZID:  American ten twenty threem contact Indy Center on one two three point seven seven, good day

AA1023:  twenty three seventy seven, Aerican ten twenty three, good day

ZID: USAIR seventeen fifty one  descent and maintain flight level three five zero

1751: Ah, Seventeen fifty one, descend to three five zero

ZID:  [indistinct]four nine quebec sierra cleared direct Spartansburg

49QS: Cleared direct Spartansburg, forty nine quebec sierra

ZID:  American seventy seven, Indy, radio check, how do you read?

[twenty seconds]

423:  Indy, were you calling [indistinct] four twenty three?

ZID: [indistinct] four twenty three,  Negative

ZID:  American ah seventy seven, Indy Center, how do you read?

[seven seconds]

ZID:  American seventy seven, new  radio check, how do you read?

[nine seconds]

ZID:  US air seventeen fifty one, contact Indy Center on one three four point two two, good day

1751:  Seventeen fifty one, three four two two

ZID:  four nine quebec sierra contact Indy Center on one three four point two two good day

49QS:  three four two two, [indistinct] good day

ZID:  US air twelve, correction? two seventeen, cleared direct [indistinct] mountain

217:  Direct [indistinct] mountain, US air two seventeen

[twelve seconds]

Dial Tone

Dacos:  Dacos

ZID:  This is Henderson, still haven’t got American seventy seven, ah, last he was at thrity five goin’ to Falmouth, so I don’t know where he is out there anywhere, yet, so we’re still tryin’ to get a hold of him, we contacted company

Dacos:  OK

ZID:  OK

[eleven seconds]

ZID:  Flexjet two, correct, flexjet four twenty three, contact Indy Center on one three four point two two, good day

Acknowledgement over ridden

Background:  [indistinct] fifty nine line, ah Cleveland

Unknown:  fifty nine, Morgantown

ZID:  American seventy seven, Indy

AA2493:  Center, American ah twenty four ninety three

ZID:  American twenty four ninety three, Go ahead

AA2493:  Yeah, We, ah, sent a message to dispatch to have i’m come up on twenty twenty seven, is that what you want him to do?

ZID: Yeah, we had ‘im on  west side of our airspace, and he went into coast, and don’t have a track on ‘im, and now’s he not talkin’ to me, so we don’t know what exactly happened to him, we’re trying to get ahold of ‘im, we also contacted your company, so thanks for the help

AA2493:  Alright

57.  085850 AA77 1st Contact AA Dispatch

American:  American dispatch, Jim McDonald

ZID:  This Indianapolis Center, we’re trying to get a hold of American seventy seven

American:  Ah, Indy, hang on one second please

ZID:  What?

American:  Hang on one second sir

ZID: Alright

American:  Who you tryin’ to get a hold of

ZID:  American seventy seven

American:  OK

ZID:  On frequency one two zero point two seven

American:  One two zero

ZID: point two seven.  We were talkin’ to im’ and all of a sudden it just ah

American: OK, alright we’ll get a hold of ‘im for ya

ZID:  Alright

58.  090248 AA77 ZID 2d contact AA Dispatch

American:  American dispatch, Jim McDonald

ZID:  Yes this is Indianapolis Center, we ah ah [don’t know] if we talked to the same guy, about American seventy seven

American:  Yeah,  I [indistinct]called ‘im, but I didn’t get a reply back from them

ZID:  We we ah lost track control of the guy, he’s in coast track, so we have, we don’t really know where his target is and we can’t get a hold of ‘im, Ah,

American:  I tried

ZID:  You guys tried ‘im and no response?

American:  No response

ZID:  Yeah, We have no radar contact and ah no geo? cations with him, so if you guys can try him again

American:  We’re doin’ it

ZID:  Alrght, thanks a lot

American: We’re doin’ it, Thank you.

59.  091154 AA77 ZID 3d Contact AA Dispatch 2d WTC Impact

American:  American Dispatch, Jim McDonald

ZID:  Indianapolis Center.  Did you get a hold of American seventy seven by chance?

American:  No sir, but we have an unconfirmed report that a second airplane hit the World Trade Center

ZID:  Say again

American:  You know we lost American eleven, to a hijackin’, so, American was up, ah, a Boston to Los Angeles flight

ZID:  It was, alright, I can’t really I can’t hear what you’re sayin’ there .  Did you say American eleven?

American:  Yes.  We were hijacked.

ZID:  [indistinct]

American: It was a Boston to LA flight.  And seventy seven is a Dulles LA flight.  And ah we have an unconfirmed report a second airplane just flew into the World Trade Center

ZID:  Thank you very much.  Good bye

60.  091626 AA11 AA77 ATCSCC King with Halleck AAL

King:  Are you able to confirm anything within your alirline to us?

Halleck:  No, unfortunately, ah

King:  How about, can you tell me if we know for sure if it was American eleven that went into the Trade Center or not

Halleck:  We think that’s who it was.

King:  OK

Halleck: And we’re missin’ another flight also

King: Ah, What flight are you missing?

Halleck;  Seventy seven

King:  And when is the last time you knew for sure something about him?

Halleck:  Ah, he was in, ah, wait a minute, well there’s a, I don’t know how he got up there

King:  There’s a data block [indistinct]

Halleck:  But seventy seven is up there also

King:  OK

Halleck:  He’s out of Dulles

King, OK, and,

Halleck:  Dulles L A, and they both ah apparently have been hijacked,  and eleven is we’re pretty sure is in there. and, and ah, seventy seven, we were talkin’ to him according to Indianapolis Center

King: Uh Huh

Halleck:  About forty five minutes ago, and uh in Indy Center

King:  Uh huh

Halleck:  I don’t know he got to, to ah back to the Trade Center, I have no idea if, if that happened

King: OK, it may not have, we have another call sign, of course we don’t know for sure, any of these call signs right now, but, if we find that it’s your aircraft we;ll certainly give you a call

Halleck:  So, ah, you have ah, you have two airplanes in theTrade Center?

King:  Yes

Halleck: And ah you don’t know who either one of them are, for sure?

King:  Yean, that’s true

Halleck:  OK

King:  If I did, I would share it with you

Halleck: OK thanks [indistinct]

King:  Alright, Bye, Bill

61.  091836 AA77 Summersall to ZID from ATCSCC ZID TMU

ZID:  Indy

ATCSCC:  Hey Indy, this is Bob, Command Center.  Need you to find, tell me anything, or everything you can about American seventy seven, where he is and if you have radar or not

ZID:  Well,  OK, I’m listenin’ to my Ops Manager talk to Washington

ATCSCC:  I’m sorry

ZID:  We were talkin’ to ‘im in the vicinity of ah Henderson

ATCSCC:  Henderson?  What’s Henderson?

ZID:  Hang on, hang on a second [eight seconds]

ZID:  OK, we ah I guess we were talkin’ to him, in the vicinity of Henderson, H N N, we lost communications and radar with him.  Hang on a minute, I’m goin’ to have the Ops Manager tell ya the story  [four seconds]

ZID:  Hello, Command Center?

ATCSCC:  Yes sir

ZID:  This is John Thomas, Ops Manager.  I think we need to let everyone know this right away, if they don’t already.  American seventy seven was over ah was just west of Charleston, West Virginia,  at flight level three five zero, it’s a heav, heavy Boeing sever fifty two, and dissappeared off our radar scope about twelve fifty six Z, a long with lost ah frequency.

ZID:  We were treating is as a lost, started to do some procedures to notify search and rescue, and what not, whe, when American Airlines told us they’d had some aircraft, or an aircraft hijacked.  We now believe that aircraft may have been hijacked, although no one has, we have nothing, you know, to verify that.  What with the World Trade Center we could have another loose aircraft out there somewhere.

ATCSCC:  K, at the time of loss do you, ah what altitude  was he at? Flight level

ZID:  Flight level, flight level three five zero

ATCSCC:  And he just just lost primary, also

ZID:  Lost all, Yes lost, no primary, or ah that we could see. Course we couldn’t wouldn’t necessarily be able to pick up a primary there anyway

ATCSCC:  I’m assuming then that you’re ah, doing what you can to do a primary read retrack on him, if you can do that

ZID:  Sure

ATCSCC:  And then, ah, so at twelve fifty-six Zulu we lost [indistinct] comm and radar.  Any ah ELTs?

ZID: No ELTs

ATCSCC Ah um, OK, ah, any more information you get, I’d appreciate it.  And I’ll forward this immediately up to the NOM and everyone that’s standin’ up there

ZID: Thank you

ATCSS:  Thank you, bye

ZID:  Bye

62.  093607 Gofer 06 Traffic to Site 757 Low Altitude

DCA:  Gofer zero six  traffic is eleven o’clock and five miles northbound, fast moving, type and altitude unknown

Gofer 06:  Gofer 06.  We have the traffic in sight, twelve o’clock

DCA:  Ah, you have the traffic, do you know what kind it is, can you see?

Gofer 06:  Looks live a seven fifty seven, sir

DCA: A seven fifty seven, can you estimate his altitude?

Gofer 06:  Ah, looks like he’s at low altitude right now, sir

DCA:  Gofer eight six [sic], thank you

63.  093641 Gofer 06 Vectored for Traffic

Gofer 06:  That ah traffic for Gofer zero six is still in a descent now, and uh looks like he’s rolled out Northeast bound

DCA:  Alright, Thank You.

Background:  Swan, Swan, anyone?

DCA:  Gofer eight six [sic] climb and maintain, ah

Background:  You got a military?

DCA:  Yeah, stand by.  Gofer eight six turn right and follow the traffic, please.

DCA:  Gofer eight six, turn right heading zero eight zero, we’re gonna vector you for the traffic

Gofer 06:  OK, zero eight zero, Gofer zero six [indistinct]

DCA:  Dulles, I’m keeping Gofer eight six, um, zero six with me for a while

Background:  [indistinct]

64.  093800 Gofer 06 Aircraft is Down

Gofer 06:  And, uh, Washington, this is Gofer zero six

DCA:  Gofer zero six, go ahead

Gofer 06  Yes sir, thati aircraft is down, he’s in our twelve o’clock position, ah, look’s like it’s just  ay, uh, north west of the airfield at this time, sir

DCA:  Gofer eight six, thank you.  Descend and maintain two thousand

Gofer 06:  OK, We are down to two thousand. And, uh, this is Gofer zero six, it looks like that aircraft crashed into the Pentagon, sir

DCA:  Gofer eight six, Gofer zero six, thank you

65.  093826 Gofer 06 ac Crashed into West Side Pentagon

Gofer 06: Understand you still want Gofer zero six to descend to two thousand sir

DCA:  Gofer zero six you can maintain three thousand and ah turn left heading two seven zero

Gofer 06: OK.  Left turn to two seven zero, Gofer zero six, ah,  any chance we can circle around the Pentagon, sir, on our two seven zero turn

DCA:  Gofer zero zix, Approved as requested

Gofer 06:  Gofer zero six

DCA:  Gofer ah zero six, OK,  they’re asking if you would go ahead and move away now towards the west, two seventy heading and ah two thousand for now

Gofer 06:  Roger, we’re climbing to three thousand sir,and it looks like that aircraft has impacted the west side of the Pentagon

DCA:  Alright, thank you

66.  092100 AA11 Scoggins Still Airborne3

ZBW:  Military, Boston Center,  just had a report that American eleven is still in the air and its on its way towards heading towards Washington

ID Tech:  K. American eleven is still in the air?

ZBW:  Yes

ID Tech: on its way towards Washington?

ZBW:  It was another evidently another aircraft that hit the tower, that’s the latest report that we have

ID Tech:  OK

ZBW:  I’m gonna try and confirm an I D for you, but I would assume he’s somewhere over ah either  New Jersey or somewhere further south

ID Tech:  OK so, American eleven isn’t the hijack at all then, right?

ZBW:  No, he is a hijack

ID Tech:  He, American eleven is a hijack

ZBW: Yes

ID Tech:  And he’s on his way towards Washington

ZBW:  Could be a third, It could be a third aircraft

67.  092140 Still Airborne Scramble Langley Tail Chase
Background:  OK, third aircraft hijacked, heading towards Washington.

Nasypany:  OK, ah, American Airlines is still ariborne, eleven, the first guy, he’s heading toward Washington.  OK,  I think we need to scramble Langley right now and I”m I’m gonna take the fighters from Otis and try to chase this guy down if I can find ‘im.

Nasypany:  Yeah

Nasypany:  You sure?

Nasypany:  OK, he’s heading towards Langley, or I should say Washington.  American eleven, the original guy, he’s still airborne. We’re still [indistinct] gettin’ a

Nasypany:  We’re gettin’ a position.  Got a position?

Background:  [indistinct] Got a hijack real world, gotta go.

Nasypany:  OK

Nasypany:  Foxy, scramble Langley.  Head ’em toward the Washington area

Fox:  Roger that

Nasypany:  [indistinct].. American..  We’re tryin’ to get a code on this guy right now, we do have a tail number.  It’s a

Nasypany:   Uhooh, we are, it’s ah, uuuuh, what was the tail number?

Background: Panta four five four six

Dooley:  November three three four alpha alpha

Nasypany: November three three four alpha alpha.  If we can find ‘im.  We, we’re gettin’ we’re tryin’ to get we’re tryin’ to get the modes tryin’ to get the position on this guy.  So, [indistinct] then we’ll run on ‘im.

Nasypany:  Yep, OK, bye.

Background:  OK

68.  092427 NEADS BC Update Forget Tail Chase

Nasypany:  OK, right now what we’re running with out there is two by zero by two by guns for Langley, two [indistinct] and two ah two tanks.  OK.  Also, we have the Panta four five four six, zero by ten by two by guns, three tanks.  Let me give you another head..

Background: try and get into a tail chase with this American one one headed toward Washington if we can find him

Nasypany:  Three tanks, affirmative.  Plus I have ah more stuff available if I need it from the SOF there.  Also, I have a tanker, a Maine 85

Nasypany:  OK you got the tanker, I have additional tankers out of McGuire, KC 10s, Team call sign, I”m not sure on the ah numbers, two two and two three. Two KC 10s. I’m sticking ’em in ah Whiskey107.  Yeah, and did you get the word that Langley got scrambled.

Background:  Go ahead,  sir

Nasypany:  Yes

Background:  OK, we couldn’t find the position on the airplane

Nasypany::  They just got scrambled about ah two minuites ago.  No thats, OK

Background:  FO. FO says forget the tail chase

Nasypany:  Even though we couldn’t find ‘im.  Yeah, great, that’s great

69.  092847 AA11 ID Summary call to Unknown

ID Tech:  Hi, this is Huntress calling, Uh, I was told to give you a buzz for our our Mission Crew Commander, any information, I guess three aircraft out of Boston are missing and apparently two of them have hit the Trade Center and one is enroute to Washington, did you get that information?

ZOB::  Yeah

ID Tech:  American one one is not the aircraft that crashed, it is still airborne, did you get that information?

ID Tech:  That’s what we just found out

ID Tech:  We don’t know where it is though, it’s headed toward Washington, was the last known information

Dooley:  Washington better get on the [indistinct]

ID Tech:  Right.  And I don’t know but somebody’s [indistinct] get the President goin’,  this is not good.

Dooley:  [background]  They’d better start looking for this guy

ID Tech:  Ah, yeah, we just hung up, I’m not goin’ to say too much right now, but ah  I wanted to give you a heads up.  Ah, do you have any information though where American one one is, or anything?

Dooley:  See this guy, they, Boston is the only one givin’ us any kinds of decent, freaking  input:

ID Tech:  Just want to, just want to say one more thing, too,  Ah, Washington, I don’t know if they don’t think this is serious, or not, but they are not, unless they hear from like the centers.  If you could give them a heads up and let them know [indistinct]

ID Tech:  Washington Center, they’re not really, not at all, OK sir?

Dooley:  We’ve got to get a point out on that American airlines

Background:  We do, we’ve got it on Langley scrambled

ID Tech:  Boston is calling Washington right now

Dooley:  They got ‘im?

Backgrround:  I don’t know if he’s on him yet, but Langley is scrambled to intercept [indistinct] and headed for Washington [indistinct] the fighters over ]indistinct]

ID Tech: [indistinct] I just talked to them

Dooley:  And I’d have the President airborne, whereever!

Dooley: What’s up?

ID Tech:  Uh, Boston has no clue where they are and he’s goin’  let Washington Center know that this is very serious

Dooley:  Good

ID Tech:  [indistinct]

Dooley:  Yeah, fuckin’

ID Tech:  So

Dooley:  Hey

Background:  American airlines headed toward D C [indistinct]

ID Tech:  I do, I lat long

Dooley:  Hey, anybody get it now?  Take a lat last lat long and they were doin’ two hundred and ninety knots

ID Tech:  Did you get the third call sign?

Dooley:  Headed toward Washington

Dooley:  The Z point that was the American airlines one

Dooley:  No, our first our first Z point, yeah, that was the American airlines, that was our lat long on him

Dial Tone

70.  093212 AA11 AA77 ID Summary ZDC loss of AA77
ID Tech:  Open Line

ID Tech  Huntress ID unsecure line

ZDC:  Huntress ID, this is Washington Center, the Operations Manager, ah

ID Tech: Go ahead sir

ZDC:  OK, I guess you’d called here a couple of times, you haven’t talked to me, but if there’s anything you need, or anything I can help you with, let let me know what it is right now please

ID Tech:  OK, ah, do you want me to let you know what we have going on, sir?

ZDC:  I would, yes, well I have a pretty good idea, but yes

ID Tech:  OK, there are three aircraft missing out of Boston, we spoke to Boston, and they said they’re not sure of the third aircraft call sign but the do have two,  one of them is United one sever
five

ZDC:  Uh huh

ID Tech: And one is American one one.  They thought that the American one one was the aircraft that crashed into the World Trade Center with the United one seven five, however,
American one one is not the aircraft that crashed, he said the pilot on American one one was talking to him, having a rough time telling him what’s going on, there was threats in the cockpit being made, this was the initial ah hijack information that we got, American one one, it’s a seven six seven, from Boston to Los Angeles. proposed route he was headed towards JFK at the time that they lost contact, but that was not the aircraft headed ah into the World Trade Center, that hit it

ZDC: OK

ID Tech:  What Boston’s saying.  He, the last known, and I”m not sure where we heard it, through the grapevine, people calling, is that American one one was headed toward Washington, and that’s the only thing

ZDC:  Was headed toward where?

ID Tech:  Washington

ZDC:  OK

ID Tech:  So, your A O R, and I just wanted to give you a heads up

ZDC:  OK, now,

ID Tech:  The last

ZDC: OK go ahead

ID Tech:  The last lat long that we had, primary target only, was four zero three eight north, zero seven four zero three west on American one one

ZDC  OK

ID Tech:  But again, remember nothing has been confirmed as far as which aircraft have hit the World Trade Center but the other one we have is information headed towards Washington

ZDC:  OK, now let me tell you this, I, we’ve been lookin’, we’e also lost American seventy seven

ID Tech:  American seventy seven

Dooley:  OK, American seventy seven lost

ID Tech:  Where was he proposed to head, sir?

ZDC:  Excuse me

ID Tech  Where was he proposed to head?

Dooley:  American 77

ZDC:  OK, he was going to LA also

Dooley:  He was goin’ to LA

ID Tech:  He was goin’ to LA

ZDC:  Now, uh

ID Tech: From where, sir?

ZDC:  Ah, I think he was from Boston, also

Dooley:  Boston to LA

ZDC:  Now let me tell you this story here. Ah, Indy, Indianapolis Center was workin’ this guy

ID Tech:  What guy?

ZDC:  American seventy seven

ID Tech:  OK

ZDC:  At flight level three five zero,  however,

Dooley:  [indistinct] in background

ZDC:  They lost radar with him, they lost contact with him,  they lost everything and they don’t have any idea where he is or what happened.  So what we’re done at the roud surrounding Centers here is to tell everyone to look out for limited codes, primary targets or whatever the case may be

ID Tech: OK

ZDC:  And that was the last time, that was about fifteen minutes ago since  I talked to the Indianapolis Center ah Operations Manager

ID Tech:  Do you have a type aircraft sir?

ZDC:  That was a seven sixty seven I believe

Dooley:  Seven sixty seven

ID Tech:  OK, and ah, right, I’ll call Indianapolis [indistinct]

ZDC:  Somebody else is talking, I’m sorry,  I can’t hear you in background

ID Tech: Um, All I need is the lat long, last known position of the seven sixty seven

ZDC:  Well I don’t know, that was Bos, that was Indy Center.  But they said somewhere, it was,  last time I talked to ’em they said that it was East of York.  And I don’t even know what State that is.

ID Tech:  Ok, sir, well I’m goin’ to go  ahead and just give them a call

ZDC:  OK

ID Tech:  Thank you sir

ZDC:  Thanks

71.  093536 AA77 Scoggins VFR 6 Miles

ID Tech:  Huntress ID, Sgt [indistinct] how can I help you

Colin Scoggins:  Our latest report the aircraft VFR six miles southeast of the White House

ID Tech:  Six miles southeast of the White House?

Colin Scoggins: Yep.  East?  He’s moving away?

ID Tech:  Southeast of the White House

Colin Scoggins:  Aircraft is moving away

ID Tech:  He’s moving away from the White House

Colin Scoggins:  Yeah

ID Tech:  OK, but, what, he was a DVFR?

Colin Scoggins:  We believe it’s a [indistinct]  VFR aircraft, we’re not sure who he is, ah, if you want to hold on a second

ID Tech: OK, copy

Colin Scoggins:  We have people down there lookin’

ID Tech:  OK copy

Colin Scoggins:  Where was that position?

Colin Scoggins:  Six, six southwest, six southwest of the White House deviating away

ID Tech:  Deviating away, you don’t have a type aircraft, you don’t know who he is

Colin Scoggins:  Nothing, nothing

ID Tech:   [indistinct] VFR

Colin Scoggins:  [indistinct] So, I have no clue, hopefully someone in Washington would have a better information for you

ID Tech:  OK

Colin Scoggins:  Is this a good number to keep calling?

ID Tech:  Yeah. This is a great number to keep calling.

Colin Scoggins: OK, all right

ID Tech:  Washignton, OK.  So it’s six miles.  You guys have him primary target only?

Colin Scoggins:  We just have a telcon, we don’t have any target at all, we’re just on a telcon.  We just heard that and wanted to make sure you got that information.

ID Tech:  OK, do me a favor go ahead and, [indistinct]  I mean Washington on this?

Colin Scoggins: I’ll try and give ’em a call, I don’t have a number for them.

ID Tech:  OK, I’ll give you a good number, then.  Washington’s number is, nine

Colin Scoggins:  What is it?

ID Tech:  OK, the number DSN is nine three seven one four

Colin Scoggins:  Yeah

ID Tech:  two zero

Colin Scoggins:  And what was New York’s?

ID Tech:  New York number that we’ve got for them is ah one, six three one

Colin Scoggins: Oh, you don’t have a DSN?

ID Tech:  No, I don’t have a DSN for New York, we have a shout? line

Colin Scoggins: OK, I have that already [indistinct] they do have a DSN, I just found [indistinct]

ID Tech:  [indistinct] on the DVFR, sir, that was six miles

Colin Scoggins: No, no information at all.  You would be better talking to Washington

ID Tech:  I’m sorry sir is it a deviating aircraft or is it a DVFR?

Colin Scoggins:  OK that’s what you have?

ID Tech:  No no sir, on the one that was six miles southeast of the White House?

Colin Scoggins:  Yeah, Southwest

ID Tech:  Southwest?

Colin Scoggins:  Yeah, Southwest

ID Tech:  OK, Southwest of the White House.  Was he a DVFR?  Or you don’t have any codes on it, but was he an actual deviating aircraft?

Colin Scoggins:  We believe, he, yes, they believe he was [indistinct] actually a deviating aircraft

ID Tech:  [indistinct] Believe that he is a deviating aircraft.

Colin Scoggins:  Yeah

ID Tech:  OK, copy

Colin Scoggins:  [indistinct] out of Washington

ID Tech:  OK, copy, copy

Colin Scoggins:  Pass the information

ID Tech:  OK

72.  093836 AA77 ID call to ZDC Boston Space Dont Know Anything

ZDC: Washington

ID Tech:  Washington, Huntress.  Ah, Boston just called us.  They said they had information about some aircraft that was six miles southwest of the White House that appeared to be [indistinct]

ZDC:  Boston does?

ID Tech:  Boston called and said that.   I’d like to get the information  from you on it.  They don’t have a call sign for the aircraft.
They don’t have any codes for the aircraft.  They just know that there was one that was six miles southwest of the White House.

ZDC:  OK, well Boston’s airspace doesn’t even come close to that, I don’t know how they got that information, but ah, we don’t..  Hey! [to off phone person]

18 second pause

ZDC:  OK, we, we don’t know anything about that.

ID Tech:  OK, you don’t know anything about that

ZDC:  No, we do not.  And it’s probably just a rumor, but ah, you might want to call ah, ah, National or Andrews someplace, somewhere like that and find out, but we don’t any thing about that

ID Tech:  Copy thanks.

ZDC:  OK Bye

ID Tech:  Bye

73.  093621 Langley DirectDC AFIO Monster Mash

Nasypany:  [indistinct] near the White House, Jesus, Fox

Unknown:  That came from Boston?

SGT Huckabone:  We’re goin’ to turn and burn and crank, [indistinct] here we go, here’s what we’re gonna do here.

Nasypany:  Sir, we’ve got an aircraft [indistinct] east of the White House right now,

SGT Huckabone:  A monster marsh

Nasypany:  OK

Unknown:  What happened,

Unknown:  from FAA?

Unknown:  Is that airliner [indistinct]?

Nasypany:  Run ’em

radio transmission: Team two one [indistinct]

Nasypany: authorizing AFIO, right now? you want to authorize it?

Background:  I can’t get through

Radio transmission:  Yeah, we’re hearing him loud and clear

Unknown:  What’re we doin’?

Background:  Goin’ direct DC with our guys

Nasypany:  AFIO?

74.  0939 MCC Windows Break Push Back

Nasypany:  [indistinct], if need be. I don’t care how many windows you break.

Unknown:  Langley had them [indistinct] in three eight six

Nasypany:  Why’d they go up there?

Unknown:  Because Giant Killer sent them out there

Nasypany:  God Dammit!

Nasypany:  OK, Pat?, Push ‘ em back

75.  132230 Langley Scramble Norfolk Tower

Klaxon sounds

Huntress:  Langley Command Post

Langley:  Command Post is on

SGT Powell:  Alright, This is Huntress with an active air defense scramble for Quit two five and two six, I repeat an active air defense scramble for Quit 25 and Quit 26.  Scramble immediately, time one three two four, authenticate, bravo xray, scramble on a heading of zero one zero, flight level two niner zero.  Contact Huntress on frequency two three four decimal six and back up three six four decimal two.   All parties acknowledge with initials, Langley Command Post?

Langley Tower: [indistinct]

Langley cP:  Command Post

Others:  [indistinct]

SGT Powell: three six four decimal two.

Indistinct:  Copy

SGT Powell:  Giant Killer copy?

Norfolk Approach:  [indistinct] Copy

SGT Powell:  [indistinct] If you have any questions give me a call me on the land line

76.  093100 Langley What Heading would like hand off Giant Killer

Quit 25:  [indistinct] Norfolk Departure, Quit 25 is with ah on approach one five for two nine oh, friendly heading

Norfolk Approach:  Quit 25, Norfolk Approach, Roger.  Ah, maintain flight level ah two three zero for now.  What heading would you like, sir?

Norfolk Approach:  Quit 25, if you can go eastbound, heading, ah maintain flight level two three zero

Norfolk Approach:  Quit 25, Norfolk approach, how do you hear?

Quit 25:  [indistinct]

Quit 25:  Norfolk, Quit 25 is with you climbing to twelve thousand for two three oh

Norfolk Approach:  Quit 25 Norfolk Approach have you loud and clear, how me?

Quit 25: I gotcha loud and clear, now

Norfolk Approach:  Quit 25, Roger.  Have your third man squawk four six zero aero

Quit 25:  Will do

Norfolk Approach:  Quit 25, you goin’ direct to the Langley zero nine zero and six zero, is that where you’re goin?

Quit 25:  Ah, firmative.  [indistinct] That is our second clearance, we had an earlier clearance of a vector and an altitude

Norfolk Approach:  Quit 25, Roger

Norfolk Approach:  Giant Killer, two fifty? six, Quit 25

Giant Killer:  Giant Killer’s on

Norfolk Approach:  Flight of three, third man’s squawkin’ right now

Norfolk Approach:  they are direct to the Langley ninety at sixty, climbin’ at two three oh

Giant Killer: He’s radar

Norfolk Approach:  Quit 25, contact Giant Killer on two three eight point one

Giant Killer:  Copy two thirty eight point one, Quit push

77.  093927 D1989 ID Scoggins 3d ac is D1989

SGT Richmond:  Sergeant Richmond, unsecure line, how may I help you?

Colin Scoggins:  Colin Scoggins, Boston Center military

SGT Richmond:  Yes sir

Colin Scoggins:  Third aircraft, Delta nineteen eighty nine

ID Tech:  OK

ID Tech:  Delta nineteen eighty nine

SGT Richmond:  OK Type aircraft?

Colin Scoggins:  Type aircraft?

SGT Richmond:  Yes sir

Colin Scoggins:  Code, did I give you a code?

SGT Richmond:  Yes give me the code

Colin Scoggins:  one three zero four, presently due south of Cleveland

SGT Richmond:  OK, presently due south of Cleveland

Colin Scoggins:  Heading westbound destination Las Vegas

SGT Richmond:  Heading westbound destination Las Vegas

ID Tech:  And is this one a hijack sir?

Colin Scoggins:  We believe it is

ID Tech:  You believe it is

SGT Richmond  And are they gonna to squawk hijack?

Colin Scoggins:  I don’t know, I don’t know, they it’s squawking thirteen oh four now if you want to try to track him up

ID Tech::  Ok, and the type aircraft is what, sir?

Colin Scoggins:  Ah, do we have a type aircraft on that Delta?  [off mike]

Colin Scoggins:  Delta nineteen eighty nine, I think he’s on there

Colin Scoggins: Seven sixty seven

SGT Richmond:  Seven sixty seven

Colin Scoggins:  And altitude?

SGT Richmond:  Yes, please

Colin Scoggins:  Three five oh

ID Tech:  And where did he take off out of

Colin Scoggins:  He took off out of Boston

ID Tech:  Boston?

Colin Scoggins:  Yeah. We’re goin to try and get you a tail number on that if you want to get someone up there

SGT Richmond:  Alright copy that

ID Tech:  Do you have any [indistinct] how many souls on board?

Colin Scoggins:  Ah, no, we don’t have that information

ID  Tech:  You don’t have any of that?

SGT Richmond: [in background] There he is

ID Tech:  Copy that, thank you sir

SGT Richmond:  [in background] Do you want me to [indistinct]  I”m going to make [indistinct]

Colin Scoggins:  We’re going to try and get you a tail number

SGT Richmond:  OK, thanks, bye

SGT Dooley:  [in background]  Hey, we have a Delta

78.  094232 D1989 ID Alert Call to ZID

ZID:  Indy Center

ID Tech:  Ah, Indianapolis Center, Huntress, reference Delta eight nine, do you know anything, information about that aircraft?  I want to give you a heads up this is another hijack aircraft

ZID:  Uh Huh

ID Tech:  Boston to Las Vegas  he’s on a Mode 3 of one three zero four, we do have contact via

ZID:  What was the number again, Delta?

ID Tech:  Delta eight nine, its a seven sixty seven out of Boston,

ZOB:  Uh Huh

ID Tech:  heading to Vegas and he’s on a Mode 3 of one three zero four, I have a [indistinct]  lat long, if you need it

ZOB:  Go ahead

ID Tech:  Lat long

ZOB:  [indistinct] quick

ID Tech: Four one two one north,

ZOB:  Uh huh

ID Tech:  zero eight two one five west

ZOB:  OK

ID Tech:  And if you [indistinct] that’s all we have right now, but he is confirmed hijack

Background:  Indistinct,

ZOB:  OK, we’re not showing him in our system at this point, you are tracking him you say?

ID Tech:  We have him on the radar, sir, but he is headed your way

ZOB?  He is headed our way?

ID Tech:  Delta eight nine

Background:  [Dooley, indistinct]

ZOB:  Boston to L A S, right?

ID Tech:  L A X?

ZOB:  L A X?

ID Tech:  I’ve got Vegas, sir, whatever Vegas is

ZOB:  Oh, L A S, OK Las Vegas.  OK, ’cause we’re not showin’ him in the system anywhere

ID Tech:  OK, he’s on a, do you have like Mode 3 capability or anything?

ZOB:  He’s one a one three zero four code?

ID Tech: Correct, correct

ZOB:  OK, we’ll bring that up

ID Tech: Alright sir

ZOB:  OK, thanks

Dooley:  We got Duluth on?

79.  094452 D1989 ID Alert Call to ZOB

ZOB:  Cleveland military, Dukelin

ID Tech:  Cleveland Center, Huntress ID.  Ah, we are obviously having ah a pretty bad situation going on with aircraft.  I wanted to give you a heads up

ZOB:  Ah, did they get into the, ah, hold on please.  OK go ahead

ID Tech:  Yes sir. Delta airlines eight niner is a hijack headed, it is in your sector currently right now.  Mode 3 one three zero four, we’re not sure if his intentions [indistinct]

ZOB:  Hold on, hold on, I ah want you to talk to ah..

ID Tech:  Go ahead sir, transfer me out

ZOB:  Hello

ID Tech:  Hello, this is Huntress ID, I wanted to give you a heads up in your center, Currently, we have Delta eight niner, it’s a seven sixty seven, out of Boston, headed for Las Vegas, last known, now a confirmed hijack on a Mode 3 of one three zero four

ZOB:  OK (female voice)

ID Tech: And, he is in your center.  As you know, we have about five aircraft, currently, that are missing out of Boston two of ’em, ah, into the World Trade Center and now Washington, ah,  has confirmed near the White House.  So, this apparently is pretty serious. This is Delta eight niner, I’m not sure where his intentions are, but if you have any..Oh, I’m sorry, one nine eight nine, I just got now, it’s one nine eight nine

ZOB:  Nineteen eight nine is a confirmed hijack, OK.

ID Tech:  [indistinct] OK Ma’am

ZOB:  Thank you

ID Tech:  And anything that you have please call us.

ZOB:  OK

ID Tech:  Ah, do you have our number?

ZOB:  Ah, you know what I’m gonna let you give it to someone else and I’m going to go take care of it

ID Tech:  OK

ZOB:  (male voice) OK, Delta nineteen eight nine confirmed hijack, code is thirteen zero four, correct?

ID Tech:  Correct,  Yes.

ZOB:  OK

ID Tech:  He’s a seven sixty seven, Boston to Las Vegas

ZOB: He’s a seven sixty seven, Boston to Las Vegas

ID Tech: And, apparently, ah we’re keeping a eye on this aircraft, obviously, ah now that it’s a hijack..

ZOB:  Right here, Delta nineteen eighty nine

ID Tech:  ah, we’ve got other aircraft [indistinct]

ID Tech:  If you have any information I’d like to give you a number to call

ZOB:  OK, go ahead

ID Tech:  Three one five  three three four six three one one, that’s the Mission Crew Commander

ZOB:  OK, And who would that be?

ID Tech:  Major Nasypany

ZOB:   Major Nasickaney?

ID Tech:  Nasypany

ZOB:  Nasypany

ID Tech:  Alright sir?

ID Tech:  If there’s any deviation whatsoever from the, ah

ZOB: OK, and uh you said you’re trackin’ him right now, well, we are too

ID Tech: We have him on radar, sir, ah that’s about all right now

ZOB:  OK

ID Tech:  We have all of our fighters out over the other aircraft

ZOB:  All right you uh you’ve sent fighters out?

ID Tech:  Negative on the Delta, ah,  one nine eight nine.  Let me just check with the Mission Crew Commander

ID Tech:  [indistinct] Cleveland Center is wondering if there are any aircraft after the Delta nineteen eighty nine

Male voice:  We are trying to get some aircraft up right now, we can’t find..

ID Tech:  We are in the process of trying to get some aircraft up right now sir.

ZOB:  OK, could you please get back to me, ah, if you do launch the aircraft out there, please?

ID Tech:  I certainly will

ZOB:  OK

ID Tech:  Watch for any deviations and call us if you see it, sir

ZOB:  I understand

80.  094241 AA11 D1989 ID Scoggins Extended Discussion

ID Tech:  OK, so you don’t know who the one, what’s the third, OK what’s the third one, the third aircraft, you guys don’t know who..

Colin Scoggins:  We believed it is Delta nineteen eighty nine.  However, when we asked him to respond to ACARS to land at Cleveland he said he would. So, therefore, I don’t know if ah, ah

ID Tech:  And that’s the one that they..

Colin Scoggins.  I don’t know if he is a hijack or not.  I really don’t know.

ID Tech:  OK

Colin Scoggins:  I can’t confirm that he is.

ID Tech:  OK.  Do you remember when we were talking about, ah, the, the aircraft by, you guys have any idea who that aircraft was by, ah..

Colin Scoggins:  By the White House?

ID Tech:  Yeah

Colin Scoggins:  We thought for some reason to believe it was American eleven.  I don’t know if we heard that from somebody else, that they got a visual on him that it was American airlines or what.  We just don’t know.  So, we don’t know, ah, which aircraft that was.  So, we have three call signs, we don’t know what the third call sign is yet.  So, we have two aircraft in the towers, and one in the Pentagon and we don’t know what that third call sign was.

ID Tech:  You don’t know what the third call sign was?

Colin Scoggins:  No, we thought Delta nineteen eighty nine  was it. But now we have a third [garbled], possibly four aircraft.  Are you, are you still tracking Delta nineteen eight nine?

ID Tech:  Yes sir we still are. What..

Colin Scoggins:  Is he descending into Cleveland, appear to be?

ID Tech:  Right now, no. He’s at, he’s at twenty eight thousand feet, three hundred ninety six knots, still squawking his code

Colin Scoggins:  Still squawking

ID Tech:  Yeah, it looks like he’s by Toledo

Colin Scoggins:  By Toledo.  Doesn’t look like he’s landing?

ID Tech:  No

Colin Scoggins:  OK, Ah..

ID Tech:  No, he’s at twenty seven thousand feet

Colin Scoggins:  At twenty seven?

ID Tech:  Yeah

Colin Scoggins:  Oh. then he is..

Dooley:  Sir!

Colin Scoggins:  Yeah

Dooley  Excuse me,  I’m sorry, where would he be right now if he was ah going to be landed in Cleveland, would he be descended?

Colin Scoggins:  He would be descended now

Dooley:  He would be descended and, and speed would be slowing

Colin Scoggins:  Speed would be slowing

Dooley:  Oh, looks like he’s not gonna go there

Colin Scoggins: Doesn’t look like he’s going to Cleveland?

Dooley:  Nope, OK, yep.

81.  095934 NEADS MCC What Are We Going To Do

Nasypany:  We got, uh, well here’s the deal.

Nasypany:  Uh, [garbled] they just did a quick turn, they got no weapons.  They just did a strafing run up to the range, they blew all their load.

Nasypany:  Yeah, I know.  But we got two, they’re loitering, and we are gonna send them down to do investigations

Nasypany:  Two from Selfridge are airborne already.  I got two more from Toledo.  This, that special track is over, ah, the what do you call it, over the lake right now.

Nasypany So what are we going to do with it,  if it is it?

Nasypany:  What are we going to do?  I gotta give my guys directions.

82.  0959 NEADS to ZBW D1989 Not Hijack

[Kara note:  may want to try a find a better fidelity clip for this entry]

ID Tech:  [garbled]  Reference that Delta one nine eight nine

Colin Scoggins: Yes

ID Tech:  Cleveland talked to them they talked to the pilot, he’s not [garbled]  they’re going ahead, I mean [garbled] and land him at Cleveland [garbled]

Colin Scoggins:  He’s not a hijack

ID Tech:  No

83.  1003 ID Techs notify ZID about D1989

ZID:  Indy Center

ID Tech:  Hi, Huntress ID calling. I wanted to give you a heads up on the Delta airlines one nine eight niner that was in Cleveland Center’s AOR.  He ws giving you the information that he was a hijacked aircraft.  He is not a hijacked aircraft.  He’s taken precautionary measures and he’s landing at Cleveland Center.  However, we do have four fighters launched on that aircraft just to be sure.

84. 092556 Midex 150 Philadelphia

ZOB:  Medex 150  and you, ah,  they are taking the Philadelphia traffic right now, ah whatever is airborne, ah, as long as they can, so ah hopefully we’ll be able to get you in there

Medex 150:  Alright, great, thanks, appreciate it.

ZOB:  You may want to talk to your company and see what the alternate plans are, they’ve, I don’t know if you’ve heard about the accident in the ah New York

Medex 150:  Yeah we just ah turned on the ADF to try and find out, something pretty serious up there

ZOB:  Ah, yeah

85.  0928 UA93 last normal and first trouble

ZOB:  United ninety three, that traffic for you is one o’clock, twelve miles eastbound, three seven zero

UA93:  Negative contact, we’re looking, United ninety three:

UA93: Hey!    [Hijack begins, unintelligible, a 4.9 second transmission]

ZOB:  Somebody call Cleveland?

AA1060:  Roger American ah ten sixty,  with you we’re at three zeven zero, we’re slowing due to the delays if posslbe going eastbound

ZOB:  That’s American ten sixty?

UA93: [second unintelligible transmission, a 4.8 second transmission, eleven seconds after the first one]

ZOB:  You got United 93?

ZOB second voice:  United 93, south of Chardon?  Descended.

ZOB:  What’s that?

ZOB second voice:  I just sayin’ it looks like he descended there

ZOB:  United 93 verify three five zero

ZOB second voice.  United 93, Cleveland

ZOB:  Go ahead

ZOB another voice:  Do you have United 93 south of Chardon?

ZOB other voice:  We hear some funny noises we’re trying to get him.  Do you have him?

ZOB another voice:  No

ZOB other voice:  Thank You.  United 93, Cleveland

ZOB:  United 1523 did you hear your company, did you hear some interference on the frequency, couple a minutes ago, screaming

United 1523:  Yes I did seve ninety seven and ah we couldn’t tell what it was either

ZOB:  OK.  United 93, Cleveland,if you hear the center, ident

American 1060:  Ditto on the other transmissions

ZOB:  American 1060, you heard that also

American 1060:  Yes sir, twice

ZOB:  Roger, we heard that also, thanks, just wanted to confirm it wasn’t some interference.:

86.  0932 UA93 Bomb on Board

Ziad Jarrah:  (u/i) Please sit down and remain sitting, we have a bomb on board, so (u/i)

(three seconds later)

ZOB:  Ah. Calling Cleveland Center, you are unreadable, say again slowly

87.  0934 UA93 moves other traffic including D1989

Unknown:  Yeah, that transmission you said was unreadable, it sounded like someone said they had a bomb on board.

ZOB: That’s what we thought,  we ah we  didn’t get it clear.  Is that United 93 calling?

Medex 150:  Center. Medex 150

ZOB:  Medex 150, ah stand by if you would unless you got an emergency.

Medex 150:  Standing by

ZOB:  Roger. USAIR 2542 Cleveland on one twenty five point four two.

USAIR 2542:  2542 USAIR (u/i):

ZOB:  ExecJet 956 that aircraft we believe was transmitting is twelve o’clock one five miles turn left heading two two five, I’ll get you away from him

ExecJet 956:  two two five, ExecJet 956

ZOB:  One six mike foxtrot fly heading one two zero, I’ll get you away from that

Mike Fox:  Flying one twenty I’m heading, Mike Fox

ZOB: 561 Alfa Charlie fly heading zero nine zero

561AC:  zero nine zero, one alfa charlie

ZOB:  Roger, American ten sixty fly heading eight niner zero

AA1060: [acknowledged]

ZOB:  Roger

ExecJet 956:  Center, ExecJet 956, what’s that traffic for us again?

ZOB:  Say again

ExecJet 956:  That traffic we’re turning for, is that about a two to three o’clock?

ZOB: It is one to two o’clock, yeah,  two to three o’clock as you turn

ExecJet 956:  Alright, we’ve got him on TCAS, I think we got him

ZOB:  He’s climbing, so I want to keep everyone away from him

ExecJet 956:  OK, I think we’ve got him in sight

ZOB:  Delta 1989, ah Cleveland

Delta 1989:  Yes sir:

ZOB:  Delta 1989 ah turn right to a heading of ah three two zero

Delta 1989:  Alright, Delta 1989 heading three two zero

ZOB:  OK, Delta 1989, we’re gonna go the other way, fly a heading of ah two six zero

Delta 1989:  Alright, two six zero, Delta 1989

ZOB:  Delta 1989

88.  0939 UA93 Bomb on Board and Controller Followup

Ziad Jarrah:  This is the Captain, I would like you all to remain seated. We have a bomb on board and are going back to the airport and have our demands.  So please remain quiet.

ZOB: Okay, that’s United 93 calling?  United 93 understand you have a bomb on board, go ahead.

ExecJet 956:Command Center, ExecJet 956, that was the transmission

ZOB:  ExecJet 956, did you understand that transmission

ExecJet 956::  Affirmative, he said there was a bomb on board

ZOB:  That’s what you got out of it also?

ExecJet 956:  Affirmative

ZOB:  Roger, United 93, go ahead.

89.  0931 CC Inventory Order

Herndon Center:  OK, stand by please

Herndon Center:  OK, looks like I have everyone on here except Boston Center.  This is the air traffic command center the TMO on duty in the West area.  I need to have all traffic management units do an inventory, basically an inventory of all airborne traffic, ensure that you do not have any unusual situations or any aircraft that are not accounted for.  If you have any unusual situations or unaccounted for aircraft identify them and contact us here at the Command Center

90.  0934 UA93 ZOB Reports Bomb on Board

ZOB:  United 93 may have a bomb on board

Herndon Center:  OK, United 93, who’s speaking?

ZOB:  Cleveland Center

Herndon Center:  OK Cleveland, what’s his origination and destination?

ZOB: [background]  Out of Newark going to San Francisco

ZOB: Out of Newark going to San Francisco, his position is, twenty, fifteen east, actually he’s further than that, he’s east of Dryer, his exact position is 30 miles East of Dryer

Herndon Center:  You have a transponder on this aircraft or did he go primary?

ZOB:  At this time he’s ah code one five two seven and we still have a transponder

Herndon Center:  OK, and can you give me any additional information as to why you believe there may be a bomb?

ZOB:  Ah, because he’s screaming that on the frequency

Herndon Center:  OK, very good.  Anyone else?  Alright, I’m disconnecting now.

91.  0934 UA93 CC report to HQ FAA

Herndon Center:  We just had another report, United 93, who was in Cleveland Center’s airspace, somewhere around Dryer Intersection,  just reported that they heard screaming on the frequency and the people have a bomb on board.  The aircraft departed Newark enroute to San Francisco was the report.

FAA HQ:  Know what type?

Herndon Center:  No, I don’t have that information

FAA HQ:   OK We’re still tracking it now, right?

Herndon Center:  Correct, we’re still tracking, at this time

FAA HQ:  OK, Thanks Bud

Herndon Center:  Alright

92.  093601 ZOB Call re want to scramble military here

Herndon Center:  Command Center:

ZOB: Our question here is, our aircraft that we have has climbed, turned and is not talking to us, ah do we want to scramble, we have a couple of local military here?

Herndon Center:  Okay, that’s a decision that has to be made at a different level

ZOB:  Is someone talikin’ about it at least?

Herndon Center:  What’s the call sign again?

ZOB:  It’s United 93, he’s right over Cleveland.

Herndon Center:  Over Cleveland now?  OK, we’ll call you right back.

93.  0941 UA93 CC to HQ FAA Over Akron

Herndon Center:  United 93, we spoke about him before

FAA HQ:  Yes

Herndon Center:  He is reversing course over Akron, they just lost his transponder, he’s headed East bound

FAA HQ:  What kind of airplane, do we know yet?

Herndon Center:  Ah, just a second, Seven Fifty Seven

FAA HQ:  Thanks buddy

Herndon Center:  The aircraft is descending

FAA HQ:  OK.  He is descending

Herndon Center:  Correct

94. 0946 UA93 CC to HQ FAA 29 minutes out

Herndon Center:  Okay, United 93

FAA HQ:  Go ahead

Herndon Center:  Is 29 miles ot of er, 29 minutes out of Washington D.C., 29 minutes of of Washington D.C., and tracking towards it, this is the one that reversed course in Ohio

FAA HQ:  Yes.  Go ahead

Herndoon Center:  That’s all I have

95.  0948 UA93 CC to FAA HQ 23 minutes out   [note, this clip is mistitled as 23 min out, need to fix]

FAA HQ:  Okay, the ah United 93 is twenty-nine minutes out of where?

Herndon Center:  Uh, he’s heading toward the Washington area.  He has, he was at flight level 350, he turned around at Akron, Ohio, and is tracking toward the Washington area at this time.

96.  0949 Pulling Jeff away

FAA Headquarters:  All right, they’re pulling Jeff away to go talk about United 93

Herndon Center:  Ah, do we wanta think about ah scrambling aircraft?

FAA Headquarters:  Ah, [sighs] Oh God, I don’t know

Herndon Center:  Uh, that’s a decision someone is gonna have to make probably in the next ten minutes

FAA Headquarters:  Uh, you know everybody just left the room

97.  0958 UA93 20 miles Johnstown

Herndon Center:  United 93 is two zero miles northwest of Johnstown

FAA HQ:  two zero miles northwest on primary?

Herndon Center:  Well that’s a report from another aircraft

98.  1000 UA93 Rocking Wings

Herndon Center:  United 93

FAA HQ:  Yes

Herndon Center:  Was waiving his wings as he went past the V the VFR aircraft, they don’t quite know what that means.  Rockin’ his ring  , wings

FAA HQ:  Kay

99.  100744 UA93 Report of Black Smoke AA77 Q re Police Report

Herndon Center:  OK, there’s now on that United 93

FAA HQ:  Yes

Herndon Center:  There is a report of black smoke in the last position I gave you, fifteen miles south of Johnstown

FAA HQ:  Uh, From the airplane or from the ground?

Herndon Center: Uh, They’re speculating it’s from the aircraft, ah who, it hit the ground, that’s what they’re, that’s what they’re speculating, it’s speculation only.

FAA HQ OK.  [passed in background]  We’re getting a preliminary report that United 93 hit the ground about 15 miles south of Johnstown, or there abouts.

Herndon Center:  How about American 77, that report from by the Indianapolis  [sic] state police, do we have any update on that?  I didn’t get that from you did I?

Herndon Center: [background]  You didn’t get that from me?  What?

FAA HQ {background}  We have some black smoke reported near {u/i]   Shirley?

100.  100701 UA93 ZOB to NEADS Bomb on Board

ID Tech:  Huntress ID, nonsecure line

ZOB:  I believe I was the one talking about that Delta 1989:

ID Tech:  Go ahead

ZOB:  OK, well, uh, disregard that, ah, did you

ID Tech:  What we found out was that he was not a confirmed hijack, however…

ZOB:  OK, I, I don’t even want to worry about that right now, we’ve got a United 93 out here, are you aware of that?  That has a, [pause] that has a bomb on board.

Dooley:  {concurrent in background} we’ve got three more hijacked airborne

ID Tech:  A bomb?  On Board.  And is this confirmed, do you have a Mode 3, sir?

ZOB:  No we lost his transponder.  Um, What we want to know is did you scramble airplanes on that Delta 1989

Dooley:  [concurrent in background]  We have a bomb on board, Boston…

ID Tech:  We did, out of Selfridge and Toledo, sir.

ZOB:  Did you?  Did you?  Are they in the air?

ID Tech:  Yes they are.

ZOB:  Is there any way we can get them to where this United is?

101.  100901 UA93 Negative Clearance to Shoot

Nasypany:: 1527, Mode 3, do we have a track number2?  1527, Mode 3 we got a track number?

Nasypany:  OK, we got a Mode 3 on this, ah, United 93

Nasypany:  How close are you?  [Reference to unkown over the White House, not UA 93}

Nasypany:  3951 North 07846 West [From Dooley in Background]

Dooley (background):  This is the g uy with the bomb on board

Nasypany:  Got it

Nasypany:  Toledo was, look for him, hey I need a track number

Nasypany,  OK, Hey, Brian [Captain Nagel] OK two Syracuse birds will be airborne in less than 20 minutes, any weapons?

Background simultaneous:  near Pittsburg, Mode 3, 1527

Nasypany:  We don’t know, just press with that

Background:   We have any commited on the one, aircraft with a bomb on it?

Nasypany:  We’re gettin to it, we don’t know where it is,  we’re gettin’ track on it

Concurrent voice:  Pass that to weapons

Nasypany:  [on phone to Battle Cab]  Yeah, OK, Got it. [hangs up phone]

Background:  United nine three, mode 3 1527

Nasypany:  Negative, negative clearance to shoot [In reference to unknown over the White House]

Nasypany:  Jaime?

Background:  1527 Brian

Nasypany:  God dammit!  Foxy?

Fox:  I’m not really worried about the code words

Nasypany:  Fuck the code words, that’s perishable information.  Negative clearance to fire,  I D type, tail.[In reference to unknown over the White House]

102.  101145 NEADS Discussion with Syracuse Cdr

Nasypany: Sir, how’re you doing

Syracuse CO:  I doning well, as good as can be expected.  I’ve good guys that will be launching in about 15 minutes

Nasypany:  Appreciate it.  Are they loaded?

Syracuse CO:We’ve got hot guns, that’s all I’ve got

Nasypany:  :Hot Gusn?  Well that that’s good enough for me, for the time being.  Only words I’ve got, I’ve got anoither aircraft with a possible bomb on board it’s in, ah, Pennsylvania, York?  Approximate area

Syracuse CO:  Yeah that’s south

Nasypany: Yeah, South of us, and there’s also the possibility of another one at posibily at Cleveland area

Syracuse CO:  Okay you got vectors on those?

Nasypany:  Not yet.  [fact one?} The one over Cleveland turned around looks like he’s headin’ back, the guy down at York, Pennsylvania he’s heading North, Northwest

Syracuse CO:  OK. We might be able to get those two

Nasypany:  Yeah, and the call sign for the guy in York is United 93, Mode 3 of 1527

Syracuse CO:  OK, doesn’t help us, we can’t interrogate

Nasypany: OK, I got, and I got this other guy out west, he’s American [reference to AA 77]

Background Voices :  Who’s that guy?  Track just faded over Cleveland

Nasypany:  Excuse me, OK I’ve got one that just faded over Cleveland, Delta eight niner, Mode 3, Uh, I know that’s not going to help you, but if your’e talking to FAA they might be able to help you. 1304

Syracuse CO:  OK, when we get our guys airborne they are going to contact you on 260 point nine, I’ve got two jets right now, do you need more than two?:

Nasypany:  Can you bring up two more?

Background Voice:  Get four, sir.:

Syracuse CO:  Yep, yep

Nasypany:  OK, thank you sir, and if you want to talk to Colonel ah Marr he is up at 6403, sir.

Syracuse CO:  Thank You

103.  101418 ZDC to NEADS UA93 is down

NEADS:  I also want to give you a heads up, Washington

ZDC:  Go Ahead

NEADS:  United nine three, have you got information on that yet

ZDC:  Yeah, he’s down

NEADS:  He’s down?

ZDC:  Yes

Background NEADS:  When did he land?

ZDC:  He did not land

NEADS:  He is down, down?

ZDC:  Somewhere Northeast of Camp David

Background NEADS:  Northeast of Camp David

ZDC:  That’s the last report, they don’t know exactly where

104.  103200 Chat Log Shootdown words

Voice One:  You need to read this, Region Commander has declared that we can shoot down tracks if they are not responding to our, uh, directions

MCC Position:  OK, I’ll pass that to weapons.

Voice One:  OK

MCC Postion:  The Region Com, the Region Commander has declared that we can shoot down aircraft that do not respond to our  direction.  Copy that?

Weapons:  Copy that sir.

MCC Position:  So if you’re trying to divert somebody and he won’t divert

Major Fox:  DO is saying no.

MCC Position:  No?  It came over the chat.  Foxy, you got a conflict on that?  You got a conflict on that direction?

Major Fox:  Right now, no.

MCC Position:  OK

Vocie One:  Hey

MCC Position:  OK

Vocie One:  You read that from the Vice President, right? The Vice President has cleared…

MCC Position:  Vice President has cleared us to intercept tracks

Voce One.  Of interest

MCC Position:  and shoot them down if they do not respond, per CONR CC



 


9/11: Air Threat Conference Call; Staff Transcript.

Robbyn Swan, co-author of The Eleventh Day, filed a mandatory declassification review with NARA concerning the Air Threat Conference Call convened by the National Military Command Center (NMCC) on 9-11.  That request surfaced a Commission Staff version titled, “DJH Notes.”  Swann and Summers, therefore, are the only investigators, other than the Commission Staff, who have had access to the contents of that key document.

Background

The NMCC had a simple, inexpensive, reel-to-reel cassette recorder that resided on the Duty Director of Operations (DDO) desk.  The acting DDO, Navy Captain Leidig activated the recorder at approximately 0930 as a Significant Event Conference was being convened.  By 0939 the conference had transitioned to an Air Threat Conference.  The recording was not transcripted and there is a brief gap around the 1037 time before Leidig realized side one of the cassette had run out and he needed to turn it over.

Commission Staff learned of the air threat conference call from NORAD logs and formally requested any and all information, including tapes and transcripts.  DoD determined that a recording had been made but no transcript.  DoD made a transcript but did not time stamp it.  Further, after review of its contents, custody of both the tape and transcript were transferred to the National Security Council (NSC).

Commission Staff and at least one Commissioner listened to the tape at the NSC.  A copy of the transcript was provided to and held by the NMCC for staff use during interviews. Given that the staff could not hold a copy and given that it was not time-stamped, a Team 8 member, Dana Hyde (DJH), patiently made a working copy from her own notes, over time.  It is that copy that is now publicly available, thanks to Robbyn Swan.

My estimate is that the derived timeline is accurate within three minutes +/-.  I base that on the 1049 entry “DDO” Emergency Actions message relearned [sic should be ‘released’] at 1452Z re Def Con 3 Acknowledgements.”

The DJH Notes, explained

The notes are a reliable approximation of the original transcript.  Given clearly identifiable data points that were known from other sources, Dana Hyde set about to construct a Team 8-derived timeline.  The left-hand column contains times in the form clock time (tape time).  For example, the first line attributed to the PEOC is as follows:

0942(13) PEOC: POTUS not yet left FLA; planning to depart and head to DC. NORAD Update: Possible fourth hijacking in progress — Delta 89 [Delta 1989]

The times in parentheses are tape times paired with clock times as in the PEOC example.  The marginal notes are Hyde’s handwriting.  Note that the lead marginal note indicates that the Staff was focusing on the issue of UA 93.

Observations

At  0933 reference was made to “hijack is still airborne heading toward DC.”  That is an explicit reference to AA 11 and not to AA 77.  NORAD followed that with its “conflicting reports” input passing along the erroneous report [a possible garble of the AA 11 report] of a “possible hijacked aircraft taking off out of JFK en-route DC.”

At 9:48 the DDO summarized for the PEOC that the possible Delta hijack would be the fourth (AA 11, UA 175, the possible out of JFK, and Delta 1989)  There is no reference to AA77 in that PEOC update.

At 9:58 NORAD inputted “No update at this time — we’ll provide an ETA when fighters will be on CAP over WH.”  At that very moment the Langley fighters were establishing a CAP and at 1000 one was directly overhead the Pentagon at 23,000 feet.

At 1007 NORAD inputted “No indication of hijack heading to DC at this time.  At that same moment NEADS first learned about UA 93.  Also, at that time they were attempting to intercept a a target over the White House, one that turned out to be one of the Langley fighters.  Explicit language in the NEADS tapes at that time about “identify by type and tail,” and “negative clearance to shoot” concerned the unknown (Langley fighter) not UA 93.

At 1014 the PEOC passed along the VP confirmation that “fighters are cleared to engage the aircraft inbound…”

At 1017 FAA was finally in the conference, but not the Headquarters or even Herndon Center, per se.  The person on the line was a mid-grade employee in the CARF (Central Altitude Reservation Facility).  That was the only place found that had the necessary clearance level to join the conference.  The CARF employee confirmed that at 1019 when he said, “I’m back in a secure area in Command [Herndon] Center.”

At 1020 Dr. Rice was “in the PEOC now.”

At 1032 Hadley informed Myers of “an inbound aircraft flying low 5 miles out.”  This is the false report that caused the Andrews wing to relaunch Major Hutchison even though he was low on fuel.

At 1035 Secretary Rumsfeld confirmed he was in the conference.

At 1038 the Vice President believed that we’ve “already taken a couple of aircraft out.”

At 1044 the Vice President stated that he would have to run the DEFCON 3 decision by the President.  (It is odd that would have taken that position and not a similar position on the shootdown authority issue.)  Summers and Swan speak to the issue in an end note:

Commission notes released to the authors in 2011 did indicate that the Vice President felt the need to get Bush’s authorization at a later point [10:44]…it is arguable that Cheney would have felt the same need for authority to engage hijacked airliners.

At 1048 there was still no fighter escort for Air Force One.  “Verification scrambled 2 fighters out of Ellington Field to escort AF! — stand by for intercept time.”  Southeast Air Defense Sector (SEADS) radar files show that the Ellington fighters intercepted Air Force One a few minutes prior to landing at Barksdale AFB.

At 1056 NORAD made one of several references to a single E-3 on location over DC.  That is a reference to Century 40 with operational call sign Bandsaw Kilo.  According to the NEADS tapes that aircraft established an active link at 1450 (1050) off of W701 (a warning/training area).

 

Book Review: “The Eleventh Day; The Full Story of 9/11 and Osama Bin Laden”

A disclaimer for the record.  I was interviewed by Robbyn Swan and have maintained a continuous dialogue with her since, including a meeting recently in Washington D.C.  I was a reader for a final version of the Summers/Swan book prior to a late revision to account for the death of bin Laden.

The Eleventh Day, by “New York Times” best selling authors Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan, is a game changer.  Published by Ballantine Books, Random House Publishing Group, the book, according to the publishers,  “is the first panoramic, authoritative account of 9/11.”

The Eleventh Day is the new definitive timeline for 9/11, a superb and detailed extension of the work of the 9/11 Commission and the Congressional Joint Inquiry.  Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan’s work is peerless in the depth, breadth, and accuracy of their research and reporting. Together, this experienced team has cleared the air of suspect research and speculation, an invaluable service to future researchers and historians.

The game change comes on page 118.  Citing investigative writer David Corn, the author’s conclude a detailed examination of conspiracy theories with this summary:

The legacy of the spurious doubts, though, has been that far too little attention has been given to the very real omissions and distortions in the official reporting. The conspiracy theorizing in which the skeptics indulged, David Corn has rightly said, “distracts people from the actual malfeasance, mistakes and misdeeds of the U.S. government and the intelligence community.” There were certainly mistakes, and there may have been wrong doing.

The Authors’ Road Map

“The Attack,” Part I. is a succinct retelling of a by now familiar story as first told by the Commission in Staff Statement 17 and then in its final report. Those familiar with the past work of, first, Summers and then Summers and Swan, as a team, will recognize a familiar pattern of detail after detail woven together in a compelling story that leaves no room for doubt as to the thoroughness of the underlying research.

The authors then pause their story for two chapters to undertake a necessary chore at the beginning of Part II, “Distrust and Deceit.”  Their impeccable writing style is nowhere more evident than in the bridge to Part II.  Concluding Part I, they wrote: “An American apocalyse,  a catastrophe with consequences–in blood spilled and global political upheaval–that continues to this day.”

Part II begins: “One consequence, a national and international phenomenon, is that countless citizens do not believe the story of September 11 as we have just told it.”  Here, Summers and Swan take direct aim at the conspiracy theorists. The necessary chore was to sweep the decks clean of the detritus from years of innuendo, speculation, and, in some cases, outright intellectual dishonesty.  Again in their words, “9/11 is mired in “conspiracy theory” like no previous event in American history…”

In rapier-sharp strokes they skewer the conspiracy theories with authority, leaving no stones unturned.  They borrowed a useful construct from David Rostcheck, a software consultant with a physics degree.  Rostcheck described a bifurcated America, “America 1 and America 2,” the first shaped by “broadcast media,” the latter by the “Internet domain.”  One gets the distinct impression from the authors that the two Americas are like ships passing in the night, each unaware of the other.

Citing their demonstrably thorough research after more than four years of work Summers and Swan conclude:

Wonder one may, but the authors have seen not a jot of evidence that anything like a false flag scenario was used on 9/11.  Nor…have we encountered a shred of real information indicating that the Bush administration was complicit in 9/11.  Subjected to any serious probing, the suspicions raised by Professor Griffin and his fellow “truthers” simply vanish on the wind.

That housecleaning, a high-powered vacuuming, set the stage for their own thesis, the game change described earlier. They spend the remainder of part II concluding the story of the day of 9/11 but with a specific predicate, a Team 8 (my team) memo to the front office questioning the accuracy of FAA and NORAD statements. They also draw extensively on the published work of the Team 8 leader, John Farmer, the author of Ground Truth.

The author’s conclude Part II with a direct quote from Farmer.  “‘”History,” Farmer wrote later in his book, “should record that, whether through unprecedented administrative incompetence or orchestrated mendacity, the American people were misled about the nation’s response to the 9/11 attacks.””

In Part III, “America Responds,” the authors focus on “The Arabs,” faulting the Commission Report and Commission Staff supplemental documents for failure to speak to a found document, a  “Spiritual Manual.”  “The omission in extraordinary, unconscionable, for the telltale pages were important evidence.”  The authors consider the “Manual” or “Handbook” the key piece of evidence, concluding that, “the “Spiritual Manual” must surely close off all doubt as to whether Atta and his comrades committed the hijacking.”

I cannot speak to the omission from the Commission Report.  I do recall from my work on both staffs that the document was known and considered.  It was not as central, then, as the author’s have it now.  They use it as a springboard to discuss the equivocation of bin Laden, himself, about whether or not he was ultimately responsible.

“The truth,” beginning chapter 15, “that officialdom gave us, that young men loyal to al Qaeda and bin Laden were responsible…is not the full story. The 9/11 Commission varnished the story for public consumption…”

Here, the author’s strip away the facade of “skeptics’ ramblings.”  They, again, cite David Corn, “Without conspiracy theories…there is much to wonder about September 11…”  Summers and Swan then patiently build the case that there was a support network in the United States for the hijackers and, ultimately that network extended to Saudi Arabia, to include members of the royal family.  “The Saudi factor is one of the wild cards….The possibility of Saudi involvement, a vital issue, will be a major focus in the closing chapters of this book.”

First, though, the authors take us through the hunt for bin Laden and a resultant “sea change” when by March 2002 the focus turned from that hunt to “a war plan for Iraq.”  And that led to a discussion of “The Plotters” in part IV.

The authors begin Part IV by recounting in precise detail a story told by others, the life of bin Laden and his father before him.  In that recounting they established a relationship between bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam, a lecturer and prayer leader at King Abdul Aiz University in Jeddah.  Azzam was a Palestinian who was “on his way to becoming the “Emir of Jihad.”  According to the authors, bin Laden met with Azzam in Los Angeles in 1979 during a visit not firmly established until 2009.

The year 1979 was critical.  It “marked the start of a new century in the Islamic calendar, a time said to herald change.”  And change there was.  Religious zealots seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca, a revolt that was crushed.  A month later Soviet troops poured into Afghanistan which began a secret war to “push back communism.”  According to the authors, the conflict was “orchestrated by the intelligence agencies of three nations: America, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.”  And that was when “the nightmare started,” quoting a friend of bin Laden.

Thereafter in their narrative, the authors establish a relationship between bin Laden and the GID (Saudi intelligence service), and a trilateral relationship among the CIA, the GID, and the ISI (Pakistani Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence), intertwined with the activities of the jihadist, Abdullah Azzam, bin Laden’s mentor.

Azzam, assassinated along with his sons in a murder with no known assailant or motive, had already passed the “vanguard” of leadership to bin Laden.  According to the authors, “Azzam had said jihad needed a “vanguard” that would give a dreamed-of future Islamic society a “strong foundation.””  That foundation was “al-qaeda al-sulbah” and its military base “al-qa’ida al’askariyya.” Al-qaeda was neither a foundation or a base.  The authors credit bin Laden as telling a journalist that “al Qaeda was an organization to record the names of the mujahideen and all their contact details: a database.”

After a detailing of the future cast of 9/11 characters–bin Laden, Mohammed Atef, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, et. al.–the authors move to the principle grievance, one “at least as large as Palestine,” the Saudi response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.  Oil was the issue and it brought the United States to the defense of Saudi Arabia and the introduction of “a foreign and overwhelmingly Christian army” to the “sacred land of the prophet.”  It was a “cultural thunderbolt” for bin Laden.

In the end it was not the United States that left Saudi Arabia, it was bin Laden.  His departure for Sudan left him “free to pursue jihad.  That, in the context of fighting for Islam, would be very much in line with Saudi foreign policy.”  The authors pose the question of “just who did launch bin Laden on his career as international terroist?”  Citing the Commission Report the answer is “he had gotten out of Saudi Arabia “with the help from a dissident member of the royal family.””

And that began the Sudan exodus, a “place and a time for training—and hatching plots.” Among the budding jihadists, according to the authors was an individual who said he was an “emissary from bin Laden,” Ramzi Yousef, who led the first attempt to bring down the World Trade Center in 1993.  Yousef was also responsible for a plot against the Pope and a plot against American airlines, bojinka.

The authors linked Yousef to his uncle, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who credits the Manila-based plot to down airliners as giving him the “idea of using planes as missiles.”  Mohammed is then linked with Ramsi Binalshibh and the authors relate a meeting between the two and an Arab television journalist, Yosri Fouda.  The important point made is that story told to Fouda “largely matches the version subsequent extracted from Mohammed by the CIA under interrogation.  The authors consider Fouda’s interview as “breakthrough” and take the Commission to task for “unaccountably” failing to interview him.  Important to the interview was the presence of a mystery man, Sheikh Abu Abdullah, a name used to refer to Osama bin Laden.

Concerning the plot and the plotters, the authors conclude that had al Qaeda been a company KSM would have been the CEO and bin Laden the Chairman.  But the plotters were not the perpetrators, a different story which the authors tell in Part V.

In Part V, “Perpetrators,” the authors build the case that bin Laden was, in the words of Michael Scheuer, the chief of the uniquely chartered “Alec Station,” “a truly, dangerous, dangerous, man.”  After the Embassy bombing in Africa the bin Laden threat was raised to the highest level, “Tier Zero.”  And it was soon thereafter that CIA Director George Tenet said “we are at war.”

Thereafter, the authors lead us through the development of the planes operation and the recruitment and formation of the individuals who would carry it out, the perpetrators.

While it is a familiar story, Summers and Swan uniquely tell it with the advantage of four years of research across multiple countries and languages, leaving few, if any leads not followed.  They interviewed two of the most knowledgeable investigators, Eleanor Hill, the staff Director of the Joint Inquiry and her primary investigator for the San Diego story, Michael Jacobson, who was also a member of the Commission staff.  They portray, as have others before them, a dysfunctional national level effort, one that transcended administrations.  Nevertheless, the attack did occur on President Bush’s watch and the new administration proceeded by fits and starts (and stops) as spelled out in detail by the authors.

The authors summed things up nicely near the end of Chapter 27.  Quoting Michael Hirsh and Michael Isikoff of Newsweek: “The question is…not so much what the President knew and when he knew it.  The question is whether the administration was really paying attention.”

As the tempo of hijacker activity picked up in late August and early September, the administration was just then getting started with a “long-delayed, very first meeting [of Principals] to discuss the bin Laden problem.”  Under consideration was a draft National Security Presidential Directive agreed upon well before by the Deputies.  There was considerable discussion about use of the Predator, who had the mission and, more importantly, who was going to pay for it.  There was no substantive resolution.  In the end, the Directive was approved, “it would be ready for the president’s signature—soon.”

In a short Part VI, “Twenty-Four Hours,” the authors take us through the final hours before the attack, detailing a series of facts that, retrospectively in the aggregate, are far more ominous than they were in real time.

Among the events were: the Moussaoui probe running “into the ground;” a last ditch attempt by Senator Feinstein to get the Vice President’s attention; the assassination of Ahmed Shad Massoud, which triggered a personal call to President Bush from President Putin; the leisurely search for Hazmi and Mihdhar; and, most seriously, late intercept of two critical messages by NSA that went untranslated.”  The gist was, “Tomorrow is zero hour,” and “The match begins tomorrow.”

The authors tied things together in a concluding Part VII, “Unanswered Questions.”  Recall that they earlier said that, “The Saudi factor is one of the wild cards….The possibility of Saudi involvement, a vital issue, will be a major focus in the closing chapters of this book.”  They did weave that theme in their subsequent narrative and returned to it in Part VII.

First, however, their summation of earlier chapters is worth a verbatim quote.

The story of September 11, 2001 — that of the victims and of the terrorists — is told. The identify of the perpetrators is not in doubt. As told in these pages, the essential elements are as described in the conclusions of the two official inquiries.

The authors define two areas in which the 9/11 Commission “fudged or dodged” the issue:  “the full truth about U.S. and Western intelligence before the attacks; and whether the terrorist operation…had the support of other nation-states or of powerful individuals within those nation-states.”  Here, “Western intelligence” refers primarily to Germany.

And it is on those points that the authors establish themselves as the pre-eminent 9/11 investigators.  Agree with them, or not, they are meticulous in their sourcing, fearless in their analysis, and precise in their prose.

I remain personally skeptical of the story that “U. S. intelligence officials had had a face-to-face meeting with Osama bin Laden [in Dubai] in early July 2001.” First, there is no accounting for the movement of a bin Laden entourage to and from Dubai other than that he “traveled secretly from Pakistan to Dubai…”  Second, to my knowledge, the staffs of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Joint Inquiry staff knew nothing about this event, even though the Inquiry had a team devoted to CIA with office space at CIA Headquarters.

Dubai aside, the authors speak briefly to Iran and Iraq as potential nation-state sponsors and then focus on their real candidate, Saudi Arabia.  Summers and Swan conclude Chapter 32 with this statement as a partial summation of their investigation: “In 2001, sympathy for al Qaeda and bin Laden was widespread across the spectrum of Saudi society.  It extended, even, to approval of the strikes on America.”  That is an unequivocal statement with no caveats.

The authors continued the Saudi thesis as they discuss the aftermath of the attacks.  There was a “struggle” by both the Saudis and the Bush administration to “keep the fabled U.S.-Saudi “friendship” from falling apart.”  Oil flowed, to the tune of nine million barrels over two weeks.  The President met with Prince Bandar.  Saudi nationals hastened to depart the county midstream of the FBI’s investigative work.  The Bush administration sought “rapprochement” not confrontation.  And, in 2002, Crown Prince Abdullah was the President’s guest in Texas.

There were five key Saudi individuals: Fahad al-Thumairy, an accredited diplomat; the San Diego resident Omar al-Bayoumi; on the money front, Osama Basnan; a Saudi religious official, Saleh al-Hussayen; and the American-born imam, Anwar Aulaqi.

The authors conclude: “Taken together the roles and activities [of the five]…heightened suspicion that the perpetrators of 9/11 had support and sponsorship from backers never clearly identified.”

Summers and Swan consulted extensively with Senator Bob Graham, a co-chair of the Joint Inquiry. In Graham’s opinion, “9/11 could not have occurred but for the existence of an infrastructure of support within the United States.  By ‘the Saudis,’ I mean the Saudi government….[and that] included the royal family.”

Central to the author’s thesis, apart from input from Senator Graham, is the 28-page redaction in the Joint Inquiry report.  I read the pages in the final draft report and my vague recall is that they had to do, in part, with the San Diego events.  I’m with Eleanor Hill on this one.  “Know what,” she told the authors, “I can’t tell you [this far removed] what’s in those pages.”

Summers and Swan report a bipartisan finding.  Both co-chairs of the Joint Inquiry, Senators Graham and Shelby, considered the pages withheld for reasons other than national security.  Graham was explicit, according to the authors.  “In Graham’s view, Bush’s role in suppressing important information…should have led to his impeachment and removal from office.”  The pages remain unreleased to this day, despite a President Obama  expression of willingness to Kristin Breitweiser to “get the suppressed material released.”

Bluntly, Summers and Swan concluded that “The 9/11 Commission Report blurred the truth about the Saudi role…[but also reported that Iraq] had nothing to do with 9/11.”  And because of Iraq, “the real evidence that linked other nations to Osama bin Laden and 9/11 faded from the public consciousness.”

After covering “Saudi Arabia’s murky role,” Summers and Swan turn their final attention to a nation “deserv[ing] equally close scrutiny,” Pakistan.  Not long into that narrative they tied everything together in the words of former U.S. special envoy Peter Tomsen.  According to the authors, “Tomsen told the 9/11 Commission that the Taliban “actually were the junior partners in an unholy alliance” —ISI, al Qaeda, and the Taliban.  As it grew in influence the ISI liaised closely with Saudi intelligence…”

Things in perspective

The authors, consistent with the state of other current research and writing about 9/11, do not place the event in the context of what else was happening in the world.  Terrorism, to include al Qaeda, was just one of multiple issues on the nation’s and the President’s plate.  They do provide a metric that allows some insight into the larger context.  On page 309, they wrote: “Every day, too, the President received a CIA briefing knows as the PDB—the President’s Daily Brief.  Between the inauguration and September 10, bin Laden was mentioned in forty PDBs.”

There were, therefore, some 234 PDBs.  In perspective, bin Laden was mentioned in one of every six or so PDB, approximately once a week.  Further, each PDB contained multiple articles.  Assuming a low figure of six articles per PDB, there were about 1400 articles, about three in one hundred mentioned bin Laden.  That small percentage is consistent with an analysis of the SEIB (Senior Executive Intelligence Brief) I did while a member of the Joint Inquiry.  The SEIB is a PDB-like document for a slightly larger audience, but one without law enforcement information.  I found that terrorism articles, whether or not they mentioned bin Laden, were a small percentage of the total SEIB articles.

So what was going on?  There were the continuing international situations, generally briefed daily, including the Middle East, Iran and Iraq separately, Central Europe and so forth.  There was the matter of a resurgent Russia that,  according to the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff intelligence briefings for the same period (which I also reviewed), was flexing a military muscle not seen for ten years or not seen since the fall of the former Soviet Union.  That flexing was a front burner issue on 9-11, the Russians had scheduled an air-launched cruise missile live-fire launch for the day and for which a NOTAM had been issued.  However, above all other issues the one that garnered the plurality of SEIB articles (and, by extension, PDB articles) was an emerging China.  Of specific importance, on April 1, 2001, the Chinese forced down an U.S. reconnaissance aircraft, a serious international event.

International events aside, there was also the domestic issue of transition.  While the authors wrote about bits and pieces of the transition from Clinton to Bush, they did not address the larger issue of transition time, in general.  Each inauguration year, spring and well beyond, brings with it a struggle between a new administration to get its team in place and the Senate to confirm the key members of that team.  2001 was no different, with an additional constraint.  Because of the contested election the whole nomination and confirmation process was delayed.  There is no evidence that bin Laden’s insistence that the date of the attack be moved up had to do with the transition, but it would have been helpful if the authors had addressed the subject in a larger context.

In military terms, bin Laden was operating within the decision cycle of his enemy, a fundamental advantage, one that virtually assures success.  When Mihdhar reentered the United States on Independence Day, July 4, 2001, the perpetrators swung into action.  Six days later the administration met to discuss things.  My recall is that one outcome was a request to put things in perspective for the President.  The answer to that request became the August 6 PDB, in my recollection.  Thereafter, the administration’s leisurely pace stands in stark contrast to the accelerated pace of the preparation for the attack.  It is that contrast and comparison, discussed implicitly in The Eleventh Day, that warrants separate treatment.

Depth of research

In my estimation, no one knows more about the day of 9/11 than Robbyn Swan and no one knows more about the body of information, pre-event, event, and post-event necessary to competently discuss 9/11 than Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan.

Here are just a few examples of the thoroughness of their meticulous work.

  • Obtained, prior to publication, a copy of Kevin Fenton’s contemporary book, Disconnecting the Dots
  • Filed multiple FOIA actions, to include a critical request for a mandatory declassification review. That action surfaced a Commission staff iteration of the Air Threat Conference transcript
  • Developed a close and continuing relationship with NARA staff to facilitate exploitation of Commission files
  • Sought out Erik Larson, the single public person most knowledgeable about the contents of the 9/11 Commission files as uploaded to the History Commons Scribd account, and obtained a searchable DVD that greatly facilitated exploitation of the Commission files
  • Sought and obtained responsive foreign language documents and interviewed comprable sources, if at all possible
  • Called on a vast number of sources cultivated over the decades of previous work
  • In March 2010, printed out every document in the archives of my website and added to that compilation over time

Chaos considered

As is the universal case, the authors use the word chaos, or quote others who do, without definition.  Chaos is a word whose meaning is simply understood without explanation.  My purpose here is to document for future reference their mention of the word.

On page 50, in the context of a discussion of the fate of UA 93, the authors wrote: “FAR BELOW, ALL WAS CHAOS [capitalized by the authors].  At the very moment that the attendant in 93’s cockpit had fallen ominously silent…Flight 77 had slammed into the Pentagon.  On his first day of duty in the post, FAA national operations manager, Ben Sliney and his senior colleagues had no way of knowing what new calamity might be imminent.”

On page 125 they cite a Commission analyst.  “The challenge in relating the history of one of the most chaotic days in our history…is to avoid replicating that chaos in writing about it.”

On page 128, in the context of the false report of AA 11 still airborne, the authors wrote, “The information was a red herring.  In the chaos of the moment, however, no one knew for certain that is was Flight 11…”

On page 268 they cite the writer Peggy Noonan.  “If someone does  the terrible big thing to New York or Washington, there will be a lot of chaos….The psychic blow—and that is what it will be to the people who absorb it, a blow, an insult that reorders and changes—will shift our perspective and priorities, dramatically, and for longer than a while….”

 

9-11: NEADS Mission Crew Commander; a valiant effort, ultimately futile, Part II

Introduction

This is the second in a series of articles describing the battle on the morning of September 11, 2001, from the perspective of the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), Mission Crew Commander (MCC) Major Kevin Nasypany.  The account is based on primary source information, the NEADS audio tapes.

In the first article we covered the first eighteen minutes of the counterattack, from the moment the phone rang at NEADS with a request for military support from the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Boston Center to the point that NEADS tacticians, Major Nasypany and Major Fox, the Senior Director (SD) had decided to place the just airborne Otis fighters in a holding pattern in a designated offshore military training area (Whiskey 105).

As we pick up the story Majors Fox and Nasypany are continuing on the basis that AA 11 might still be airborne.  As yet, they know nothing of the situations concerning UA 175 and AA 77, both known to FAA but not to the military.

Continue to hold

Major Nasypany continued conversations with both Colonel Marr in the Battle Cab and Major Fox, the SD.  Concurrently, and heard faintly in background, Colin Scoggins, Boston Center called the Identification (ID) Technicians and reported that Boston was pretty sure the AA 11 hit the World Trade Center.

During that time Nasypany mused, in jest, to either Fox or Marr, or both, “think we put the exercise on hold, what do you think?”  The time was just before 0858 EDT and the morning’s exercise activity had not yet begun. That is yet more evidence that NEADS clearly separated exercise and real world activity and that exercise Vigilant Guardian did not interfere with the military response to the hijackings.  Here is the audio clip.  0911121800 Continue to hold

Continuity of operations

As of 0900 EDT. NEADS had just one issue on its plate, guarding against AA 11 assuming it was not the aircraft that struck the World Trade Center north tower.  NEADS had committed 50% of its available assets and was now faced with the task of maintaining operations.  The Otis fighters had been vectored to a holding pattern south of New York City but could not remain there indefinitely without tanker support.

Major Nasypany in a brief to the Battle Cab concluded by pointing out they had a tanker, Maine 85 in Whiskey 105 that they could use.  That capability was coordinated with Giantkiller.  0911121800 We have Maine 85

Nasypany was listening in to the weapons controllers and remarked that it looked like Maine 85 was on his way home.  Concurrently, the controllers were discussing tanker operations in general and Sergeant Beluscio called McGuire to ask about KC 10 support.  During a series of two phone calls background voices can be heard discussing the situation, including the call signs for the Otis fighters.  A comment was made that they lost the hijacked airliner when the World Trade Center was struck.  Another comment indicated that the Battle Cab was following the tanker support situation and had asked how long Maine 85 would be available.

Toward the end of the second Beluscio phone call the MCC briefed the Battle Cab about a second hijack, real world, a United.  The time was 0904 EDT; United 175 had just struck the south tower.  0911121800 Second hijack a United real world

Nasypany, still listening to the Weapons Controllers, briefed the Battle Cab while Sergeant Beluscio was arranging for tanker support. Those concurrent events are heard intermingled in the next audio clip.  The net result of Beluscio’s work was guaranteed tanker support, already airborne, Team 23 and Team 24, two DC-10s, “heavyweights.”  0911121800 Battle Cab brief and tanker support

Thereafter, Nasypany directed Major Fox to “plug in’ and then told “Foxy” to work with FAA to get the fighters over Manhattan so that they would have some kind of play if this stuff continued.  Fox’s plug in is clearly distinguishable in this next clip and, briefly, radio comms are heard in the background, most likely the controller talking to the Otis fighters.  0911121800 Over Manhattan some kind of play

Langley, Battle Stations

Nasypany continued to brief the Battle Cab and advised that he was scrambling Langley.  He was immediately given countermanding guidance to put NEADS last remaining aid defense assets on battle stations only, which he did.  While NEADS continued to work the tanker support issue Sergeant Powell issuing the battle stations order for Quit 25 and 26. He documented the time as 0910.  0911121800 Langley Battle Stations Only

Three things were ongoing concurrently as heard on the next clip.  Fox attempted to contact New York Center, unsuccessfully.  Nasypany directed that he wanted the Otis fighters south of JFK and then gave orders to the trackers to cover Boston, Manhattan, and points in between, all the while keeping the Battle Cab informed.  Powell called Langley back to further coordinate and in the process was asked for the “words,” the mission.  All he could provide was “the hijacking going on.”  There was no target and therefore no intercept mission.  0911121800 Many voices no target

Tactical Plan Completed

By 0915 Nasypany’s tactical plan was complete, in consultation with the Battle Cab.  At that time NEADS had no targets, 50% of its air defense assets aloft in a holding pattern in Whiskey 105, and the other 50% on Battle Stations.  They were positioning tankers in support, Maine 85 in Whiskey 105 to support the Otis fighters and one KC 10 in Whiskey 107 to support the Langley fighters, if scrambled.  They were ready for any additional targets originating from Boston unaware that a new threat to the nation’s capital was approaching from the West.  0911121800 Tactical plan completed

Recapitulation

Retrospectively, a summation of what was going on, in real time, is in order.  The time was 0908 EDT.  Two planes had been identified to NEADS as hijacked, AA 11 and UA 175.  NEADS had sufficient information to know that Mode 3 3321 (United 175) impacted the World Trade Center.  NEADS understood that AA 11 may have also impacted but did not know that with clarity.

AA 77 had been hijacked, but that fact was not known to either of the two persons who were fighting the battle or their organizations; Ben Sliney at Herndon Center, the Operations Manager of the National Airspace System (NAS), and Colonel Bob Marr at NEADS, the defender of the NAS.  Nor was that fact known to the tactical officers for Marr, Major Nasypany the Mission Crew Commander and Major Fox, the Senior Director.

There is nothing that any higher echelon in the chain of command, all the way to the National Command Authority, could do.  No definitive action had yet been taken at FAA, the Pentagon, or the White House. Yes, there was an understanding that the nation was under attack, but none of the coordinating mechanism–FAA’s primary net, the NMCC’s Significant Event Conference–had been activated.

The battle would soon get more chaotic and Nasypany and Fox, with guidance from Marr would, together and separately from Ben Sliney and Herndon Center, fight the rest of battle.  Marr and Sliney never communicated; they did not know each other, had never met, and did not understand one to the other that for there to be any success at all the had to share critical information in real time.

Information concerning AA 77 was never forthcoming in a timely manner.  At the time Nasypany was directing Fox to get the Otis fighters over Manhattan Indianapolis Center was taking action to spread the word about a potential threat from the West.  Dutifully, the Center notified its next higher administrative headquarters, Great Lakes Region.  The critical information that AA 77 was lost was simply held at the Region while they tried to grapple with a situation they did not understand.

Concurrently, under the assumption that AA 77 had crashed, the Center notified the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) at Langley AFB.  At Langley, as at Great Lakes the information simply stopped.  The RCC had no obligation to report further, its job was to take action to initiate rescue operations, which it did.

Unbeknownst to everyone, and even though AA 77 as a primary target only was not detectable at the scope level at Indianapolis Center, AA 77 came into range of the Joint Surveillance System radars supporting NEADS.  By 0910 NEADS could have refocused their search to the West and, in my assessment, would have quickly picked up the track.

I make that assessment for three reasons.  First, there was far less clutter to deal with.  Second, the JSS search algorithms would have tracked fore and aft to correlate the unknown track to the known track of AA 77 before the transponder was turned off.  Third, by that time Sergeant Richmond had sufficient trackers at his beckon to dedicate one or more to the new threat.

In sum, the time frame 0909-0910 was the critical opportunity for Herdon Center and NEADS working together to scramble the Langley fighters Westerly.  Instead, NEADS operating suboptimally with Boston Center, prudently, in my estimation given the information available to them at the time, opted to place those fighters on battle stations only, as we shall soon hear.  Further, NEADS committed the Otis fighters away from the Whiskey 105 holding pattern and they were no longer available.

With that opportunity never recognized, Nasypany and Fox continued their tactical work simply unaware that the second prong of a two-pronged attack was developing.

Nasypany, continued

AT 0916 EDT Colin Scoggins, Boston Center called with an update and a tail number for UA 175.  Scoggins asked the ID Technicians what the NEADS plan was in there were any more deviating aircraft.  The Technicians referred Scoggins to Nasypany and he picked up on DRM1 Channel 4 to brief Scoggins.  To conclude the conversation Nasypany asked Scoggins, “if you get anything…give us a yell.”  The time was 0919 EDT.  0911125341 Scoggins Nasypany Conversation

Major Nasypany then updated the Battle Cab on the Scoggins call.  He also advised on the tactics he would use, if necessary against a large aircraft, “AIM 9’s in the face.”

During the update Nasypany learned and briefed the Battle Cab that the Otis Supervisor of Flying had recalled the six aircraft on a training mission for possible use.  Nasypany misinterpreted this to mean the planes were back on the ground and were ready.  According to the 84th RADES radar files the fighters were then in the process of returning.  0911125834 Scoggins call briefed to Battle Cab

The Situation

It was 0921 and Nasypany was asking for a cup a coffee.  The NEADS counterattack had been in progress for forty minutes.  During that time they had been informed of two hijacked aircraft, AA 11 and UA 175 and knew that two aircraft had flown into the World Trade Center.  They had no targets and were arranging for tanker support and additional assets, specifically backup from Otis for Panta 45 and 46.  Their last remaining air defense fighters at Langley had been placed on battle stations.  Nasypany had tightened the relationship with Boston Center, specifically Colin Scoggins.  NEADS knew nothing of the developing situation to the West concerning AA 77, but they were about to find out, not in the form of a new plane, but an old foe reborn, AA 11. 

To be continued

9-11: NORAD and FAA Timelines; in perspective

Note to readers.  I consider this to be version 1.0, subject to update and expansion

Preface

On October 23, 25, [edited Aug 25, 2011] 2001, at the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the role of the Defense Department in Homeland Security, the following exchange took place:

Senator Levin:  “General Eberhart, there’s been some confusion about the sequence of events on September 11 that maybe you can clear up for us…at 9:25, the FAA notified NORAD that flight 77 was headed toward Washington.  Was that the first notification – the 9:25 notification – that NORAD or the DOD (sic) had that flight 77 was probably being hijacked?…”

General Eberhart:  “Sir, there is one minor difference, I show it as 9:24 that we were notified, and that’s the first notification that we received.”

That NORAD Commander in Chief’s testimony to Congress by General Ralph Eberhart set in concrete a story that was simply wrong; a time that would influence events two years later when FAA Administrator Jane Garvey testified before the Commission.

My Perspective

I have consistently criticized NORAD for shoddy staff work and incomplete analysis in its attempts to provide an accurate timeline concerning events of 9-11. FAA fared no better in its attempts. Even worse, the two agencies did not reach agreement during the preparation for a White House meeting on September 17, 2001, and never resolved differences concerning notification to the military.

In a previous article I described the events that morning as a battle in a larger war against terror, an attack against the National Airspace System (NAS).  I identified the Battle Commanders as Benedict Sliney, the National Operations Manager of the NAS and Colonel Robert Marr, who commanded the defense of the northeast sector of the NAS.

I also identified the Battle Managers, the next higher echelon with direct involvement, as Jeff Griffith, an air traffic control manager at FAA Headquarters, and Major General Larry Arnold, NORAD’s CONUS Region (CONR) Commander and Colonel Marr’s immediate supervisor.  It was the Battle Managers, Griffith and Arnold, who were charged with working together to determine the facts.  In the immediate aftermath of 9-11, NORAD and FAA worked together and separately to determine the facts.  The following information comes from Commission Staff MFRs.

Darlene Freeman, then Director of Safety and Special Studies for the Deputy Administrator was tasked to put together the Administrator’s Briefing Book.  She recalled that Jeff Griffith was speaking with “some of the military people” to facilitate the project; he was tasked by Belger and Garvey to be the specific contact with the military in their efforts to develop an accurate timeline.  She was surprised at the release of the NORAD timeline and that they put it together so quickly without reviewing the document thoroughly with FAA, according to a Commission Staff interview with her.

Once the timeline was released, Monte Belger asked her to compare times in the document with times held by FAA.  Concerning the 0924 notification time for AA 77,  in FAA timelines the time was sourced back to a NEADS document not an FAA document.  That document was the MCC/T log.  Freeman stated she built her timeline off of the NORAD press release and did not have the benefit of the MCC/T log.  Commission staff represented to her that FAA did have the MCC/T log in possession and referred to it in a Sep 17 compilation.

On his part, Griffith recalled that “it was like pulling teeth” to get information after 9-11.  The FAA Centers weren’t cooperative.  Finally, they got it together to the point they could brief the FBI and the Secret Service.  Dick Clark was present at the meeting, as were DoD people.  Griffith characterized Freeman’s report as a topic of hot debate among FAA employees.  He knew people wee saying that FAA and military notification times were inconsistent. “Everyone was pointing fingers.”  Concerning General Arnold, Griffith said that “Larry and he” approached in pragmatically.  Although they had a lot of heated conversations, “Larry and I agreed we wanted the truth on the issue.”

Truth is not what they got.  General Arnold delegated some work to Brigadier General Douglas R. Moore, Director, Command, Control, Communications, and Computers, Headquarters, California Air National Guard, who he brought to CONR to assist.

NORAD staff errors undetected

In a Sep 16, 2001, email, sent near midnight (23:06 EDT) to the NEADS Battle Commander and NEADS Director of Operations, “Amplifying Data for 11 Sep,” Moore tasked NEADS for additional information commenting, “Thank your person [unidentified] who dug up the requested information from your logs and tapes.  I have passed it to the proper FAA office and they are very appreciative.  They are using this data to brief the White House tomorrow.  They request a little more amplification on a couple of the questions, and have a new one.  If someone can work these tonight, and e-mail answers here by 6AM, it would be greatly appreciated.”  Among the questions was this one:  “AA 77, 1324Z, Which FAA organization passes notification of “a possible track heading to DC’(sic)?”  (The email is DoD accession number NCTA000256547)

Moore’s question conflated two MCC/T Log entries.

  • 1324 American Airlines N334AA Hijacked
  • 1325 Hijack AA Flt headed to Wash D.C.

The request was answered by Colonel Clark Speicher “NEADS/DO Nights.”  Speicher was the NEADS Deputy Commander and was on shift as the night Director of Operations (DO).  Speicher responded:  “I have reviewed the crew MCC logbook and one of our MCC [Mission Crew Commander]’s and I reviewed the audio tapes to answer your questions.  The MCC log reveled [sic] the following:  1st question: AA 77, 1342Z (emphasis added):  Boston FAA says another A/c is missing AA77 flight to LA lost unable to contact.”

And that was the fatal error.  Speicher correctly identified the right log entry for notification concerning AA 77, but got the time wrong.  Not only did he transpose two digits, garbling the question, he provided the wrong time, entirely.  Here is the complete sequence of log entries that were misread.

  • 1324 American Airlines N334AA Hijacked
  • 1325 Hijack AA Flt headed to Wash D.C.
  • 1326 LFI scrambled on AA flt @1324Z
  • 1327 Boston FAA says another a/c is missing
  • 1334 American 77 Flt to LA lost/unable to locate

Those entries, properly parsed and reported, would have settled the matter and there would have been no Eberhart certainty about a time that was misleading.  For wont of a nail.  The accurate notification time, 1334, also figured into the Garvey testimony two years later.

Moore also asked two questions concerning UA 93, indicating that CONR and NEADS were aware that the first notification came after UA 93 crashed.  Even so, that exchange was garbled at both ends.  Moore asked: “United 93, 1408Z, Which center calls with information that UA 93, M3 1527 is heading for Cleveland?”  Separately, he asked, “United Flt 93, 1415Z, Who reported to NEADS that aircraft had crashed (new question)?”

Speicher responded: “2nd question: United 93, 1408Z: the log does not identify the center.”   “3RD question: United 93: The log does not identify the agency.

The actual log entry is “1407 [emphasis added] Bomb on Board UAL93 over Pittsburg 1527 M3 3951N 07846W.”

None of this specificity of knowledge survived to inform NORAD testimony before the Commission on May 23, 2003.

Moore asked a final question which reveals full awareness of the D 1989 issue.  “Delta 89, at 1341Z.  Did you receive a call of a possible highjack?  If so, from whom?”

Speicher responded: “4th question. Delta 89. 1341Z.  The log shows a call reflecting Delta 89 possible hijack Boston to Vegas.”  Speicher did not answer the “from whom” question because the log did not so state and he was unable to find it in the tapes.  “We spent six hours trying to retrieve data from the voice tapes…the system is complex..[and]…it is rather cumbersome as analyzing the data is difficult to say the least.”

Speicher also said, “we realize a comprehensive transcript will take days to ensure we accurately identify all voice recordings from all the tapes.  Nevertheless, NORAD made a rush to judgment.

NORAD preempts

NORAD, in true military fashion, took the high ground and published its timeline, unilaterally, on September 18, 2001, in a formal news release, “NORAD’s Response Times.” (Incorrect entries in red)

Response Times 
Hijacked Plane Notification Time
AA 11 0840
UA 175 0843
AA 77 0924
UA 93 N/A, Langley already airborne

Nearly a year later on August 12, 2002, FAA released a fact sheet, “Chronology of Events on September 11, 2001,” that included military notification times.

Added, July 31, 2011.  FAA did not, did not include a notification time for AA 77.  I have deleted that entry in the table.

Notification Times 
Hijacked Plane Notification Time
AA 11 0840
UA 175 0843
AA 77 0924
UA 93

FAA acquiesced , meekly in my opinion, to the NORAD position established months earlier on UA 175, but stood its ground on AA77 by making no entry in the chronology.  (Revised July 31, 2011) But it took them a while to reach that point and they, too, struggled with uncertain staff work and estimates.  I discussed, in detail, FAA’s preparation of a key document, the Administrator’s Briefing Book, in an article concerning AA 77.  FAA, specifically Dulles TRACON, was not aware that a fast-moving unknown (AA 77) was bearing down on the nation’s capital until shortly before Danielle O’Brien sounded the alarm at about 0932 EDT.  As discussed in the linked article, FAA controllers did, without comprehension, observe the target as early as, ironically, 0925 EDT.  That observation in no way resulted in a notification to the military as the NORAD timeline suggested.  It did not even become actionable within FAA.  O’Brien’s alarm did become actionable and that information was passed to NEADS, not by FAA Headquarters or Herndon Center but by, again, Boston Center, ZBW.

Both NORAD and FAA had information available to them that should have resulted in an accurate assessment for the White House on September 17, 2001, and for General Eberhart’s subsequent testimony to Congress.  Staffs at all levels in both agencies failed to get the story right.  Command at all levels in both agencies failed to vet the work of their staffs.

And that is how matters stood when the Commission began its work.  For over two years, the public had been misinformed, an egregious violation of the public trust by both agencies and responsible White House staff. Things not only did not get better, they got much worse.

May 22 and 23, 2003 Hearing

On the afternoon of the first day, Administrator Garvey answered a question about the notification time for AA 77 as follows: “I would like to submit that specific timeline for the record, with the first notification being at 9:34.”  She was then asked about that since the time did not square with General Eberhart’s testimony to Congress.  Garvey had been provided the accurate time by FAA staff but was not confident.  She had just previously stated: “The timeline that I have, that I remember, is one that had a notification of NORAD twice before the time [9:24] that you mention, so that there had been three notifications.”  The issue was not resolved and became more confused the next day.

On the morning of the second day Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta testified and this exchange took place when Commissioner Tim Roemer asked him: “…but you had not been in the room when the decision was made — to what you inferred was a decision made to attempt to shoot down Flight 77 before it crashed into the Pentagon. Is that correct?”

MR. MINETA: I didn’t know about the order to shoot down. I arrived at the PEOC at about 9:20 a.m. And the president was in Florida, and I believe he was on his way to Louisiana at that point when the conversation that went on between the vice president and the president and the staff that the president had with him.

MR. ROEMER: So when you arrived at 9:20, how much longer was it before you overheard the conversation between the young man and the vice president saying, “Does the order still stand?”

MR. MINETA: Probably about five or six minutes.

MR. ROEMER: So about 9:25 or 9:26.

And that erroneous recall by the Transportation Secretary set the stage for the NORAD briefing and testimony, which immediately followed his appearance.

NORAD, among other things, was tasked to explain the Otis and Langley scrambles. The Commission Staff review of the radar files revealed that neither scramble proceeded directly, despite anecdotal news accounts to the contrary. In the process of trying to explain things, the NORAD representatives compounded previous errors concerning notification times. Here is a summary of their testimony: (incorrect times in red)

Testimony 
Hijacked Plane Notification Time
AA 11 0840
UA 175
AA 77 0924
UA 93 0916

So, What Happened?

We do not know for sure, but based on my own experience supervising the staff of two command centers (Pacific Command Intelligence Watch and the National Military Intelligence Center) I have a pretty good idea. In a previous article, I used a Sudoku puzzle metaphor, explaining that an early wrong entry, undetected, makes a solution impossible. NORAD made four errors, twice, in determining what entries to make.

First, they failed in September 2001 and again in May 2003 to listen to and understand the events of the morning as recorded at NEADS. They had to listen to just two channels, DRM1, Channel 2, the Mission Crew Commander position and DRM 1, Channel 4, an ID Technician position.

Second, they failed on both occasions to accurately parse the single most important document of the day concerning military notifications, the Mission Crew Commander/Technician (MCC/T) log. As does a ship’s log, that log accounts for, chronologically, the important actions of any given day.

Third, they, together with FAA, failed on both occasions to reach an accurate and agreed upon position.

Fourth, they failed on both occasions to accurately define the list of hijacked planes, as reported to them by FAA, concerning notifications to the military.

As a result, in the first go-round, once they made what they thought was the correct and only entry for AA 11, 0840, then no other possibility was considered, and the next American Airline entry in the MCC/T log was, without parsing, assumed to be a reference to AA 77.

In the second go-round in preparation for the May 2003 testimony, once they decided there was no necessity to establish a notification time for UA 175, then the first United Airlines entry in the MCC/T log, 0916, was assumed, without parsing, to be a reference to UA 93.

This is a simple and logical explanation of what happened. It is consistent with my understanding of how staffs work and how after-action reviews are accomplished.

Had concerned NEADS, CONR, and NORAD staff listened to the MCC and ID Technician position tapes as a first, and mandatory, order of business, they would have, by necessity, come up with the following table as a starting point. (additional entries in blue)

Notification Times 
Hijacked Plane Time
AA 11
UA 175
AA 11
AA 77
D 1989
UA93

With that accurate baseline established, the recorded and logged events at NEADS easily fall into place. Times below are as they actually appear in the MCC/T log, consistent with the methodology that Colonel Scott stated he used when he briefed the Commission on May 23, 2003. (Click on the times for audio)

Notification Times 
Hijacked Plane Time
AA 11 0840
UA 175 0905; 0916
AA 11 0924
AA 77 0934
D 1989 0941
UA93 1007

Assessment

The single most important error was the failure at NEADS to acknowledge the notification that AA 11 was reborn and to understand that the 0924 MCC/T log entry, a tail number, was a specific reference to AA 11, as established on the NEADS tapes. That error was compounded the Colonel Speicher/General Moore failure to sort out the log entries pertaining to AA 77 notification.  The resulting incorrect determination was a notification time of 0924 for AA 77.  That time survived the NORAD vetting process and ended up as definitive in General Eberhart’s testimony, a fait accompli.

The NORAD timeline 0843 error concerning UA 175 is problematic. As one individual at NORAD explained to us in passing (not recorded), the fact was that the Otis fighters had already been scrambled and were airborne because of the original notification for AA 11. The 0843 time was omitted, correctly, during the May 23, 2003 testimony. NORAD, however, made another egregious error, a simple failure to parse the MCC/T log, and equate a 0916 time to UA 175. The resultant incorrect entry was a 0916 time for UA 93.

NORAD also failed to account for D 1989, the only plane they tracked that morning. Further, it was the only plane reported hijacked by NORAD to the National Command Authority via the Air Threat Conference Call. In the aftermath NORAD conflated D 1989 with UA 93 and concluded, erroneously, that it had been tracking and reporting on UA 93.

In sum, two incorrect entries on two different occasions made the puzzle twice unsolvable.

The failure to twice solve the puzzle falls squarely on the shoulders of the Commander and staff at NEADS and at CONR. The failure to confirm the work of subordinate staffs falls squarely on the leadership at NORAD.

Regrettably, an organization, NEADS, that performed well on the morning of September 11, 2001, given the failure by FAA to provide actionable target information, performed abysmally thereafter.

Chaos Theory considered

In my consideration of Chaos, I determined that we could use, metaphorically, the language of Chaos Theory to analyze the terrorist attack and the counterattack. Specifically, I discussed strange attractors, nonlinearity, cascading bifurcation, and disruptive feedback. That morning, the false reports that AA 11 was reborn and that D 1989 was hijacked were disruptive feedback. The feedback was so disruptive that it contaminated all subsequent NORAD and FAA fact-finding and analysis. The matter was left to the Commission to sort it out, which it did.